Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New York

• Decanio v. Kohler Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A boiler maker seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the injury. Removing parts from boilers already disassembled by other trade workers was not shown to be an unforeseeable use or misuse, so that question was for a jury.
• Young v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; conflicting expert affidavits on general and specific causation raise issues of fact for trial, and plaintiffs need only show facts from which liability may reasonably be inferred.
• Lewis v. QCP (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot get summary judgment in an asbestos case by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the disease, and conflicting testimony raises credibility issues that cannot be resolved on papers.
• Licul v. Mario DiBono Plastering Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). On summary judgment in an asbestos case, the plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred, and a witness's inability to give exact details or contradictory testimony raises credibility issues for the trier of fact.
• Leavitt v. Rogers Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show facts from which exposure to the defendant's product may reasonably be inferred, and a defendant's conclusory sales-record affidavit does not meet its prima facie burden. Specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) exists where the defendant's sales of its product into New York have an articulable nexus to the plaintiff's claim.
• Marzigliano v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the illness, and conflicting expert reports on general and specific causation raise issues of fact for trial.
• Linsky v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof and must show its product did not contribute to the illness. Conflicting expert opinions on whether chrysotile causes mesothelioma and on exposure level raise fact issues that cannot be resolved on papers.
• Ombramonti v. Morse Diesel (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof; plaintiff need only show facts and conditions from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred, and conflicting testimony raises credibility issues for a jury.
• Stock v. Jenkins Bros. (IN the Matter of the Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation) (Erie, 2019). A manufacturer has a duty to warn of dangers from the known and reasonably foreseeable use of its product with a third-party product needed for it to function as intended. Specific causation does not require precise quantification of dose, only evidence that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of the agent known to cause the harm.
• Leavitt v. AO Smith Water Prods., Co. (2019). Specific long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) exists where the defendant supplied asbestos-containing product to a New York facility where the plaintiff was allegedly exposed. A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and conflicting testimony raises credibility issues for trial.
• Matter of Fischer v. American Biltrite, Inc. (2019). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff cannot show facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the plaintiff was exposed to an asbestos-containing product the defendant manufactured, distributed, sold or installed.
• Matter of Marzigliano v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiffs' proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the illness, and conflicting expert evidence on causation raises fact issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Yavner v. Fulton Boiler Works (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and conflicting testimony about dates raises credibility issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Macaluso v. A.O. Smith Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2019). A jury's findings of exposure and recklessness stand if supported by legally sufficient evidence, but damages awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation under CPLR 5501(c) must be reduced or retried.
• Fischer v. Burnham (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Leave to renew requires new facts and a valid excuse for not presenting them earlier; leave to reargue requires a showing that the court overlooked or misapplied facts or law. A defendant meets its summary judgment burden by showing the plaintiff cannot identify its products as a source of exposure.
• Moldow v. AI Friedman, LP (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the disease. Conflicting expert affidavits on general and specific causation raise credibility issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Schwartz v. Advance Auto Supply (2019). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the injury, and a plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred; an uncertain store location raises a credibility question for the jury.
• Shanahan v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (1st Dept., 2019). Even assuming the defendant made a prima facie showing that its product could not have caused the injury, the plaintiff raised triable fact issues through testimony of exposure to the named product and documents contradicting the defendant's account of where and when it sold asbestos-core doors.
• Smith v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc. (2019). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the injury; conflicting expert and testimonial evidence on exposure and causation raises credibility issues that cannot be resolved on papers.
• Cohen v. American Biltrite Inc. (2018). On a summary judgment motion, a defendant must affirmatively show that exposure to asbestos in its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's mesothelioma or was insufficient to do so; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's evidence does not meet that burden, and conflicting expert findings raise fact issues.
• Hooper-Lynch v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof is not enough. Conflicting expert evidence on exposure and causation raises fact issues for trial.
• Hooper-Lynch v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2018). A defendant moving for summary judgment on causation must unequivocally establish through admissible evidence that its product could not have contributed to the injury. Conflicting expert evidence on whether the talc contained asbestos raises credibility issues for a jury.
• Germain v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and conflicting expert evidence on whether talc contained asbestos and caused mesothelioma raises fact issues for a jury. Plaintiffs need only show facts from which liability may be reasonably inferred.
• Rothlein v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and conflicting expert evidence on whether talc products contained asbestos and caused the disease raises fact issues for trial. Unsworn expert reports may be considered in opposition if other admissible evidence is also submitted, and a court may consider late sworn affidavits absent prejudice.
• Isernia v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Expert reports that cite unannexed studies or are conclusory do not meet the Parker and Cornell foundation standards, and a defendant cannot succeed merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.
• Swanson v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and cannot do so with conclusory expert reports lacking a scientific foundation or by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof.
• Macaluso v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A jury verdict is set aside only if it could not be reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence, but damages that deviate materially from reasonable compensation must be reduced. A boiler maker has a duty to warn of asbestos hazards from foreseeable removal of its boilers and the asbestos components used with them.
• Chen v. Volkswagen Group of America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A New York court may exercise long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3) over out-of-state car makers where the plaintiff raises a fact issue that their asbestos-containing parts injured him in New York and due process is met. Defendants did not carry the heavy burden of showing the balance of factors strongly favored dismissal for forum non conveniens.
• Juni v. Ford Motor Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Viewing the evidence in plaintiff's favor, it was legally insufficient to establish that Ford's conduct was a proximate cause of the decedent's mesothelioma under Parker v Mobil Oil Corp. and Cornell v 360 W. 51st St. Realty, so Ford was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under CPLR 4404 (a).
• Shulman v. Brenntag N. AM., Inc. (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and speculative or conclusory expert affidavits fail that burden. Conflicting expert evidence on whether talc was contaminated with asbestos raises fact issues for trial.
• Krok v. The Nash Engineering Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2017). A defendant seeking summary judgment must first show prima facie that the decedent could not have been exposed to its products or their asbestos; the decedent's inability to identify the defendant's product as a source of exposure does not meet that burden.
• O'connor v. Aerco International, Inc. (3rd Dept., 2017). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must first show its products could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof is not enough. At summary judgment the defendant also bears the initial burden on specific causation (Parker).
• Seabridge v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. (Albany, 2017). In an asbestos case, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need not show the precise cause of the injury, only facts and conditions from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred.
• Snedeker v. Arvinmeritor, Inc. (Broome, 2017). In an asbestos case a defendant moving for summary judgment must first make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot meet that burden by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.
• Hernandez-Vega v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2016). A defendant cannot obtain summary judgment by pointing to gaps or equivocation in a plaintiff's product-identification testimony; it must offer affirmative evidence, and discrepancies in the plaintiff's description of the product are credibility issues for the jury.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). Whether New York or New Jersey law applies, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at levels known to cause the disease. A single one-to-three-hour exposure within a long career of exposure is insufficient, and the wrongful death claims fail with the underlying claims.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product, and a pump maker has no duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts used with its pumps absent evidence it had an active role, interest or influence in their use. Under maritime and New York law alike, wrongful death claims fail if the underlying liability claims fail.
• Battistoni v. ITW Food Equipment Group (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its products could not have contributed to the injury. Under Parker, plaintiff's experts need not quantify exposure precisely, and whether exposure was a substantial factor is for the jury.
• DeMartino v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). A defendant seeking summary judgment must affirmatively show that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; a conclusory affidavit from a witness lacking personal knowledge of the relevant period, or pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, does not meet that burden.
• Bartolone v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). A defendant cannot obtain summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's product identification proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the injury, and conflicts over a witness's description of a product are for the jury. Under Parker, an expert may rely on work history and product asbestos content without precisely quantifying exposure.
• Koulermos v. O'Connor Constructors (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2016). A defendant moving for summary judgment in a New York asbestos case must affirmatively show its work could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's evidence is not enough.
• Miller v. Hennessy Indus. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2016). A manufacturer that knew its product would mainly be used with asbestos-containing brakes and designed it for that use may be held to have a duty to warn. Visible dust from an asbestos-containing product can support expert testimony on specific causation of mesothelioma without precise dose quantification.
• Gonzales v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2015). A manufacturer of a safe (bare metal) product may have a duty to warn about asbestos components used with it if it had a sufficiently significant role, interest, or influence in the type of component used after the product entered the stream of commerce; evidence of such a role raises a triable issue.
• Koulermos v. Treadwell Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2015). A defendant moving for summary judgment must first make a prima facie showing of no material issue of fact; failing that, and given factual disputes over when the plaintiff worked at the site and whether he worked alongside the defendant's employees, cross-claims cannot be dismissed.
• Hernandez-Vega v. Fisher Controls Int'l (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A defendant moving for summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and personal jurisdiction defenses not raised in a pre-answer motion or the answer are waived under CPLR 3211(e). A valve maker with a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos parts used with its valves may be liable even if the valve was "bare metal."
• Ricci v. Cleaver-Brooks (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally show that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Weighing the credibility of equivocal product-identification testimony is a jury function, not a basis for summary judgment.
• Ricci v. Crane Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A valve maker has no duty to warn about other makers' asbestos components unless it had a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the components used with its product. A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally show that its product could not have contributed to the injury, and weighing equivocal identification testimony is for the jury.
• Smyth v. Crane Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A defendant moving for summary judgment in an asbestos case must first make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; Crane did not, and plaintiff's deposition testimony also raised fact issues for a jury.
• Assenzio v. Burnham (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A verdict is set aside as a matter of law only where no valid line of reasoning could support it. Testimony on cumulative asbestos exposure, together with evidence of exposure to the defendant's equipment, can establish causation under New York's Frye standard. Awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation must be reduced.
• Galasso v. BF Goodrich (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2015). A defendant that made both asbestos-containing and asbestos-free products must eliminate the possibility that plaintiff was exposed to the asbestos-containing product, and it must account for residual marketplace use after it stopped making it. Equivocal identification testimony raises credibility issues for the jury.