Maritime Law and Navy Ships in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on maritime law: 344 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Maryland

• Ament v. John Crane-Houdalille, Inc. (2019). Under Maryland Rule 5-702, an expert's opinion needs a sufficient factual basis, and a trial court does not abuse its discretion in striking causation testimony when the expert cannot tie the fact witnesses' testimony to the defendant's product. The appellant must pinpoint specific errors on appeal.
• Crowe v. CSX Transportation, Inc. (2019). A railroad employee engaged in maritime employment is covered by the LHWCA as amended in 1972, and because a latent occupational disease injury occurs at manifestation, applying the Amendments to a post-1972 diagnosis is not retroactive; the LHWCA remedy is exclusive and bars a FELA claim.
• Arbogast v. Georgia-Pacific LLC (2017). Under the LHWCA's exclusivity provision, an employer covered by the Act cannot be a joint tortfeasor, so third parties cannot bring contribution claims against it. Liability is not apportioned between a worker's covered and non-covered employment with the same employer.
• Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2017). A government contractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it acted under a federal officer, has a colorable government-contractor defense (shown where the government exercised discretion in approving warnings, the contractor gave them, and the government knew the hazards as well as the contractor), and the claims are connected to or relate to the federal act; a strict causal nexus is not required.
• Rhodes v. McIC, Inc. (2016). A defendant seeking federal officer removal need only make a plausible, colorable showing of the government contractor defense, which can apply to failure-to-warn claims, and that showing ordinarily satisfies the causal nexus requirement. The court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims, given the cross-claims and the need for economy and fairness.
• Sawyer v. Union Carbide Corporation (2016). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant must show a colorable federal defense and a causal nexus to conduct under federal direction; Navy control over warnings on delivered boilers did not extend to warnings for workers in the shipyard boiler shop.
• May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2015). A manufacturer has a duty to warn in negligence and strict liability about asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not supply when its product contains asbestos and no safer material is available, asbestos is critical to the product, periodic maintenance involving asbestos parts is required, and the manufacturer knows or should know of the risk.
• May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). A manufacturer has no duty to warn of the hazards of asbestos-containing replacement parts (here, gaskets and packing) that it neither manufactured nor placed into the stream of commerce, even if it was foreseeable that such parts would be used with its product.
• Vaughn v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc. (1989). A shipowner that settles a seaman's unseaworthiness claim may obtain indemnity from a manufacturer whose asbestos-containing product made the vessel unseaworthy, by showing potential liability, contribution of the product, and a reasonable settlement. A good-faith settlement with other manufacturers extinguishes contribution claims and does not reduce the non-settling manufacturer's liability.

Massachusetts

• Ciolino v. Keystone Shipping Co. (2024). A late expert disclosure by a plaintiff's treating physicians was substantially justified and not excluded under the Esposito factors. Statements by a shipowner's officers about asbestos aboard the vessel are non-hearsay party admissions. Disputed facts on asbestos presence and causation preclude summary judgment on Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims.
• Cook v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2023). Asbestos exposure claims arising from repair and maintenance aboard a Navy ship on navigable waters fall within admiralty jurisdiction, so substantive maritime law applies, with state law only supplementing where maritime law is silent. General maritime law does not bar loss of consortium, punitive or survival damages against a manufacturer in such a case.
• McIsaac v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2023). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at a high enough level that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; the mere presence of the product at the workplace is insufficient. Rule 56(d) allows time to find facts, not to gather additional expert opinions.
• Pritt v. John Crane, Inc. (2023). Where a product manufacturer that was not the seaman's employer is sued over an indivisible injury from asbestos exposure on the high seas and in territorial waters, neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applies. General maritime law then permits punitive damages, loss of consortium damages and survival remedies, so an amendment seeking them is not futile.
• Pritt v. John Crane, Inc. (2022). A contractor asserting the government contractor defense on summary judgment must show no genuine dispute on all three Boyle prongs; disputes over what warnings and specifications the Navy required preclude judgment. Derivative sovereign immunity does not protect a contractor from liability for its own negligence.
• Sebright v. General Electric Co. (2021). Under maritime law, a manufacturer's duty to warn under the DeVries test can reach asbestos insulation added to its bare-metal product if the product required insulation to function, and the court treats the sophisticated purchaser defense as unavailable where a risk and burden balancing weighs for the Navy sailor. A plaintiff must also show that a defendant's specific product contained asbestos, and loss of consortium and parental society claims are not available under general maritime law in this circuit.
• Stearns v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (2018). The Massachusetts six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property does not bar asbestos claims against a contractor like GE, given the long latency of asbestos disease, known risks and GE's continuing control of the site. A premises owner is not liable to an independent contractor's employee for asbestos hazards the contractor's own work created, or for a contractor's negligence where the owner kept no real control over the work.
• Holdren v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2009). To remove a failure-to-warn case under the federal officer removal statute, a government contractor must show reasonably precise government specifications or other evidence that the government exercised discretion over asbestos warnings, creating a genuine conflict with state law, plus a causal link. Government silence on warnings is not enough.
• O'connell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2008). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only plausibly show a military contractor defense to a failure-to-warn claim: the government approved reasonably precise warnings, the contractor complied, and the contractor warned the government of hazards the government did not know. A plaintiff's disclaimer of federal claims does not defeat this removal.

Mississippi

• Webb v. 3M Company (2022). A defendant that plausibly alleges the elements of federal officer removal need not submit evidence unless the plaintiff contests it, and a colorable government contractor or derivative sovereign immunity defense, acting under the Navy's specifications, and a connection to the alleged asbestos exposure satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a).

Missouri

• Schaffer v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). The 2011 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 does not allow in personam maritime claims seeking common-law remedies to be removed without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, because of the saving-to-suitors clause.

New Jersey

• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under the DeVries test applied in maritime law, whether a manufacturer had a duty to warn about asbestos-containing parts made by others depends on factual questions: whether its product required the part, whether it knew the integrated product was dangerous, and whether it had reason to think users would realize the danger. Disputed facts about what the Navy knew also defeated summary judgment on the government contractor defense.
• Feaster v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, including that the defendant made or distributed the asbestos-containing product. New Jersey law would give the same result because liability requires an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant.
• Fuoco v. 3M Company (2015). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; speculation that the worker was around the defendant's pump does not defeat summary judgment.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for, and owes no duty to warn about, asbestos-containing parts it did not manufacture or supply, and a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos product made or supplied by that defendant. The government contractor defense could not be resolved on summary judgment where there was a factual dispute over whether the Navy controlled warnings.
• Latter v. 3M Company (2015). On summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the plaintiff's favor, and testimony plus vessel documents showing asbestos materials can let a factfinder reasonably infer exposure aboard the defendant's vessels, supporting Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.
• Shearer v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law, which governed work aboard a dry-docked Navy ship, a manufacturer owes no duty to warn about asbestos products it neither made nor distributed, so a turbine maker is not liable for insulation applied after the turbine left its control.
• Lewis v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2012). Under the federal officer removal statute, one defendant that satisfies the Feidt factors can remove the entire case without the other defendants joining, and the court may keep the related state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.
• Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. US (1988). Following the Sandy Hook approach, a contribution claim against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act accrues when the underlying cause of action arises, not at settlement, so it is barred after two years.

New York

• Keller v. Exxonmobil Oil Corporation (2025). Under Rule 702, a specific-causation expert opinion that rests on an assumed, unquantified asbestos exposure and ignores an obvious alternative cause (radon) is inadmissible, and without it a Jones Act plaintiff whose injury has multiple possible causes cannot prove causation. The relaxed Jones Act causation burden does not relax the Rule 702 admissibility standards.
• Howard v. AO Smith Water Prods. (3rd Dept., 2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must affirmatively show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and cannot merely point to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. Testimony that a plaintiff encountered the defendant's pumps, together with routine overhauls, raised a fact issue.
• Badamo v. Chevron USA Inc. (2022). A Jones Act claim for cancer accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the cancer, and a suspicious mass is not enough as a matter of law. Under the Jones Act's relaxed causation standard, circumstantial evidence of asbestos exposure on a vessel can reach a jury.
• Pritt v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Minimal exposure, or exposure only to another maker's component, is not enough. Maritime law also allows loss of consortium and punitive damages in a non-Jones Act claim.
• Phelps v. CBS Corporation (2021). Under maritime law and Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a boiler manufacturer has a duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts only if its product requires incorporation of the part, and plaintiff offered no admissible evidence that the boilers required asbestos insulation.
• Allen v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2019). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment in an asbestos case need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred, and a failure to identify the exact pump or its location does not defeat the claim. A motion supported only by an attorney's affirmation, without the deposition transcript annexed, also fails to show entitlement to judgment.
• New York City Asbestos Litig (2019). A party relying on a seaman's release must show it was executed freely and with full understanding of his rights under Garrett's heightened admiralty standard, and where the release does not clearly cover a later mesothelioma and the record is silent or ambiguous on consideration and advice, summary judgment is inappropriate.
• Grimes v. CBS Corporation (2018). Joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties under Rule 19(a), because a plaintiff need not sue all joint tortfeasors in one action and a defendant that pays more than its share can seek contribution. Efficiency in avoiding multiple lawsuits does not make absent parties necessary.
• Johnson v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) or (a)(2) requires evidence that the defendant actually transacted business in New York or committed a tortious act there, and a plaintiff's inference that a sales employee visited the Brooklyn Navy Yard does not meet that requirement.
• South v. Chevron Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2017). Texaco, which bore the burden in this admiralty case, did not show that a 1997 asbestos release covered a later mesothelioma claim; even under the more lenient Third Circuit (Wicker) test, the release did not show that South understood and knowingly released the actual risk of mesothelioma.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product, and a pump maker has no duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts used with its pumps absent evidence it had an active role, interest or influence in their use. Under maritime and New York law alike, wrongful death claims fail if the underlying liability claims fail.
• South v. Texaco (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). Under the Jones Act and general maritime law, the party relying on a seaman's release bears the burden of showing it was fairly made and fully understood, and a release of future claims is not enforced where the proof beyond its language does not show the seaman understood he was releasing a future mesothelioma claim, whether the Sixth Circuit or Third Circuit standard applies.
• Unterberg v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (2016). A Jones Act claim lies only against the seaman's employer, and a parent company is treated as the employer or vessel owner only if the subsidiary is its mere instrumentality or alter ego, which requires actual domination rather than mere stock ownership or some overlap of personnel and offices.
• Quinlan v. Marine Transport Lines (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2015). Equitable tolling applies only where the plaintiff timely filed in the wrong forum, the defendant actively misled the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was extraordinarily prevented from filing; the diligence standard applies to counsel as well, and plaintiffs showed neither active misleading nor extraordinary prevention.
• Crews v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A plaintiff who cannot tell which of two similarly named companies supplied the product offers only speculation, and the defendant has no duty to warn about third-party products used with its valves.
• Logan v. AP Miller-Maersk, Inc. (2013). A corporation that acquires another's assets may take on the seller's tort liabilities through a de facto merger, which is judged case by case on many factors. The seller's continued existence for years after the sale does not alone defeat such a claim.
• Logan v. AP Moller-Maersk, Inc. (2013). In New York asbestos cases, a defendant seeking summary judgment must first unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; failing that, the motion is denied regardless of the opposition, and the court need not reach choice of law.
• Bischofsberger v. AO Smith Water Products (2012). A court may join cases for trial under CPLR 602 where common questions exist, and in asbestos cases it weighs the Malcolm factors (work site, occupation, time of exposure, disease, living or deceased, discovery status, same counsel). Joinder was denied because the cases would share too little testimony to serve judicial economy.
• Kline v. Crane Co. (IN the Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2010). A plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos fibers released from the particular defendant's product; circumstantial evidence can suffice only where there is a time-and-place link to the defendant's product, and speculative inferences from ship-class similarity, approvals, or other workers' testimony do not meet that standard.
• Miranda v. Abex Corp. (2010). Under CPLR 602(a), asbestos plaintiffs need not share an identical work site, occupation or exposure period to be tried jointly if common questions predominate. An individual factor, such as possible federal maritime law, can still require a separate trial.
• Thaut v. AO Smith Water Prods. (2010). Summary judgment is denied where conflicting evidence raises fact issues about the presence, origin and proximity of the defendant's pumps and related asbestos materials; a plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may reasonably be inferred.
• Flynn v. AO Smith Water Prods. (2009). Questions of fact about whether ship owners had actual or constructive knowledge of asbestos hazards preclude summary judgment on a Jones Act claim, and a vessel with friable asbestos can be unseaworthy regardless of the Coast Guard's insulation requirements.