Maritime Law and Navy Ships in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on maritime law: 344 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Delaware

• Rogers v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing injury; mere presence of a product at the workplace is insufficient. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff must show a product nexus, meaning proximity to the defendant's asbestos product when it was used.
• Rogers v. Nosroc Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under Delaware law a plaintiff must show a product nexus between exposure to the defendant's product and his injury, and under maritime law that the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury; a plaintiff who identifies no exposure to the defendant's product cannot meet either test.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under maritime law and Washington law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A general recollection of a manufacturer's name, with no detail on where, when or how often he worked with the product, does not meet that burden.
• Pieno v. Crosby Valve (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Vague recollection of a brand name, with no link to a particular ship or product, does not meet that burden, even when the motion is unopposed.
• Kister v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no product identification, summary judgment follows even when the motion is unopposed.
• Charlevoix v. Caterpillar, Inc. (2017). Under both maritime law and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; mere presence of a product, or minimal exposure, is not enough.
• Evans v. CBS Corp. (2017). Under maritime law (and Colorado law for land-based claims), a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or distribute (the bare metal defense). Even an unopposed summary judgment motion requires the court to find the undisputed facts warrant judgment.
• Evans v. Flowserve US Inc. (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Even when a motion is unopposed, the court must find that the undisputed facts support judgment.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A plaintiff who bears the burden of proof at trial and cannot show this loses on summary judgment.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; general testimony about replacement parts, without evidence they were made by the defendant, does not meet that burden.
• Charlevoix v. Caterpillar (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or supply.
• Evans v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and under the bare metal defense a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply.
• Evans v. John Crane (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Summary judgment on punitive damages is improper where a genuine factual dispute exists about whether the defendant knew its asbestos products were harmful and sold them anyway with willful, wanton or reckless disregard. Credibility of a corporate witness cannot be judged at summary judgment.
• Tallman v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare metal defense bars liability for asbestos materials the defendant did not make or supply. Speculation does not create a genuine factual dispute on these points.
• Denbow v. CBS Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply.
• Charlevoix v. John Crane (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Evidence that does not show regular exposure over an extended period does not meet this test. A failure to respond to a summary judgment motion does not alone justify judgment.
• In re Asbestos Litigation Evans v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Without evidence of exposure to a defendant's product, summary judgment is proper even when the motion is unopposed.
• Hillyer v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2016). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply, and speculation cannot create a fact issue on product identification.
• In re Asbestos Litigation Charlevoix v. CBS Corporation (2016). Under maritime and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no evidence identifying such a product, summary judgment is proper even when unopposed.
• Hillyer v. ABB (In re Asbestos Litigation Hillyer) (2016). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or a manufacturer's product merely being present, is not enough, and a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or distribute.
• Shaw v. Andritz Inc. (2016). Maritime law applies only if the exposure meets both a locality test and a connection test; a submarine still under construction is not a vessel, so the locality test fails and state law governs.
• Pease v. Ford Motor Company (2012). A transferee MDL court's earlier summary judgment ruling rejecting the bare metal defense stood, and a defendant that did not seek reargument there could not relitigate the same arguments on remand. The MDL ruling would have been the same under Delaware or maritime law.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show substantial exposure to asbestos from the defendant's own product; a valve maker is not liable for third-party asbestos packing, gaskets or insulation absent evidence it specified or required them.

Florida

• Edmonds v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). An expert opinion that every asbestos exposure, however small, substantially contributed to cancer is unreliable under Daubert, but a cumulative-exposure opinion limited to exposures found to be regular, frequent and proximate and framed as increasing risk in a dose-related way is admissible.
• Gallo v. Carnival Corporation (2023). With the plaintiffs' disclaimer of recovery for exposures during years covered by arbitration agreements, those agreements do not "relate to" the claims for Convention-based removal. The removing party bears the burden of showing jurisdiction, and Carnival did not give enough information to interpret the arbitration agreement's reach under the governing contract law.
• Israel v. John Crane, Inc. (2022). Under the maritime three-year statute of limitations, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its cause, which does not require actual knowledge or a physician's confirmation. Deposition testimony that irreconcilably contradicts an earlier interrogatory response may be disregarded under the sham affidavit rule.
• Oneal v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2014). A maker of a product that contains no asbestos is not liable for injuries from asbestos that others supplied or used with its product (the bare metal defense), and plaintiffs must show exposure to asbestos the defendant itself made or supplied. Maritime law governed claims of exposure aboard Navy ships.
• Faddish v. Buffalo Pumps (2012). Under maritime law, applying Florida substantive law, a manufacturer that sold 'bare metal' equipment and was not in the chain of distribution of the asbestos-containing insulation, gaskets or packing used with it has no duty to warn, in negligence or strict liability, about hazards from those third-party products.

Georgia

• Davis v. John Crane, Inc. (2019). In Georgia a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos-containing products for which the defendant is responsible, and a plaintiff's own testimony from personal knowledge can meet that burden. A pump manufacturer is not liable for design or failure to warn over asbestos-containing replacement parts made by others (bare metal defense).
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law the sophisticated user defense applies to both negligence and strict liability failure-to-warn claims. The sophisticated purchaser defense requires that the defendant knew the intermediary (the Navy) was aware of the asbestos dangers and reasonably concluded it would warn its employees, and the intermediary's knowledge alone is not enough.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos product, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply; a parent or successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent facts supporting piercing the corporate veil.

Hawaii

• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2014). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos product as a substantial factor, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply. A parent corporation or its successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent a showing supporting veil-piercing.
• Cabasug v. Crane Co. (2013). Under maritime law the sophisticated user defense applies to both negligence and strict liability failure-to-warn claims. The sophisticated purchaser defense requires proof that the defendant knew the intermediary (the Navy) was aware of asbestos dangers and reasonably concluded it would warn its employees; the intermediary's knowledge alone is not enough.
• Cabasug v. Crane Co. (2013). Under the Sisson/Grubart test, admiralty law governs asbestos claims by a shipyard worker exposed aboard Navy vessels in drydock, and the Ninth Circuit's four-factor test in Myhran no longer controls.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A manufacturer has no duty to warn about, and is not liable for, asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not manufacture or distribute.

Illinois

• Pelton v. John Crane, Inc. (2024). Under maritime law, a plaintiff may show substantial-factor causation through admissible general expert testimony plus circumstantial evidence of substantial exposure over a substantial period, without expert testimony specific to the defendant's product. The Second Restatement's consumer-expectations test still governs maritime strict liability, and punitive damages remain available as a remedy even though willful and wanton conduct is not a separate cause of action.
• Perez v. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. (2016). A defendant does not waive removal by filing a state-court motion to dismiss shortly before removing, and under Ruppel a federal officer removal defendant need only show a colorable government contractor defense, which affidavits from Navy and medical experts can support.
• McALVEY v. Atlas Copco Compressors, LLC (2015). Under Illinois and maritime law, a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence, such as coworker testimony and proximity to the defendant's product, to show exposure, and need not identify the specific maker of replacement parts.
• Mohler v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). A defendant invoking federal officer removal need only show a plausible, colorable federal defense, such as the government contractor defense, and a defense that applies to one claim makes the whole case removable.
• Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Company (2014). Maritime law governs asbestos exposure during work on a Navy vessel. A valve maker may owe a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets and packing supplied by others where its valves needed asbestos components to function and those parts would be replaced with similar materials, but it owes no such duty for third-party insulation it did not supply.
• Smith v. AW Chesterton Company (2014). A private defendant may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it acted under a federal officer, raises a colorable federal defense such as the government contractor defense, and shows a causal nexus. Affidavits that Navy specifications required asbestos-containing materials can satisfy this without a contract with the government.

Indiana

• Hedden v. CBS Corporation (2015). Maritime law applies to asbestos exposure aboard a Navy ship, and the two-disease rule governs under maritime law. Kentucky law governs the non-maritime claims, and its one-disease rule bars a mesothelioma suit after an earlier suit over asbestosis.
• Lambert v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1999). A claim for asbestos exposure aboard a naval vessel on navigable water falls within admiralty jurisdiction and is governed by maritime law. The Indiana statute of repose is inconsistent with the federal maritime limitations statute and so does not apply.

Iowa

• Perrin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994). Under Iowa law, evidence that a defendant's asbestos products were in stock at shipyards and used on ships generally shows only a possibility of exposure and cannot support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff was exposed to them aboard his ship. Iowa has not adopted a burden-shifting rule for asbestos cases.

Kentucky

• Stallings v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation (2015). Under both maritime law and Kentucky law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at a level high enough to make a finding of substantial causation more than conjecture. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in other makers' replacement parts, and an expert opinion that any exposure is a substantial cause does not meet that standard.
• Stallings v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation (2013). A government contractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it was acting under a federal agency, there is a causal nexus between its work and the plaintiff's claims, and it raises a plausible (colorable) government contractor defense. A defendant may support removal with declarations and affidavits at an early stage.

Louisiana

• Prude v. Fidelity and Casualty Insurance Company OF New York (2025). Where the LHWCA's situs and status requirements are met and not disputed, workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer, which bars tort wrongful death claims. The insurer's liability under Louisiana's Direct Action Statute is derivative of the insured employer's, so those claims are dismissed too.
• Marsh v. Chas Kurz & Company (2024). A Jones Act plaintiff must show he was exposed to the toxic substance aboard the particular defendant's vessels, and general evidence that asbestos was widely used on ships does not suffice. Expert opinions resting only on that general use and on the plaintiff's assumption may be excluded, and without them causation cannot be shown.
• Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2023). In the LHWCA twilight zone, neither express nor conflict preemption bars a Louisiana maritime worker's state-law tort claim where the worker seeks no LHWCA compensation and his injury was not covered by the applicable pre-1975 Louisiana workers' compensation statute. The holding is limited to that narrow category of claims.
• Del Vescovo v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (4th Circuit, 2023). Under both the federal discovery rule and Louisiana's contra non valentem, the limitations period in a latent disease case starts when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury and its cause. The plaintiff must show a reasonable inquiry was made or would have been futile.