Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (E.D. La., Mar. 30, 2025)

Our plain-English summary of Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, March 30, 2025).

Robert Sentilles sued several defendants, including Pelnor, L.L.C., alleging he developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure. The opinion does not describe his work or exposure. Sentilles settled with Pelnor in September 2024. Pelnor had a crossclaim against its umbrella insurer, First State Insurance Company, over who owed Pelnor's legal expenses. On January 20, 2025, the District Court granted Pelnor partial summary judgment, holding First State liable for all of Pelnor's attorney's fees and costs without reduction. Pelnor then asked for leave, after the pleading deadline, to add a Louisiana statutory bad faith claim against First State. A magistrate judge recommended a split result. Claims based on the period from the September 2024 settlement to January 20, 2025 should be denied, because the parties had jointly asked the court to delay its summary judgment ruling and Pelnor could not benefit from that delay. Claims based on events on or after January 20, 2025 should be allowed, because Pelnor could not have raised them earlier, acted promptly, and First State would suffer no unfair prejudice.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana
• Decided: March 30, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 21-958
• Stage: Discovery or evidence ruling
• State: Louisiana

Outcome. The magistrate judge recommended granting in part and denying in part Pelnor's motion: Pelnor may supplement its crossclaim with a bad faith claim against First State for events on or after January 20, 2025, but not for events between September 4, 2024 and January 20, 2025.

What the court held. A party seeking to supplement a pleading after the scheduling-order deadline must show good cause under Rule 16(b) and satisfy Rule 15(d). A party cannot base a bad faith claim on a delay that it jointly requested.

Issues decided: Insurance Coverage, Trial Procedure and Discovery.

The people and their exposure

• Robert Sentilles: mesothelioma

The defendants

• Pelnor, L.L.C.
• First State Insurance Company (insurer)
• Huntington Ingalls Incorporated

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (December 20, 2021). The court denied defendant Pelnor's motion for partial summary judgment, so plaintiff Sentilles may pursue his claims about exposure at Pelnor on or after September 1, 1975, and the court did not categorically exclude evidence of post-1975 exposure.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (April 8, 2022). The court granted the unopposed summary judgment motions of Union Carbide, Amchem, Zurich (as alleged insurer of Marquette) and John Crane, and dismissed Sentilles's and Huntington Ingalls (Avondale)'s claims against them with prejudice.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (April 8, 2022). The court granted Avondale's unopposed motions for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Sentilles's claims about his employment there after June 23, 1969, and his secondary-exposure claims tied to his father and brother.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (April 22, 2022). The court granted Avondale's motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Sentilles's state-law tort claims against Avondale, both occupational and take-home, as preempted by the LHWCA's exclusivity provision.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (April 25, 2022). The court granted Avondale's (Huntington Ingalls') summary judgment motion and dismissed Sentilles's state-law tort claims against it with prejudice, ruling that the LHWCA's exclusivity provision preempts them.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (June 21, 2022). The court granted Pelnor's Rule 54(b) motion, entering partial final judgment on the order dismissing plaintiff Sentilles's claims against Avondale so that the dismissal can be appealed immediately.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (October 3, 2024). The court granted Avondale's Rule 12(c) motion dismissing with prejudice Sentilles's reasserted claims about post-June 1969 Avondale work and his father's and brother's Avondale employment, denied his motion for reconsideration, and barred him from using Pelnor's experts Pierce and Roggli at trial.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (October 4, 2024). The court denied plaintiff Sentilles's motion in limine to exclude Avondale's expert Christopher Herfel, finding him qualified and his opinions relevant and reliable.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (January 20, 2025). The court granted Pelnor's motion for partial summary judgment and denied First State Insurance Company's cross-motion, holding that First State must indemnify Pelnor for all of its reasonable defense attorney's fees and costs.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (February 10, 2025). The court ruled on Avondale's objections to plaintiff Sentilles's trial exhibits: it overruled some, sustained others (including expert reports and several publications as hearsay), deferred many to trial, and dismissed several as moot.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

ROBERT STEPHEN SENTILLES,

v.

HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 21-958.

March 30, 2025.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

SECTION: "M" (3)

EVA J. DOSSIER, Magistrate Judge.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Crossclaimant Pelnor, L.L.C.'s Motion for Leave to File First Supplemental and Amending Cross-Claim. [1] Cross-Defendant First State Insurance Company ("First State") filed an opposition.[2] Pelnor filed a Reply.[3] A status conference was held on March 26, 2026, relative to the motion. Having considered the memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, it is recommended[4] that the District Court grant in part and deny in part Pelnor's motion. I. Background

Plaintiff, Robert Sentilles, alleged that he developed mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos.[5] Sentilles alleged that Pelnor, among other defendants, was liable under theories of negligence and strict liability.[6]

Pelnor, in turn, maintained that First State had a duty to indemnify Pelnor, including relative to its legal expenses, under an umbrella insurance policy.[7] First State maintained that the policy imposed a duty to defend, rather than a duty to indemnify, such that First State was not liable for the full amount of Pelnor's legal expenses.[8] Pelnor filed a crossclaim based on First State's alleged breach of its indemnification obligation on March 28, 2024.[9] The deadline for amendments to pleadings, third-party actions, crossclaims, and counterclaims expired the next day.[10]

Sentilles reached a settlement with Pelnor on September 4, 2024.[11] By way of cross-motions for summary judgment, Pelnor and First State then sought a determination of the extent of First State's liability to Pelnor.[12] The District Court granted Pelnor's motion for partial summary judgment on January 20, 2025.[13] The Court held that "First State is liable for all of Pelnor's attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against Sentilles's claim and Avondale's crossclaim without division, reduction, or set-off because the insurance policy provides for the indemnification of Pelnor's ultimate net loss, which includes such fees and costs, and the policy contains no duty to defend."[14]

Pelnor filed the instant Motion to for Leave to File First Supplemental and Amending Crossclaim on February 26, 2025. The motion requests leave to amend and supplement Pelnor's crossclaim to include a claim under La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1892. That statute permits an insured to recover penalties and attorney's fees when an insurer's actions are "found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause." See § 22:1892(B)(1). These statutory claims are commonly known as a bad faith claims.

II. Standard of Law

When, as here, a party moves for leave to amend or supplement after the deadline set forth in a scheduling order, the motion is governed by the good cause requirements of Rule 16(b). Rule 16(b) provides that a scheduling order "may be

modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). "The good cause standard requires the `party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.'" S&W Enterprises, L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

The Fifth Circuit has established a four-part test for the exercise of the trial court's discretion in determining whether a movant has established good cause. See Lampkin v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 925 F.3d 727, 741 (5th Cir. 2019). The trial court considers: "(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend, (2) the importance of the amendment, (3) the potential prejudice the other party would suffer if the amendment was allowed, and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure that prejudice." Id. (citing S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536). Even if a party establishes good cause under Rule 16(b), it must still satisfy the additional requirements of Rule 15(a) or Rule 15(d).

Rule 15(a) applies to amended pleadings—i.e., when the facts underlying the new or modified claim occurred before the original pleading was filed. 6A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1504 (3d ed. 2024). Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days or service or, "if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier." If that deadline has passed, then the party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Id.

Rule 15(d) applies to supplemental pleadings—i.e., when the facts underlying the new or modified claim occurred after the original pleading was filed. 6A Wright et al., supra § 1504. Under Rule 15(d), "the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). "[T]he discretion exercised in deciding whether to grant leave" is similar with respect to amended and supplemental pleadings. Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 239 (5th Cir. 1983). But the Fifth Circuit has observed that "[w]hile the text of Rule 15(a) provides that leave should be freely granted, the text of Rule 15(d) does not similarly provide." Burns v. Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1998).

III. Analysis

A. Pelnor has clarified the narrow temporal scope of its proposed bad faith

claim.

On the face of the proposed pleading, the time period underlying Pelnor's proposed bad faith claim is unclear. Read broadly, the claim could encompass any action by First State in connection with the indemnity dispute. The briefing, however, indicates that Pelnor is basing the claim on more recent events. A recent status conference clarified the scope of the proposed claim.[15]

During the status conference, Pelnor, through counsel, confirmed that it is not attempting to bring a bad faith claim based on its entire history of interactions with First State. Rather, Pelnor explained, the proposed bad faith claim dates back to the September 4, 2024 settlement, at the earliest, and focuses on First State's response (or lack thereof) to the District Court's January 20, 2025 grant of summary judgment. Thus, because all relevant events occurred after the original crossclaim was filed, the motion for leave refers only to a supplemental crossclaim. The two potential start dates for Pelnor's proposed supplemental crossclaim will be addressed separately because they lead to opposite results under Rule 16(b). B. Pelnor should not be permitted to supplement its crossclaim to address

events dating back to September 4, 2024.

The first potential start date for the proposed bad faith crossclaim is the September 4, 2024 settlement between Sentilles and Pelnor. The District Court granted summary judgment on January 20, 2025. Pelnor suggests that its bad faith claim may arise from events that occurred in the interim period. That suggestion lacks merit because this interim period was the direct result of the parties' multiple joint requests that the Court delay ruling on summary judgment.

The parties filed their cross motions for summary judgment on September 18, 2024.[16] The original submission date for both motions was October 3, 2024.[17] The parties jointly requested that the District Court delay ruling on the summary judgment motions while they engaged in settlement discussions.[18] Ultimately, after granting four separate joint motions for a continuance of the submission date, the District Court took the motions under advisement on January 9, 2025.[19] The District Court ruled on the motions for summary judgment on January 20, 2025.[20] Thus, the period between Pelnor's settlement with Sentilles and the summary judgment is nearly coextensive with the parties' requests that the District Court delay ruling.

Having asked the District Court to delay clarifying First State's obligations via summary judgment, Pelnor cannot now capitalize on that delay to support a bad faith claim. Virtually every Rule 16(b) factor confirms this commonsense proposition. See Lampkin, 925 F.3d 727, 741 (reciting factors). First, the reason for Pelnor's delay was a decision to focus on settlement rather than pursue a summary judgment ruling from the District Court. Thus, the delay was not only voluntary —it was strategic.[21] Second, the proposed bad faith claim is unimportant because Pelnor cannot plausibly allege that First State was in bad faith for delaying payment when the parties jointly asked the District Court to postpone clarifying First State's contractual liability. Third, any bad faith claim dating back to September 2024 would cause significant unfair prejudice to First State, including because the District Court could have ruled much earlier on the pending motions had the parties not jointly requested a delay. And fourth, a continuance cannot cure that prejudice. Pelnor's actions (in which First State joined) created the delay period at issue—and that delay cannot be undone or mitigated with a continuance. Thus, Pelnor's supplemental claim relative to September 4, 2024, through January 20, 2025, fails under Rule 16(b). In the alternative, this claim fails under the Rule 15(d) standard. "The decision to grant or deny leave to supplement is within the sound discretion of the district court." See Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). By December 2024, both parties agreed that, if the matter did not settle, they would "await adjudication of their [contractual] dispute by the Court following the January 9, 2025, submission date."[22] First State cannot be faulted for doing just that. For reasons that overlap with those discussed above, the discretionary Rule 15(d) standard supports denying Pelnor leave to file a bad faith claim based on events that occurred between September 4, 2024, and January 20, 2025.

C. Pelnor should be permitted to supplement its crossclaim to address

events beginning on January 20, 2025.

Virtually every Rule 16(b) factor, however, supports allowing Pelnor to file a supplemental crossclaim to address events beginning on January 20, 2025. First, it was impossible for Pelnor to raise this claim by the March 2024 deadline. And Pelnor's delay in acting after summary judgment was de minimis. Pelnor apparently waited 30 days after summary judgment for First State to pay. When First State failed to do so, Pelnor promptly brought its motion for leave within a matter of days. Pelnor's delay is not unreasonable under the circumstances. Second, the proposed amendment is important because it allows Pelnor to raise a statutory claim, with significant additional remedies, that was not available earlier. Third, while First State will be prejudiced in confronting new allegations and new requests for relief, that is true with virtually every supplemental pleading. First State cannot establish any unfair prejudice in connection with the supplemental crossclaim here. And fourth, any prejudice can be cured by a continuance should the District Court believe it necessary. Thus, it is recommended that Pelnor be allowed to supplement its crossclaim to include a bad faith claim based on events occurring on or after the January 20, 2025 summary judgment ruling.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Pelnor's Motion for Leave to File First Supplemental and Amending Crossclaim (R. Doc. 456) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the motion be DENIED IN PART to the extent that Pelnor seeks to amend and supplement its crossclaim to add a claim under La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1892 for events before the January 20, 2025 summary judgment ruling.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the motion be GRANTED IN PART to allow Pelnor to file an otherwise untimely supplemental crossclaim relative to events that occurred on or after January 20, 2025.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, if the District Court adopts this Report and Recommendation, Pelnor be required to file a supplemental crossclaim that is consistent with the above parameters within seven days of the District Court's ruling. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. [1] R. Doc. 456.

[2] R. Doc. 457.

[3] R. Doc. 458.

[4] Only the District Court has the authority to modify the scheduling order to permit Pelnor's otherwise-untimely proposed crossclaim. [5] R. Doc. 1 at 2-3. The underlying asbestos litigation has settled.

[6] R. Doc. 289 at 3.

[7] R. Doc. 291 at 23-30. Further factual background is available in the District Court's Order and Reasons relative to summary judgment. See R. Doc. 399; see also Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., No. 21-958, 2025 WL 244365 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2025). [8] See Sentilles, 2025 WL 244365, at [*4].

[9] R. Doc. 291 at 23-30.

[10] R. Doc. 285 at 1 ("Amendments to pleadings, third-party actions, crossclaims, and counterclaims shall be filed no later than March 29, 2024") (emphasis omitted). The briefing confirms that the parties understood this deadline applied both to amended and supplemental pleadings. See also Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying a deadline for amendment of pleadings to a proposed supplemental complaint).

[11] R. Doc. 456 at 2.

[12] Sentilles, 2025 WL 244365, at [*3].

[13] The Order and Reasons was signed on January 18 but docketed on January 20, 2025.

[14] Sentilles, 2025 WL 244365, at [*7].

[15] R. Doc. 464.

[16] R. Docs. 327, 330.

[17] See id.

[18] See, e.g., (R. Doc. 336) (requesting a continuance to permit the parties additional time to discuss an amicable resolution of the issues raised in their cross-motions).

[19] R. Docs. 339, 363, 369, 379.

[20] R. Doc. 399.

[21] Focusing on settlement is generally a sound strategy. Pelnor's misstep is its attempt to use that same period to support a bad faith claim.

[22] R. Doc. 382 at 3-4 (Joint Motion for Separate Trial) (December 9, 2024).

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Louisiana asbestos laws
• Louisiana asbestos exposure sites