Settlements and Releases in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on enforcing or interpreting a settlement or release: 203 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Nebraska

• In re Estate of McConnell (2020). Wrongful death proceeds are not estate property and are not waived by a premarital agreement unless its language specifically waives them. A spouse's wrongful death recovery is limited to pecuniary loss after the death, and pain and suffering before death belongs to the estate under a survival claim.

New Jersey

• In re Congoleum Corp. (2009). Pre-petition settlement payments to claimants who retained no stub claims against the estate did not create unequal treatment under Combustion Engineering, but fees paid to claimants' counsel are subject to court approval as reasonable under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(4). Dismissing a Chapter 11 case sua sponte without notice and a hearing on creditors' best interests was an abuse of discretion.
• In re Congoleum Corp. (2007). A § 524(g) plan must give the trust a majority of voting shares through a contingency that would operate while the shares still have meaningful value, and must treat similar asbestos personal injury claims in substantially the same manner. Separate classification and preferential treatment of pre-petition settling claimants violates that requirement.
• Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. US Gypsum Co. (2001). A civil RICO claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of its injury, and a building owner who should have known of the potential asbestos hazard in its buildings more than four years before suing is time-barred. A prior state class settlement is given the preclusive effect it would have in the state that rendered it.

New York

• Kirby v. David Fabricators OF NY, Inc. (1st Dept., 2025). A prior dismissal with prejudice of a settled action does not bar a later suit against a defendant who was not a party to it and was not in privity with the settling party, an alleged joint tortfeasor. Joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties under CPLR 1001(a).
• Farris v. Avon Products, Inc. (2024). A wrongful death settlement must be approved under Local Civil Rule 83.2(b) and N.Y. EPTL 5-4.6 as fair, reasonable and adequate, and a contingency fee of up to one-third of the recovery is deemed reasonable under New York rules.
• Matter of Lucano (Queens, 2024). Sealing court records requires a written finding of good cause, meaning a likelihood of significant and concrete harm and compelling circumstances. Confidentiality is the exception, and an unopposed motion or a confidentiality clause in the settlement does not alone satisfy that burden.
• McLaughlin v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2024). A motion to reargue under CPLR 2221(d)(2) requires a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended facts or law. The release's unambiguous language covered mesothelioma as an asbestos-related disease, so the claims against LILCO were released.
• McLaughlin v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2023). A clear and unambiguous general release covering all present and future asbestos-exposure claims bars a later suit for a different asbestos disease. The plaintiffs did not show mutual mistake or that the release was unfairly or unknowingly made, particularly where the settlement agreement itself listed mesothelioma as an asbestos-related disease.
• New York City Asbestos Litig (2019). A party relying on a seaman's release must show it was executed freely and with full understanding of his rights under Garrett's heightened admiralty standard, and where the release does not clearly cover a later mesothelioma and the record is silent or ambiguous on consideration and advice, summary judgment is inappropriate.
• Matter of Murphy-Clagett v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2018). Under the New York City Asbestos Litigation Case Management Order, defendants may meet their CPLR Article 16 burden as to settled non-parties through those non-parties' interrogatory answers and certain depositions, so forcing a settled party to produce a live trial witness is contrary to settlement policy and unnecessary.
• South v. Chevron Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2017). Texaco, which bore the burden in this admiralty case, did not show that a 1997 asbestos release covered a later mesothelioma claim; even under the more lenient Third Circuit (Wicker) test, the release did not show that South understood and knowingly released the actual risk of mesothelioma.
• South v. Texaco (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). Under the Jones Act and general maritime law, the party relying on a seaman's release bears the burden of showing it was fairly made and fully understood, and a release of future claims is not enforced where the proof beyond its language does not show the seaman understood he was releasing a future mesothelioma claim, whether the Sixth Circuit or Third Circuit standard applies.
• Mineweaser v. One Beacon America Insurance Company (2015). Settlement agreements relevant to the merits of the claims are judicial documents carrying a strong presumption of public access, and the defendants showed no compelling reason to keep them sealed.
• Matter of Miller (Erie, 2014). A wrongful death distribution goes to distributees based on their pecuniary loss from the death, so a distributee with no contact or support for decades may be allotted nothing; a presumption of death from absence requires proof of a diligent search.
• Konstantin v. 630 Third Ave. Assoc. (2012). A verdict is set aside as a matter of law only if no valid line of reasoning could support it, and a pain and suffering award is reduced under CPLR 5501(c) when it deviates materially from reasonable compensation. Expert causation opinions need only a proper foundation in generally accepted methods, not studies on identical circumstances.
• US Fid. & Guaranty Co. v. American Re-Ins. Co. (1st Dept., 2012). Under a follow-the-fortunes clause, a reinsurer must accept its reinsured's good-faith allocation and settlement of covered losses and cannot second-guess them; collateral estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and decided.
• United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. American Re-Insurance Company (2010). Under a follow-the-settlements clause, a reinsurer must reimburse a cedent's good-faith settlement payment that is at least arguably within the reinsured coverage. The reinsurer may not second-guess the cedent's allocation method or look behind the settlement to how funds were distributed to individual claimants.
• Charlop v. AO Smith Water Prods. (1st Dept., 2009). A party will not be relieved from a stipulation unless there is sufficient cause such as fraud, mistake, collusion or accident, and must seek to vacate it with reasonable promptness; here the delay before seeking vacatur required adherence to the stipulation.
• Matter of Anne Lautenschuetz v. AP Greene Industries, Inc. (3rd Dept., 2008). Under Workers' Compensation Law § 29(5), a settlement made more than three months earlier can be approved nunc pro tunc only if the amount is reasonable, the delay was not the petitioner's fault or neglect, and the carrier was not prejudiced; failure to seek approval for avoidable reasons bars approval.
• Reynolds v. Garlock Sealing Technologies (Mtr OF Eighth Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litigation) (2007). When a plaintiff and a defendant in a multi-defendant action make a high-low agreement that keeps the agreeing defendant in the case, the parties must disclose the agreement and its terms to the court and the non-agreeing defendants. Failure to disclose it prejudices the non-agreeing defendant and warrants a new trial.
• In re Quigley Co. (2006). A bankruptcy court has discretion to estimate unliquidated asbestos claims for voting so that voting power matches economic interests. The $1.00-per-vote method is acceptable only when it is harmless error, and claimants' contractual 90% reduction of their recovery can be reflected in a reduced vote.
• Langhorne v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (1st Dept., 2005). Release language covering any and all present and future asbestos claims is plain and unambiguous and bars later claims, including a later mesothelioma claim, absent evidence of duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake about the scope of the release.
• Matter of Conway v. Cbi Services, Inc. (3rd Dept., 2003). Where the medical evidence does not show a dust disease, liability falls under Workers' Compensation Law § 44 on the last employer in the kind of employment that caused the disease, and notice to the employer is imputed to its carrier. A settlement of the disability claim's third-party action does not bar the separate death claim.
• Matter of Drewes v. Steel (3rd Dept., 2003). A carrier ordered to contribute a share of compensation benefits is liable for compensation and so holds a lien under Workers' Compensation Law § 29(1) on third-party settlement proceeds, and its written consent to the settlements is required. The Board could rationally put the duty to obtain consent on the State Insurance Fund.
• Bille v. Hedman Resources (Matter of Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation v Hedman Resources, Ltd.) (4th Dept., 2000). A release in a personal injury case may be set aside for mutual mistake where there was a mistaken belief that an injury did not exist, and fact issues about the parties' knowledge of the injuries and their intent to release unknown injuries preclude summary judgment.
• Didner v. Keene Corp. (1st Dept., 1993). A defendant gets a verdict reduction under General Obligations Law § 15-108 only if the plaintiff gave a release or covenant not to sue to the other tortfeasor; a consent judgment with no release does not qualify. In dicta, the court said an aggregation method of reducing the verdict best serves the statute's purposes.

North Carolina

• Penegar v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (2022). A Medicare Secondary Payer Act plaintiff must show a concrete injury in fact. A plaintiff who was never owed the Medicare reimbursement and who released claims arising from the workers' compensation matter has not shown one.
• Kingston v. Lyon Construction, Inc. (2010). A superior court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-10.2(j) to determine a workers' compensation lien once a final, enforceable settlement with some third parties exists, even if claims against other third parties remain. The court has discretion to reduce the lien after considering the statutory factors.

Ohio

• RW Beckett Corp. v. Allianz Global Corp. (2020). Under Ohio law, "atmosphere" in a pollution exclusion is ambiguous as to whether it covers air inside a residential basement, so the exclusion is construed against the insurer. A non-settling insurer seeking a settlement credit must show the settling insurer's payment was for the same damages.
• Arpin v. Consol. Rail Corp. (8th Appellate District, 2016). Following the Sixth Circuit's bright-line rule, a release is valid under Section 5 of FELA only if it reflects a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury. A release of future claims for injuries that had not yet accrued is invalid.
• Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2008). Under Ohio's all-sums approach, an insurer selected by the insured that pays an entire asbestos settlement may seek equitable contribution from the insured's other triggered primary insurers. The insured's breach of notice provisions in the other insurers' policies does not defeat that claim, because contribution rests on equity rather than contract.
• Anderson v. AC & S., Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2003). Under FELA, a release is valid only if it settles an accrued claim for a known injury; a 1986 release for asbestosis could not bar a later-diagnosed mesothelioma claim that had not yet accrued, and Section 55 voids such a release to that extent.
• Estate of Orecny v. Ford Motor Co. (8th Appellate District, 1996). Under R.C. 4123.65 as amended in 1993, a settlement between a self-insuring employer and a claimant that is binding and dismissed with prejudice in the common pleas court does not abate when the claimant dies, and the Industrial Commission's abatement regulation does not apply to it.

Oklahoma

• Public Service Company v. Austin Power, Inc. (2016). Oklahoma's 2006 anti-indemnity statute for construction agreements does not apply retroactively, so it does not void indemnity rights under a 1968 contract even though the underlying suit and payment came after the statute took effect.
• Fisher v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (1989). Under Oklahoma law an unambiguous release is a contract interpreted as a matter of law, and a mutual-mistake challenge fails where the plaintiff already knew of and had pleaded the possibility of the later-diagnosed disease when he settled.

Other federal courts

• Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. US (2015). The Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to a general liability insurer suing as equitable subrogee of a prime contractor, because the insurer never stepped into the contractor's shoes in contract performance.
• Conwed Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp. (2006). Under Minnesota law, after a Naig settlement the jury's allocation of fault to the employer is applied once, to the lesser of the verdict or the workers' compensation benefits paid and payable, and a verdict on warnings in a mesothelioma trial does not collaterally estop litigation of warnings for asbestosis claims where the issue was not necessarily determined.
• Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. (1999). A mandatory settlement class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on a limited fund theory requires proof that the fund is limited by more than the parties' agreement. It also requires that the class include all claimants with unsatisfied claims and that conflicting interests within the class be addressed through separately represented subclasses.
• Brown & Root, Inc. v. Sain (1998). Under the LHWCA a latent-disease claimant becomes a "person entitled to compensation" when he learns of the disease and its disabling effect, not at exposure. For the section 33(g) forfeiture comparison, the gross amount of third-party settlements is compared with disability compensation only, excluding medical benefits.
• In re Asbestos Litigation (1998). A mandatory settlement class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in which all future claimants are treated alike differs from the Rule 23(b)(3) class in Amchem, and the Rule 23(a) requirements were satisfied because class members shared common interests in equitable distribution of limited funds.
• Sybron Transition v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford (1997). Under New York law, which governed the Hartford policies and Sybron's defenses to late notice, a 22-month notice delay without valid excuse is unreasonable as a matter of law, and lack of prejudice, waiver, estoppel or bad faith did not excuse it.
• Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. (1996). A class certified only for settlement must satisfy Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) as if it were going to be litigated; a class of this size and diversity cannot meet the typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements.
• Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management (1995). Under New York and Texas law, occurrence-based liability policies are triggered throughout a progressive disease process when the evidence shows injury-in-fact recurring at each point; the insured bears pro rata responsibility for years it chose to go uninsured but not for years after 1985 when asbestos insurance was unavailable, and each installation of asbestos building products is a separate occurrence for per-occurrence deductibles.
• Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1993). Family members who settle third-party tort claims before a worker's death are persons "entitled to compensation" under both section 33(f) and section 33(g) of the LHWCA, so the set-off and written-approval requirements apply to them even though the death had not yet occurred.
• In re Joint E. & SO. Dist. Asbestos Lit. (1993). A complaint that asks only for a court-assisted class settlement and states no substantive claim of right against the defendants presents no Article III case or controversy, and a request for a declaratory judgment does not supply one. A debtor may not use a mandatory limited-fund class action to evade the Bankruptcy Code.
• Sealover v. Carey Canada Inc. (1993). A claimant who has merely a claim against the Manville Trust, and has not settled with or released it, does not have a settled defendant for molding a verdict. Under Pennsylvania Rule 238, a continuance requested by plaintiff's counsel counts as plaintiff-caused delay and is excluded from delay damages.
• Feldman v. Owens-Illinois (In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation) (1992). Plaintiffs could prove causation in the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases without identifying the exact product that injured each person, and the Navy's failure to warn did not relieve manufacturers of their own duty to warn. Under New York law, the settlement set-off and the cap on non-economic damages operate independently, each calculated from the original verdict, and a settlement occurs only when the plaintiff gives a release.
• In re Joint E. & So. Dist. Asbestos Litigation (1992). A mandatory non-opt-out Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class settlement that readjusts creditors' rights against an insolvent entity requires proper subclasses, and co-defendant manufacturers cannot be in the same class as health claimants. Bankruptcy jurisdiction cannot be used to modify a confirmed and substantially consummated plan in violation of section 1127(b).
• Force v. Director, Owcp, Dept. of Labor (1991). Under 33 U.S.C. § 933(f), an employer may offset the claimant's entire third-party recovery, including non-economic and punitive damages, but only the portion attributable to the claimant. The employer bears the burden of proving that apportionment in a multi-party settlement.