Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New Jersey

• Vesper v. 3M Company (2016). Under New Jersey law a plaintiff needs direct or circumstantial evidence of exposure to the defendant's friable asbestos with frequency, regularity and proximity, applied flexibly to the case's facts. Speculation about a defendant's product is not enough.
• Whelan v. Armstrong Int'l (2016). A manufacturer has a strict-liability duty to warn about asbestos in replacement parts it did not make or sell if its product as marketed contained asbestos components integral to its function and it was reasonably aware routine maintenance would replace them with other asbestos-containing parts. The court disagreed with Hughes v. A.W. Chesterton, and plaintiff must still show frequent, regular and close exposure to the complete product, including necessary replacement parts.
• Estate OF Brust v. Acf Industries, LLC (2015). The Locomotive Inspection Act preempts state-law design and failure-to-warn claims about locomotive equipment even when the user is an urban rapid transit operator not subject to federal railroad regulation. A plaintiff must show asbestos exposure to the defendant's product that was frequent, regular and in close proximity to establish substantial-factor causation.
• Feaster v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, including that the defendant made or distributed the asbestos-containing product. New Jersey law would give the same result because liability requires an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant.
• Feaster v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under New Jersey law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to friable asbestos manufactured or distributed by the defendant, and failure to identify the defendant's product defeats the claim.
• Fuoco v. 3M Company (2015). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; speculation that the worker was around the defendant's pump does not defeat summary judgment.
• Haas v. 3M Company (2015). Under New Jersey law, a mesothelioma plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence of exposure, together with expert proof, to reach a jury, and the exposure needed is lower for mesothelioma. Deposition testimony of a deceased witness may come in under Rule 804(b)(1) when a co-defendant who questioned the witness had a similar motive to the party it is offered against.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for, and owes no duty to warn about, asbestos-containing parts it did not manufacture or supply, and a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos product made or supplied by that defendant. The government contractor defense could not be resolved on summary judgment where there was a factual dispute over whether the Navy controlled warnings.
• Latter v. 3M Company (2015). On summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the plaintiff's favor, and testimony plus vessel documents showing asbestos materials can let a factfinder reasonably infer exposure aboard the defendant's vessels, supporting Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.
• Shearer v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law, which governed work aboard a dry-docked Navy ship, a manufacturer owes no duty to warn about asbestos products it neither made nor distributed, so a turbine maker is not liable for insulation applied after the turbine left its control.
• Thomasson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). To recover in an asbestos case under New Jersey law (and similarly maritime law), a plaintiff must identify an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant and show exposure to it frequent and close enough to support causation; dismissal as a sanction for missed deadlines requires weighing the Poulis factors.
• Barnes v. Foster Wheeler Corp. (2014). Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must identify an asbestos-containing product manufactured or supplied by the defendant to which the plaintiff was exposed; presence of asbestos insulation made by an unidentified party around the defendant's turbines is not enough, even in a mesothelioma case.
• Haas v. 3M Company (2014). Under New Jersey's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing component of the defendant's product; speculation does not suffice. A contractor meeting the three Boyle prongs is shielded from both design defect and failure-to-warn claims where the specifications are silent on warnings.
• Buttitta v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2010). In a mesothelioma case, the frequency, regularity and proximity test is applied in light of expert evidence that the disease can follow minimal and infrequent exposure, so brief but regular work near a defendant's asbestos product can support a jury finding of medical causation.
• Kurak v. AP Green Refractories Co. (1997). To hold an asbestos defendant liable, a plaintiff must show with direct or circumstantial evidence that he was exposed to that defendant's friable asbestos frequently, regularly and in close proximity, and mesothelioma's low dose threshold bears on that showing. Jurors must set damages without regard to how fault is apportioned among defendants, and the trial court must correct a jury question suggesting otherwise.
• Goss v. American Cyanamid Co. (1994). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos products with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity, but may do so by circumstantial evidence, including a distributor's supply of the products to the plant. A trial court may not set aside a jury verdict and resubmit an issue when the evidence supports a reasonable inference for the jury's finding.
• Sholtis v. American Cyanamid Co. (1989). To defeat summary judgment in an asbestos case, a plaintiff must show exposure to a defendant's friable asbestos that was a substantial factor in causing the disease, shown by exposure of sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity, usually with expert proof linking the exposure to the condition. Market-share and similar collective liability theories do not apply to this cumulative-exposure case.

New York

• Caligiuri v. AO Smith Corp. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment on causation must affirmatively establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; competing expert causation evidence raises a question of fact that precludes summary judgment.
• Caligiuri v. AO Smith Corp. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must affirmatively prove as a matter of law that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; an industrial hygienist's exposure opinion without medical causation evidence does not meet that burden, and competing expert evidence raises a fact question.
• Seen v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2024). A pain and suffering award that deviates materially from reasonable compensation under CPLR 5501(c) must be reduced or retried, and under General Obligations Law § 15-108 settlement amounts paid by settling defendants are deducted from the total award, with specified offsets for a settling defendant on the verdict sheet.
• Pefanis v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2024). On summary judgment in an asbestos case, the defendant must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; conflicting testimony and competing expert opinions raise fact issues that preclude judgment.
• Pira v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment on causation must affirmatively prove as a matter of law that there was no causation, not merely argue the plaintiff cannot prove it; competing expert evidence on exposure and causation raises a fact question.
• Bassier v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment must affirmatively establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot simply argue the plaintiff lacks proof. Plaintiff's deposition testimony identifying the product is enough to raise a fact issue.
• Campise v. Arkema, Inc. (Erie, 2023). Under the Parker and Nemeth test, an expert who estimates exposure levels from peer-reviewed data and compares them to levels shown to cause mesothelioma raises a triable issue of causation without precise quantification. Punitive damages require proof of recklessness or conscious disregard of others' rights.
• Gold v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2023). On summary judgment in the First Department, the moving defendant must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; Revlon did not meet that burden given the decedent's product-identification testimony and its lack of evidence that its product could not have contained asbestos.
• Hollingsworth v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2023). On summary judgment in an asbestos case, a defendant must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot merely argue that plaintiff failed to prove causation.
• Horvath v. AW Chesterton Co. (2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the injury. A plaintiff's deposition testimony identifying the product and the years of exposure raises a fact question for the jury, even if one statement is unclear.
• Howard v. AO Smith Water Prods. (3rd Dept., 2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must affirmatively show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and cannot merely point to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. Testimony that a plaintiff encountered the defendant's pumps, together with routine overhauls, raised a fact issue.
• Munoz v. AO Smith Water Prods. CO (2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; arguing that the plaintiff cannot prove causation is not enough, and a non-case-specific expert affidavit does not meet that burden.
• Sason v. Dykes Lumber Co., Inc. (1st Dept., 2023). To establish specific causation, a plaintiff must give a scientific expression linking actual asbestos exposure to a level known to cause mesothelioma. Competing expert evidence on that point raises a fact issue that defeats summary judgment.
• Sides v. Advance Auto Parts Inc. (2023). A defendant meets its summary judgment burden by showing that the exposure witness never identified its product, and the plaintiff must then produce admissible evidence of a triable issue of fact; speculation or unsubstantiated assertions are not enough.
• Barbarino v. BASF Catalysts LLC (2022). A summary judgment movant must first establish a prima facie case that its product could not have contributed to the injury; it cannot meet that burden merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.
• Gartner v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2022). A summary judgment movant must affirmatively prove its entitlement to judgment rather than point to gaps in the opponent's proof. A conclusory affidavit lacking personal knowledge, and exposure evidence that does not address the specific product and work setting, does not meet that burden.
• Katechis v. Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp. (2022). A defendant's summary judgment motion fails where it rests on a deposition from an unrelated case that is inadmissible against the plaintiff under CPLR 3117, and the plaintiff's own testimony identifying the defendant as a supplier raises a factual question for the jury.
• Pritt v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Minimal exposure, or exposure only to another maker's component, is not enough. Maritime law also allows loss of consortium and punitive damages in a non-Jones Act claim.
• Theophil v. AO Smith Water Prods. CO (2022). On summary judgment the movant must first show no triable issue, and viewing the evidence favorably to the plaintiff, presence near spray operations and a contractor's possible supervisory control over the injury-producing work raise fact issues.
• Theophil v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2022). A defendant seeking summary judgment on specific causation must show actual exposure levels tied to its own product and the plaintiff's work setting; an expert's worst-case theoretical assumptions, such as those based on the inverse square law, do not meet that burden.
• Theophil v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2022). A summary judgment movant cannot meet its prima facie burden merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and may not cure that failure with new evidence in reply. Personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) was shown by O'Connor's New York business and use of New York real property connected to the alleged exposure.
• Unger v. AW Chesterton Co. (2022). A defendant moving for summary judgment cannot meet its burden by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. It must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the injury. Under the NYCAL case management order, a pending motion does not automatically stay discovery.
• Berger v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (2021). Conflicting expert evidence on whether talc contained asbestos and caused the disease raises fact issues defeating summary judgment on causation. A bulk supplier that adequately warned the intermediary manufacturer, a sophisticated user, has no duty to warn the end user of the intermediary's finished products.
• Camiolo v. American Biltrite Inc. (2021). In an asbestos action, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment absent proof that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos from its products, but a defendant's prima facie showing fails to win summary judgment where the opposition raises fact issues about product identification and whether its tiles contained asbestos.
• Esposito v. Abb, Inc. (2021). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot meet that burden by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.
• Greene v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (2021). Conflicting expert opinions on whether chrysotile exposure from the defendant's product can cause mesothelioma raise credibility issues that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. A Frye hearing is not warranted where the defendant has not shown the plaintiff's expert methods lack general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.
• Johnson v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (2021). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show affirmatively that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; merely pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof does not meet that burden.
• Kriz v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (Rockland, 2021). An asbestos defendant seeking summary judgment must first show that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and cannot meet that burden by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. A duty to warn in a take-home exposure case can extend to a roommate who lived in close quarters with the worker.
• Love v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (2021). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; testimony identifying the defendant's products and the dust they created raised a fact issue. A successor holding the brand's assets only for a set period is not liable for products sold by other entities outside that period.
• Milan-Leal v. Brenntag N. AM. (2021). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the injury, and it cannot meet that burden by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. Strict liability may be imposed on retailers, and indemnification claims are premature until the underlying claims are resolved.
• Mrjaj v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (Erie, 2021). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where plaintiffs offer no evidence creating a reasonable inference that the decedent was exposed to and inhaled asbestos fibers from that defendant's product, even if the company named in a document is presumed to be the defendant.
• Phelps v. CBS Corporation (2021). Under maritime law and Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a boiler manufacturer has a duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts only if its product requires incorporation of the part, and plaintiff offered no admissible evidence that the boilers required asbestos insulation.
• Sprague v. Abb, Inc. (2021). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot meet that burden merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.