Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Louisiana

• Sampey v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A plaintiff who fails to oppose a summary judgment motion is treated as admitting that she cannot prove an essential element of her claim, here exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product, so summary judgment is entered under Rule 56 and Celotex.
• Sampey v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A plaintiff who fails to oppose a summary judgment motion is treated as admitting she cannot prove an essential element, here exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing products, so summary judgment is entered against her.
• Sampey v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A party that fails to oppose a summary judgment motion is treated as admitting it cannot prove an essential element of its claim, so summary judgment is entered against it. Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of injury.
• Sanchez v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no opposing evidence, summary judgment is required.
• Sanchez v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no opposition and no evidence of exposure, summary judgment is required.
• Sanchez v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; failing to oppose a motion that points out the lack of such evidence results in summary judgment.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). A party who fails to oppose a summary judgment motion is treated as admitting it cannot prove its claims. Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of his injury.
• Williams v. Huntington Ingalls Industries (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of the injury. Circumstantial evidence that the product was used throughout the workplace and near where the worker was can defeat summary judgment even without identifying the product by name.
• Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was exposed to asbestos; testimony showing only a possibility of exposure, such as a child's memory of seeing a parent change brakes of unknown make, does not defeat summary judgment.
• Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product, and mere presence of the product at the worksite is not enough. Circumstantial evidence that a worker regularly worked near a defendant's asbestos cloth can create a fact issue on take-home exposure.
• Hsieh v. Badger Oil Corporation (2021). In an asbestos-exposure case under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show that a particular defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in generating his harm; defendants who showed they were not involved in the relevant offshore work, with no opposition, were entitled to judgment.
• Hulin v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease; even on an unopposed motion, the movant must show it is entitled to judgment, and here plaintiff offered no evidence of exposure to the defendant's products.
• Jackson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show that exposure to the defendant's asbestos product was significant and was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Circumstantial evidence of exposure and causation can raise fact questions that defeat summary judgment.
• Krutz v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the disease; even when a summary judgment motion is unopposed, the movant must show it is entitled to judgment, and here the record lacked such evidence.
• Legendre v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2021). Summary judgment on successor liability was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed about what assets and liabilities Mestek intended to acquire from Wing and legally assumed under the 1987 Asset Purchase Agreement.
• Steib v. Lamorak Insurance Company (4th Circuit, 2021). The mere presence of asbestos-containing materials at a job site does not defeat summary judgment for an employer or premises owner. The plaintiff must offer specific, non-speculative evidence linking those materials to the work the plaintiff did, and a witness's internally inconsistent or conjectural testimony cannot create a genuine issue of fact.
• Williams v. Seidenbach (2021). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product as a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the burden is not relaxed in a long-latency, multiple-defendant case. Federal officer removal was proper because the contractor raised a colorable government contractor defense.
• Adams v. Ethyl Corporation (2020). Under Louisiana article 2317, a premises condition is a defect if it is relatively permanent, and routine, ongoing maintenance activity that disturbs asbestos is not categorically a temporary condition. A jury's reasonable inferences from the evidence, and a district court's remittitur applying the maximum recovery rule, receive deferential review.
• Courville v. Lamorak Insurance Company (4th Circuit, 2020). Insurers and insureds cannot retroactively annul liability policies by a post-injury agreement, and such an agreement is not enforceable against an injured third party. A policy's claims-made-type provision limiting coverage for disease claims to those made within 36 months of the policy period's end is a permissible limit under the Direct Action Statute.
• Gaddy v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. (2020). A jury verdict may be set aside under Rule 50(b) only if no reasonable jury could have found otherwise. Testimony that Owens-Illinois made the Kaylo pipe covering shipped to International Paper, with no evidence of other insulation there, was enough to link Dr. Gaddy's exposure to Owens-Illinois.
• Gomez v. Aardvark Contractors, Inc. (2020). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the movant points to the absence of evidence that the plaintiff or his father was exposed to asbestos from its products and no one opposes the motion to show a genuine factual dispute.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc (2020). Under Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 804(B)(1), a deceased plaintiff's deposition can be used against a defendant who was absent if other defendants present, such as gasket and packing makers, had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine. Testimony about exposure and an expert's opinion that above-background exposures were a substantial cause create a fact question on causation.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). A deceased plaintiff's deposition testimony is admissible against a defendant who was absent if other defendants present had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine him. Whether a valve maker had a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets used with its valves depends on disputed facts, and the Supreme Court's DeVries decision was treated as instructive outside maritime law.
• McAllister v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). Under general maritime law a plaintiff must show a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in the injury, and circumstantial evidence can show exposure, but not when nothing shows the defendant's product was present at the worksite. Louisiana law governed successor liability and does not recognize the product line exception.
• Bagwell v. Union Carbide Corporation (4th Circuit, 2019). A jury's choice between conflicting views of the evidence on exposure and causation will not be disturbed on review. An appellate court that finds a general damages award an abuse of discretion may raise it to the lowest reasonable amount, guided by awards in similar mesothelioma cases.
• Michel v. Ford Motor Company (2019). Plaintiffs must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's products and an injury substantially caused by that exposure. Whether a particular exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing mesothelioma is a question of fact for the jury.
• Rodrigue v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2019). Where the movants pointed to insufficient record evidence on an essential element and the non-moving parties submitted no evidence showing a genuine factual dispute, summary judgment is proper under Celotex.
• Gomez v. Aardvark Contractors, Inc. (2018). A plaintiff may plead asbestos exposure on information and belief when the facts, such as the composition of pipe insulation, are within the defendant's control. A premises owner owes a duty of reasonable care to an independent contractor's employees, and a strict liability claim is plausibly pleaded when it alleges custody of defective asbestos products that caused the plaintiff's disease.
• Leech v. 3M Company (2018). A defendant moving for summary judgment may show an absence of evidence of exposure to its product, and an unopposed motion with merit may be granted. Under Louisiana law, plaintiffs must show the defendant exposed the decedent to asbestos and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
• Leech v. 3M Company (2018). Where the movant shows an absence of evidence and the non-movant files no opposition, summary judgment is proper; under Louisiana law plaintiffs must show the defendant exposed the decedent to asbestos and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2018). Summary judgment is proper where the plaintiff's own testimony shows he was not exposed to asbestos at the defendant's facility or through the defendant's employees' actions, and there is no genuine issue of material fact.
• Michel v. Ford Motor Company (2018). A non-diverse defendant is improperly joined when the removing party shows through summary-type evidence that the plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of recovering against it; the 30-day removal period runs from the 'other paper' that first shows the case is removable, here the final expert deposition transcript.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). Under the court's narrowed bare metal defense, a component maker can be liable under general maritime law if it substantially participated in integrating its part with asbestos products or recommended asbestos for use with its part. A manufacturer is not liable merely because asbestos ended up on its product, or because asbestos use was foreseeable.
• Smith v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC (2017). A non-diverse defendant is improperly joined only if there is no reasonable basis to predict the plaintiff might recover against it; facts are viewed in the plaintiff's favor, and incomplete discovery that leaves a reasonable possibility of connecting the plaintiff to the defendant's asbestos products defeats improper joinder.
• Bozeman v. Wyeth Holdings Corporation (2016). A removing defendant claiming improper joinder bears a heavy burden to put forward evidence negating any possibility of recovery against the non-diverse defendant; evidence that the plaintiff and co-workers did not know of the supplier does not meet that burden.
• Murphy v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. (2016). A non-diverse defendant is improperly joined if the plaintiff has no reasonable, as opposed to merely theoretical, possibility of recovery against it; filing exceptions in state court and asking for a hearing, without a merits ruling, does not waive the right to remove.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, product identification is a threshold element, and a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product; the presence of asbestos parts at the workplace without proof of actual exposure is insufficient.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; the mere physical presence of asbestos or speculation that a gasket contained asbestos is not enough to defeat summary judgment.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, a plaintiff must identify the defendant's product as a source of the asbestos exposure and show it was a substantial factor in causing the illness; speculation about unidentified vehicles and brake jobs is not enough.
• Laurent v. New Orleans City (2015). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show with specific evidence that the claimant was significantly exposed to the defendant's asbestos-containing product; the physical presence of such products at a workplace, or work in a ship's engine spaces, is not enough to defeat summary judgment.
• Laurent v. New Orleans City (2015). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment must produce evidence that the decedent was exposed to asbestos from the specific defendant's products; a belief that all types of cars passed through the workplace is not enough. A request for more discovery requires a Rule 56(d) affidavit.
• Oddo v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd. (4th Circuit, 2015). When a jury's special-verdict answers are irreconcilably inconsistent and the trial court neither sends the jury back nor orders a new trial, that is legal error, and the appellate court reviews the affected findings de novo. In asbestos cases a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product was significant and a substantial factor in causing the disease.
• Vedros v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. (2015). An asbestos exposure expert need not calculate the specific dose or concentration of asbestos from a defendant's product to give a reliable causation opinion, and a motion in limine cannot substitute for a summary judgment motion on whether exposure to the defendant's product occurred.
• Comardelle v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Company (2014). A genuine issue of fact on exposure defeats summary judgment, and challenges to an expert's factual basis and exposure history go to weight rather than admissibility. An expert need not know the dose of asbestos from each defendant to give a causation opinion.
• Leonard v. Board OF Supervisors OF Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College (2014). A party seeking discovery over objection must show some factual basis that the decedent was exposed to an asbestos-containing component of the defendant's product; without it, the requests are overbroad and the motion to compel is denied.
• Luna v. AW Chesterton Company (1st Circuit, 2014). Prescription on an asbestos survival claim began when mesothelioma was diagnosed, and a remaining tortfeasor must prove the other defendants' products were a substantial cause of the injury to obtain a virile share reduction.
• Millet v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2014). Summary judgment is premature where the discovery deadline has not passed and further discovery could produce evidence of a genuine issue of fact; an unopposed motion may be granted where no party offers evidence or argument against it.
• Najolia v. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. (2014). Under Louisiana law, the mere presence of asbestos-containing material, or a supplier's sale of such material to a shipyard, is not enough to hold that supplier liable; plaintiffs must produce evidence that the worker was exposed to the defendant's product.
• Robertson v. Doug Ashy Building Materials, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2014). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may prove substantial-factor causation through a qualitative assessment of exposure (level, frequency, nature, proximity, duration) without quantifying dose. Disputed fact questions about the relative contribution of chrysotile exposure cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
• Robertson v. Doug Ashy Building Materials, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2014). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may prove causation through a qualitative assessment of exposure (level, frequency, nature, proximity, duration) and need not prove a quantitative dose. Genuine fact issues about exposure to the supplier's asbestos and its substantial contribution to mesothelioma preclude summary judgment.