Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Washington

• Curtis v. Abb Incorporated (2015). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Arguably inconsistent deposition testimony is not conclusive against the nonmovant at summary judgment, and discrepancies raise credibility issues for the factfinder.
• Estenson v. Caterpillar Inc. (1st Division, 2015). An asbestos plaintiff may prove exposure to a defendant's product by direct or circumstantial evidence and need not show inhalation of airborne fibers from that product. Causation may be shown under the substantial factor test, and a large noneconomic award is not shown to be the product of passion or prejudice by its size alone when substantial evidence supports it.
• McCROSSIN v. Imo Industries, Inc. (2015). Under maritime law, a plaintiff can raise a genuine issue of material fact about asbestos exposure with either direct or circumstantial evidence, and expert testimony on exposure can suffice when other record evidence supports it. Here the expert also claimed personal knowledge.
• McCROSSIN v. Imo Industries, Inc. (2015). A defendant asserting that a third party's negligence was a superseding cause bears the burden of showing it, and the Navy's negligence must have been shown and unforeseeable. The government contractor defense in a failure-to-warn case requires that the government approved reasonably precise specifications limiting the contractor's ability to warn.
• McCROSSIN v. Imo Industries, Inc. (2015). Summary judgment fails where plaintiff offers testimony and expert opinion creating a genuine dispute whether the defendant's asbestos materials were on the ship and were a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma, under either state or maritime law. A defendant's superseding-cause and derivative sovereign immunity defenses also fail at this stage where factual disputes remain.
• McMann v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). Maritime law governs a claim by a predominantly sea-based Navy worker exposed aboard a ship in dry dock, and under the Lindstrom standard the plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; mere presence of the product at the workplace is not enough.
• Nelson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). Under maritime law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not place in the stream of commerce.
• Botts v. US (2013). Under the FTCA the Navy is liable only for violating its mandatory asbestos control rules, and under Washington's substantial-factor test the plaintiffs needed evidence beyond speculation that exposure traceable to those violations contributed to the disease.
• Lipson v. ON Marine Services Company, LLC (2013). Under Rule 702 and Daubert, challenges such as dissimilar test conditions, inability to quantify dose or identify a threshold, non-peer-reviewed sources, and lack of direct product evidence go to the weight of expert testimony, not its admissibility, and are for cross-examination.
• Stevens v. CBS Corporation (2012). Circumstantial evidence can let a jury reasonably infer that a worker was exposed to a defendant's original or replacement asbestos-containing parts. Where the facts are disputed, summary judgment is not available on causation, the government contractor defense or assumption of risk. Under maritime law, Washington substantive law applies because it does not conflict with maritime law.
• Morgan v. Aurora Pump Co. (1st Division, 2011). A plaintiff may prove exposure to a defendant's asbestos product by circumstantial evidence, including witnesses who saw him or others near him work on that defendant's equipment. Under the Lockwood factors, such evidence can create a fact question on exposure and substantial-factor causation. The government-contractor defense is a fact-intensive affirmative defense for the jury.
• Arnold v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc. (2nd Division, 2010). A general contractor with supervisory and coordinating authority over multiple subcontractors in common work areas may owe a duty to keep those areas safe, and a landowner owes invitees, including subcontractors' employees, a duty of reasonable care as to conditions on the land such as asbestos. The federal Walsh-Healey Act creates no duty enforceable by third parties in a negligence suit.
• Butler v. Amtico International Inc. (1st Division, 2008). An asbestos plaintiff need only show that the defendant's asbestos-releasing product was in his work environment during the period of cumulative exposure that caused the disease; separate expert testimony that the defendant's product alone was a substantial factor is not required. Reasonable inferences on product exposure are drawn in the nonmovant's favor.
• Kimball v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd. (1st Division, 2008). Under the Lockwood exposure test, a plaintiff can use circumstantial evidence placing the defendant's asbestos-covered products at the worksite while the worker was there, plus expert testimony on asbestos drift. Showing the defendant's asbestos was part of the 'cloud' of exposure meets the substantial factor causation test, including for secondary (take-home) exposure.
• Taylor v. Union Carbide Corporation (2nd Division, 2008). A plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to show exposure to a defendant's asbestos, and need only show the defendant's asbestos was among that in his work environment and was a substantial factor in causing his disease. Evidence that a joint compound maker used the defendant's asbestos fiber is enough to raise a fact question for trial.
• McPhee v. Ford Motor Company (1st Division, 2006). A party cannot create a genuine issue of fact with an affidavit that contradicts, without explanation, clear earlier deposition testimony, and a conclusory expert declaration without factual support cannot defeat summary judgment on medical causation.
• Berry v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. (1st Division, 2000). The Marshall rule, which bars a later affidavit that clearly contradicts earlier testimony, did not apply to a fact witness's statements that were arguably inconsistent but not clearly contradictory. Circumstantial evidence under the Lockwood factors was enough to raise a fact issue on exposure to the defendant's products.
• Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp. (1st Division, 1997). In multi-supplier asbestos cases where the expert says all of the plaintiff's exposure probably played a role and the actual cause cannot be identified, a substantial-factor causation instruction is proper instead of but-for. A claim arises under the Washington Product Liability Act when the plaintiff is exposed to asbestos, not when the disease is discovered.
• Sorenson v. Raymark Industries (2nd Division, 1988). Evidence of increased cancer risk from asbestos exposure is admissible to show the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear of contracting cancer, which is a compensable damage element. A quotient-style verdict is not juror misconduct where jurors did not agree in advance to be bound by the calculation.
• Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc. (1987). A plaintiff may prove exposure to a defendant's asbestos product through witnesses who identify the products present at the workplace, rather than by his own identification. A manufacturer also has a continuing duty after exposure ends to use reasonable care to warn of known dangers if a warning could prevent or lessen harm.

West Virginia

• Murphy v. ST. Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. (2024). A statutory presumption of occupational pneumoconiosis is rebuttable and disappears once contrary evidence is credited; the Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board's finding that occupational disease was not a material contributing cause of death is given great deference and need not identify the actual cause of death.
• Bennett v. West Virginia Office OF Insurance Commissioner, W Va: Supreme Court of Appeals 2016 (2016). Dependent's benefits turn on whether the disease contributed in any material degree to the death. The agency's findings on the date of last exposure and the chargeable employer stand where no persuasive evidence challenges them.
• Lawrentz v. Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, W Va: Supreme Court of Appeals 2015 (2015). Where the worker had no occupational pneumoconiosis or asbestosis, his lung cancer could not be causally attributed to his occupational asbestos exposure for compensation purposes.
• Bayer Corporation v. Toney, W Va: Supreme Court of Appeals 2013 (2013). The court affirmed because the Board of Review's decision was not clearly a violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, not clearly the result of erroneous legal conclusions, and not based on a material misstatement or mischaracterization of the evidentiary record.
• Hoffman v. West Virginia Office OF Insurance Commissioner, W Va: Supreme Court of Appeals 2012 (2012). The court affirmed because the Board of Review's decision did not clearly violate any constitutional or statutory provision, was not clearly based on erroneous legal conclusions, and did not materially misstate the evidence.
• Adams v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (2003). Under FELA, a railroad employee's smoking can be raised as contributory or comparative negligence that reduces damages, and a court may exclude smoking evidence where the disease is mesothelioma, which smoking does not bear on.
• Powell v. State Workmen's Compensation Com'r (1980). Lung cancer can be a compensable occupational disease under W.Va. Code § 23-4-1 even though it also occurs in the general public, and the claimant need not prove an intermediate occupational disease such as asbestosis or negate all non-occupational causes such as smoking.

Wisconsin

• Chapp v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (1st District, 2019). A plaintiff cannot reach a jury on causation when the evidence shows only a possibility that the defendant's product contained asbestos and the probabilities are at best evenly balanced. Physicians who are not qualified to test talc for asbestos cannot serve as a conduit for others' opinions that a talc brand was contaminated.
• Kilty v. Weyerhaeuser Co. (2018). Plaintiffs claiming mesothelioma from non-occupational (household or community) exposure must offer evidence from which a jury could find that exposure was a substantial contributing factor. The mere scientific possibility that a small exposure contributes is not enough, and expert opinions resting on unsupported assumed exposures cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Kilty v. Weyerhaeuser Company (2018). Wisconsin's Workers' Compensation Act exclusivity provision does not bar claims based on community (non-workplace) asbestos exposure distinct from the employment exposure, and at the pleading stage plaintiffs need only allege that this exposure on its own substantially contributed to the injury. Nuisance claims based on emissions that ended in 1979 are barred by the statute of limitations.
• Carroll v. Abb, Inc. (2017). Under Wisconsin law as applied here, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos products it did not make or distribute unless it specified asbestos replacement parts, and a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a jury could infer without speculation that the defendant's asbestos products were a substantial factor in the injury.
• Carroll v. John Crane, Inc. (2017). Expert opinion that low chrysotile exposure carries little mesothelioma risk is admissible under Rule 702, but an opinion that there is no risk at some exposure level is not. An "every exposure" theory does not show that a product was a substantial contributing factor.
• Pecher v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2017). Claims by employees whose asbestos injuries arose from their plant work are barred by Wisconsin's workers' compensation exclusive remedy, and plaintiffs cannot avoid it by recasting the injuries as off-the-job nuisance harms. Product liability does not attach to a patent holder that merely licenses a patent to a manufacturer.
• Ahnert v. Employers Insurance Company OF Wausau (2016). Airborne asbestos released during regular pipe repair and insulation work can be an unsafe condition associated with the structure under Wisconsin's safe place statute, and the statute of repose does not bar the claim unless the defendant shows the work was an improvement to real property.
• Ahnert v. Employers Insurance Company OF Wausau (2016). Evidence that an insulation contractor worked at the sites where the plaintiff was near dusty asbestos insulation work can let a jury infer exposure caused by that contractor. Wisconsin's construction statute of repose protects permanent improvements to real property, not repair or maintenance work, so it did not bar the claim on this record.
• Boyer v. Weyerhaeuser Company (2016). A party seeking reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must show newly discovered evidence or a manifest error of law or fact. The rule cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments that could have been made earlier, or undo procedural failures.
• Boyer v. Weyerhaeuser Company (2016). Plaintiffs claiming non-occupational asbestos exposure need not show it was the main cause, but they need reliable expert evidence of significant non-occupational exposure to show it was a substantial factor. For mesothelioma, living within 1.25 miles of the plant for at least a year could support that opinion.
• Suoja v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2016). Under Wisconsin law, a plaintiff must prove exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease. An expert opinion that any exposure, however slight, contributes to cumulative exposure, without addressing dose or comparing it to other exposures, did not carry that burden.
• Alexander v. Auer Steel & Heating Co. (1st District, 2015). A plaintiff in a products liability action must offer direct evidence of exposure to the defendant's asbestos product or evidence supporting a reasonable inference of exposure; a mere possibility or guess about the supplier or manufacturer is speculation and insufficient.
• Herr v. Linde LLC (2015). A plaintiff must produce evidence that he inhaled asbestos from the defendant's own product, and unlabeled gloves cannot be tied to a defendant whose gloves were labeled. A Pierringer release of a settling distributor also releases a strict liability claim against a non-settling defendant in the same chain of distribution.
• Spychalla v. Boeing Aerospace Operations Inc. (2015). The court did not decide whether Wisconsin recognizes the bare metal defense. Even assuming it does, it would not apply to makers of completed aircraft and engines when unrebutted expert evidence showed they specified asbestos-containing replacement parts. Issues already decided by the MDL court on product identification and causation would not be reopened.
• Miller v. American Art Clay Co. Inc. (2014). Under Wisconsin law a plaintiff must show a defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Where the evidence fits asbestos-free products as well as the asbestos-containing one, causation is only speculation and summary judgment is proper.
• Calewarts v. CR Meyer and Sons Company (3rd District, 2012). A merged successor to a nonemployer building owner can be sued for the owner's pre-merger safe-place liability under the dual persona doctrine despite workers' compensation exclusivity. A plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only present evidence of potential asbestos exposure, from which a jury may infer exposure.
• Risse v. Building Services Industrial Supply, Inc. (1st District, 2012). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce evidence showing the worker was probably exposed to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in the illness; evidence leaving exposure to speculation or conjecture is not enough.
• Singer v. Pneumo Abex, LLC. (1st District, 2012). In negligence and strict products liability claims, a plaintiff must offer credible evidence from which a reasonable person could infer exposure to the defendant's product; a mere possibility of causation, resting on piled-up inferences, does not defeat summary judgment.
• Zielinski v. AP Green Indus., Inc. (2003). Summary judgment is improper where the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the workplace and the plaintiff worked with it. The court declined to adopt a bright-line causation rule and applied Wisconsin's substantial-factor test to the totality of the circumstances.
• Anderson v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (2002). A jury verdict stands if any credible evidence supports it, and the jury may draw reasonable inferences from expert and lay testimony about exposure without expert proof tracing specific fibers to one defendant. A jury's apportionment of fault is not disturbed unless the percentages are grossly disproportionate or the proof so lacking that the verdict is speculation.
• Neubauer v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas (1981). Wisconsin law does not apply a discovery rule to the three-year personal injury statute of limitations, so for progressive asbestos diseases the cause of action accrues on the date of last exposure to any asbestos-containing product, not the date of discovery. That date applies to claims against all manufacturers of asbestos products to which the plaintiff was exposed.

Wyoming

• Johnson v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. Prod. Liab. Trust (2014). In an asbestos case, a plaintiff must offer competent evidence that the defendant's product or conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Witnesses who admit in deposition that they lack personal knowledge of what the insulation contained, or who made it, cannot supply that evidence. The court also applied Pennsylvania's 12-year construction statute of repose, in the alternative, to Bechtel, CBS and GE.
• Johnson v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation Product Liability Trust (2014). Under the substantial-factor causation test, a plaintiff must have admissible, personal-knowledge evidence linking a particular defendant's asbestos to the plaintiff's exposure. Witnesses' deposition testimony that contradicts their earlier affidavits is treated as more reliable at summary judgment, and a real-property-improvement statute of repose can bar claims over permanent improvements.