McCloskey v. Allis-Chalmers Products Liability Trust (2011)

Our plain-English summary of McCloskey v. Allis-Chalmers Products Liability Trust (U.S. District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, March 14, 2011).

Wendy Ann McCloskey and other plaintiffs sued Allis-Chalmers Products Liability Trust and other defendants in federal court in western Pennsylvania. They claimed that Arthur Partner developed mesothelioma from asbestos-containing products used aboard the USS Vernon County, where he served in the Navy. The plaintiffs had also filed a separate state-court case in Cambria County about his later asbestos exposure at a PPG auto glass plant in Tipton, Pennsylvania. Lincoln Electric, a defendant in the state case that made welding rods the plaintiffs say exposed him to asbestos, asked to intervene in the federal case. It argued the plaintiffs should not be allowed to keep two actions over the same injury. The court denied the motion. It reasoned that Lincoln's claims concern exposure after Navy service and would add new issues and parties. It also noted that separate suits against different defendants for one harm are not barred by claim splitting or res judicata, and that Lincoln can protect its interests in the state case.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 14, 2011
• Docket: No. 3:09-CV-219
• Stage: Other
• State: Pennsylvania

Outcome. The court denied Lincoln Electric Company's motion to intervene as a defendant, so the plaintiffs' Navy-exposure case proceeds without Lincoln and its post-service welding-rod claims.

What the court held. A court may deny permissive intervention where the intervenor would add new issues and parties that unduly complicate the case. Separate actions against different defendants for a single harm are not barred by claim splitting or res judicata.

Issues decided: Trial Procedure and Discovery.

The people and their exposure

• Arthur Partner: mesothelioma

The defendants

• Allis-Chalmers Products Liability Trust (manufacturer)
• The Lincoln Electric Company (manufacturer)

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

WENDY ANN McCLOSKEY, etal, Plaintiffs,

v.

ALLIS-CHALMERS PRODUCTS LIABILITY TRUST et al, Defendants.

No. 3:09-CV-219.

March 14, 2011.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KIM R. GIBSON, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on The Lincoln Electric Company's Motion to Intervene as a Defendant Pursuant to Rule 24 (Document No. 34). Plaintiffs filed a Brief in Opposition to The Lincoln Electric Company's Motion to Intervene as a Defendant Pursuant to Rule 24 (Document No. 35). The Court now DENIES The Lincoln Electric Company's Motion to Intervene as a Defendant Pursuant to Rule 24 (Document No. 34).

Plaintiffs filed the instant action to recover alleged damages related to Arthur Partner's development of mesothelioma as a result of alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured and/or supplied by the defendants in this action and used aboard the USS Vernon County, on which Mr. Partner served in the Navy. Prior to filing this action, Plaintiffs instituted a separate action in the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas based on Mr. Partner's alleged post-naval exposure to asbestos while employed in a PPG auto glass plant in Tipton, Pennsylvania. One of the defendants in the state-court action, The Lincoln Electric Company filed a motion to intervene as a defendant in this action. Lincoln argues in its motion that it is entitled to intervene and litigate Plaintiffs' claims against Lincoln in this Court because Plaintiffs should not be permitted to maintain separate actions, arguing that "[t]he Plaintiffs should be precluded from maintaining two separate actions arising out of the same alleged injury." The claims that Lincoln seeks consideration of concern Mr. Partner's exposure to asbestos-containing products while employed by PPO at its auto glass facility in Tipton, Pennsylvania. Currently, the instant case concerns only Mr. Partner's exposures while serving in the U.S. Navy. The current defendants are manufacturers of equipment used aboard the ship on which Mr. Partner served. Lincoln, by contrast, manufactured welding rods, which Plaintiffs allege exposed Mr. Partner to asbestos when he worked for PPO beginning in the 1970s. The defenses asserted by Lincoln would stand in stark contrast to those asserted by the current defendants in this case.

By raising an argument concerning the propriety of Plaintiffs maintaining two causes of action, and by seeking to insert itself into an action in which its defenses will be different from the other defendants' Lincoln is inserting new issues into this litigation. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has noted that "[t]he addition of new issues and new parties may be considered contrary to orderly procedure" and that therefore "the court may properly deny or limit pennissive intervention where it feels that the interposition of counterclaims not related to the matters at issue between the plaintiff and defendant would unduly delay or complicate the detennination of those issues." Mitel Corp. v. A&A Connections Inc. E.D. Pa. No. 97-CV-4205, 1998 WL 136529, 6 (1998) (citing 3A Moore"s Federal Practice § 24.17 (Matthew Bender 1987) (other citations omitted, brackets in original». Another judge in the Eastern District denied intervention where it was detennined that the issues raised by the intervenor would complicate the case. See Shorb by Shorb v. Airco, Inc., E.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 82-1983, 1985 WL 5954, 4 (1985).

The instant matter focuses on Mr. Partners' alleged exposure to asbestos during his service in the Navy. Lincoln's claim would focus on alleged exposure after his service. These matters, while perhaps related, need not be tried in the same proceedings. Where different defendants are involved, even if their conduct caused a single hann, the doctrines of "splitting" and res judicata do not bar separate actions. See, e.g., Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 272, 149 A.2d 648, 650 (1959) ("under the common law of Pennsylvania plaintiff could bring separate actions against several defendants for a joint trespass"); Grossman, supra (permitting separate action against attorney-agent after taking judgment against principal for same tort); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 49 (1982) (cited in Grossman, 424 Pa. Super. at 467, 623 A.2d at 3) ("A judgment

against one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the injured party may have against another person who may be liable therefor."). Lincoln can protect its interests in the action currently pending in state court. Principles of lis pendens alibi and res judicata ensure that the same issue will not be litigated twice. Because Lincoln seeks to inject new issues and new parties into this matter, the Court finds that intervention would unduly complicate this case, and would be inappropriate. The Court now DENIES The Lincoln Electric Company's Motion to Intervene as a Defendant Pursuant to Rule 24 (Document No. 34).

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Pennsylvania asbestos laws
• Pennsylvania asbestos exposure sites