Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2022)

Our plain-English summary of Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, June 21, 2022).

Robert Stephen Sentilles was diagnosed with mesothelioma in October 2020. He sued several defendants under Louisiana tort law, alleging asbestos exposure between the 1950s and 1980s. He claimed exposure as a yard clerk in the insulation shop at Avondale's shipyard for about a month in 1969, secondary exposure from his brother Thomas's clothes when Thomas worked at Avondale, and exposure while working at Pelnor from 1974 to 1983. In April 2022 the court granted summary judgment to Avondale, holding Sentilles's state-law negligence claims preempted by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. This order addressed a later motion by Pelnor, joined by Sentilles, asking the court to enter partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) so the Avondale dismissal could be appealed right away. Avondale did not oppose. The court granted the motion. It reasoned that the remaining parties faced possible retrial if the Fifth Circuit disagreed, that only Avondale had raised the preemption issue so piecemeal appeals were not a concern, and that other courts faced the same issue.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana
• Decided: June 21, 2022
• Docket: Civil Action No. 21-958
• Stage: Other
• State: Louisiana

Outcome. The court granted Pelnor's Rule 54(b) motion, entering partial final judgment on the order dismissing plaintiff Sentilles's claims against Avondale so that the dismissal can be appealed immediately.

What the court held. A court may certify a dismissal of one party for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) when there is no just reason for delay, such as when delay risks repeated litigation of the same issue and retrial that outweighs the policy against piecemeal appeals.

Issues decided: Maritime Law and Navy Ships, Trial Procedure and Discovery.

The people and their exposure

• Robert Stephen Sentilles: mesothelioma

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Robert Stephen Sentilles	yard clerk in the insulation shop (shipyards and maritime work)	Avondale shipyard, Louisiana	May 28, 1969 to June 23, 1969
Robert Stephen Sentilles	brother of Avondale worker (shipyards and maritime work); dust brought home	Avondale shipyard, Louisiana
Robert Stephen Sentilles	worked at Pelnor	Pelnor	1974-1983

The defendants

• Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (Avondale) (employer)
• Pelnor, L.L.C. (employer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (December 20, 2021). The court denied defendant Pelnor's motion for partial summary judgment, so plaintiff Sentilles may pursue his claims about exposure at Pelnor on or after September 1, 1975, and the court did not categorically exclude evidence of post-1975 exposure.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (April 8, 2022). The court granted the unopposed summary judgment motions of Union Carbide, Amchem, Zurich (as alleged insurer of Marquette) and John Crane, and dismissed Sentilles's and Huntington Ingalls (Avondale)'s claims against them with prejudice.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (April 8, 2022). The court granted Avondale's unopposed motions for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Sentilles's claims about his employment there after June 23, 1969, and his secondary-exposure claims tied to his father and brother.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (April 22, 2022). The court granted Avondale's motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Sentilles's state-law tort claims against Avondale, both occupational and take-home, as preempted by the LHWCA's exclusivity provision.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (April 25, 2022). The court granted Avondale's (Huntington Ingalls') summary judgment motion and dismissed Sentilles's state-law tort claims against it with prejudice, ruling that the LHWCA's exclusivity provision preempts them.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (October 3, 2024). The court granted Avondale's Rule 12(c) motion dismissing with prejudice Sentilles's reasserted claims about post-June 1969 Avondale work and his father's and brother's Avondale employment, denied his motion for reconsideration, and barred him from using Pelnor's experts Pierce and Roggli at trial.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (October 4, 2024). The court denied plaintiff Sentilles's motion in limine to exclude Avondale's expert Christopher Herfel, finding him qualified and his opinions relevant and reliable.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (January 20, 2025). The court granted Pelnor's motion for partial summary judgment and denied First State Insurance Company's cross-motion, holding that First State must indemnify Pelnor for all of its reasonable defense attorney's fees and costs.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (February 10, 2025). The court ruled on Avondale's objections to plaintiff Sentilles's trial exhibits: it overruled some, sustained others (including expert reports and several publications as hearsay), deferred many to trial, and dismissed several as moot.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (March 30, 2025). The magistrate judge recommended granting in part and denying in part Pelnor's motion: Pelnor may supplement its crossclaim with a bad faith claim against First State for events on or after January 20, 2025, but not for events between September 4, 2024 and January 20, 2025.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

ROBERT STEPHEN SENTILLES,

v.

HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED, etal. SECTION M (3)

Civil Action No. 21-958.

June 21, 2022.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

ORDER & REASONS

BARRY W. ASHE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion by defendant Pelnor, L.L.C. ("Pelnor") for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to this Court's April 25, 2022 order that resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Huntington Ingalls, Inc. ("Avondale").[1] Pelnor argues that the motion should be granted because all claims against Avondale have been dismissed, this case cannot be resolved by settlement without appellate finality on plaintiff's claims against Avondale, and there is a real risk of multiple trials without immediate appeal.[2] Plaintiff Robert Stephen Sentilles joined in and adopted the motion.[3] Avondale has not filed an opposition to the motion. Considering the parties' memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delay and Pelnor's Rule 54(b) motion for immediate appeal of this Court's April 25, 2022 order dismissing all claims against Avondale should be granted. I. BACKGROUND

This case involves claims of asbestos exposure. On October 27, 2020, Sentilles was diagnosed with mesothelioma.[4] Sentilles filed this suit asserting Louisiana state-law tort claims against several defendants, alleging that his disease was caused by exposure to asbestos that occurred from the 1950s to the 1980s.[5]

More specifically, Sentilles claims that he was exposed to asbestos when he worked as a yard clerk in the insulation shop at Avondale's shipyard along the Mississippi River from May 28, 1969, to June 23, 1969.[6] Sentilles remained employed at Avondale until 1972, but he was moved to an office job on June 24, 1969.[7] Sentilles also claims that he was secondarily exposed to asbestos from his brother Thomas's clothes when his brother Thomas worked at Avondale.[8] Finally, Sentilles alleges that he was exposed to asbestos when he worked at Pelnor from July 31, 1974, through 1983.[9]

On April 25, 2022, this Court granted Avondale's motion for summary judgment, finding that Sentilles's state-law negligence claims against Avondale are preempted by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(a) and 933(i) (the "LHWCA").[10] Pelnor and Sentilles now move for partial final judgment on that order under Rule 54(b). II. ANALYSIS

Rule 54(b) is an exception to the general rule that a final judgment is appealable only after the adjudication of the rights and liabilities of all parties to a proceeding. Westmoreland v. Venice Marine & Outdoor Consultants, Inc., 2018 WL 2124040, at [*1] (E.D. La. May 8, 2018). Rule 54(b) provides in pertinent part:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief. . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. . . .

Thus, to certify an otherwise interlocutory order for immediate appeal, a district court must make two separate findings under Rule 54(b): first, the court must determine that the order constitutes a "final judgment" as to one or more "claims or

parties"; and second, the court must determine that "there is no just reason for delay."

The Fifth Circuit has explained that Rule 54(b) "reflects a balancing of two policies: avoiding the `danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal' and `avoid[ing] piecemeal appeals.'" Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting PYCA Indus. v. Harrison Cty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996)). Rule 54(b) motions are rarely granted because a district court must "take into account judicial administrative interests" to "`preserve[] the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.'" Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956)). As to the first of the two requirements for certification, the district court can certify an order as a Rule 54(b) judgment only if the order has "disposed of `one or more. . . claims or parties.'" Eldredge, 207 F.3d at 740 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). A court should look to see whether this requirement is met as to each party or claim because it is jurisdictional. Id. (citing In re Southeast Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1548-52 (11th Cir.1995) (finding that a Rule 54(b) final judgment was improperly entered as to certain rulings because they did not dispose of distinct claims, but that it was properly entered as to certain defendants who were completely dismissed)). Here, the first requirement is met. The April 25, 2022 order disposes entirely of Avondale as a party in this litigation.

Pelnor has also satisfied the second requirement for a Rule 54(b) certification by demonstrating that an immediate appeal would avoid dangers of hardship or injustice, or that any hardship it faces outweighs judicial administrative interests in avoiding piecemeal appeals. PCYA, 81 F.3d at 1421 (under "no just reason for delay" requirement, "[a] district court should grant certification only when there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal; it should not be entered routinely as a courtesy to counsel"); Matthews v. Stolier, 2015 WL 4394109, at [*3] (E.D. La. July 15, 2015) ("`[I]n deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual final judgments. . . a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved.' The foremost of which is the strong federal policy against piecemeal appeals.") (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8). The remaining parties here face the hardship or prospect of retrial if the Fifth Circuit determines on appeal that Avondale should not have been dismissed. This hardship may be said in this instance to outweigh judicial administrative interests in avoiding piecemeal appeals. Avondale was the only party that raised the LHWCA preemption argument. Thus, because any other appeal in this case will not involve the same issue, the Court finds that the risk of piecemeal appeals does not weigh against granting the Rule 54(b) motion. The Court further finds that all parties may suffer prejudice if the motion is denied. Many other sections of this Court and other federal courts are already facing, or may in the future face, this same LHWCA preemption issue. Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 2021 WL 5447447, at [*2] (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2021), appeal to be argued, No. 21-30761 (5th Cir. July 8, 2022). As further explained by the court in Barrosse:

In light of the numerous cases in which the preemption issue has arisen, and the likelihood that it will continue to arise in future cases, the Court finds that delaying the potential appeal in this case would prejudice Avondale. Specifically, Avondale will have to litigate the preemption question repeatedly in the district courts until the Fifth Circuit resolves the issue. The Court finds that the prejudice caused by forcing Avondale to relitigate this question can be alleviated by expediting the time in which the parties can appeal the Court's. . . decision. As such, this factor weighs in favor of granting [the] motion.

Finally, the Court finds that issuing a partial final judgment will serve the interest of judicial economy by hastening the ultimate resolution of the LHWCA preemption question. A decision by the Fifth Circuit will assist the numerous district courts who have been, or will be, presented with this question. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of granting [the] Motion.

Id. The potential prejudice to Avondale in Barrosse is arguably shared by all the remaining parties to this litigation. For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the risk that delay will unfairly prejudice the parties outweighs the risk of piecemeal appeals. Thus, the Court finds there is no just reason for delay and grants the motion.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Pelnor's motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) as to Avondale is GRANTED.

[1] R. Doc. 236 (citing R. Doc. 231).

[2] R. Doc. 236-1.

[3] R. Doc. 237.

[4] R. Doc. 60 at 2-3.

[5] Id. at 1-20.

[6] R. Docs. 176-1 at 2; 123-4 at 3.

[7] Sentilles originally alleged that he was exposed to asbestos when he worked at Avondale from May 1969 until 1972. R. Doc. 60 at 6. This Court granted Avondale's unopposed motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Sentilles's claim as it relates to his employment at Avondale after June 23, 1969. R. Doc. 214.

[8] R. Doc. 123-1 at 10. Sentilles also alleged secondary exposure related to his father's and other brother's employment at Avondale. R. Doc. 60 at 4-5. This Court granted Avondale's unopposed motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of those claims because (1) Sentilles's father was not exposed to asbestos at Avondale and (2) Sentilles moved out of the family home before his other brother started working there. R. Doc. 214.

[9] R. Doc. 60 at 6-7.

[10] R. Doc. 231.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Louisiana asbestos laws
• Louisiana asbestos exposure sites