Lagrange v. Eagle, Inc. (E.D. La., Sept. 6, 2024, removal or venue)

Our plain-English summary of Lagrange v. Eagle, Inc. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, September 6, 2024).

Irma Lee LaGrange sued Avondale (Huntington Ingalls), Hopeman Brothers, Liberty Mutual and others, alleging she developed mesothelioma from asbestos dust carried home on her husband's work clothes, which she laundered. Her husband, Allen LaGrange, worked at Avondale's Bridge City, Louisiana shipyard from 1973 to 1996 as a laborer, welder and pipefitter. The case had been removed to federal court under the federal officer removal statute. The court had earlier concluded that the defendants could not establish a federal government contractor defense. Plaintiff then asked the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and send the case back to state court, since the parties were not diverse. The court denied the motion. It found the asbestos exposure and failure-to-warn claims raised no novel or complex Louisiana law issues. It also reasoned that a federal court does not lose jurisdiction because a federal defense later fails, as long as the defense was not insubstantial or frivolous when the case was removed. The case stayed in federal court.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana
• Decided: September 6, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 23-628
• Stage: Jurisdiction, venue or removal
• State: Louisiana

Outcome. The court denied plaintiff Irma Lee LaGrange's motion to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand to state court, so the case stays in federal court against Avondale (Huntington Ingalls), Hopeman Brothers and Liberty Mutual.

What the court held. A federal court that had federal officer removal jurisdiction at the time of removal does not lose it when the federal defense later fails, and it may keep supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims where they raise no novel or complex state-law issues.

Issues decided: Government Contractor Defense and Removal, Personal Jurisdiction, Venue, Removal and Transfer.

The people and their exposure

• Irma Lee LaGrange (family member): mesothelioma

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Irma Lee LaGrange	laundering her husband's work clothes (husband Allen C. LaGrange was a laborer, welder, and pipefitter) (shipyards and maritime work); dust brought home	Avondale shipyard, Bridge City, Bridge City, Louisiana	1973-1996

The defendants

• Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (Avondale) (premises owner)
• Hopeman Brothers, Inc. (contractor)
• Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (insurer)
• Eagle, Inc.

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• Lagrange v. Eagle, Inc. (September 6, 2024). The court granted plaintiff Irma Lee LaGrange's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that defendants Huntington Ingalls and Hopeman Brothers may not use the Government Contractor Defense, and denied Hopeman's motion for leave to file a surreply.
• Lagrange v. Eagle, Inc. (November 22, 2024). The court stayed the entire case against Avondale and the other defendants until March 11, 2025, because of co-defendant Hopeman Brothers' Chapter 11 bankruptcy, over the plaintiffs' objection and in line with Avondale's request, with a reassessment of the stay to follow on motion.

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corporation (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 2021). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for Lockheed Martin, holding that federal officer removal was proper, the discovery orders were not an abuse of discretion, summary judgment was correct, and the $10,000 sanction against plaintiffs' attorney stood.
• Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 2020). The en banc Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order remanding the case to state court and remanded for further proceedings in federal court, ruling for Avondale (Huntington Ingalls) and against Latiolais on removal.
• Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 2016). The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order remanding the case to state court, holding the shipyard showed a causal nexus for the survival strict liability claims, and remanded for the district court to decide whether the shipyard has a colorable federal defense; the Savoie family lost on the remand ruling.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

IRMA LEE LAGRANGE,

v.

EAGLE, INC., ET AL.

Civil Action No. 23-628.

September 6, 2024.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

SECTION: "J" (5)

CARL J. BARBIER, District Judge.

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is an Emergency Motion Seeking the Court to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction and Remand to State Court (Rec. Doc. 13). Defendants Huntington Ingalls, Inc. ("Avondale") (Rec. Doc. 24), Hopeman Brothers, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Rec. Doc. 37) oppose the motion to which Plaintiff has filed a reply (Rec. Doc. 53). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion to remand (Rec. Doc. 13) should be DENIED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Irma Lee LaGrange allegedly contracted mesothelioma as a result of asbestos exposure by laundering her husband's work clothes. Her husband, Allen C. LaGrange, worked at Avondale's Bridge City, Louisiana shipyard from 1973 until 1996. Allen was allegedly exposed to asbestos at Avondale shipyard through his work as a laborer, welder, and pipefitter. This work created dust that accumulated on his clothes. Asbestos materials were used pursuant to contracts between the United States Government (U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Administration) and Avondale, and a joiner contractor between Avondale and subcontractor Hopeman. In the instant motion, Plaintiff now seeks to bar Defendants from using the Government Contractor Defense.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts that, because this Court concluded that Defendants cannot establish a federal defense under Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) and Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), all remaining claims and defenses arise under state law between parties that are not diverse. (Rec. Doc. 13, at 2). Thus, they argue, this Court should, at its discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Defendants argue that this Court should continue to exercise jurisdiction because it satisfied all elements of federal officer jurisdiction at the time of removal. (Rec. Doc. 24, at 1, 2). Further, Avondale argues that this Court should not decline supplemental jurisdiction because Plaintiff's claims involve no novel or complex issues of state law and because this Court has denied similar motions to remand in other asbestos cases. See Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association, No. 21-1971, 2023 WL 2646754 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2023); Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc., No. 21-1443, 2022 WL 16534223 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2022); Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., No. 15-1220, 2022 WL 807525 (E.D. La. Mar. 17, 2022).

Although federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 is unlike other removal doctrines: it is not narrow or limited." State v. Kleinert, 855 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2017); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Although the principle of limited federal court jurisdiction ordinarily compels federal courts

to resolve any doubt about removal in favor of remand, courts should analyze removal under § 1442(a)(1) "without a thumb on the remand side of the scale." Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F. 3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 990 F.3d 852, 859 (5th Cir. 2021) ("unlike the general removal statute, the federal officer removal statute is to be `broadly construed' in favor of a federal forum"). Nevertheless, it remains the removing party's burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute, a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction if the defendant is "any person acting under [an officer] of the United States or of any agency thereof. . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). To qualify for removal under § 1442(a)(1), a defendant must show: (1) it has asserted a colorable federal defense, (2) it is a "person" within the meaning of the statute, (3) that has acted pursuant to a federal officer's directions, and (4) the charged conduct is connected or associated with an act pursuant to a federal officer's directions. Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2020).

Although the "general rule" in the Fifth Circuit is to "decline to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims when all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case prior to trial, this rule is neither mandatory nor absolute." Batiste v. Island Recs. Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing state law claims in a case that had been pending in federal court for three years and lacked any novel or difficult issues of state law). Instead, the Court may, at its discretion, decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over claims for which there would be no original subject matter jurisdiction if:

(1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law

(2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction

(3) The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

In this case, the statutory factors above do not weigh in favor of this Court remanding the case back to State Court. First, although Plaintiffs argue that their claims are more frequently litigated in state court, the asbestos exposure and failure to warn claims do not raise any novel or complex issues of Louisiana law.

Second, although Plaintiffs accurately submit there are no federal questions remaining in this case, a federal court does not lose jurisdiction "if the facts later indicate the federal defense fails." Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 990 F.3d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 474 n.6 (2007) ("[W]hen a defendant removes a case to federal court based on the presence of a federal claim, an amendment eliminating the original basis for federal jurisdiction generally does not defeat jurisdiction.")). If, at the time of removal, the record indicates the federal contractor defense was not "insubstantial on its face or obviously frivolous," the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims is also proper. Id. Thus, dismissing Avondale's federal defenses does not affect this Court's jurisdiction over this case. This Court will therefore continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims.

Accordingly,

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to remand (Rec. Doc. 13) is DENIED.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Louisiana asbestos laws
• Louisiana asbestos exposure sites