Maritime Law and Navy Ships in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on maritime law: 344 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

About this issue

Asbestos was used throughout Navy and merchant ships, and many shipyard workers, sailors and longshoremen developed asbestos diseases. Federal maritime (admiralty) law applies to a claim when the exposure occurred on navigable waters (or was caused by a vessel there), the activity could disrupt maritime commerce, and it bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Exposure on a ship in navigable waters may qualify; exposure in a shore-side shipyard building often does not. When maritime law applies, it governs many questions in place of state law.

Maritime law has its own rules, including:

• the DeVries rule on equipment makers' duty to warn about asbestos parts;
• the Jones Act, which lets seamen sue their employers for negligence;
• the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), which provides employer-paid compensation to covered maritime workers who meet its job and location tests, and limits their suits against vessel owners to certain kinds of negligence. Seamen and federal civilian employees are not covered;
• special damages and limitations rules.

Under the Feres doctrine, service members generally cannot sue the United States for injuries arising from their military service, including asbestos exposure aboard Navy ships. Veterans may qualify for VA disability compensation, and survivors for dependency and indemnity compensation, and they may have claims against the private companies whose asbestos products were used aboard ship. See Navy asbestos exposure.

Alabama

• Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc. (2020). An order granting a plaintiff's Rule 41(a)(2) motion to voluntarily dismiss the rest of a complaint is a final judgment for appeal, and a court may refuse to consider a new choice-of-law (maritime law) argument first raised in a motion for reconsideration after summary judgment.
• Kite v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2011). A plaintiff's disclaimer of claims arising on a 'federal enclave' or under color of federal office is circular and ineffective to bar federal officer removal. Removal is proper if one claim qualifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), where the defendant shows it acted under direct federal control and has a colorable government contractor defense.

California

• Elorreaga v. Viacomcbs Inc. (2024). Boyle v. United Technologies is a preemption case and does not supply the government contractor standard for federal maritime claims. Contractors may instead assert the Yearsley government contractor defense against such claims, so the district court had to consider it.
• Marcus v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs can reach a jury on substantial-factor causation with testimony about the work done on a product, evidence the product contained asbestos, and expert estimates of exposure from that work, without relying on an "every exposure" theory. The government contractor defense does not apply to federal maritime claims, and loss of consortium and punitive damages are unavailable under maritime law.
• Sarjeant v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2024). Under Rule 26 relevance and proportionality, records about a defendant's equipment on ships repaired at a shipyard where the plaintiff worked were discoverable, because the defendant identified no specific burden.
• Smargisso v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos products and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor; circumstantial shipmate and records evidence can meet this. Non-pecuniary damages are not recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action based on negligence and strict liability absent historical support.
• Speck v. CBS Corporation (2024). Under federal maritime law a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury, and expert testimony is not required to prove this. The government contractor defense fails where the product was substantially the same as one sold commercially or the contractor did not show the Navy required asbestos.
• Elorreaga v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. (2023). The Boyle government contractor defense rests on preemption of state law, so it does not apply to claims brought under federal maritime law. Plaintiffs' evidence of exposure to each defendant's products and of a substantial contributing factor was enough to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Elorreaga v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. (2023). Under federal maritime law, plaintiffs must show exposure to a defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the illness. Expert testimony that considers the nature, frequency and proximity of exposure, even qualitatively, is not an excluded 'every exposure' theory.
• Elorreaga v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. (2022). Under the Atlantic Sounding and Batterton framework, punitive damages are unavailable under general maritime law where plaintiffs show no historical basis for them, and Ninth Circuit precedent (Smith v. Trinidad) bars loss of consortium damages under general maritime law.
• Shelton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under federal maritime law, a specific-causation expert must analyze the plaintiff's actual exposure (frequency, duration, proximity) to each defendant's products, by a qualitative or quantitative method, rather than relying on product presence and general causation principles.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (2021). Maritime law applies to naval shipyard asbestos claims where some exposure occurred aboard vessels in drydock, and plaintiffs must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos products that was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A pump maker may owe a duty to warn about asbestos in third-party parts its product requires, and conflicting evidence on exposure precludes summary judgment.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (2021). Under Rule 702, an expert's testimony must rest on sufficient facts or data, so an expert with no knowledge of the specific products a plaintiff worked with, beyond the plaintiff's own deposition, cannot testify about them, and the plaintiffs bear the burden of showing the expert is qualified on a subject.
• Pizarro v. National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (2021). A contractor asserting Yearsley or Boyle government contractor defenses must show it complied with the government's specifications, and a genuine dispute over that compliance requires a jury. Under California law, evidence that a retailer knew of asbestos dangers and sold asbestos-containing brakes without warning can create a jury question on malice for punitive damages.
• Shelton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Placing a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not purposeful direction toward the forum state, and a small number of pump sales to a Navy contract and one winch did not establish specific jurisdiction on the pleadings and evidence presented.
• Spurlin v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Yearsley government-contractor immunity is an affirmative defense on which the contractor bears the burden, not a bar to subject matter jurisdiction. It also did not apply here because no government instruction prevented the manufacturers from giving asbestos warnings.
• Spurlin v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under federal maritime law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, it knows or has reason to know the integrated product is likely dangerous, and it has no reason to believe users will realize the danger. Punitive damages and loss of consortium are not available in a maritime negligence action.
• Harris v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2019). In an asbestos case a plaintiff must show a probability, not merely a possibility, of exposure, and circumstantial evidence that supports a reasonable inference of exposure creates a triable issue that defeats summary judgment. An expert declaration giving a more detailed explanation of re-entrainment does not contradict his deposition.
• Hilt v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos material the defendant manufactured or supplied and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury. Here, deposition testimony and an expert declaration created genuine factual disputes on exposure to Foster Wheeler boilers and on the bare metal defense.
• Botts v. US (2016). Under Washington law, expert testimony that asbestos fibers disperse across a whole shipyard can support an inference that a person working there breathed asbestos, so evidence of Navy rule violations, shipyard-wide exposure and a multi-year exposure period was enough for a factfinder to find causation.
• Lund v. 3M Company (2016). Under the Ninth Circuit's McIndoe decision, Navy warships are not 'products' for strict liability, so a shipbuilder cannot be strictly liable for building the ship. A shipbuilder can still be strictly liable for a specific asbestos-containing product it actually manufactured.
• Murat v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2015). Under the Longshore Act, a vessel owner is liable to a ship repair contractor only for breach of the turnover, active control or intervention duties. A plaintiff must produce evidence of the manner and circumstances of asbestos exposure to show such a breach, and a mere possibility of exposure is not enough.
• Grande v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, Inc. (2014). Under California law, a plaintiff may show exposure to a defendant's asbestos-containing product through circumstantial evidence that supports a reasonable inference of exposure. Punitive damages go to the trier of fact unless no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.
• Whalen v. General Electric Corporation (2014). Under maritime law, a complaint alleging that a defendant designed and manufactured asbestos-containing ships need not identify specific vessels at the pleading stage, and the Mack rule that a Navy ship is not a product was left open for the summary judgment or trial stage.
• Willis v. Buffalo Pumps Inc. (2014). Under California law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the aggregate dose causing disease; equivocal product-identification testimony and evidence of corporate knowledge of asbestos hazards create fact disputes that preclude summary judgment, including on punitive damages.
• Willis v. Buffalo Pumps Inc. (2014). Under California law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in the aggregate dose; conflicting evidence on whether defendant supplied the product creates a jury question. Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression or fraud by an officer, director or managing agent, which was lacking here.
• Keeney v. AW Chesterton Company (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2013). A jury's apportionment of fault is upheld if any evidence under a reasonable view supports it, and the appellant must set out all material evidence. A party lacks standing to assert a privilege held by the Navy or another public entity.
• Woodard v. Crane Co. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2011). Following Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery, a valve manufacturer whose own product was not defective is not strictly liable for failing to warn of hazards of asbestos-containing gaskets, packing and insulation made and supplied by third parties. The component part doctrine and foreseeable-modification arguments did not change this.
• Johnson v. Certainteed Corporation (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2010). A purchaser of asbestos fiber that did not control its packaging, warnings or shipping owed no negligence duty to a longshoreman, and a purchaser is strictly liable only if the plaintiff presents evidence that it could influence how the product is distributed and marketed.
• Clemmer v. Thorpe Insulation Company (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2009). A plaintiff may prove exposure to a defendant's asbestos product through circumstantial evidence that the product was sufficiently prevalent at the work site to support a reasonable inference of exposure.
• Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2009). A valve manufacturer that did not make or supply the asbestos-containing packing, gaskets or insulation that caused the plaintiff's exposure is not in the chain of distribution of those products and has no strict liability duty to warn of their hazards. The same reasoning bars the design defect claim, and the component parts doctrine supports it.
• Taylor v. John Crane, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2003). Under Proposition 51, fault may be allocated to an entity that is immune from paying for its tortious acts, but not to an entity whose conduct has been declared non-tortious. Fault could therefore be allocated to the Navy even assuming it was immune.
• Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship Management Corp. (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2000). Under the Jones Act and federal maritime law, the limitations period for a separate and distinct asbestos-related disease begins to run when that disease becomes manifest, not when an earlier asbestos-related disease was diagnosed.

Connecticut

• Carlson v. CBS Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A loss of consortium claim under Connecticut law fails when the injured spouse's underlying claim fails.
• Bray v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2015). Under either the Connecticut Product Liability Act or general maritime law, a plaintiff must show with direct or circumstantial evidence that he was exposed to the particular defendant's product. Speculative equipment lists and inadmissible hearsay do not meet that burden. A loss of consortium claim under Connecticut law fails when the injured spouse's underlying claim fails.
• Kotecki v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2009). A defendant may remove under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), by showing it acted under a federal officer, that its acts were causally tied to the government's directions, and that it has a colorable federal defense. The defense need not be proven on the merits at the removal stage.
• Pantalone v. Aurora Pump Co. (2008). Federal-officer removal under § 1442(a)(1) requires only adequately supported assertions of acting under a federal officer, causation and a colorable federal defense. Removal is still subject to the 30-day limit of § 1446(b), and the defendant bears the burden of showing it could not have ascertained removability earlier.
• Contois v. Able Industries Inc. (2007). A defendant may remove under the federal officer statute when it shows it acted under federal direction, with a causal link to the claim, and has a colorable military contractor defense. The 30-day removal period runs from when the defendant can intelligently ascertain removability from a pleading or other paper.

Delaware

• Salvemini v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and vague testimony that cannot separate that defendant's product from others fails. General maritime law did not reach a spouse's land-based take-home exposure when the plaintiffs did not show the maritime connection test was met.
• Roadarmel v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2023). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Bystander testimony about dust from repairs of the defendant's engines was enough to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Gilstrap v. CBS Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant exposure to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A failure to respond to a summary judgment motion does not alone justify judgment, but here the undisputed record showed no such evidence.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product, that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and that the defendant made or sold it; and a manufacturer may have a duty to warn about asbestos parts incorporated into its equipment under the DeVries test, which here raised genuine fact issues.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a manufacturer may owe a duty to warn about third-party replacement parts when its product requires them, it knows or has reason to know of the danger, and it has no reason to believe users will realize that danger. Disputed facts on these elements and on the Boyle elements preclude summary judgment.
• Cox v. Nash Engineering Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must first show exposure to the specific defendant's product before substantial factor causation is reached; without product identification evidence, strict liability, wrongful death, consortium and punitive damages claims fail.
• Pruitt v. Amdura (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; circumstantial evidence can suffice, but not a chain of speculative inferences. Under Georgia law the plaintiff must show the defendant's asbestos product was used at the job site and that he was in proximity to it when it was used.
• Pruitt v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Georgia law requires proof that the product was a contributing factor and that the plaintiff was near its use. An unopposed motion still requires the court to find that the undisputed facts support judgment.
• Vocciante v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or mere presence of the product somewhere at the workplace, does not suffice without evidence of frequency, regularity or proximity.
• Evans v. John Crane, Inc. (2019). General maritime law and state survival statutes can supply survival damages where an asbestos injury is indivisible across the high seas and territorial waters, so DOHSA does not bar them. DOHSA does limit the wrongful death claim itself to pecuniary damages. An expert's lack of experience with the specific products or documents goes to weight, not admissibility.
• Mosher v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal exposure or the mere presence of a product aboard a ship is insufficient.
• Mosher v. ABB (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law and Colorado law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos-containing product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal or unidentified exposure is insufficient, and failure to oppose a motion does not alone justify summary judgment.