Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Washington

• Roemmich v. 3M Company (1st Division, 2022). Where a plaintiff's mesothelioma results from cumulative asbestos exposure from multiple sources, the substantial factor test governs proximate cause and a combined but-for and substantial factor instruction is error. A superseding cause instruction is unsupported when the intervening employer negligence was foreseeable and no evidence showed the employer had specific knowledge of the defect.
• Strong v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2022). Where the parties dispute material facts about the decedent's exposure to other forms of asbestos that may have caused the disease, summary judgment cannot be granted, and evidence of alternative causation is admissible.
• Behrmann v. Abb, Inc. (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show with evidence of the amount or duration of exposure that a defendant's asbestos product was a substantial factor in causing the disease; general evidence of possible exposure is not enough. A failure to warn claim fails when causation cannot be shown.
• Behrmann v. Abb, Inc. (2021). Maritime law applies to asbestos exposure on ships in drydock when the locality and connection tests are met, and under it a plaintiff must show substantial exposure to the defendant's asbestos for a substantial period. A court may defer summary judgment under Rule 56(d) when the nonmovant identifies specific facts it expects discovery to produce.
• Jack v. Dco, LLC (2021). Under Washington law, a take-home exposure claim fails without evidence of asbestos on the premises and without evidence that the risk to a worker's family was foreseeable at the relevant time. A post-sale failure-to-warn claim fails without specific evidence that an adequate warning would have led the plaintiff to avoid injury.
• Varney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (2021). A declaration offered as a dying declaration was properly excluded where the evidence did not show the declarant had personal knowledge of its contents; the district court's factual findings were reviewed for clear error and its evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2021). Maritime law governed, and under it plaintiffs must show substantial exposure to asbestos from the defendant's own products, including the amount and duration of exposure. A manufacturer has no duty for third-party replacement parts unless its product required their use. State-law causation rules could not supplement maritime law where they conflict.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2021). Maritime law governed the claims and required evidence that exposure attributable to the shipyard was a substantial contributing factor in the injury, including the amount and duration of exposure. Speculation about what might have happened was not enough.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show exposure to asbestos attributable to the defendant was a substantial contributing factor, including evidence of the amount and duration of exposure. Showing that a defendant's products were present and the worker was occasionally exposed is not enough.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show evidence of the amount and duration of exposure to asbestos from the defendant's products sufficient to make a substantial-factor inference more than conjectural; placing a defendant's products in the workplace is not enough.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show that exposure to asbestos from the defendant's products was a substantial contributing factor in the injury, with evidence of the amount and duration of that exposure. Placing a defendant's products in the workplace and showing occasional exposure is not enough.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show exposure to a defendant's asbestos products was a substantial contributing factor, with evidence of the amount and duration of exposure. A manufacturer owes a duty to warn about third-party replacement parts only if its product requires the part to function as intended.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show that exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos product was a substantial contributing factor, including evidence of the amount and duration of exposure; placing a defendant's products in the workplace and showing occasional exposure to asbestos dust is not enough.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show that exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product was a substantial contributing factor in the injury, with evidence of the amount and duration of that exposure. Minimal or occasional exposure is not enough.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under Washington law, plaintiffs must present evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer exposure to asbestos from the specific defendant's products; without evidence that the defendant's products were in the decedent's work spaces, causation would rest on speculation.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show with evidence of the amount and duration of exposure that asbestos from the defendant's products was a substantial contributing factor in the injury. A manufacturer has no duty to warn about third-party replacement parts unless its product requires them to function as intended.
• Clevenger v. John Crane, Inc. (1st Division, 2020). A party is entitled to an instruction that lets her argue her theory of the case when substantial evidence supports it. In this asbestos case, a proximate cause instruction limited to mesothelioma was misleading because the evidence supported either mesothelioma or an asbestos-related lung cancer as the cause of death.
• Deem v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos-containing materials installed by the defendant and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor; evidence that machinists sometimes worked on products that could have contained asbestos, supported only by speculative expert opinion, does not meet that standard.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Expert testimony on a worker's asbestos exposure may rest on Navy records, a shipmate's declaration and the expert's experience even without eyewitness accounts of the specific work. Differences in the facts go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). The Court did not rule on Puget Sound Commerce Center's Daubert motion; it renoted the motion and allowed plaintiffs to file a sur-reply on the reliability of the experts' substantial contributing factor opinions.
• Clayton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2019). A scheduling order may be modified for good cause; good cause existed because discovery closed before a wrongful death claim was added to the case, so the defendant had no notice it would need discovery on cause of death.
• Jack v. Dco, LLC (2019). Under Washington law a manufacturer of asbestos products can have a continuing post-sale duty to warn, but a claim based on it fails where there is no evidence the plaintiff would have acted on a warning in a way that materially reduced his exposure, because that causal chain is speculative.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law (Lockwood), a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury and the particular defendant's product, and general evidence of asbestos on ships does not suffice. A defendant that files its answer after discovery closes, causing prejudice, waives an affirmative limitations defense.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington's Lockwood factors, a plaintiff can show product-specific causation by evidence of proximity, duration, handling, fiber release and other sources, and a jury may find that exposure to Bendix brakes was a causative factor in mesothelioma despite other possible exposures.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must identify the manufacturer of the product that caused the injury, and the Lockwood factors guide whether the evidence is enough for a jury on causation. Evidence of extensive dusty brake work with Rayloc brakes attributed to Pneumo Abex was enough to reach a jury.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law, an asbestos plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product, and the manufacturer, assessed using the Lockwood factors. General evidence of shipboard asbestos exposure, without evidence tying the decedent to this defendant's product, is not enough for a jury.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). A plaintiff's inability to prove exposure or causation against one defendant does not eliminate other defendants' affirmative defenses of alternative asbestos exposure, and the plaintiff did not show there was no genuine dispute of material fact on them.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington product liability law (Lockwood), a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and the particular defendant's product. A plaintiff cannot rely on an exposure theory dropped from the operative complaint to defeat summary judgment.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington product liability law, a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and the manufacturer, and the Lockwood factors must support a finding that exposure to the defendant's product caused the injury. General evidence of shipboard asbestos and of asbestos causing the disease is not enough.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and the particular defendant's product, and general evidence of brake exposure that does not tie asbestos-containing brakes to the defendant is insufficient to reach a jury.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must identify the particular manufacturer of the asbestos product that caused the injury, and the Lockwood factors require evidence from which a jury could find that the defendant's product caused the harm.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington product liability law and the Lockwood factors, a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product, and the defendant that made or sold it. Evidence that the decedent shopped at the store, without proof he bought an asbestos-containing product there, was insufficient.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington product liability law (Lockwood), a plaintiff must establish a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and the manufacturer, and must identify the particular manufacturer of the product that caused the injury; without admissible evidence identifying the defendant's product, summary judgment is proper.
• Klopman-Baerselman v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington product liability law and the Lockwood factors, a plaintiff must offer admissible evidence reasonably connecting the injury, the defendant's product and the defendant; without such evidence, causation, an element of all the claims, fails.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law and the Lockwood factors, a plaintiff may identify a manufacturer through a co-worker's testimony about products present at the workplace, and a minimally sufficient showing of exposure and causation creates a genuine issue of fact. Summary judgment evidence need not be in a form admissible at trial.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and its manufacturer. Once the court had excluded the decedent's affidavit and the causation expert's opinion, no admissible evidence remained to show that connection.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington product liability law, a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and the manufacturer. With Mr. Varney's affidavit and the causation expert's opinion excluded, and no opposition filed, plaintiffs could not show that Parker-Hannifin's products were a substantial factor in causing his disease.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington products liability law (and maritime law), a plaintiff must offer admissible evidence connecting the injury to the defendant's product. Without the excluded affidavit and expert opinion, the plaintiffs could not show that Warren's products caused the disease.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington products liability law, a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product, and the manufacturer; without admissible evidence of causation, summary judgment for the defendant is proper.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington products liability law (Lockwood), a plaintiff must offer admissible evidence connecting the injury, the defendant's product and the defendant; without the excluded affidavit and expert opinion, causation could not be found.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (2018). A court may not order a new trial on damages unless it has a firm conviction the jury erred, and may not grant judgment as a matter of law where substantial evidence, including admissible expert testimony on causation and exposure, supports the verdict.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (2018). Under Washington law, a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence, such as sales records showing which machines received a defendant's asbestos-containing products and the plaintiff's work on those machines, to let a jury infer exposure and causation without direct identification of the product.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (2018). Expert causation opinions resting on an "every exposure" or "cumulative exposure" theory, under which any exposure that adds to total dose is a substantial factor, are unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. Differences between test conditions and actual workplace conditions go to weight rather than admissibility.
• Jack v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2018). Expert testimony on asbestos exposure is admissible under Rule 702 if it is relevant and reliable, and disputes between experts go to weight. 'Every exposure' and 'cumulative exposure' theories are unreliable, and an expert must be qualified in the specific field he testifies about.
• Jack v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, LLC (2018). A motion for reconsideration requires manifest error or new facts or authority that could not earlier have been presented, and it cannot be used to submit evidence or arguments that could have been raised before. Under Washington law, a plaintiff must first show actual exposure to asbestos resulting from the defendant's conduct to establish proximate causation.
• Jack v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, LLC (2018). Under Washington law, an employer could not be charged with foreseeing take-home asbestos risks in and before 1955, when no studies or industry knowledge linked household exposure to disease. Washington's wrongful death statute also allows a spouse who married after the injury to recover loss of consortium damages arising from the death.
• Mikelsen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2018). Maritime law did not apply because the worker's exposure was mainly in a land-based shipyard machine shop, so Washington law governed. A jury could find causation even without proof the worker handled the defendant's product, and the government contractor defense was not shown as a matter of law.
• Estate OF Brandes v. Brand Insulations, Inc. (1st Division, 2017). A contractor that installed asbestos insulation and created dust without labeling or controls owed a duty of care to the spouse of a nearby worker who was exposed through laundering his clothes. A denial of summary judgment on disputed material facts cannot be appealed after a trial on the merits.
• Jack v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2017). Under Rule 35, a party seeking an autopsy must show the decedent's condition is in controversy and that an autopsy is the most medically reasonable method compared with the alternatives. The defendants made that showing here, and it outweighed the widow's moral objections.
• Woo v. General Electric Company (1st Division, 2017). A manufacturer generally has no duty to warn of asbestos in other makers' products used with its equipment, but a fact issue on duty exists where the evidence shows the equipment required asbestos-containing insulation, gaskets and packing to function as designed and the plaintiff was exposed to original gaskets and packing the manufacturer supplied.