Settlements and Releases in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on enforcing or interpreting a settlement or release: 203 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Louisiana

• Matherne v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2024). An assumption of another's obligation under La. Civ. Code arts. 1821-1823 must be explicit and in writing, and buy-back agreements that release and void insurance policies do not assume the insurers' obligations to third parties.
• Hotard v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2023). A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order is judged under Rule 54(b), looking to changed law, new evidence or manifest error. A third-party indemnity claim under a contract covering claims arising directly or indirectly from the vendor's performance states a plausible claim, and the vendor's earlier tort settlement with the plaintiffs does not affect it.
• Hotard v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2023). Under Rule 54(b), a court may reconsider an interlocutory order denying leave to file third-party demands for cause, considering factors such as an intervening change in controlling law. A party that files a cross-claim at the outset and does not invoke an arbitration clause for years waives its right to arbitrate interrelated claims.
• Marsh v. Continental Insurance Company (2023). In maritime asbestos cases, the liability of non-settling defendants is calculated in proportion to the jury's allocation of responsibility rather than by a pro tanto credit, which applies only when fault cannot be fairly apportioned. Maritime asbestos litigation is not 'non-ordinary' so as to justify a departure from this rule.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Under Louisiana law, releases of future claims are enforceable, and releases that cover future cancer or all future asbestos-exposure claims cover later-developed mesothelioma unless the plaintiff shows no intent to release it. A release that leaves doubt about whether a future claim is covered will not be read to release it.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Avondale's contribution claims, which stand in the shoes of the plaintiffs by subrogation, were barred by res judicata because Robichaux had settled and released asbestos claims, including future mesothelioma claims, against the cross defendants. A defendant is also entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff offers no evidence of exposure to that defendant's products.
• Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A contractor asserting the Boyle defense to failure-to-warn and failure-to-prevent-spread claims must show the government exercised discretion in approving specific warnings or precise specifications; minimum safety standards are not enough. Yearsley does not shield a contractor's own negligence that is separate from the acts the government authorized.
• Aaron v. Bancroft Bag, Inc. (2021). A case with a non-diverse defendant becomes removable only when that defendant is clearly out of the case, and a settlement with it counts only if it is binding and enforceable under state law; the removing defendant bears the burden of proving this.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2021). Under Louisiana law, a release of future claims is narrowly construed and applies only if the parties' intent to release the specific claim is clear. Where doubt exists, extrinsic evidence of intent may be considered, and a factual dispute over intent precludes summary judgment on res judicata.
• Chevron Oronite Company, LLC v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Incorporated (2020). Under Louisiana law, an indemnitee under a written contract who tenders its defense and gives the indemnitor a chance to take over or approve the settlement need show only potential liability. Once it does, the indemnitor bears the burden of showing the settlement was unreasonable.
• Courville v. Lamorak Insurance Company (4th Circuit, 2020). Insurers and insureds cannot retroactively annul liability policies by a post-injury agreement, and such an agreement is not enforceable against an injured third party. A policy's claims-made-type provision limiting coverage for disease claims to those made within 36 months of the policy period's end is a permissible limit under the Direct Action Statute.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2020). Under Louisiana law, releases of future claims are narrowly construed, and any doubt about whether a future claim is covered means it is not released. Even where a release expressly mentions cancer, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent can create a fact issue that precludes summary judgment.
• Joseph v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2020). A compromise worded in general terms, releasing present and future occupational lung disease and all other personal injury claims from the employment, can bar a later survival action for a disease not named in it. The survival beneficiaries are the injured person's legal successors for res judicata purposes, so they are bound by his release.
• Chevron Oronite Company v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc. (2019). In an Erie guess about Louisiana law, once an indemnitee shows it was potentially liable to the underlying plaintiff, the burden shifts to the indemnitor to show that the indemnitee's settlement was unreasonable.
• Courville v. Lamorak Insurance Company (4th Circuit, 2019). A post-injury settlement between an insurer and its insured that limits or annuls coverage cannot be enforced against third-party tort victims, because Louisiana public policy bars post-injury reformation of coverage and La. R.S. 22:1262 voids retroactive annulment of liability policies.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2019). Under Louisiana law, alleged children have standing to bring survival and wrongful death claims if they are the decedent's biological children, shown by clear and convincing evidence. A survival action is a single shared claim, so a prior dismissal with prejudice binds later-joined beneficiaries, while each wrongful death beneficiary has an individual claim that others cannot settle.
• Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2019). Under Louisiana law, releases of future claims are narrowly construed, but a release that expressly names the claim (or future asbestos-related cancer), signed by a represented party, shifts the burden to the opposing party to show no meeting of the minds, fraud or ill practices. Where release language leaves doubt about covering a future claim, it is construed not to cover it.
• Chevron Oronite Company LLC v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc. (2018). Potential rather than actual liability was the standard because Chevron Oronite tendered the defense and Jacobs, which had a fair opportunity to defend and join settlement talks, refused. The court did not decide whether a written contract alone would suffice. A phrase covering attorney's fees "relating to any of the foregoing" applies to every preceding disjunctive clause.
• Savoie v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. (2017). Under Louisiana law, a signed compromise that expressly releases future mesothelioma, wrongful death and survival claims gives rise to res judicata. The party attacking it bears the burden of proving it invalid, and a small payment, claimed lack of understanding or missing master-settlement documents does not defeat it.
• Garrie v. Aiu Insurance Company (2013). A settlement with a non-diverse defendant can make a case removable only if it was binding at the time of removal; under Louisiana law, counsel need express authority to compromise a client's claim, and tentative negotiations without final authority do not create a binding settlement.
• Landry v. Eagle, Inc. (2012). A case with a nondiverse defendant becomes removable only when that defendant is effectively out of the case, such as through a settlement that is binding and enforceable under state law. The removing defendant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence, and any doubt is resolved in favor of remand.
• Pierre v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2012). An attorney's statutory privilege under La. R.S. 37:218 runs only against the attorney's own client and that client's settlement proceeds. It does not let the attorney interfere with or nullify settlements by other plaintiffs who were never the attorney's clients, and a party plaintiff cannot intervene in her own suit.
• Hymel v. Eagle, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2009). A written settlement and release that expressly names mesothelioma and cancer is enforceable against a later mesothelioma claim arising from the same earlier conduct. A represented party cannot avoid it merely by claiming he did not understand it, and a compromise cannot be rescinded for lesion or error of law.
• Mouton v. Morton International, Inc. (3rd Circuit, 2007). A survivor under La. C.C. art. 2315.1 can be the 'legal successor' under La. C.C.P. art. 801 only if the action survives in the survivor's favor. Here the plaintiff's suit had been settled before his death, so the succession representative was the proper party to dismiss it.
• Breaux v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2004). A release is a contract, so its effect is governed by the law in effect when it was executed, not by the law in effect at the time of the asbestos exposure. Cole v. Celotex is not read expansively to reach contract questions.
• Hamilton v. Anco Insulation, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2003). A policy condition requiring a disease claim within thirty-six months after the policy period is a suspensive condition, and it is not an impossible condition merely because it was impossible to meet on the facts of one case with a long latency period; impossibility under the Civil Code means no one could ever bring about the event.
• Hebert v. Anco Insulation, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2002). A defense that a settlement extinguished the debt must be specifically pleaded, and Dow's post-verdict assertion of it was untimely. The majority held, however, that pre-1985 law (former art. 2203, requiring a reservation of rights) governs the effect of the settlements, so the trial court had to rule on whether plaintiffs reserved their rights. A later general appearance does not waive a pending declinatory exception, and the individual defendants' Louisiana contacts were too thin for personal jurisdiction.
• Breaux v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. (5th Circuit, 1998). A compromise extends only to differences the parties clearly intended to include, and a $500 release listing asbestosis, silicosis and pneumoconiosis was not read to release a later-manifesting mesothelioma claim.
• Meredith v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (4th Circuit, 1998). A wrongful death action arises at the time of death, so the workers' compensation exclusivity law in effect on the date of death governs, barring tort wrongful death suits against the employer even where the asbestos exposure occurred before the 1976 amendment. A pre-death settlement reserving rights against other defendants does not preclude a survival action against defendants not named in the earlier suit.
• Potter v. Patterson (4th Circuit, 1997). When Article 1913(B) requires notice of the signing of a final judgment, the delay for a new trial motion does not start until the clerk mails the notice, so the plaintiffs' motion was timely. Because the dismissal of the whole case was a mistake, the motion should have been granted.

Maryland

• National Union Fire Insurance Company OF Pittsburgh, PA v. Porter Hayden Company (2014). Under Maryland law, an insurer that was notified of claims and chose not to respond cannot rely on a voluntary obligation or consent-to-settle provision to deny coverage, but it may still challenge the reasonableness of the settlements. The insurer has the burden of production and the insured has the ultimate burden of persuasion on reasonableness.
• Brannan v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust (2012). Under Maryland's final judgment rule, a plaintiff gets one recovery for a single harm. Estates that took judgments and settlements from other tortfeasors while a joint tortfeasor was in bankruptcy cannot later reopen them to collect from that tortfeasor's successor trust.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook (2005). Under the exposure approach, the noneconomic damages cap does not apply when the last asbestos exposure was before July 1, 1986, and this also covers a derivative loss of consortium claim. A premarital latent injury does not bar a consortium claim if neither spouse knew or could reasonably have known of it at marriage.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook (2005). A loss of consortium claim based on a latent premarital injury that neither spouse knew or could have known of at marriage accrues when the injury is discovered or reasonably discoverable. It is not subject to the damages cap when the underlying personal injury claim is not. A release reserving claims for mesothelioma is read as a whole under objective contract principles.
• Rourke v. Amchem Products, Inc. (2004). A Maryland court must give an out-of-state judgment the same preclusive effect it would have in the rendering state, so Virginia's mutuality requirement governed and barred offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. The settlement's broad arbitration clause was not displaced by a later letter that mentioned a contract remedy and a 'lawsuit'.
• Owens-Illinois v. Gianotti (2002). Under Scribner, the Maryland noneconomic damages cap does not apply when the plaintiff's last asbestos exposure was before July 1, 1986. A loss of consortium claim is barred by a premarital injury only if the couple knew or should have known of the injury when they married.
• Vaughn v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc. (1989). A shipowner that settles a seaman's unseaworthiness claim may obtain indemnity from a manufacturer whose asbestos-containing product made the vessel unseaworthy, by showing potential liability, contribution of the product, and a reasonable settlement. A good-faith settlement with other manufacturers extinguishes contribution claims and does not reduce the non-settling manufacturer's liability.

Massachusetts

• Barraford v. T & N Limited (2014). A Chapter 11 plan confirmation with a discharge and channeling injunction lifts the automatic stay, so 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) gave only 30 days to sue after that. A tolling letter between class counsel and the CCR did not cover plaintiffs who were not that firm's clients, and equitable tolling did not apply.
• Graphic Arts Mutual Insurance Co. v. DN Lukens, Inc. (2013). Under Boston Gas, progressive-injury claims such as asbestos disease are allocated pro rata by time on the risk, with the insured bearing uninsured periods, using a continuous trigger; an insurer's reservation of rights does not oblige it to cede the defense or bar allocation of uninsured periods to the insured.

Michigan

• Kachman v. Standard Fuel Engineering Company (2023). Federal-question jurisdiction depends on a federal issue necessarily raised by the plaintiff's state-law claims; a later motion or paper raising a federal issue, such as Medicare reporting of settlements, does not create removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
• Jaqua v. Canadian Nat. RR, Inc. (2007). A FELA release does not violate § 5 if it is executed for valid consideration as part of a settlement and its scope is limited to risks known to the parties when it was signed, so it can release known risks of future injury such as cancer. A settlement with the injured person also bars a later claim by his personal representative.
• Beaudrie v. Anchor Packing Co. (1998). Under the Michigan workers' compensation statute, all persons with a financial interest in a wrongful death recovery are "parties" for apportioning expenses of recovery. The lien-holder's reimbursement and its share of expenses are recalculated with each new recovery from a separate tortfeasor.
• Beaudrie v. Anchor Packing Co. (1994). Under Eddington, a workers' compensation carrier may seek reimbursement from the entire third-party recovery, whatever the type of damages, where the recipient is a compensation beneficiary; recoveries by non-beneficiaries are not subject to the lien.

Minnesota

• Strand v. Allied Insulation Supply Co. (2007). When settling parties invoke Pierringer principles, the settling defendant has paid its own share and gives up contribution claims. A settling defendant cannot keep contribution claims against others by also releasing them, because Minnesota law bars assigning personal-injury claims and the non-signing parties could not be sure of enforcing the release.
• Bunce v. Api, Inc. (2005). A defendant who settles with a plaintiff through a Pierringer release pays only its fair share and so has no accrued claim for contribution or indemnity against non-settling third-party defendants. A release that purports to reserve those claims cannot bind non-signatories, and the plaintiff's death does not change this.
• Conwed Corporation v. Union Carbide Corporation (2004). Under Minnesota law, an employer has no obligation to contribute to a third-party tortfeasor's Naig settlement with an injured employee, because a Naig settlement covers only damages for which the employer is not liable and the employer's fault does not affect their allocation.

Mississippi

• Union Carbide Corporation v. Nix (2014). A manufacturer's compliance with the OSHA warning wording does not make its warning adequate as a matter of law, and expert testimony is not required where a warning's adequacy is within a layperson's understanding. A judge's comments suggesting the compensatory award was too low can taint a punitive award submitted right after.
• Everitt v. Pneumo Abex, LLC (2009). A settlement agreement that set no express claim deadline implicitly required claims to be submitted by the date set for determining the total payable. The bankruptcy automatic stay does not automatically extend to a non-debtor co-defendant, so it did not suspend that deadline or the non-debtor's obligations.

Missouri

• Wagner v. Bondex International, Inc. (Western District, 2012). Missouri requires but-for causation (the substantial factor test applies only in two-fires cases), and a plaintiff must identify the defendant's asbestos-containing product as the source of exposure. Section 537.060 reduces a judgment only by settlements actually made, not by trust payments the plaintiff never sought.

Nebraska

• Butler v. Union Pacific R. Co. (2020). Under FELA § 5 (45 U.S.C. § 55), a release is valid only if it compromises a specific controversy. A release of an asbestosis claim is therefore limited to asbestos-related injuries and cannot bar claims for harm from other toxins, even if it uses broad 'laundry list' language.