Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Texas

• Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v. Rogers (5th District, 2017). Gross negligence can rest on an employer's awareness that low-level asbestos exposure can cause mesothelioma, without knowledge of the particular dose. Under the Texas exemplary damages cap, pecuniary loss findings count as economic damages only to the extent evidence shows actual monetary loss.
• In re EI DU Pont DE Nemours and Company (9th District, 2015). A trial court may set aside a jury's "no" finding as against the great weight of the evidence only if the record supports its stated reasons. An appellate court can check those reasons in mandamus, and conflicting evidence on a disputed issue does not justify overturning the verdict.
• Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (2014). The Flores substantial-factor causation standard applies to mesothelioma cases, so proof of 'any exposure' is not enough and the plaintiff must offer some quantification of dose from the defendant's product. Strict but-for causation is not required in multiple-exposure cases. Without direct proof, the plaintiff must show through reliable expert testimony that exposure to the defendant's product more than doubled the risk of disease.
• Hearn v. Snapka (13th District, 2012). A party who offers expert evidence bears the burden of proving it reliable once the other side objects, and a trial court may strike it if that burden is not met. When a summary judgment order does not state its grounds, the appellant must challenge every ground, and an unchallenged ground requires affirmance.
• Georgia-Pacific Corporation v. Bostic (5th District, 2010). A plaintiff in an asbestos case must prove that the defendant's product was a substantial factor and cause-in-fact of the disease, including frequent, regular and proximate exposure and quantitative evidence that the exposure increased the risk of disease. Expert testimony that each and every exposure to asbestos contributes to mesothelioma does not meet that standard.
• Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc. (2nd District, 2010). A plaintiff claiming mesothelioma from an asbestos-containing product must meet Borg-Warner's substantial factor test, including evidence of an aggregate dose from the defendant's product and a minimum threshold dose above which mesothelioma risk increases; this applies to chrysotile-only products.
• In re Global Sante FE Corporation (2008). The Jones Act does not preempt Chapter 90's expert-report requirements or its MDL pretrial consolidation, which are procedural and general in nature, but it does preempt the minimal-impairment requirement for silicosis claims and any higher causation standard than the federal one.
• Borg-Warner Corporation v. Flores (2007). A plaintiff claiming asbestosis from a defendant's product must show that the product was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Proof of frequency, regularity and proximity is necessary but not sufficient without defendant-specific evidence of the approximate dose of fibers and that the dose was sufficient to cause the disease.
• Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens (2007). Under Borg-Warner v. Flores, a plaintiff proves substantial-factor causation in an asbestos case only by showing frequent, regular, proximate exposure to the defendant's product plus reasonable quantitative evidence that the exposure increased his risk of disease. Testimony that any exposure contributes to mesothelioma is not enough.
• Georgia-Pacific Corporation v. Stephens (1st District, 2007). Under Borg-Warner v. Flores, a plaintiff proves substantial-factor causation in an asbestos case only with evidence of frequent, regular, proximate exposure to the defendant's product plus reasonable quantitative evidence that the exposure increased the risk of disease. Expert testimony that any exposure to asbestos contributes to causing mesothelioma is not enough.
• Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey (9th District, 2006). Under Havner and Robinson, expert testimony that is not scientifically reliable is no evidence. A plaintiff in a toxic tort case must offer reliable evidence of specific causation and must exclude other plausible causes, such as heavy smoking, with reasonable certainty.
• Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores (13th District, 2004). In an asbestos case, a plaintiff meets the burden on causation with evidence that the defendant supplied any of the asbestos to which he was exposed; the court did not read prior precedent to require separate proof that the product emitted respirable fibers. A manufacturer of asbestos products is held to the knowledge of an expert, which supports a finding of malice.
• In re Roc (4th District, 2004). To survive a no-evidence summary judgment, plaintiffs had to show with reliable evidence that they were exposed to an injurious form of asbestos or silica from the defendants' products and that they were reliably diagnosed. Expert diagnoses that assumed exposure and did not rule out other causes were unreliable and could be excluded.
• Vaughn v. Ford Motor Co. (11th District, 2002). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to each particular defendant's asbestos product (the Thacker test); without such evidence, directed verdicts for each brake manufacturer are proper, and an erroneous expert exclusion is harmless if the experts' testimony would not bear on that gap.
• North American Refractory Co. v. Easter (13th District, 1999). Third-party eyewitness testimony that a worker was present when a defendant's asbestos products were used is enough evidence of exposure and causation, and the court did not adopt the Lohrmann frequency-regularity-proximity test. Asbestos claims may be consolidated under the Ethyl factors, and the punitive award met the BMW v. Gore due process guideposts.
• Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Sitz (11th District, 1998). Offensive collateral estoppel should not be applied where it would be unfair to the defendant. A prior asbestos verdict does not establish that the defendant's product was defective or unreasonably dangerous at all relevant times.
• Click v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (1995). In an asbestos case, a plaintiff can survive a directed verdict with circumstantial evidence that the worker frequently and regularly worked in proximity to the defendant's products so that he likely inhaled its fibers. Direct proof that the worker handled the defendant's product is not required.
• Keene Corp. v. Rogers (6th District, 1993). A judge need not be recused merely because his son-in-law, a salaried associate, joined the firm trying the case before him when there is no showing that the relative worked on the case or was substantially affected by its outcome. Erroneously admitted evidence that is merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence is harmless.
• Celotex Corp. v. Tate (13th District, 1990). Where several suppliers' raw asbestos combined to cause a worker's mesothelioma, a defendant shown to have supplied some of it cannot escape liability because other suppliers' asbestos also contributed, and the defendant bears the burden of apportionment. A successor-liability defense is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded, and Texas punitive awards that combine several purposes cannot be reviewed for cumulative-award due process claims absent separate findings.
• Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1990). In an asbestos case under Texas law, prejudgment interest runs from six months after the plaintiff's last asbestos exposure. Damages for a large class may be set by averaging jury verdicts from a statistically representative random sample without violating due process.
• Gaulding v. Celotex Corp. (1989). A plaintiff must prove the defendant supplied the product that caused the injury. On these facts (unidentified asbestos board bought at a salvage yard), alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability and market share liability did not apply, and neither joint and several liability nor res ipsa loquitur relieved that burden.
• Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1980). Under federal law, offensive collateral estoppel based on Borel could bar defendants from relitigating whether asbestos-containing products are defective and unreasonably dangerous and whether asbestos dust can cause mesothelioma and asbestosis. State-of-the-art evidence is irrelevant in a strict liability action.

Utah

• Riegler v. Carlisle Companies, Incorporated (2023). Under Rule 702, a medical expert's specific causation opinion is inadmissible when it rests on an unsupported assumption that exposures to each defendant's products were equal and the expert does not show how he applied his methods. Without expert causation testimony, which Utah law generally requires in such cases, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
• Hipwell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2022). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-associated product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a boiler maker may owe a duty to warn under DeVries if it directed that asbestos be incorporated. The court treated the substantiality of exposure, the duty to warn, the government contractor defense and warning causation as disputed fact questions, with Utah's heeding presumption applying to the causation question.
• Sylvester v. Blue Bird Corporation (2022). A plaintiff in an asbestos case must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Generic evidence that a defendant sold some asbestos products, without evidence the decedent likely encountered them, is too speculative to defeat summary judgment. Evidence not disclosed under Rule 26 may be excluded under Rule 37(c)(1).
• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2014). An expert's opinion that each of the plaintiff's described exposures was individually substantial, based on his testimony about specific products combined with scientific data on fiber release and dose, is not an inadmissible 'every exposure' opinion. Weaknesses in its underpinnings go to weight, not admissibility.
• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2013). A replacement causation expert may be allowed after the original expert's death, but testimony on the 'every exposure' theory of causation is barred because the district judge ruled it does not meet Rule 702 and Daubert.
• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2013). Expert testimony that every asbestos exposure above background contributes to mesothelioma is inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert when the experts lack data on the dose needed to cause disease and on the plaintiff's exposure to the defendants' products.
• Riggs v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2013). A tort claim for asbestos disease accrues when the disease is diagnosed, not at exposure, so the law in force at diagnosis governs. A raw-material supplier can obtain JNOV under the bulk supplier rule only if the evidence shows as a matter of law that it met its duty to warn.
• Smith v. Ford Motor Company (2013). An expert's "every exposure" opinion, that each and every asbestos exposure contributes to mesothelioma, lacks sufficient facts, data and reliable science to be admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert, and would also be excluded under Rule 403.
• Luckau v. Board of Review (1992). Under the 1988 Last Injurious Exposure Rule, an employer is liable if the employee was exposed to substances that did or could have contributed to the disease in an amount sufficient to cause or contribute to it to any degree; the statute does not require a substantial dose or lengthy duration.
• Tisco Intermountain v. Industrial Com'n of Utah (1987). Under the last-injurious-exposure rule, an award against an employer must rest on competent evidence of exposure during employment with that employer. An unsworn offer of proof is hearsay and cannot support the award, and liberal construction of the statute cannot fill the gap.

Virginia

• Gehant v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2022). Under Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a manufacturer's duty to warn depends on whether its product required incorporation of an asbestos-containing part, not merely heat insulation generally. Disputed facts on each DeVries prong, on the Boyle/Sawyer government contractor test, and on substantial-factor causation preclude summary judgment.
• Goodrich v. John Crane, Inc. (2018). A defense expert's opinion must rest on sufficient facts and data under Rule 702, and the defendant, as proponent, bears that burden. Studies quantifying relative asbestos fiber potency were excluded as unreliable, while converting fiber-release test results to time-weighted averages was allowed.
• Goodrich v. John Crane, Inc. (2018). A manufacturer cannot offer evidence of the Navy's knowledge or negligence as a superseding cause, because the Navy's failure to protect workers from asbestos was foreseeable. Evidence of the Navy's knowledge also is not state-of-the-art evidence, because it shows the hazards were known to experts and so supports a duty to warn.
• Wilson v. AC&S, Inc. (2015). Whether under maritime law (exposure to the product as a substantial factor) or Virginia law (exposure more likely than not sufficient to cause the illness), a plaintiff needs evidence that the defendant's product released enough asbestos fibers to cause the disease. A belief that a part looked like asbestos, plus visible dust, did not supply that evidence.
• Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Minton (2013). Under the LHWCA's 1972 amendments, a shipowner's duty to intervene turns partly on whether it could rely on the shipyard, so evidence of the shipyard's knowledge and safety programs is relevant. Section 905(b) makes the negligence action against the vessel exclusive, which bars punitive damages.
• Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer (2013). In Virginia mesothelioma cases involving multiple exposures, causation is judged by whether the defendant's exposure was more likely than not sufficient by itself to cause the disease (concurring or multiple sufficient causes), not by a "substantial contributing factor" instruction. A jury may infer from the evidence that an injured person would have heeded an adequate warning.
• National College OF Business and Technology, Inc. v. Davenport (2011). A safety citation needs only proof that employee access to the asbestos hazard was reasonably predictable, not actual exposure. A "serious" violation requires evidence tying the level or frequency of exposure to a substantial risk of death or serious harm, and showing only that asbestos is a carcinogen is not enough.
• Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson (1992). A manufacturer has a duty to warn only if it knows or has reason to know its product is dangerous. Circumstantial evidence can prove exposure to a particular manufacturer's product. Evidence of conscious concealment of a known hazard can support punitive damages. The attorney-client privilege does not cover a memorandum that reveals a fraud on a court.
• Caudle-Hyatt, Inc. v. Mixon (1979). The conclusive presumption of total dependency under Code § 65.1-66 arises once actual dependency, even if only partial, is shown. Under Code § 65.1-52, an exposure is injurious if reasonably calculated to bring on the disease, which can be shown by actual causation or by exposure of a duration and intensity that generally causes the disease.

Washington

• Perkins v. United States (2024). Under the FTCA and Washington law, a plaintiff must show by non-speculative evidence that the decedent was exposed to a substantial dose of asbestos resulting from negligent violation of a mandatory and specific directive, and that this exposure was a substantial factor in her disease. An expert opinion that every exposure above background counts toward a cumulative dose is unreliable.
• Perkins v. United States (2024). The discretionary function exception does not apply where a mandatory and specific directive prescribes a course of action, and factual disputes over whether Navy asbestos directives were mandatory and followed preclude dismissal. Under Washington law, duty turns on foreseeability of a general field of danger, and disputed expert evidence on substantial-factor causation precludes summary judgment.
• Perkins v. United States (2024). Under Rule 702 the court acts as gatekeeper and tests the soundness of an expert's methodology, not the correctness of conclusions; the government's objections to assumptions and exposure assessment went to weight rather than admissibility.
• Sorrentino v. Ammco Tools, Inc. (1st Division, 2024). In a pre-WPLA failure-to-warn claim, a jury may infer a plaintiff would have heeded an asbestos warning from evidence he read manufacturer materials and would have heeded intermediary warnings. The substantial factor causation test applies in asbestos cases where it is hard to identify the exact source of harm, and personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer was proper given its importer agreement requiring marketing in Washington.
• Deem v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2023). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos and that it was a substantial contributing factor, which requires substantial exposure for a substantial period when direct evidence is absent. The presence of a defendant's product at a shipyard is not enough.
• Holdsworth v. Scapa Waycross, Inc. (1st Division, 2023). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may prove exposure to a defendant's product through circumstantial evidence, and expert testimony that all asbestos exposure cumulatively contributes to the disease, together with that exposure, supports a reasonable inference that the product was a substantial factor. A judge's curative instruction to disregard one statement in closing argument did not require reversal, because any error was cured by the written instructions.
• Welch v. Crane Co. (2023). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos-containing materials from the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury. The mere presence of a defendant's products on the ship is not enough. A manufacturer's duty to warn is assessed under the DeVries three-part test.
• Budd v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. (1st Division, 2022). Washington courts apply a more lenient standard of proof to product identification in asbestos cases, given the long latency period. In a failure-to-warn case, evidence that the plaintiff would have heeded a warning can establish cause in fact.
• Hickson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (1st Division, 2022). To survive summary judgment, an asbestos plaintiff must show a genuine issue of fact on exposure to asbestos and on causation under the Lockwood factors; potential exposure and an expert's conditional hypothetical opinion, without evidence of actual exposure, require speculation and are not enough.