Compensatory Damages in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on amount of compensatory damages: 350 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Delaware

• C&d Contractors, Inc. v. McLaughlin (2023). Under 19 Del. C. § 2350(f), a claimant whose Board position is affirmed on appeal may recover a reasonable fee, which includes paralegal services; costs are not covered by § 2350(f) but may be awarded under 10 Del. C. § 5101.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A jury's damages verdict is not disturbed unless it results from passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, or manifestly disregards the evidence or law, or is so grossly excessive that it shocks the court's conscience and sense of justice.
• Evans v. John Crane, Inc. (2019). General maritime law and state survival statutes can supply survival damages where an asbestos injury is indivisible across the high seas and territorial waters, so DOHSA does not bar them. DOHSA does limit the wrongful death claim itself to pecuniary damages. An expert's lack of experience with the specific products or documents goes to weight, not admissibility.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). When deciding whether a jury's compensatory damages verdict is excessive, a court must look at the total damages the jury found, not the defendant's smaller share based on its percentage of fault.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A court will not overturn a jury verdict as inconsistent if the differently worded interrogatory answers can be logically reconciled, and will not set aside or reduce a damages award unless it was the product of passion, prejudice or disregard of the evidence or law.
• Dana Companies, LLC v. Crawford (2011). A trial court must assess the adequacy of each damages award (survival pain and suffering, wrongful death) separately on the evidence for that claim, consistent with the jury instructions, and may not uphold an award by reference to other awards shared by the same beneficiaries.
• In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc. (2005). For the limited purpose of formulating a reorganization plan and trust, a court may estimate aggregate asbestos personal injury liability under 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) by using the debtor's own claims history and the more reliable expert method, without mathematical precision and without adjudicating individual claims.
• In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc. (2005). In estimating aggregate asbestos liability under 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) to fund a personal injury trust, the court may choose the estimation methodology it finds more reliable. The estimate rests on the debtor's own claims history, a disease-incidence model, and adjusted discount and inflation rates, rather than on mathematical precision.
• Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston (2005). Under Bankruptcy Code section 502(c), asbestos claims are estimated by their value in the state-law tort system as of the petition date, with historical settlement and verdict values adjusted for factors unlikely to recur, including punitive damages, which are subordinated in bankruptcy.

Florida

• Ripple v. CBS Corporation (2024). A spouse who married the decedent after the injury but who outlived the decedent is a "surviving spouse" under Fla. Stat. 768.21(2), and the common law "marriage before injury" rule for loss of consortium does not bar that statutory wrongful death recovery.
• Ripple v. CBS Corporation (4th District, 2022). A spouse who married the decedent after the injury cannot recover consortium-type damages under section 768.21(2) of the Wrongful Death Act because the Act does not abrogate the common-law marriage-before-injury rule. Because the defendants successfully argued the wife was not a surviving spouse for that purpose, the adult children may recover under section 768.21(3).
• DeLisle v. Crane Co. (2018). The 2013 amendment to section 90.702 adopting the Daubert standard infringes on the Florida Supreme Court's rulemaking authority to the extent it is procedural, so Frye remains the test in Florida. Medical causation testimony is not new or novel and is not subject to Frye analysis.
• Crane Co. v. DeLisle (4th District, 2016). A trial court must act as an active gatekeeper under section 90.702 and Daubert, and an expert's 'every exposure above background' causation opinion unsupported by tested data or explained methodology is inadmissible. Counsel's invitation to measure damages by the defendants' expert fees is an improper basis for an award.
• Honeywell International, Inc. v. Guilder (3rd District, 2009). A non-party's fault must go on the verdict form for apportionment when the defendant pleaded it and presented sufficient evidence. A child's parental consortium claim under section 768.0415 requires a negligent act on or after October 1, 1988, measured by the last exposure. Settlement proceeds are set off against the verdict.
• Honeywell International, Inc. v. Guilder (3rd District, 2009). A non-party's fault must be listed on the verdict form for apportionment once the defendant pleads it and presents sufficient evidence, and a child's parental consortium claim under section 768.0415 requires negligent acts on or after October 1, 1988, measured by the last exposure. Settlement proceeds are set off against the verdict in the same economic and noneconomic proportion as the jury's award.
• Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard (1999). A punitive award above three times compensatory damages can overcome the statutory presumption of excessiveness under section 768.73(1) when clear and convincing evidence shows egregious misconduct; appellate courts review the denial of remittitur only for abuse of discretion.
• ACandS, Inc. v. Redd (3rd District, 1997). A spouse's loss of consortium claim is derivative and abates when the injured spouse's personal injury action abates on his death from the injuries, so recovery lies only under the Wrongful Death Act. Prejudicial testimony and an excessive verdict also warranted a mistrial or new trial.
• Snoozy v. US Gypsum Co. (3rd District, 1997). A defendant that wants non-parties placed on the verdict form for apportionment of fault must produce evidence of the specifics of the different asbestos products, how often they were used, and their toxicity as used. Minor children cannot be awarded zero damages for a parent's wrongful death when the record shows undisputed evidence of their loss.
• WR Grace & Co.—Conn. v. Dougherty (2nd District, 1994). A jury may be instructed on, and asked to apportion fault to, nonparties under Fabre and section 768.81 only if there is evidence of the nonparties' fault. In asbestos cases that evidence must cover the specifics of the products, how often they were used and their toxicity as used. Evidentiary objections not raised at trial are not preserved for appeal.
• Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox (3rd District, 1985). A plaintiff with asbestosis cannot recover damages for an enhanced risk of future cancer, but keeps the right to sue later if cancer develops, and that later suit is not barred by the rule against splitting causes of action. Evidence of the cancer risk is admissible to prove present fear-of-cancer distress, because inhaling asbestos counts as a physical impact and asbestosis supplies the required physical injury.

Hawaii

• Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (1984). Adherence to government specifications is not an absolute defense to strict liability where the product is inherently dangerous because of the specified material. Under HRS § 663-14, multiple separate releases must be treated collectively, so the verdict is reduced by the total consideration paid or the releasees' total liability share, whichever is greater.

Illinois

• Spain v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. (4th District, 1999). Once a plaintiff shows frequency, regularity and proximity of exposure to the defendant's asbestos product, the defendant is presumed a proximate cause and may not introduce evidence of other asbestos exposures unless it files contribution actions against those other manufacturers. Under amended Rule 213, the treating physician exception to opinion disclosure no longer exists.
• Barry v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1st District, 1st Division, 1996). A jury damages award in a wrongful death and survival case will not be disturbed unless it results from passion or prejudice or falls outside the limits of reasonable compensation, and awards are not measured by comparison with other asbestos verdicts. A verdict form giving separate wrongful death amounts to each survivor was error under the Wrongful Death Act but was not prejudicial.
• Keystone Steel and Wire Co. v. Costa (3rd District, 1994). A denial of summary judgment is merged into the trial and not reviewable where the defendant's own refusal to produce a witness led to a sanction judgment on liability. Section 2-1101 permits conditioning denial of a motion to quash on advance payment of expenses but does not authorize reimbursing expenses after production.
• Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd. (4th District, 1993). A civil conspiracy claim is actionable if properly pleaded and need not rest on an independent tortious act; the allegations here also sufficed as a fraudulent misrepresentation conspiracy. A trial court may enter a default judgment on liability when a party willfully refuses to produce relevant witnesses under Rule 237(b).
• State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. WR Grace & Co. (1993). The Illinois construction statute of repose protects a product manufacturer only if it substantially participated in construction activities or custom-made and installed its product for the project, and only for claims arising from those construction activities, not manufacturing-related negligence such as failure to warn.
• Owens Corning Fiberglas v. Ind. Comm'n (4th District, 1990). Under section 7 of the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act, a widow has an independent cause of action for death benefits even if her husband received disability benefits during his life. The date of death is the date of injury for determining the applicable statute and minimum rate, and an employer's reimbursement right under section 5(b) reaches only recoveries by the employee or his personal representative.

Iowa

• Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Fund (1993). Evidence of cancer risk from asbestos is admissible to show a manufacturer's duty to warn and the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear of cancer, and proof of exposure plus cumulative-effect expert testimony can create a jury question on proximate cause. Knowledge sufficient to trigger a duty to warn does not by itself support punitive damages, and Iowa law does not allow a separate award for lost opportunity to live out a full life expectancy.

Kentucky

• Letcher County Board OF Education v. Hall (2022). State agencies, including school boards, are subject to the Workers' Compensation Act, so the Department of Workers' Claims, not the Claims Commission, has jurisdiction over a school employee's asbestos-related work injury claim. Unpaid benefits owed before the 2017 amendment to KRS 342.040(1) carry the new 6% interest rate.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2021). Under Kentucky's substantial-factor test, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A cumulative-dose opinion tied to the defendant's specific products, as distinct from the rejected each-and-every-exposure theory, can create a jury question. A seller that relines used brake shoes alters them and falls outside the Kentucky Middleman Statute.
• Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey (1994). A negligence claim for asbestos exposure does not accrue, and no damages for increased risk or fear of cancer are available, until the plaintiff shows some harmful result from the exposure. The tort of outrageous conduct is intentional, needs no physical contact or injury, and a failure to comply strictly with the prehearing statement rule (CR 76.03) is not grounds to withdraw a decided issue.
• Michals v. William T. Watkins Meth. Church (1994). Under Kentucky law, mental distress damages in negligence require some physical contact with the plaintiff, and a claim for increased risk of future disease cannot be maintained without a present physical injury or proof that the harm is probable rather than speculative. KRS 446.070 creates a cause of action but does not set the measure of damages.

Louisiana

• Alford v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. (2025). Under Louisiana law before the Products Liability Act, an OSHA-compliant asbestos warning is not automatically adequate, and whether a warning was adequate is a jury question. Exposure to a particular asbestos product may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
• Stauder v. Shell Oil Company (4th Circuit, 2024). Under Pete v. Boland Marine, appellate courts must consider prior general damage awards as guidance when deciding whether a jury's award is an abuse of discretion, but those awards are only a starting point and do not cap what a jury may award given the particular facts.
• Pete v. Boland Marine and Manufacturing Company, LLC (2023). An appellate court must consider relevant prior general damage awards for similar injuries, along with the particular facts of the case, in deciding whether a jury abused its discretion in a general damage award. If it did, the award is reduced to the highest amount reasonably within that discretion.
• Pete v. Boland Marine and Manufacturing Company, LLC (4th Circuit, 2023). A jury instruction that correctly makes fault an element of a take-home claim cures the omission of fault from a verdict interrogatory when no timely objection was made. The reviewing court will not disturb a jury's causation finding or a general damage award unless the record shows manifest error or an abuse of discretion.
• Stauder v. Shell Oil Company (4th Circuit, 2023). An appellate court may disturb a general damages award only after finding the jury abused its vast discretion, and prior awards are compared only after that finding. Under Burton and Cole, prejudgment interest against a joint tortfeasor added by amended petition runs from the date suit was originally filed.
• Walker v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2023). Under Louisiana's pre-comparative-fault law, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable. Each is assigned a virile share, including non-parties found liable at trial, with credit only for parties who settled. Strict liability for things in one's custody depends on custody and control, not ownership.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, wrongful death damages compensate beneficiaries only for injuries suffered from the moment of the victim's death onward, so pre-death lost earnings and out-of-pocket expenses are not recoverable in the wrongful death action.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law an injured plaintiff cannot claim loss of consortium, but he may recover damages for household services he can no longer perform himself because of his injury, even though the services are unpaid.
• Lege v. Union Carbide Corporation (4th Circuit, 2021). A jury's allocation of fault and general damages is reviewed for manifest error or abuse of discretion, and exposure need not be long if it was significant enough to be a substantial factor. A non-settling tortfeasor gets a credit for a released party's share only if it proves that party's fault at trial, even when solidary liability was already found.
• Adams v. Ethyl Corporation (2020). Under Louisiana article 2317, a premises condition is a defect if it is relatively permanent, and routine, ongoing maintenance activity that disturbs asbestos is not categorically a temporary condition. A jury's reasonable inferences from the evidence, and a district court's remittitur applying the maximum recovery rule, receive deferential review.
• Gaddy v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. (2020). Under Louisiana article 2317 as it stood in 1955-1959, asbestos dust from constant, necessary refurbishment work in a plant is not a 'temporary condition' that bars strict liability. Under the maximum recovery rule, a general damages award above the range supported by comparable mesothelioma cases must be reduced to the highest amount a jury could properly award.
• McAllister v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). Under general maritime law a plaintiff must show a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in the injury, and circumstantial evidence can show exposure, but not when nothing shows the defendant's product was present at the worksite. Louisiana law governed successor liability and does not recognize the product line exception.
• McAllister v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). Under general maritime law and the Jones Act, a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering is treated as a pecuniary loss recoverable by the estate, and loss of support or household services damages go only to survivors who show they received such support or services.
• Bagwell v. Union Carbide Corporation (4th Circuit, 2019). A jury's choice between conflicting views of the evidence on exposure and causation will not be disturbed on review. An appellate court that finds a general damages award an abuse of discretion may raise it to the lowest reasonable amount, guided by awards in similar mesothelioma cases.
• Berry v. Anco Insulations (2nd Circuit, 2019). Under pre-comparative fault Louisiana law, a defendant who blames settled nonparties must prove their fault by a preponderance of the evidence, and a midtrial settlement does not automatically give the remaining defendant a virile share credit; the test is fairness to that defendant. Future medical expenses can be awarded where the record shows they will probably be incurred, even when the cost estimates are rough.
• Craft v. Ports America Gulfport, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2019). A plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that future medical expenses will be medically necessary, and need not prove their exact value. An employer's duty to protect workers from asbestos depends on whether it knew or should have known of the danger during the employment.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). Where a seaman's asbestos exposure occurred both on the high seas and in territorial waters, DOHSA does not bar a survival action, which proceeds under general maritime law. Under general maritime law a seaman's survivors may recover only pecuniary losses, but pre-death pain and suffering is treated as pecuniary.
• Romano v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (4th Circuit, 2017). A solidary obligor gets a virile share credit only if the plaintiff released the other tortfeasor and that tortfeasor's liability was established at trial; absent a settlement, no credit applies. A general damages award that is an abuse of discretion is raised to the lowest amount a jury could reasonably have awarded.