Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Florida

• Rich v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. (4th District, 2012). Florida Statute 90.804(2)(a) does not require strict privity between a party and a "predecessor in interest" for former testimony of an unavailable witness to be admitted; it is enough that the earlier party had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony.
• Celotex Corp. v. Copeland (1985). Market share liability is not needed, and the court did not adopt it, where the plaintiff can identify at least some manufacturers of the products that injured him. When a progressive asbestos disease manifested itself is a fact question that summary judgment cannot resolve.
• Copeland v. Celotex Corp. (3rd District, 1984). A complaint alleging long-term cumulative exposure to asbestos products need not plead a specific time and place of exposure. Where the plaintiff cannot identify which manufacturer's product caused the injury, the court adopted market share liability, applied through Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(2) in asbestosis cases.

Georgia

• Sinyard v. Georgia Power Company (2022). A premises owner that contracts to build for co-owners is a statutory employer immune from tort suit for that construction work. Otherwise, whether a premises owner had superior knowledge of the specific asbestos hazard, and whether it relinquished possession and control to the worker's contractor, are jury questions unless the worker's own employer had equal knowledge.
• Davis v. John Crane, Inc. (2019). In Georgia a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos-containing products for which the defendant is responsible, and a plaintiff's own testimony from personal knowledge can meet that burden. A pump manufacturer is not liable for design or failure to warn over asbestos-containing replacement parts made by others (bare metal defense).
• Farmer v. Air and Liquid Systems Corporation (2018). Under Georgia law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos-containing products the defendant made or supplied, or to a defendant's product that required an asbestos component to function. A successor that agreed to provide maintenance or repair services for a predecessor's products may be liable for failing to warn under Restatement (Third) of Torts § 13.
• Hanson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2018). Expert opinion is unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert when the expert did not record data that would let others test his work and skipped a step needed to rule out false positives. Other experts cannot rely on an opinion the court has excluded or repeat findings outside their own expertise.
• Hanson v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2018). Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product, at a level greater than de minimis. Evidence that some samples of a product contained asbestos, with nothing tying them to the plaintiff's own product, does not create a jury issue. Punitive damages fail when the underlying tort claims fail.
• Thurmon v. Georgia Pacific, LLC (2016). Under Georgia law, negligent design and failure-to-warn claims both require proof that the defendant's own product, as originally sold, proximately caused the injury. Exposure to third-party asbestos gaskets used on the defendant's valves was not enough, and the court did not need to adopt a general 'bare metal defense'.
• Thurmon v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2014). Predicting how the Georgia Supreme Court would rule, the court held that Georgia recognizes the bare metal defense, so a valve manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in replacement gaskets and packing it did not manufacture, supply or design, and plaintiffs must show exposure to the defendant's own product.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos product, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply; a parent or successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent facts supporting piercing the corporate veil.
• Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields (2013). A party may rely on allegations and admissions in the opposing party's pleadings as evidence to contest summary judgment, even if later amended or withdrawn, and an appellate court cannot affirm on a ground such as causation that the movant never raised in its summary judgment motion.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Fields (2012). A defendant cannot have fault allocated to a nonparty under OCGA § 51-12-33 unless it presents competent evidence that the nonparty's product actually contributed to the plaintiff's injury; inference, unverified allegations, or settled status alone are not enough. An employer owes no duty for take-home exposure, so it bears no allocable fault.
• Butler v. Union Carbide Corporation (2011). A trial court does not abuse its discretion under OCGA § 24-9-67.1 and Daubert by excluding an expert's 'any exposure above background' specific causation opinion as unreliable, and without that expert evidence a toxic tort plaintiff cannot show specific causation to survive summary judgment.
• Adamson v. General Elec. Co. (2010). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the plaintiff's work location and that the plaintiff was in proximity to it while it was being used; generalized or speculative testimony is not enough.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Highsmith (2004). The court followed the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in John Crane v. Jones in rejecting the requested "substantial" contributing factor charge. It also held that a jury verdict stands if any evidence supports it, and that the evidence of defect and exposure was sufficient.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Jones (2003). A trial court need not charge that exposure to a defendant's product must be a 'substantial' contributing factor; Georgia's joint tortfeasor rule requires only that the defendant's negligence be a contributing cause. A verdict will be upheld if any evidence supports it.
• Williams v. Flintkote Co. (2002). To survive summary judgment, an asbestos plaintiff must show that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the job site and that the plaintiff was in proximity to it while it was used; the court declined to adopt a presumption of exposure from merely working at a site where the defendant's products were used.
• Hoffman v. AC&S, Inc. (2001). A plaintiff in an asbestos case must present non-speculative evidence that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the job site while the exposed person was nearby; testimony that a defendant's products were used at the site at some unspecified time during the 1960s is insufficient. An expert's general opinion that workers were exposed to asbestos products does not supply the missing link to a particular defendant.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Wommack (1997). A jury verdict approved by the trial judge must be affirmed if any evidence supports it. Here there was evidence that the manufacturer knew or should have known of asbestos hazards, owed a duty to warn, that its packing released respirable fibers in foreseeable use, and that it contributed to the plaintiff's disease.
• Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. (1982). Georgia law does not recognize market share or industrywide liability, which would shift the burden of proving causation, and employees of a purchaser lack the privity required for an implied warranty claim. A fraud claim against asbestos manufacturers can proceed if the plaintiffs show the manufacturer of their particular product took part in the alleged misrepresentations.

Hawaii

• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2014). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos product as a substantial factor, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply. A parent corporation or its successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent a showing supporting veil-piercing.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A manufacturer has no duty to warn about, and is not liable for, asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not manufacture or distribute.

Idaho

• Stephens v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (2018). Field preemption under the Locomotive Inspection Act is an affirmative defense that is waived if not pleaded, not a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. A plaintiff must prove exposure as a threshold matter and must produce evidence that the defendant's asbestos was a substantial factor in causing the disease.

Illinois

• Pelton v. John Crane, Inc. (2024). Under maritime law, a plaintiff may show substantial-factor causation through admissible general expert testimony plus circumstantial evidence of substantial exposure over a substantial period, without expert testimony specific to the defendant's product. The Second Restatement's consumer-expectations test still governs maritime strict liability, and punitive damages remain available as a remedy even though willful and wanton conduct is not a separate cause of action.
• Krumwiede v. Tremco, Inc. (4th District, 2020). Under Illinois's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show more than de minimis exposure to respirable asbestos fibers released from the defendant's product; proof of frequent contact with a product merely capable of releasing fibers is not enough.
• Campbell v. Acme Insulations, Inc. (1st District, 6th Division, 2018). A nonresident corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is "at home," and specific jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum and the plaintiff's specific claims, which the plaintiff must support with competent evidence; registered-agent status and unrelated Illinois business do not amount to consent, and the court declined to adopt "jurisdiction by necessity."
• Startley v. Welco Mfg. Co. (1st District, 2nd Division, 2017). Under Illinois's frequency, regularity and proximity test, which is less rigid for mesothelioma, testimony that a worker used a defendant's joint compound on some jobs, backed by expert evidence that low exposures contribute to the disease, can let a jury find a substantial factor. The injury occurred in Illinois, so Illinois law presumptively applies.
• Hasenberg v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd. (2015). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may use circumstantial evidence to show exposure to a defendant's asbestos-containing products. Evidence that the defendant made the pumps and sold asbestos-containing replacement parts to the Navy was enough to create a genuine fact issue.
• McALVEY v. Atlas Copco Compressors, LLC (2015). Under Illinois and maritime law, a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence, such as coworker testimony and proximity to the defendant's product, to show exposure, and need not identify the specific maker of replacement parts.
• Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. (2014). Under Illinois law, an asbestos plaintiff need only show through the frequency, regularity and proximity test that exposure to the defendant's product was a substantial factor contributing to the disease, not that it was sufficient alone to cause it. Evidence of the exact dose is not required.
• Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Company (2014). Maritime law governs asbestos exposure during work on a Navy vessel. A valve maker may owe a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets and packing supplied by others where its valves needed asbestos components to function and those parts would be replaced with similar materials, but it owes no such duty for third-party insulation it did not supply.
• Gillenwater v. Honeywell Intern., Inc. (4th District, 2013). A civil conspiracy proved only by circumstantial evidence needs clear and convincing proof, and parallel conduct that has a reasonable nonconspiratorial explanation is not enough. A manufacturer owes no duty to a worker's future spouse for an asbestos exposure that occurred before the marriage, so her consortium claim fails.
• Zickuhr v. Ericsson, Inc. (1st District, 6th Division, 2011). In an asbestos case a plaintiff shows causation by the frequency, regularity and proximity of exposure to the defendant's asbestos product, without proof of the exact quantity of fibers; the jury's credibility choices on product identification stand where evidence supports them.
• Caruso v. M & O Insulation Co. (4th District, 2003). A directed verdict is improper where there is some evidence, including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences, that the defendant sold asbestos-containing products to the plant, and where witness credibility is decisive.
• Spain v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. (4th District, 1999). Once a plaintiff shows frequency, regularity and proximity of exposure to the defendant's asbestos product, the defendant is presumed a proximate cause and may not introduce evidence of other asbestos exposures unless it files contribution actions against those other manufacturers. Under amended Rule 213, the treating physician exception to opinion disclosure no longer exists.
• Costa v. Dresser Industries, Inc. (3rd District, 1994). Expert testimony from a witness disclosed months before trial was properly admitted under Illinois Rule 220 even though the plaintiff never served Rule 220 interrogatories, and consulting experts are discoverable only on a showing of exceptional circumstances. An instruction that mere presence of a product at a work site is insufficient to show exposure was erroneous but harmless where the jury found no mesothelioma.
• Hartman v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (5th District, 1994). Circumstantial evidence of regular exposure to the defendant's asbestos product over several months, together with medical evidence, can support an inference that the product probably caused mesothelioma. Trial courts keep discretion over sanctions for late expert disclosure under Rule 220, and a settlement may be allocated to a spouse who signed the releases, so that part is not set off against the verdict.
• Thacker v. Unr Industries, Inc. (1992). In asbestos cases a plaintiff must show frequency, regularity and proximity of exposure to the defendant's asbestos. Fiber drift evidence can meet the proximity element, and it need not come from expert testimony.
• Thacker v. Unr Industries, Inc. (4th District, 1991). Evidence that asbestos dust from all sources drifted through the plant, combined with testimony that slight contact with asbestos could cause cancer, created a jury question on whether Manville asbestos was a proximate cause. Claims of error not raised in the post-trial motion in a jury case are waived under Rule 366(b)(2)(iii).
• Wehmeier v. Unr Industries, Inc. (4th District, 1991). In asbestos cases Illinois courts apply the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test for causation. Expert fiber-drift evidence can establish the proximity prong but cannot alone support an inference of causation.
• Leng v. Celotex Corp. (1st District, 1990). Illinois does not recognize market share liability in asbestos cases, so a plaintiff who cannot identify the manufacturers of the asbestos products that caused the injury fails to state a cause of action under that theory.
• Naden v. Celotex Corp. (1st District, 1989). A plaintiff must show more than a mere possibility of exposure to a defendant's product; circumstantial evidence must support an inference of probability, not speculation. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to delay a summary judgment ruling for late discovery requests.
• H & H Plumbing Co. v. Indus. Comm'n (5th District, 1988). The Commission's finding of asbestos exposure and an occupational disease could rest on lay testimony, circumstantial evidence and a test of a similar blanket, and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The employer in whose employment the worker was last exposed is liable even if earlier exposure also contributed.

Indiana

• Hedden v. CBS Corporation (2015). Maritime law applies to asbestos exposure aboard a Navy ship, and the two-disease rule governs under maritime law. Kentucky law governs the non-maritime claims, and its one-disease rule bars a mesothelioma suit after an earlier suit over asbestosis.
• Asbestos Corporation Limited v. Akaiwa (2007). A plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to support an inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from the defendant's product. Review of summary judgment is limited to the materials designated to the trial court, so evidence first offered on appeal is not considered.
• Black v. ACandS, Inc. (2001). The asbestos exception to the ten-year products liability statute of repose, Ind. Code 34-20-3-2, applies to persons who mined commercial asbestos and to persons who sold it without mining it. A plaintiff must produce evidence supporting an inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from the specific defendant's product.
• Parks v. AP Green Industries, Inc. (2001). A plaintiff must produce evidence supporting a non-speculative inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from the defendant's product. Indiana's asbestos exception to the ten-year statute of repose reaches those who mine or sell commercial asbestos, and a later-developed asbestos disease such as lung cancer is a new injury with its own two-year period.
• Spoonamore v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1999). A plaintiff must produce evidence that he inhaled asbestos from the defendant's product. Indiana's asbestos exception to the ten-year statute of repose applies only to defendants that both mined and sold commercial asbestos. Where the repose period has run on the underlying product claims, a wrongful death claim based on them is also barred.
• Spoonamore v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1998). Indiana's asbestos exception to the ten-year product liability statute of repose applies only to defendants that both mined and sold commercial asbestos. Where the exception does not apply and the repose period has run, the underlying product claims and the wrongful death claim based on them are barred.