Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (E.D. La., Aug. 16, 2022)

Our plain-English summary of Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, August 16, 2022).

Callen Cortez sued about thirty-five defendants after being diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2020; he died in 2022 and his family took over the case. He alleged exposure at Avondale Shipyards, where Hopeman employees cut asbestos-containing wallboards near him, and take-home exposure from his brother's work clothes. Wayne Manufacturing, a Hopeman subsidiary, glued laminate to Marinite boards that Hopeman used at Avondale. Avondale sued Liberty Mutual as Wayne's alleged insurer, claiming Wayne was a professional vendor of the wallboards. Liberty Mutual moved for partial summary judgment on that point. Avondale did not oppose it. The court held that the plaintiffs, who had asserted no claims against Liberty Mutual, lacked standing to oppose. It then found no evidence that Wayne held the wallboards out as its own, repackaged or advertised them, or sold them at the scale needed for professional vendor status. The court granted the motion. It did not address Avondale's other theories of liability.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana
• Decided: August 16, 2022
• Docket: Civil Action No. 20-2389
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: Louisiana

Outcome. The court granted third-party defendant Liberty Mutual's unopposed motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that Wayne Manufacturing was not a professional vendor of asbestos-containing wallboards, against third-party plaintiff Avondale; plaintiffs were found to lack standing to oppose.

What the court held. Under Louisiana law, a seller is a professional vendor only if it holds the product out as its own and operates with sufficient size, volume and merchandising practices; co-parties not adverse to the movant lack standing to oppose its summary judgment motion.

Issues decided: Insurance Coverage, Trial Procedure and Discovery, Product Identification, Successor Liability.

The people and their exposure

• Callen J. Cortez: mesothelioma; died

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Callen J. Cortez	welder and tacker helper (shipyards and maritime work); worked near others using it	Avondale Shipyards (Westwego Yard), Westwego, Louisiana	1969-1974	Marinite board, asbestos-containing composite wallboards (Marinite boards by Johns-Manville glued to Micarta laminate by Westinghouse), Hopeman/Wayne
Callen J. Cortez	household member of Avondale worker (shipyards and maritime work); dust brought home	family home in Kraemer, Louisiana, Kraemer, Louisiana	1967-1968	Marinite board, asbestos-containing wallboards cut by Hopeman employees at Avondale

The defendants

• Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (insurer)
• Wayne Manufacturing Corp. (supplier)
• Hopeman (contractor)
• Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (Avondale) (employer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (November 23, 2020). The court denied Callen Cortez's motion to remand, holding that Avondale (Huntington Ingalls, Lamorak Insurance and Albert Bossier) timely and properly removed the case under the Federal Officer Removal Statute.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (May 20, 2021). The court granted Lamorak's motion and stayed and administratively closed the whole case until September 12, 2021, over plaintiff Cortez's objection that he needed an expedited trial.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (February 7, 2022). The court denied the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Callen Cortez's claims arising from the Gabler Insulations insurance coverage go forward.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (April 4, 2022). The court granted Avondale's summary judgment motion in part, dismissing Cortez's tort claims against Avondale as his employer and his intentional-tort claim, but denied it as to his take-home exposure claims against Avondale as his brother's employer.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (April 18, 2022). The court granted plaintiff Callen Cortez's motion for summary judgment that he has mesothelioma and that asbestos caused it, over the defendants' oppositions, while leaving specific causation issues for the jury.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (May 3, 2022). The court granted summary judgment to Entergy, First State, USF&G, Berkshire and Insulations, LLC, granted GE's motion in part (insulation claims) and denied it in part (asbestos gasket claims), and denied Foster Wheeler's motion; it also granted LIGA's motion in limine excluding hearsay.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (May 11, 2022). The district court denied as moot plaintiff Cortez's motion for review of the Magistrate Judge's order allowing Eagle, Inc. to file a supplemental answer, because Eagle's later answer to the third amended complaint made the earlier order irrelevant.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (May 11, 2022). The court granted insurer USF&G's unopposed motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff Callen Cortez's punitive-damages claims against it.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (May 19, 2022). The court granted Continental Insurance Company's summary judgment motion, holding the LHWCA preempted Cortez's state-law tort claims against it as Halter Marine's insurer and that his intentional-tort claims failed for lack of evidence, and dismissed Continental's two other summary-judgment motions as moot.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (May 19, 2022). The court granted Trinity's summary judgment motion and the motions to dismiss by Continental, Liberty Mutual and Travelers, dismissing with prejudice Albert Bossier's third-party claims because no substitution was made within 90 days after notice of his death.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (July 8, 2022). The court granted Westinghouse (ViacomCBS) partial summary judgment on claims about asbestos insulation used on its turbines and denied it on claims about asbestos gaskets it supplied or specified for those turbines.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (July 13, 2022). The court granted Westinghouse (ViacomCBS) partial summary judgment dismissing the failure-to-warn claims, but denied it on the Halter Marine exposure and on whether its FRDM was a substantial factor in causing Cortez's mesothelioma.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (July 18, 2022). The court granted plaintiffs' motion to exclude Danny Joyce's hearsay testimony about Walsh-Healey inspectors, but denied it as to Avondale's expert relying on that testimony, so long as Avondale does not disclose the hearsay to the jury.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (July 20, 2022). The court denied as premature the motion in limine by Foster Wheeler, GE and Westinghouse to exclude plaintiffs' two medical causation experts as cumulative, leaving defendants free to object at trial.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (July 20, 2022). The court granted in part the motion by Eagle and LIGA to limit plaintiffs' industrial hygienist Gerard Baril, barring him from testifying that a supplier who puts its name on an insulation box should legally be considered its manufacturer, and denied the motion otherwise.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (July 25, 2022). The court granted partial summary judgment for Westinghouse (ViacomCBS), General Electric and Foster Wheeler, dismissing the plaintiffs' intentional-tort and fraud claims, and dismissed the punitive-damages part of the motion as moot.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (July 27, 2022). The court denied Goodrich's motion for summary judgment (joined by several co-defendants) on Callen Cortez's claim for loss of personal household services, so plaintiffs kept that claim.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (July 28, 2022). The court granted Travelers' summary judgment motion only on whether B&B was a professional vendor of asbestos (and so on strict products liability) and denied it on negligence duty and breach and on Article 2317 liability, so plaintiffs' other claims continued.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (August 10, 2022). The court granted Hopeman Brothers' motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' intentional-tort claims and their claims that Wayne Manufacturing was Hopeman's alter ego or part of a single business enterprise.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (August 23, 2022). The court denied Hopeman Brothers and Liberty Mutual's motion to exclude or limit the testimony of plaintiffs' industrial hygienist Gerald Baril, so the plaintiffs' expert may testify.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (August 29, 2022). The court granted Hopeman Brothers partial summary judgment that it was not a manufacturer of the asbestos wallboards, but denied summary judgment on whether it was a professional vendor, so that question goes to trial against the Cortez plaintiffs and Avondale's opposition.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (September 9, 2022). The court denied Riley Power, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the statute of repose and exposure-sufficiency grounds, and denied its motion to strike as moot, so plaintiffs (the Cortez family) prevailed over Riley at this stage.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (September 29, 2022). The court granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion in limine, excluding most of Westinghouse's expert Dr. Forman's testimony on insulation and general Navy requirements but allowing his testimony on shipyard asbestos-safety requirements relevant to the sophisticated-purchaser defense.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (October 4, 2022). The court denied Certain London Market Insurers' motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims arising from Avondale exposures after January 21, 1970, so the plaintiffs prevailed on the motion.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (October 7, 2022). The court granted defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs could not recover pre-death lost income or pre-death expenses as wrongful death damages.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (October 12, 2022). The court denied plaintiffs' Daubert motion in limine to limit the testimony of Hopeman Brothers' toxicologist, Dr. Brent Finley, so Hopeman prevailed on the motion.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (October 14, 2022). The court granted plaintiffs' motion to strike eleven defense expert witnesses, including Hopeman Brothers' witness Max Richard, because no expert reports were produced.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (October 24, 2022). The court granted in part and denied in part defendants' omnibus motion in limine, barring terms like "asbestos industry" and the Bair memorandum, while allowing the "asbestos victim" label and lay testimony about dust.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (October 24, 2022). The court granted Travelers Indemnity Company's unopposed motion to quash the plaintiffs' trial subpoena, ruling against the plaintiffs.

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Hoerner v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (Louisiana Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, 2002). The appeals court affirmed most of the jury verdict for the Hoerners but reversed liability for McCarty as employer of other insulators, for Mr. Schuber III, Mr. McCarty and Home Insurance, and four settling-defendant credits, and amended the judgment to $306,111.07.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

CALLEN J. CORTEZ, ET AL.

v.

LAMORAK INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. SECTION "R" (1)

Civil Action No. 20-2389.

August 16, 2022.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, District Judge.

Before the Court is third-party defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's ("Liberty Mutual") motion for partial summary judgment, as alleged insurer of Wayne Manufacturing Corp. ("Wayne"), seeking summary judgement on the issue of whether Wayne was a professional vendor of asbestos-containing products.[1] Third-party plaintiff, Huntington Ingalls, Inc. ("Avondale"), does not oppose the motion. Plaintiffs, who are not adverse to Liberty Mutual as to the third-party claim at issue, oppose the motion.[2] For the following reasons, the Court grants Liberty Mutual's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an asbestos exposure case. Plaintiffs allege that Callen Cortez contracted mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos over the course of his career,[3] as well as take-home exposure resulting from his father's[4] and brothers' work when the family shared a home.[5]

Hopeman is a Delaware corporation[6] that performed joiner work at Avondale Shipyards during the period in which Callen Cortez and his brother, Daniel Cortez, worked at Avondale.[7] Wayne, a now-dissolved Virginia corporation,[8] was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hopeman during the relevant period.[9] As a service to Hopeman, Wayne regularly glued Micarta laminate manufactured by Westinghouse to Marinite boards manufactured by Johns-Manville, and sent the resulting composite wallboards to Hopeman at Avondale for use on vessels.[10]

Callen Cortez lived in his family home in Kraemer, Louisiana, starting from his birth in 1951 until he married and moved out in May of 1972.[11] Daniel Cortez also lived in the home. Daniel began working at the Avondale Shipyards on August 29, 1967,[12] and lived with Callen Cortez until Daniel moved out in July of 1968.[13] Daniel testified that he was exposed to asbestos at Avondale, when he worked around Hopeman employees while they were cutting asbestos-containing wallboards.[14] He further testified that fibers released from the wallboards likely got onto his work clothes.[15] He also testified that, after work each day, he came home, put up his clothes, and, with Callen Cortez's help, beat the fibers off his clothes.[16]

From March 6, 1969 until May 31, 1974, Callen Cortez worked for Avondale as a welder and tacker helper, primarily at Avondale's Westwego Yard.[17] Cortez testified that when he worked at Avondale, he was exposed to asbestos dust generated by Hopeman employees while they were cutting wallboards in his vicinity.[18]

Cortez was diagnosed with mesothelioma on June 2, 2020.[19] On July 1, 2020, he sued Hopeman and approximately thirty-four other defendants, including former employers, manufacturers, and insurance companies.[20] In his petition, plaintiff brought various negligence, products liability, and intentional tort claims against defendants.[21] He additionally asserted that Wayne was the alter ego of Hopeman during the relevant period.[22]

Callen Cortez passed away on May 26, 2022.[23] Cortez's surviving spouse and children filed an amended complaint on June 6, 2022,[24] substituting themselves as plaintiffs in a survival action and seeking additional damages arising from Cortez's alleged wrongful death.[25]

Liberty Mutual is sued by Avondale in its capacity as alleged insurer of Wayne.[26] Avondale alleges that Wayne was a manufacturer, seller, supplier, and/or professional vendor of asbestos-containing wallboards.[27] Liberty Mutual now moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Wayne was a professional vendor of asbestos-containing wallboards. [28] The Court considers the motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but "unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth `ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law' are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment." Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. "No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would `entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'" Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)). "[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion" by either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the "existence of a genuine dispute of material fact," or by "showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party." Id. at 1265. If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 ("Rule 56 `mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may not grant a "default" summary judgment on the ground that it is unopposed. Morgan v. Fed. Express Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). Even in the context of unopposed motions for summary judgment, the movant must still show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 363 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). When a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, a court may accept the movant's evidence as undisputed. Morgan, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Long, 227 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Tex. 2002)). Nevertheless, if the moving party fails to meet its burden, the Court must deny its motion for summary judgment. Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 362 n.3. III. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the Court Should Consider Plaintiff's Opposition

As an initial matter, Liberty Mutual contends that because plaintiffs are not adverse to Liberty Mutual with respect to this claim, and the adverse party does not oppose the motion, the Court should consider the motion for summary judgment as

unopposed.[29]

Rule 56 provides "that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may seek or oppose a motion for summary judgment." Dorvin v. 3901 Ridgelake Drive, LLC, No. 11-00696, 2012 WL 1057599, at [*4] (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(b)). In interpreting Rule 56, other Sections of this Court have held "that `co-defendants do not have standing to oppose a defendant's motion for summary judgment when the motion is unopposed by the plaintiff.'" Id. (quoting Thurman v. Wood Group Prod. Services, Inc., No. 09-4142, 2010 WL 5207587, at [*1] (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2010)). Many courts that have considered the question have reached the conclusion that codefendants lack standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment filed by the named defendant when "none of the defendants. . . have filed claims against each other." Fraioli v. Lemcke, 328 F. Supp. 2d 250, 263 n. 4 (D.R.I. 2005); Hawes v. Blast-Tek, Inc., No. 09-365, 2010 WL 2680778 (D. Minn. July 2, 2010); Eckert v. City of Sacramento, No. 07-0825, 2009 WL 3211278 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009); Blonder v. Casco Inn Residential Care, Inc., No. Civ. 99-274, 2000 WL 761895 (D. Me. May 4, 2000). A similar result is warranted here because third-party plaintiff Avondale has not opposed the motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs have not even asserted claims against the movant. Indeed, in opposing summary judgment, it is the nonmoving claimant who bears the burden of pointing to evidence creating a material fact issue once the moving party has asserted that there is no material factual dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Further, considerations of judicial economy support the Court's conclusion. The Court sees no reason not to dispose of this issue as unopposed when plaintiffs could have asserted any claims they may have had against Wayne, yet did not. Plaintiffs lack standing to oppose this summary judgment motion.[30] Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is unopposed for the purposes of Rule 56.

B. Professional Vendor Liability

Liberty Mutual moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Wayne was a professional vendor of asbestos-containing wallboards.[31] Avondale does not oppose Liberty Mutual's motion.

Under Louisiana law, a "professional vendor" is held to the same standard of liability as a manufacturer. Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926, 930 (La. 1978). In order to be held liable as a professional vendor, a seller must: (1) hold a "product out to the public as its own" and (2) operate with the requisite "size, volume, and merchandising practices," such that the firm is presumed to know the defects of its wares. Id. Hence, "a professional vendor is a retailer who does more than simply sell a certain product or products; it must engage in practices whereby it is capable of controlling the quality of the product, such that the courts are justified in treating the retailer like a manufacturer." Nelton v. Astro-Lounger Mfg. Co., 542 So. 2d 128, 132 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989). Because of the scale and merchandising requirements necessary for a finding that a firm is a professional vendor, a seller does not become a professional vendor just because it sells a product. Id. ("[W]e reject plaintiff's contention that Fraenkel is a professional vendor simply because it is in the business of selling sofa beds."). Avondale does not point to any evidence creating a material fact question on the professional vendor issue. Even if Wayne regularly assembled the composite wallboards at issue, there is no evidence that it held the product out as its own. There is no evidence of re-packaging by Wayne or of advertising or merchandising practices suggesting that Wayne held out the wallboards as its own. The absence of this type of evidence is significant. See Hoerner v. ANCO Insulations, Inc., 812 So. 2d 45, 60-61 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2002), writ denied, 819 So. 2d 1023 (La. 2002) (relying significantly upon evidence that the suppliers re-packaged the asbestos insulation in boxes containing the suppliers' respective names to support a finding that defendants were professional vendors). On the contrary, it was Hopeman that contracted to perform joiner work at Avondale; it was Hopeman that supplied the wallboards to Avondale; and there is no evidence that anyone at Avondale identified the wallboards with Wayne.

Furthermore, Avondale has not pointed to evidence supporting sales by Wayne on the scale necessary to be deemed a professional vendor. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment on the issue of whether Wayne was a professional vendor of asbestos.[32]

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Liberty Mutual's motion for partial summary judgment.

[1] R. Doc. 493.

[2] R. Doc. 669.

[3] R. Doc. 1-1 at 3-6 (Complaint ¶¶ 3, 8).

[4] Id. at 7-9 (Complaint ¶¶ 11-16).

[5] R. Doc. 149 at 1-2 (Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 94-95).

[6] R. Doc. 498-14 at 1 (Hopeman Articles of Incorporation).

[7] R. Doc. 498-1 at 2 (Hopeman's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ¶ 5).

[8] R. Doc. 498-15 (Wayne Articles of Incorporation).

[9] R. Doc. 498-1 at 2 (Hopeman's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ¶ 17).

[10] R. Doc. 498-1 at 3 (Hopeman's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ¶ 10).

[11] R. Doc. 499-4 at 17-18 (Discovery Deposition of Callen Cortez at 100:11-101:8).

[12] R. Doc. 499-6 at 13 (Deposition of Daniel Cortez at 12:3-13).

[13] Id. at 12-13 (Deposition of Daniel Cortez at 11:21-12:2).

[14] Id. at 58-63 (Deposition of Daniel Cortez at 57:23-62:18).

[15] Id. at 37 (Deposition of Daniel Cortez at 36:6-13).

[16] Id. at 18-19 (Deposition of Daniel Cortez at 17:16-18:17).

[17] Id. at 26-27 (Discovery Deposition of Callen Cortez at 108:25-109:9).

[18] Id. at 44-45 (Discovery Deposition of Callen Cortez at 43:18-44:8).

[19] R. Doc. 1-1 at 10 (Complaint ¶ 17).

[20] Id. at 1-3, 11-13 (Complaint ¶¶ 1-2, 25-29).

[21] R. Doc. 1-1.

[22] Id. at 43 (Complaint ¶ 90).

[23] R. Doc. 1026 at 2 (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 111).

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at 2-3 (Fourth Amended Complaint ¶¶ 111-114).

[26] R. Doc. 1-10 at 20-21 (Avondale's Cross-Claims and Third-Party Demands ¶¶ 9-12, 18-20).

[27] Id.

[28] R. Doc. 493.

[29] R. Doc. 851 at 2.

[30] The Court notes that even if it considered plaintiffs' proposed opposition, it would grant summary judgment, because the opposition in essence rehashes plaintiffs' single business enterprise arguments. The Court rejected those arguments in its August 10, 2022 Order and Reasons. See R. Doc. 1142.

[31] R. Doc. 493.

[32] The Court's decision today does not address other theories of liability alleged in Avondale's complaint.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Louisiana asbestos laws
• Louisiana asbestos exposure sites