Seabridge v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. (2017)

Our plain-English summary of Seabridge v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. (New York Supreme Court, May 9, 2017).

Tammy Seabridge, executrix of the estate of Robert Miles, and Delora Miles sued Kelsey-Hayes Company and others in Albany County. They sought damages for Mr. Miles's injuries and wrongful death from asbestos exposure. He was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in November 2015 and died later that month at about age 74. He was alleged to have been exposed to friction products while working as a parts person and parts manager for Fruehauf Corporation in Albany from 1956 to 1990. He died before being deposed, so a co-worker testified about his exposure. Kelsey-Hayes moved for summary judgment, arguing that no one had identified it or tied its products to Mr. Miles. The plaintiffs and co-defendant Carlisle opposed. They pointed to Kelsey-Hayes's own discovery responses saying Fruehauf was now known as Kelsey-Hayes, and to testimony and documents about the friction materials. The court said a plaintiff need only show facts from which liability can reasonably be inferred. It found a material issue of fact about whether Kelsey-Hayes contributed to the injury and death, and denied the motion.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: New York Supreme Court, Albany
• Decided: May 9, 2017
• Citation: 2017 NY Slip Op 33518(U)
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: New York

Outcome. The trial court denied Kelsey-Hayes Company's motion for summary judgment, finding a material issue of fact about whether it contributed to Robert Miles's injury and death, so the plaintiffs' claims against it continue.

What the court held. In an asbestos case, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need not show the precise cause of the injury, only facts and conditions from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred.

Issues decided: Wrongful Death and Survival, Premises Owner Liability, Product Identification.

The people and their exposure

• Robert W. Miles: mesothelioma; died

The defendants

• Kelsey-Hayes Company
• Carlisle Industrial Brake & Friction, Inc. (manufacturer)

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Reid v. Georgia-Pac. Corp. (New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1st Dept., 1995). The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Rapid-American Corporation's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Kenneth Reid's claim against it continues.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

2017 NY Slip Op 33518(U)

TAMMY SEABRIDGE, as Executrix of the Estate of ROBERT W. MILES, deceased, and DELORA

MILES, Individually, Plaintiffs,

v.

KELSEY-HAYES COMPANY, etal., Defendants.

Index No. 2015-901593, RJI No. 01-16-119546.

May 9, 2017.

Supreme Court, Albany County.

DECISION AND ORDER

RICHARD T. AULISI, Justice of the Supreme Court.

The plaintiffs, Tammy Seabridge, as Executrix of the Estate of Robert Miles and Delora Miles, commenced the within action to recover damages for personal injuries and the wrongful death of Robert Miles, as a result of his exposure to various asbestos containing products and materials. The plaintiffs commenced this action on or about December 28, 2015, by filing a Summons and Complaint in the Albany County Clerk's Office. Issue was subsequently joined and discovery has been conducted pursuant to an expedited discovery schedule.

Robert Miles was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in November of 1015. Mr Miles died on November 23, 2015. He was approximately 74 years of age at the time of his death.

The defendant, Kelsey-Hayes Company (hereinafter the defendant), has now made a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and all cross-claims asserted against it, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212. The defendant seeks summary judgment on the theory that the plaintiffs have been unable to identify or prove exposure to any asbestos-containing material or product attributable to the defendant.

It is alleged that the decedent, Robert Miles, was exposed to asbestos-containing materials while working as a parts person and parts manager for Fruehauf Corporation (Fruehauf) in Albany, New York from 1956 to 1990. Mr. Miles passed away prior to being deposed. A co-worker of his, Joe Hannon, was deposed and offered testimony as to Mr. Miles asbestos exposure. Mr. Hannon was employed by Fruehauf from 1967 to 1992. He testified that Robert Miles was exposed to various types of friction products at Fruehauf, and that these friction products were supplied by Fruehauf's central distribution Center in Westerville, Ohio.

The defendant seeks summary judgment alleging that it was never adequately identified in this action. The defendant asserts that at no time during the discovery phase of this action has the name Kelsey-Hayes been mentioned. The defendant further argues that because neither Mr. Miles nor either of his co-workers identified Kelsey-Hayes, the proof is insufficient to impose liability upon it.

A proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact. (Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In the context of an asbestos case, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the causation of plaintiff's injury. (Comeau v. W.R. Grace & Co., 216 AD2d 79, 80 [1st Dept. 1995]); (Reid v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 212 AD2d 462 [1st Dept. 1995]).

The Court also notes that since this is a summary judgment motion, it must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. (Salerno v. Garlock, Inc., 212 Ad2d 463, 464 [1st Dept. 1995]); (Goff v. Clark, 302 AD2d 725 [3rd Dept. 2003]).

The defendant, Carlisle Industrial Brake & Friction, Inc. (Carlisle), and the plaintiffs, have both opposed the defendant's summary judgment motion. They both claim that there is sufficient proof in the record to establish the identification of the

defendant, Kelsey-Hayes. In particular they point to the defendant Kelsey-Hayes' discovery responses in which it states that Fruehauf Corporation is "now known as the Kelsey-Hayes Company"[1] The plaintiffs assert that the testimony of Mr. Miles two co-workers, coupled with the various documents submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion, clearly identify the moving defendant was not only a premises owner where Mr. Miles worked, but also a supplier/distributor of the asbestos containing friction materials.

A plaintiff can successfully defeat a summary judgment motion by raising a material issue of fact and, once again, when this standard is applied to asbestos litigation, it has been held that plaintiff need not show the precise causes of his damages but only facts and conditions from which defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred. (Lloyd v. W.R. Grace & Co., 215 AD2d 177 [1st Dept 1995]); also see (In Re New York City Asbestos Litigation v. A.C. & S., 7 AD3rd 285 [1st Dept. 2004]). (In Re Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation v. Amechem Products, Inc., 32 AD3rd 1268 [4th Dept. 2006]). Based on the record before it, the Court finds that there is a material issue of fact with regard to the defendant's liability and whether it contributed to the causation of injury and subsequent death of the decedent, Robert Miles. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied, without costs.

This writing shall constitute the Decision and Order or this Court.

[1] Exhibit "E" Carlisle's opp. Papers.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• New York asbestos laws
• New York asbestos exposure sites