Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Pennsylvania

• Asbestos Insul. Co. v. Wcab (McGOVERN) (1983). Section 301(c)(2) is satisfied by competent medical testimony that the claimant was exposed to the hazard after June 30, 1973 and that the whole of his exposure caused the disability or death. A physician need not separate the causal contribution of exposure in different periods.
• Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1982). Under Pennsylvania law, which does not require mutuality of parties, a defendant that fully and fairly litigated an issue in an earlier case may be precluded from relitigating it. Prior verdicts that the losing party could not appeal do not support preclusion, and individual causation depends on too many variables to be precluded.
• Gill v. Pacor, Inc. (1982). A supplier's duty to warn the ultimate user of an asbestos product cannot be avoided by pointing to the employer's failure to provide a safe workplace. An employer's conduct is not a superseding cause unless it was so extraordinary that it could not reasonably have been foreseen.
• Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd. (1982). Suppliers of raw asbestos fiber owe a non-delegable duty to warn the plant workers who use it, even where the employer knows the hazard. An employer's deliberate failure to warn former workers, after being urged to do so, can be an intentional tort outside workers' compensation exclusivity. Punitive damages may be awarded to successive plaintiffs for outrageous conduct toward each.
• Utter et al. v. Asten-Hill Mfg. Co. (1973). Death from lung cancer is not death caused by asbestosis under the specific asbestosis provision. Under the catch-all section 108(n), cancer can be an occupational disease, even though it occurs in the general public, if competent evidence shows it is peculiar to the claimant's occupation by its causes and the characteristics of its manifestation.
• Bambrick v. Asten Hill Mfg. Co. et al. (1972). Under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, compensation is payable only for disability or death caused by asbestosis, not by asbestos exposure generally. Expert testimony that death was due to lung cancer related to asbestos exposure therefore did not support an award.

Rhode Island

• Day v. 3M Company Inc. (2024). Expert opinion based on the 'each and every exposure' theory is scientifically valid and admissible under Rule 702, and the 'frequency, regularity, and proximity' showing goes to a defendant's ultimate liability rather than to admissibility. An expert may not give an opinion that lacks a factual basis, but may rely on record evidence that supports it.
• Day v. 3M Company Inc. (2024). Rhode Island's frequency, regularity and proximity test governs asbestos causation, and it is applied less strictly in mesothelioma cases. Removing an electrical panel is not a 'subsequent alteration or modification' of the product under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-32.
• Lowe v. 3M Company (2024). In asbestos cases Rhode Island applies a flexible 'frequency, regularity, proximity' test for product identification and exposure, and a decedent's own testimony together with circumstantial evidence such as supplier receipts can create a fact question on whether the defendant supplied the product.
• Burdick v. NIBCO (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). To establish liability in an asbestos action, a plaintiff must identify the responsible defendant and show exposure. Summary judgment is improper where competent evidence on both sides allows more than one reasonable inference about exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product.
• Wallace v. Trane Company (2021). Under Maine law, an asbestos plaintiff must show product nexus, meaning exposure to asbestos that originated with the defendant's own product, before medical causation is reached. Evidence of third-party sealants or replacement materials used on a defendant's boilers does not establish that nexus.
• Nichols v. Allis Chalmers Product Liability Trust (2018). Under Rhode Island's ad hoc duty analysis, an employer owes a duty to a member of an employee's household who is exposed to asbestos dust on the employee's work clothes, where the harm was foreseeable. At summary judgment, the frequency, regularity, proximity test is met by evidence of regular exposure and an expert opinion on cumulative exposure.
• Belac v. Evenheat Kiln (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). A plaintiff can show product identification and causal connection at summary judgment by evidence of a specific period of exposure and the proximity and frequency of exposure, and the sham affidavit doctrine bars only an affidavit that contradicts the affiant's own prior deposition testimony.
• McCarthy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). A decedent's sworn statement made in good faith, on personal knowledge, before the action began is admissible under R.I. R. Evid. 804(c) and may be considered on summary judgment. Product identification is judged case by case using factors such as dates, proximity and frequency of contact, and is sufficient here to leave exposure and causation for the jury.
• Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2017). Under Rhode Island Rule 702, an expert need not hold a particular title or specialty license if his knowledge, skill, experience, training or education can help the fact-finder; a board-certified pathologist with asbestos-disease research and experience may testify on causation of mesothelioma.
• Baumgartner v. American Standard, Inc. (2015). Under Rhode Island's interest-weighing choice-of-law approach, Ohio law governed an Ohio resident's claim over Ohio-centered exposures. Under Ohio law, a bare-metal valve maker is not liable absent proof it supplied or specified asbestos, and boilers and turbines installed as improvements to real property fall under the ten-year statute of repose.
• Hostetter v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). Under Rhode Island law, circumstantial product identification must show it is reasonably probable, not merely possible, that the defendant was the source of the product. Evidence that the defendant was one of several brake suppliers for the trucks does not meet that standard, and the resulting chain of inferences cannot support causation.
• Reera v. AO Smith Corp. (2014). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment in a premises liability asbestos case must produce competent, admissible evidence that asbestos was present and that the plaintiff was exposed to it. A witness's later-acquired belief that insulation contained asbestos, and a promise of expert testimony at trial, do not meet that burden.
• Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2013). In Rhode Island asbestos cases, causation is judged under the "frequency, regularity, proximity" test. "Each and every exposure" evidence may be presented to show the danger of asbestos but is legally insufficient to prove substantial-factor causation without a showing of frequency, regularity and proximity.
• Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2013). A valve maker can face strict liability, failure-to-warn and implied warranty claims where evidence shows it designed valves with asbestos packing and gaskets, knew they would be replaced with similar products, and sold such replacements. A civil conspiracy claim requires a valid underlying intentional tort, here intentional misrepresentation with reliance, which was not shown.
• Brandt v. AW Chesterton Company (2011). A sworn exposure chart of a dying plaintiff is admissible as a dying declaration, and showing work with or near a defendant's asbestos products is enough to reach a jury on product identification at summary judgment.
• Cone v. Agco Corp. (2011). A company that buys another's assets may be liable as a mere continuation of the seller, a highly fact-dependent question that precluded summary judgment here. Whether a product contained asbestos, and proximate cause, are ordinarily jury questions.
• Benoit v. AW Smith Corporation (2009). In asbestos cases a plaintiff can show product identification at summary judgment by evidence that he worked with or in close proximity to the defendant's products; whether a product contains asbestos is for the jury, and summary judgment may be denied as premature where discovery responses are incomplete.
• Hicks v. Biltrite (2007). Summary judgment is premature while discovery is ongoing, and a plaintiff's deposition testimony about the product used creates a genuine issue of fact on product identification and causation; the court may not weigh credibility on summary judgment.
• LaPOINTE v. 3M Company (2007). Installing burners is an improvement to real property under the Rhode Island statute of repose, but servicing, repairing and maintaining them is not, so claims based on repair exposure are not repose-barred. Whether the burners contained asbestos and whether a duty to warn existed are jury questions.

South Carolina

• Edwards v. Scapa Waycross, Inc. (2024). South Carolina continues to apply the Lohrmann 'frequency, regularity, and proximity' substantial factor test for asbestos causation. A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's specific product on a regular basis over an extended period, in proximity to where the plaintiff worked.
• Glenn v. 3M Co. (2023). Expert testimony on cumulative dose is admissible as background medical science, and causation against a defendant is shown by exposure to its product regularly, over an extended period, near where the plaintiff worked. A nonsettling defendant is entitled to a setoff for good-faith settlements for the same injury, so the trial court must review the settlement documents and cannot simply deny a setoff on a claim the plaintiff also released.
• Edwards v. Scapa Waycross, Inc. (2022). Testimony that cumulative asbestos dose raises disease risk is not an 'each and every exposure' theory, and regular handling of asbestos-containing dryer felts supported a jury finding of substantial-factor causation. A nonsettling defendant gets setoff credit but cannot force reallocation of a plaintiff's settlement proceeds, and trust claims are offers to compromise excluded by Rule 408, SCRE.
• Jolly v. General Elec. Co. (2021). Under South Carolina's frequency, regularity and proximity test, regular close-range exposure to a defendant's asbestos gaskets supports a jury finding of substantial-factor causation. Expert testimony that exposures add to cumulative dose is not the unreliable 'each and every exposure' theory. A supplier asserting the sophisticated intermediary defense must show it actually relied on the intermediary to warn.
• Robertson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2021). Under the Lohrmann 'frequency, regularity, and proximity' test, applied the same way under South Carolina and North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product on a regular basis over an extended period. Testimony that could not say how often or how much of the work involved the defendant's product did not meet that standard.
• Robertson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2020). Under the Lohrmann "frequency, regularity, and proximity" test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure over an extended period to a specific defendant's asbestos-containing product near where the plaintiff worked. Speculative co-worker testimony and documents that do not place the plaintiff near that product are not enough.
• Chesher v. 3M Company (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Without specific causation expert testimony, the plaintiff must present evidence of the amount and duration of asbestos dust exposure, and general allegations of periodic exposure over many years are not enough.
• Chesher v. 3M Company (2017). Under maritime law, an equipment manufacturer can owe a duty to warn about asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not supply if it actually incorporated asbestos components into its original product and either specified asbestos replacements or they were essential to the product's proper functioning (the Quirin approach).
• Haskins v. 3M Company (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury, assessed defendant by defendant. An expert opinion that any exposure contributing to cumulative dose is causative, without defendant-specific analysis, is inconsistent with that standard and excludable under Rule 403.
• Dandridge v. Crane Co. (2016). Under maritime law, a valve manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in gaskets it did not make or supply. Even if the Quirin exception applies, it must be read narrowly and requires that the manufacturer actually incorporated asbestos-containing parts into its product, making exposure inevitable.
• Sparkman v. AW Chesterton Company (2014). Under South Carolina law, a plaintiff must show exposure to a specific defendant's asbestos product with frequency, regularity and proximity (the Lohrmann test), including for mesothelioma claims, and the mere presence of static asbestos is not exposure.
• Sparkman v. AW Chesterton Company (2014). Under South Carolina law, which applies the frequency, regularity and proximity test from Lohrmann, including in mesothelioma cases, a plaintiff must show regular, proximate exposure to the defendant's asbestos product. Coworker testimony combined with the defendant's own purchase and shipping records can create a jury question on that showing.
• Sparkman v. AW Chesterton Company (2014). Applying South Carolina law, the frequency, regularity and proximity test governs causation in mesothelioma cases. The court predicted the South Carolina Supreme Court would adopt the bare metal defense, so a manufacturer has no duty to warn about parts of its product that it did not make or supply.
• Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2007). Under the Door Closing Statute, a nonresident plaintiff must show the foreign corporation's asbestos exposure of the victim occurred in South Carolina, and exposure is actionable only if it meets the "frequency, regularity, and proximity" test; mere presence near static asbestos is not exposure.

Tennessee

• Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc. (2019). Daily removal and reinstallation of insulation at an industrial plant is repair or replacement, not construction of an improvement to real property, so the construction repose statute does not apply. Under Tennessee's Satterfield duty analysis, equipment makers can owe a duty to warn about asbestos parts added to their equipment after sale, and Tennessee does not follow the bare-metal defense.
• Payne v. CSX Transportation, Inc. (2015). In a FELA case a jury verdict of negligence per se stands unless the evidentiary and instructional errors were substantial, and FELA bars reducing damages for the employee's contributory negligence where the railroad violated a safety regulation. Experts need not have specific dose information to testify on causation, particularly where the railroad never monitored exposure, and a differential diagnosis is a reliable method.
• Russell v. Illinois Central Railroad Company (2015). Expert causation opinions based on differential diagnosis and a qualitative assessment of workplace exposure can be reliable and admissible even when the dose of the exposure was not quantified. Under 45 U.S.C. § 55 and the railroad health and welfare agreement, a railroad may set off medical benefits the plan paid, even though the employee paid part of the premium.
• Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc. (2011). A non-manufacturing seller may be sued in strict liability under Tenn. Code Ann. 29-28-106(b) when the manufacturers cannot be served because of bankruptcy stays or channeling injunctions. The learned intermediary doctrine does not apply to an employee's claim over asbestos products bought by his employer, and the employee, not the employer, is the consumer who must be warned.
• Lynch v. CF Industries, Inc. (2004). A party claiming workers' compensation death benefits must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, usually through expert medical testimony, that the death was due to a compensable injury or occupational disease; a trial court may credit one expert over another.
• Denton v. Southern Ry. Co. (Eastern Section, 1993). Under FELA, the employee's causation burden is slight and other causes do not reduce recovery against a negligent employer, and a plaintiff with asbestosis may present evidence of reasonable fear of cancer and future cancer-monitoring costs, with federal law governing the measure of damages.

Texas

• Burford v. Howmet Aerospace, Inc. (14th District, 2024). Where a defendant was the source of all the asbestos a plaintiff was exposed to and reliable expert testimony shows asbestos exposure is the only possible cause of asbestosis, that is direct, scientifically reliable proof of substantial-factor causation. The plaintiff need not show the exposure more than doubled the risk.
• LaFRENTZ v. Lockheed Martin Corporation (2021). A party has no preexisting duty to preserve tissue or perform an autopsy until a Rule 35 request is shown to be justified by good cause and ordered by the court, so an adverse inference requires bad faith, which was not shown. The court may still give a lesser curative instruction when counsel ignored a preservation request.
• Neely EX rel. Estate OF Goehring v. Union Carbide Corporation (14th District, 2021). Under Flores and Bostic, a plaintiff must offer reliable, defendant-specific evidence of dose, supported by epidemiology showing the exposure more than doubled the risk, to prove asbestos causation. An expert affidavit with unexplained calculations and studies not shown to match the plaintiff's exposure is unreliable and counts as no evidence.
• Petrie v. Novelis Corporation (2021). Under California law, a plaintiff need not show a quantified, defendant-specific dose that doubles the risk of mesothelioma, so the defendant had not met its summary judgment burden on causation. Claims the plaintiffs did not defend in response to the motion were recommended for dismissal.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Torres (13th District, 2019). A premises owner is liable to a contractor's employee under Chapter 95 when it controlled the manner of the work and had actual knowledge of the danger. A plaintiff suing a product maker in a multiple-exposure asbestos case must present reliable epidemiological or similar scientific proof that the defendant's product more than doubled the risk of disease.