Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Indiana

• Harris v. AC & S, Inc. (1995). Under the Seventh Circuit's Peerman decision, a plaintiff must produce evidence supporting an inference that the decedent inhaled asbestos dust from the defendant's product, meaning the product as used at the job site could possibly have produced a significant amount of dust that might have been inhaled. Generic trade-name identification does not identify a particular manufacturer, and affidavits that contradict deposition testimony are disregarded.
• Knox v. AC & S, Inc. (1988). CERCLA § 9658's discovery rule applies only where a state claim accompanies an underlying CERCLA action for a release into the environment, so it does not preempt Indiana's products liability statute of repose, which bars asbestos claims based on products delivered more than the repose period before suit.

Iowa

• Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc. (2022). Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) codifies a broad component-parts (bare-metal) defense that applies only to products liability claims, shielding manufacturers or sellers from liability for products or parts made or sold by third parties. It does not bar premises liability claims or claims against a seller of the offending product.
• Kinseth v. Weil-McLain (2018). A new trial is warranted when counsel's closing argument, viewed as a whole, repeatedly and deliberately violates an in-limine order and likely changed the result. Punitive damages under Beeman do not require proof that the defendant's conduct differed from its peers if the defendant had specific knowledge of the hazard.
• Huber v. Watson (1997). In a legal malpractice suit over an asbestos case, the plaintiff must show the underlying suit would have succeeded. Contract specifications naming asbestos products, together with evidence of the manufacturers' corporate successors, gave a jury enough to find product exposure and proximate cause. The state-of-the-art defense does not bar failure-to-warn claims based on later-acquired knowledge.
• Perrin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994). Under Iowa law, evidence that a defendant's asbestos products were in stock at shipyards and used on ships generally shows only a possibility of exposure and cannot support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff was exposed to them aboard his ship. Iowa has not adopted a burden-shifting rule for asbestos cases.
• Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994). Asbestos plaintiffs may prove causation under a flexible substantial-factor test, with circumstantial evidence of exposure to the defendant's product, without proving how much that product contributed to the disease. Punitive damages in asbestos cases are not per se unconstitutional, and the defendant bears the burden of showing a due process violation.
• Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Fund (1993). Evidence of cancer risk from asbestos is admissible to show a manufacturer's duty to warn and the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear of cancer, and proof of exposure plus cumulative-effect expert testimony can create a jury question on proximate cause. Knowledge sufficient to trigger a duty to warn does not by itself support punitive damages, and Iowa law does not allow a separate award for lost opportunity to live out a full life expectancy.

Kansas

• Menne v. Celotex Corp. (1986). Predicting Nebraska law under Erie, the court held that Nebraska would adopt alternative liability (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B), so once an asbestos plaintiff shows exposure to defendants' products and resulting injury, the burden shifts to each defendant to prove its product did not contribute, failing which the defendants are jointly and severally liable.

Kentucky

• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2021). Under Kentucky's substantial-factor test, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A cumulative-dose opinion tied to the defendant's specific products, as distinct from the rejected each-and-every-exposure theory, can create a jury question. A seller that relines used brake shoes alters them and falls outside the Kentucky Middleman Statute.
• Landreth v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2017). A plaintiff must offer direct or circumstantial evidence showing a reasonable probability of actual exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos product that was a substantial cause of the disease. Evidence showing only a possibility of exposure, or equal likelihood of exposure to another maker's product, does not defeat summary judgment.
• Surita v. Arvinmeritor, Inc. (2017). Under Kentucky law, negligence, strict liability, warranty and misrepresentation claims all require proof that each defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the harm, meaning a probable rather than merely possible cause.
• Mannahan v. Eaton Corporation (2016). In an asbestos case the plaintiff must show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that it was probable and not merely possible that he was exposed to the particular defendant's product. Evidence that a defendant's products may have reached the worksite, when other suppliers were equally possible sources, leaves a jury to speculate and does not defeat summary judgment.
• Anderson v. Motorola Solutions, Inc. (2015). In an asbestos case, circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant's asbestos-containing products were in the same place at the same time and that inhaling the fibers was a substantial factor in the disease is enough to reach a jury on causation and product identification.
• Stallings v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation (2015). Under both maritime law and Kentucky law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at a level high enough to make a finding of substantial causation more than conjecture. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in other makers' replacement parts, and an expert opinion that any exposure is a substantial cause does not meet that standard.
• Durham v. Ford Motor Company (2014). A premises owner has a duty to warn independent contractors' employees of asbestos only if it knew of the danger and the contractor lacked actual or constructive knowledge, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that. Under Kentucky's up-the-ladder immunity, an owner is immune for work that is regular or recurrent to its business.
• Jeffries v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation (2008). Errors not objected to at the time are not preserved by raising them in a new-trial motion, juror affidavits about confusion cannot impeach a verdict, and evidentiary errors are harmless where the jury's finding of no use of the defendant's product meant it never reached causation.
• White v. Cardinal Industrial Insulation Co., Inc. (2007). Legal cause may be shown by circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's activity was a substantial factor in the harm, so summary judgment was improper. Products liability standards also apply to a distributor of asbestos-containing materials, and a contractor's compliance with contract specifications did not shield it.
• Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co. (2005). Kentucky's middleman statute applies to distributors once the manufacturer is identified and subject to the court's jurisdiction, even if the manufacturer is bankrupt or other manufacturers are unnamed; but the distributor's knowledge of the defect is a fact question that needs discovery. A purchaser of a corporation's assets is not a successor unless it continues the seller's ownership or management.

Louisiana

• Alford v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. (2025). Under Louisiana law before the Products Liability Act, an OSHA-compliant asbestos warning is not automatically adequate, and whether a warning was adequate is a jury question. Exposure to a particular asbestos product may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
• Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2024). Under Louisiana law, a bare-metal product manufacturer that contemplated or specified asbestos-containing insulation for its product can be held liable for injuries from that insulation. A design defect claim fails without evidence that the product's design required asbestos insulation. Sophisticated-user and superseding-cause defenses raise fact questions that cannot be decided on summary judgment.
• Marsh v. Chas Kurz & Company (2024). A Jones Act plaintiff must show he was exposed to the toxic substance aboard the particular defendant's vessels, and general evidence that asbestos was widely used on ships does not suffice. Expert opinions resting only on that general use and on the plaintiff's assumption may be excluded, and without them causation cannot be shown.
• Crossland v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2023). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos claimant must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing her injury; without evidence of any exposure from the defendant's activities, the claim fails even when the motion is unopposed.
• Everett v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2023). A motion to join a summary judgment motion is subject to the mandatory 65-day filing deadline of La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(1) and to service requirements. A plaintiff must produce specific evidence tying the defendant to the exposure to defeat summary judgment, but a court abuses its discretion by summarily denying a new trial where counsel's error may have caused a miscarriage of justice.
• Hutchins v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2023). Under Louisiana law, a claimant must show significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the disease. General expert statements about asbestos on ships, or an assumption that the worker could have been nearby, do not show exposure to a particular defendant. Co-worker testimony that a defendant's products were used alongside the worker, with no non-asbestos alternative in use, can create a fact issue.
• Hutchins v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2023). Under Louisiana's substantial-factor test, evidence that the worker actively worked with asbestos-containing materials is enough to create a genuine fact issue on exposure and causation, so the plaintiffs could not obtain summary judgment on their own claims.
• King v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (2023). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Even when a motion is unopposed, the movant must show it is entitled to judgment.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association (2023). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers. A medical expert who weighs qualitative exposure factors, rather than just reciting an 'every exposure' theory, can raise a fact issue on causation. Contracts to sell custom-built turbines and boilers are sales contracts, not construction contracts, so the peremptive period for construction work does not apply.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). In a Louisiana asbestos case, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, even if the exposures were slight, and that this exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Avondale's contribution claims, which stand in the shoes of the plaintiffs by subrogation, were barred by res judicata because Robichaux had settled and released asbestos claims, including future mesothelioma claims, against the cross defendants. A defendant is also entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff offers no evidence of exposure to that defendant's products.
• Adams v. Eagle, Inc. (2022). To show cause-in-fact in an asbestos case, a party must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and an injury substantially caused by that exposure; circumstantial evidence of proximity to the product can create a fact issue and defeat summary judgment.
• Adams v. Eagle, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a party must show significant exposure to asbestos attributable to the defendant and that the exposure was a substantial factor in the injury; a reasonable jury could find both here, so summary judgment was not proper.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, however slight the exposure, and experts need not calculate a dose for each defendant. A manufacturer may owe a duty to warn when its product requires asbestos-containing parts or insulation to function as intended.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in the injury. Expert evidence of general and specific causation, including a reliable differential diagnosis, was enough to create a fact question for the jury.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, an insurer bears the burden of proving an exclusion applies, and an insurer is liable only for exposures during its policy period. Conflicting expert testimony on whether the exclusion was in the policy, and evidence of exposure to Eagle insulation during the policy period, create fact issues that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
• Brindell v. Carlisle Industrial Brake and Friction, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2022). Asbestos causation requires proof of exposure above background attributable to a specific defendant that was a substantial contributing factor. Once the defendant showed the plaintiffs could not meet that burden, speculation and conjecture could not create a genuine issue of material fact.
• Brindell v. Carlisle Industrial Brake and Friction, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2022). A manufacturer is entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff produces no evidence of substantial exposure to its asbestos-containing product, and a court may rule only on issues raised in the motion or opposition, not on arguments first raised at the hearing.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law as applied by the Fifth Circuit, a manufacturer has no duty to warn the employees of a sophisticated purchaser, and a purchaser need not know the specific disease the product can cause. Whether chrysotile is less potent than other asbestos types is a fact question for the jury, not a ground for summary judgment.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under pre-LPLA Louisiana law, a turbine maker can be liable for asbestos gaskets it supplied or specified as component parts, and slight exposures can suffice for substantial-factor causation. It has no duty to warn about, and no design liability for, asbestos insulation that others made and applied to its turbines.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, a seller is a professional vendor only if it holds the product out as its own and operates with sufficient size, volume and merchandising practices; co-parties not adverse to the movant lack standing to oppose its summary judgment motion.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product, and a deceased father's out-of-court statements about where he worked are hearsay not covered by the Rule 804(b)(4) family-history exception. A manufacturer has no duty to warn of dangers of a third party's asbestos insulation it did not make, sell, specify or recommend, but may be liable if it supplied or specified asbestos gaskets.
• Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product that was a substantial factor in causing injury. Evidence that a defendant's asbestos-containing product was merely present at the worksite is not enough to defeat summary judgment.
• Gooding v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the mesothelioma; substantial factor is a jury question unless reasonable people could not differ.
• Gooding v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma. Where evidence of significant exposure exists, the substantial-factor question is generally for the jury, and a shipyard owner that controlled the work environment may be directly liable for negligently exposing a worker.
• King v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; an unopposed motion still requires the movant to show it is entitled to judgment.
• Reulet v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a manufacturer may have a duty to warn when its product requires an asbestos part and it knows the integrated product is likely dangerous, even if it did not supply the part; slight exposures suffice to create a fact dispute on exposure.
• Reulet v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). An insurer's liability under the exposure theory is co-extensive with its insured's liability for harmful exposure during the policy period. Plaintiffs must offer evidence beyond speculation that the decedent was near the insured's products during that period, even if the exposures were slight.
• Reulet v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Plaintiffs need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the decedent inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, even from slight exposures; credibility determinations are not made at summary judgment. A purchase agreement expressly assuming the predecessor's litigation liabilities can make the buyer a successor to those liabilities.
• Roussell v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must prove exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of her injury; without direct or circumstantial evidence connecting the exposed person to the defendant's products, summary judgment is proper.
• Roussell v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). A plaintiff who fails to oppose a summary judgment motion arguing she has no evidence of exposure to the defendant's asbestos products is treated as admitting she cannot prove her claims.