Ragusa v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Association (2021)

Our plain-English summary of Ragusa v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Association (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, November 23, 2021).

Frank Ragusa, who later developed mesothelioma, sued in Louisiana state court over asbestos exposure while working at the Avondale shipyard. From 1972 to 1975 he worked on and off for Huntington Ingalls, running a cherry picker. He never stepped aboard a federal vessel. Huntington Ingalls and Albert Bossier removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute. Ragusa asked for remand, arguing the removal came too late and that the defendants could not show the required connection to federal direction. The court denied the motion. It held that, read broadly, the connection requirement was met. Ragusa's work took him around the shipyard, where asbestos materials were likely used on two federal vessels then under construction, and it did not matter that he never boarded one. On timing, neither complaint clearly revealed why the case was removable, so the 30-day clock never started. The defendants could therefore remove when they did.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana
• Decided: November 23, 2021
• Citation: 573 F.Supp.3d 1046
• Docket: CIVIL ACTION No. 2:21-cv-1971
• Stage: Jurisdiction, venue or removal
• State: Louisiana

Outcome. The court denied plaintiff Frank Ragusa's motion to remand, holding that defendants Huntington Ingalls and Albert Bossier properly removed under the federal officer removal statute and that removal was timely.

What the court held. Under the federal officer removal statute, the connection requirement is read broadly, so asbestos exposure at a shipyard building federal vessels satisfies it even if the plaintiff never boarded one. The 30-day removal clock starts only when the plaintiff's pleading unequivocally reveals why the case is removable, and a defendant may remove before then.

Issues decided: Government Contractor Defense and Removal, Venue, Removal and Transfer.

The people and their exposure

• Frank P. Ragusa, Jr.: mesothelioma

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Frank P. Ragusa, Jr.	cherry picker operator (shipyards and maritime work); worked near others using it	Avondale Shipyards, Louisiana	1972-1975

The defendants

• Huntington Ingalls Inc. (employer)
• Albert L. Bossier, Jr.

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• Ragusa v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (November 23, 2021). The district court denied plaintiff Frank Ragusa's motion to remand, holding that defendants Huntington Ingalls and Albert Bossier properly and timely removed the case under the federal officer removal statute.

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 2020). The en banc Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order remanding the case to state court and remanded for further proceedings in federal court, ruling for Avondale (Huntington Ingalls) and against Latiolais on removal.
• Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 2018). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order remanding the case to Louisiana state court, ruling that Huntington Ingalls (Avondale) failed to show the causal nexus needed for federal officer removal, so the Legendre brothers prevailed.
• Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 2016). The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order remanding the case to state court, holding the shipyard showed a causal nexus for the survival strict liability claims, and remanded for the district court to decide whether the shipyard has a colorable federal defense; the Savoie family lost on the remand ruling.
• Bourgeois v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2020). The district court denied plaintiff Bourgeois's motion to remand, holding that Avondale (Huntington Ingalls) and Bossier timely and properly removed the case under the federal officer removal statute.

Later decisions citing this one

4 later decisions in our library cite this one:

• Jacob v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2024). The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that General Electric's federal officer removal was timely and that the court had subject matter jurisdiction.
• Lebeau v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2023). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that Avondale (with Lloyd's and Hopeman Brothers joining) timely removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, so the case stays in federal court.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2023). The court denied plaintiff Frank Ragusa's motion to remand the case to state court, keeping it in federal court against Avondale (Huntington Ingalls) and the other defendants.
• Thompson v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2023). The court denied plaintiff Velma Lee Thompson's motion to remand, keeping the case in federal court under the federal officer removal statute, a win for Avondale (Huntington Ingalls) and its co-defendants.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

573 F.Supp.3d 1046 (2021)

Frank P. RAGUSA, Jr.

v.

LOUISIANA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, etal.

CIVIL ACTION No. 2:21-cv-1971.

Signed November 23, 2021.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

[*1048] Gerolyn Petit Roussel, Benjamin Peter Dinehart, Jonathan Brett Clement, Lauren Roussel Clement, Perry Joseph Roussel, Jr., Roussel & Clement, Mandeville, LA, for Frank P. Ragusa, Jr.

Samuel Milton Rosamond, III, Caroline M. Murley, Gina Talluto Cursain, Taylor, Wellons, Politz & Duhe APLC, New Orleans, LA, Lindsay C. Rabalais, Law Offices of Dan Claitor, Stephanie B. Laborde, Benjamin M. Chapman, LaFleur & Laborde, LLC, Baton Rouge, LA, for Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association.

Brian C. Bossier, Christopher Thomas Grace, III, Edwin A. Ellinghausen, III, Erin Helen Boyd, Laura M. Gillen, Whitney Charmaine Stewart, Blue Williams, LLP, Metairie, LA, for Huntington Ingalls Incorporated.

Susan Beth Kohn, April Ann McQuillar, Douglas Kinler, Douglas Watson Redfearn, Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Eagle, Inc.

Gustave A. Fritchie, III, Alison A. Spindler, Daphne M. Lancaster, David Michael Melancon, Michael Kevin Powell, Timothy Farrow Daniels, Connor Peth, Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Albert L. Bossier, Jr. McGready Lewis Richeson, Francis Xavier deBlanc, III, Milele N. St. Julien, Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, New Orleans, LA, for Bayer CropScience, Inc., Union Carbide Corporation.

John Joseph Hainkel, III, Angela M. Bowlin, Kelly L. Long, Kelsey A. Eagan, Lacey Taylor McCoy, Magali Ann Puente-Martin, Roth Martin Hainkel, Frilot L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Foster Wheeler LLC, General Electric Company, CBS Corporation, Occidental Chemical Corporation, Fmc Corp.

Kaye N. Courington, Blaine Augusta Moore, Brittney Bullock Ankersen, Connor Harris Fields, Jeffrey Matthew Burg, Mathilde Villere Semmes, Troy Nathan Bell, Courington, Kiefer, Sommers, Marullo & Matherne, New Orleans, LA, for Hopeman Brothers Inc.

[*1049] Christopher Kelly Lightfoot, Edward J. Lassus, Jr., Gabriel J. Veninata, Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP, Metairie, LA, for Taylor-Seidenbach Incorporated.

Mary Reeves Arthur, Daniel S. Roberts, Thomas Peyton Smith, Elizabeth Riddell Penn, Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP, New Orleans, LA, Walter G. Watkins, III, Forman, Watkins, & Krutz, LLP, Jackson, MS, for International Paper Company. Lauren Ann McCulloch Semlinger, Mitchell F. Tedesco, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Houston, TX, for Shell Oil Company. Charles B. Wilmore, Elizabeth S. Wheeler, Erin Conner Percy, Neil Charles Abramson, Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, LA, for Dow Chemical Company.

David Mark Bienvenu, Jr., Melissa Jade Shaffer, Thomas Clay Naquin, John Allain Viator, Samantha Kennedy, Bienvenu, Bonnecaze, Foco, Viator & Holinga, APLLC, Baton Rouge, LA, Daniel Edwin Buras, Jr., Inemesit U. O'Boyle, Patrick R. Follette, Erin Brooke Rigsby, James McClendon Williams, Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC, Metairie, LA, for ExxonMobil Corporation, ExxonMobil Oil Corporation.

Darryl J. Foster, David Edmund Redmann, Jr., Bradley, Murchison, Kelly & Shea, LLC, Georgia Noble Ainsworth, Janice M. Culotta, Kean Miller LLP, New Orleans, LA, Gregory M. Anding, Alexandra E. Rossi, Allison N. Benoit, Jay Morton Jalenak, Jr., Karli Glascock Johnson, Adrienne Wood, Kean Miller, LLP, Baton Rouge, LA, for Zeneca Inc.

Christopher Chocheles, Brandon William Keay, James M. Garner, Sher, Garner, Cahill, Richter, Klein & Hilbert, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Murphy Oil USA, Inc.

Darryl J. Foster, David Edmund Redmann, Jr., Dwight C. Paulsen, III, Bradley, Murchison, Kelly & Shea, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Hexion, Inc., Pharmacia LLC.

Cory R. Cahn, Entergy Services, Inc., New Orleans, LA, for Entergy Louisiana, L.L.C.

Thorne D. Harris, III, Thorne D. Harris III, Attorney at Law, Metairie, LA, for Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. Thomas J. Cortazzo, Shannon C. Burr, Susan Grace Keller-Garcia, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Marathon Petroleum Company LP.

Jennifer E. Adams, Barbara Bourgeois Ormsby, William Claudy Harrison, Jr., Amber B. Barlow, Deutsch Kerrigan & Stiles LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Riley Power, Inc.

Robert S. Emmett, Kimberly C. Delk, Roy Clifton Cheatwood, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, New Orleans, LA, for Legacy Vulcan, LLC.

Tyson B. Shofstahl, Charles A. Cerise, Jr., Diana Cole Surprenant, Adams & Reese, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Syngenta Crop Protection LLC.

Barbara Lee Arras, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, New Orleans, LA, Harrison Marc Martin, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, New Orleans, for CF Industries Nitrogen, LLC.

Deirdre Claire McGlinchey, McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, New Orleans, LA, for Caterpillar Global Mining LLC. Timothy Patrick Hurley, Jose R. Cot, Robert Kenton Denny, Hurley & Cot, APLC, New Orleans, LA, for Amdura LLC. Paula Marcello Wellons, Jonathan B. Womack, Desiree Weilbaecher Adams, Taylor, Wellons, Politz & Duhe APLC, [*1050] New Orleans, LA, for Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance Company.

Kristopher T. Wilson, Katherine Osborne Hannan, Patricia Cowen Penton, Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin & Hubbard, New Orleans, LA, for United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.

James Aristide Holmes, John K. Nieset, Kyle Demoine' Anderson, Christovich & Kearney, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for First State Insurance Company.

Tyson B. Shofstahl, Adams & Reese, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Grove U.S. LLC.

Mary Reeves Arthur, Elizabeth Riddell Penn, Forman, Watkins & Krutz LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Uniroyal Holding, Inc. John Joseph Hainkel, III, Angela M. Bowlin, Kelsey A. Eagan, Lacey Taylor McCoy, Magali Ann Puente-Martin, Roth Martin Hainkel, Frilot L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for ViacomCBS Inc.

Richard Munice Crump, Rebecca Abbott Zotti, Robert E. Dille, Shelley K. Napolitano, Maron Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy LLC, New Orleans, LA, for BP Products North America, Inc.

SECTION: J(1)

ORDER & REASONS

CARL J. BARBIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Rec. Doc. 8) filed by Plaintiff, Frank P. Ragusa ("Plaintiff"). The motion is opposed by Defendants, Albert L. Bossier, Jr. and Huntington Ingalls Inc. (collectively "Defendants") (Rec. Doc. 25). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of alleged asbestos exposure at the Avondale Shipyards. On and off from June 5, 1972 to March 20, 1975, Plaintiff was an employee of Huntington Ingalls, Inc., where he ran a "cherry picker" at Avondale shipyards. During this time, he never stepped aboard any federal vessel, but he was exposed to asbestos dust. Later in life, he contracted mesothelioma.

On July 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff amended the complaint and served Defendants on October 4, 2021.

On October 26, 2021, Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to the Federal Officer Removal Statute. On October 28, 2021, Plaintiff moved to remand, because they claim removal was untimely and Defendants cannot satisfy the connection requisite.

PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

The original petition alleges that Plaintiff was "exposed to substances which resulted in his mesothelioma and other ill effects" during his employment at Avondale but fail to mention how he was exposed. (Rec. Doc. 1-1), at 3, 6. With slightly more specificity in the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that exposure was due to asbestos dust released by the installation, removal, and repair of asbestos-containing products. (Rec. Doc. 1-2), at 4.

Considering Plaintiff's failure to affirmatively identify the reason for exposure, Defendants removed after concluding that the asbestos dust must be from ambient exposure to asbestos-containing products, which include the products required for building federal vessels at the shipyard. At [*1051] the time of the alleged exposure, Defendants claim that two federal vessels were being constructed at the Avondale shipyards.

However, Plaintiffs argue that nowhere in either complaint do they allege that Plaintiff had ambient exposure to asbestos dust from federal vessels. In fact, they clarify that Plaintiff never set foot on a federal vessel and his work with the cherry picker left him unaware how he was exposed to asbestos. Further, they contend Defendants' removal was not timely, because the thirty days from the initial petition had already passed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Although federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 is unlike other removal doctrines: it is not narrow or limited." State v. Kleinert, 855 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2017); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Although the principle of limited federal court jurisdiction ordinarily compels federal courts to resolve any doubt about removal in favor of remand, courts should analyze removal under § 1442(a)(1) "without a thumb on the remand side of the scale." Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F. 3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2016). Nevertheless, it remains the removing party's burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute, a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction if the defendant is "any person acting under [an officer] of the United States or of any agency thereof.... for or relating to any act under color of such office." 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). To qualify for removal under § 1442(a)(1), a defendant must show: (1) it has asserted a colorable federal defense, (2) it is a "person" within the meaning of the statute, (3) that has acted pursuant to a federal officer's directions, and (4) the charged conduct is connected or associated with an act pursuant to a federal officer's directions. Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2020).

Thus, in cases involving asbestos exposure, where defendants were "free to adopt the safety measures the plaintiffs now allege would have prevented their injuries," remand is warranted, but where the plaintiff's claims "rested on the mere use of asbestos" at the direction of the federal Government, removal is appropriate. Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 885 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

The issues before the Court are (1) whether the Federal Officer Removal connection prong is met and (2) whether Defendant's removal was timely.

First, Defendants properly removed under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, because they meet all requirements including the connection prong. A defendant need not win their case at their jurisdictional stage. Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 297 n.10. Moreover, courts must interpret factual disputes in favor of maintaining federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Schnexnayder v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. No. 20-775, 2020 WL 3970159, at [*3] (E.D. La. July 14, 2020); see also Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 1992).

In Bourgeois v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., the plaintiff worked at Avondale as a mail dispatcher. Bourgeois v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 2020 WL 2488026, at [*8], 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84888, at [*21] (E.D. La. [*1052] May 14, 2020). Later in life, he allegedly contracted mesothelioma because of exposure to asbestos fibers and dust during his employment at Avondale. Id. at [*2]-3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84888, at [*6]-7. There was no evidence that the plaintiff ever set foot on a federal vessel, but his job as a mail dispatcher took him all over the shipyard, including places where asbestos-containing materials were used and prepared for the federal vessels. Id. at [*2]-3, 8, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84888, at [*6]-7, 21. "Under the broad reading of `relating to' Latiolais dictates, .... the evidence that six Navy vessels were under construction while Bourgeois worked at Avondale [tends] to show that Bourgeois was likely exposed to asbestos used under the direction of a federal officer, thereby satisfying the connection prong." Id. at [*6], 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84888, at [*22].

1052

Here, courts have consistently held that Defendants in this case are entitled to removal under the Federal Officer Removal Statute. See id.; see also Latiolais, 951 F.3d 286; see also Legendre, 885 F.3d 398. Like the plaintiff in Bourgeois, the fact that Plaintiff in this case never set foot on a federal vessel is immaterial. Plaintiff's work with the cherry picker took him all over the shipyard including places where asbestos-containing materials were likely used and installed on the two federal vessels. Under the broad reading of the connection prong, the evidence that at least two federal vessels were under construction during the time of the alleged exposure tends to show that Plaintiff was likely exposed to asbestos being used under the direction of a federal officer. Thus, the connection prong is met. There are no other facts that differentiate this case from extensive precedent. Hence, Defendants meet the requirements to remove under the Federal Officer Removal Statute.

Second, Defendants' removal was timely. There is a bright line rule that a defendant has thirty days to remove starting upon defendant's receipt of an initial pleading or other document that affirmatively reveals on its face why the case is removable. Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1992). The trigger for removal must be unequivocally clear and certain. Bosky v. Kroger, 288 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 2002). Further, the trigger must be the result of a voluntary act by the plaintiff; the defendant's knowledge and actions cannot trigger the thirty-day clock. S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996); Cole v. Knowledge Learning Corp., 416 F.App'x 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011). Specifically, the thirty days do not start to run if the defendant need to do independent research to ascertain the necessary facts, nor does a defendant's subjective knowledge trigger the thirty-day clock. S.W.S. Erectors, Inc., 72 F.3d at 494; Cole, 416 F.App'x at 440. At the same time, even if the thirty-day clock has not started to run, removal is proper if a defendant is able to show why the case is removable. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 1995); see Manieri v. Cr. Eng., Inc., 2019 WL 2022535, at *___, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77655, at [*2]-3 (E.D. La. May 8, 2019) (citing Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)).

In Clark v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., the original petition did not affirmatively reveal on its face why the case was removable, because "it did not name any federal vessels or `other details that made the case removable under the Federal Officer Removal Statute.'" Clark v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., etal., 2021 WL 4860310, at [*2], 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200895, at [*9] (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2021) (quoting Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co., No. 20-2389, 2020 WL 6867250 at [*3], 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS [*1053] 218529 at [*3] (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 2020)). Because of this, the thirty-day clock was not triggered by the original petition. Id. Rather, the thirty-day time limit was triggered upon possession of the plaintiff's deposition transcript, which showed that he was exposed to people from "Army, Navy, [and] Marines" and "all the Army people came from Avondale." Id. at [*2], 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200895, at [*9]-10. The deposition made the connection between the facts triggering removability unequivocally clear by drawing the connection between the government and the injurious acts, in a way the petition did not. See id.

1053

In Manieri v. Cr. Eng., Inc., the Court held removal was proper under diversity jurisdiction, even though the defendant filed for removal before the thirty-day clock began. 2019 WL 2022535, at *___, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77655, at [*9]. In their petition, plaintiff did not affirmatively allege a specific amount in damages, so the thirty-day clock was never triggered. Id.

Plaintiff argued that the defendant had subjective knowledge that the claim's value was in excess of the jurisdictional requirement. Id. at *___, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77655, at [*4]. However, the Court held that defendant's subjective knowledge was irrelevant, because only the plaintiff can trigger the thirty-day time limit. Id. Further, the Court found that there was no requirement "to `unlock' the thirty-day window by presenting `unequivocally clear and certain' evidence," which allows a defendant to file for removal before the plaintiff affirmatively reveals why the case is removable. Id. at [*4], 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77655, at [*9] (citing Chandler v. Ruston Louisiana Hospital Co. LLC, No. 3:14CV121, 2014 WL 1096365 at [*6], 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36943 (W.D. La. Mar. 19, 2014)).

Finally, the Fifth Circuit Court noted the important policy reasons behind the bright line rule:

The Chapman court had several practical ramifications in mind when it announced this standard. By rejecting a so-called due-diligence standard, it sought to promote efficiency by preventing courts from expending copious time determining what a defendant should have known or have been able to ascertain at the time of the initial pleading. Moreover, the Chapman court wanted to avoid encouraging defendants to remove cases prematurely for fear of accidentally letting the thirty-day window to federal court close when it is unclear that the initial pleading [is removable].

Mumfrey v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. June 10, 2013). The Chapman court wanted to avoid wasting court resources on determining Defendants' subjective knowledge at a given time and to discourage Plaintiffs from hiding the ball in their pleadings. If Plaintiffs want the thirty-day clock to begin running, they must make unequivocally clear the facts triggering removability.

Like the petition in Clark, neither the Plaintiff's first nor amended complaints triggered removal, because they do not allege unequivocally clear the facts that connect the government to the injurious acts. Specifically, neither complaint affirmatively names asbestos exposure due to any federal vessels, federal employees, or other details that would make the case removable under the Federal Officer Removal Statute. Rather, Plaintiff generally alleges in both complaints that exposure was a result of asbestos dust from installation, removal, and repair of various asbestos-containing materials nearby. They never specify who was using these materials nor what these materials were used to build. Therefore, both petitions fail to affirmatively [*1054] reveal on their face why the case in removable, so neither triggered the thirty-day clock to run. 1054

However, as held in Manieri, Defendants did not need the thirty-day window unlocked to remove to this Court. Again, the clock in this case never began to run, because Plaintiffs did not affirmatively reveal why the case is removable and an inquiry into Defendants' subjective knowledge is irrelevant for purposes triggering the thirty-day clock. Therefore, even though Defendants filed for removal before the thirty-day clock was triggered, removal was timely.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDER that Plaintiff's motion to remand (Rec. Doc. 8) is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of November, 2021.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Louisiana asbestos laws
• Louisiana asbestos exposure sites