Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Ltd. v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2017)

Our plain-English summary of Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Ltd. v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (U.S. District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, March 13, 2017).

Louis Genusa, Jr. worked as a longshoreman, truck loader and warehouse worker at the Port of Baton Rouge from 1963 to 1999 and was allegedly exposed to asbestos. He developed malignant mesothelioma and died in September 2014. His wife claimed death benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act from his last employer, Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, and the company and its insurer, Signal Mutual, paid them. They then sued thirteen defendants to recover those payments, relying on admiralty jurisdiction. Twelve defendants were voluntarily dismissed, leaving the Port Commission, which moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court asked whether admiralty jurisdiction applied. It followed its earlier decision in Genusa's own case, which found that his work was predominantly land-based. He went aboard vessels only occasionally to unload cargo, and a vessel docked about once every two months. Injuries to such workers are less likely to disrupt maritime commerce, so the connection test failed. The court dismissed the claims against the Port Commission without prejudice.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Middle District of Louisiana
• Decided: March 13, 2017
• Docket: Civil Action No. 15-00633-BAJ-EWD
• Stage: Motion to dismiss
• State: Louisiana

Outcome. The court granted the Port of Greater Baton Rouge's motion and dismissed without prejudice the claims of Signal Mutual and Baton Rouge Marine Contractors for lack of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction.

What the court held. Admiralty jurisdiction requires both a maritime location and a connection to maritime activity; a predominantly land-based stevedore's asbestos injuries are less likely to disrupt maritime commerce, so the connection test was not met.

Issues decided: Personal Jurisdiction, Trial Procedure and Discovery.

The people and their exposure

• Louis Genusa, Jr.: mesothelioma; died

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Louis Genusa, Jr.	longshoreman, truck loader, and warehouse worker (shipyards and maritime work)	Port of Baton Rouge, Port Allen, Louisiana	1963-1999
Louis Genusa, Jr.	stevedore (shipyards and maritime work)	Port of Baton Rouge, Port Allen, Louisiana

The defendants

• Port of Greater Baton Rouge Port Association (Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission)

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Genusa v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (U.S. District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, 2014). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report, granted plaintiff Genusa's motion to sever and remand, and sent his claims, and BRMC's third-party claims against McKoin Trucking, back to state court while keeping BRMC's claims against the Unions.
• Cabasug v. Crane Co. (U.S. District Court, District of Hawaii, 2013). The court denied the Cabasugs' motion to apply Hawaii substantive law and ruled that admiralty law governs their asbestos tort claims against the defendant product makers.
• Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2011). The court granted defendants' summary judgment motions in Conner, Prange and Stone only to the extent they sought application of maritime law, and denied them in Willis, where state law applies.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LTD. v. ASBESTOS CORPORATION, LTD., Dist. Court, MD Louisiana 2017 - Goo… SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LTD., ET AL.

v.

ASBESTOS CORPORATION, LTD., ET AL.

Civil Action No. 15-00633-BAJ-EWD.

March 13, 2017.

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Lawrence Williams, Johnson, Yacoubian & Paysse.

Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Edward S. Johnson, Johnson, Johnson, Barrios & Yacoubian.

Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Lawrence Williams, Johnson, Yacoubian & Paysse, Glenn Lyle Maximilian Swetman, Manion Gaynor & Manning, LLC & Edward S. Johnson, Johnson, Johnson, Barrios & Yacoubian.

Port of Greater Baton Rouge Port Association, Defendant, represented by Stephen W. Glusman, Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission, Brandie Mendoza Thibodeaux, Swetman Baxter Massenburg, Christopher Owen Massenburg, Swetman

Baxter Massenberg, LLC, Glenn Lyle Maximilian Swetman, Manion Gaynor & Manning, LLC, Jeanette Seraile Riggins, Willingham, Fultz & Cougill LLP, Kevin R. Sloan, Manion Gaynor and Manning & Natasha Amber Corb, Manion Gaynor & Manning LLP.

RULING AND ORDER

BRIAN A. JACKSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(1) and Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 14) filed by Defendant Port of Greater Baton Rouge Port Association, also known as Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission. Plaintiffs Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Ltd., and Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc., filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion. (See Doc. 20). For the reasons explained herein, the Court finds that it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action, and therefore Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

While working as a longshoreman, truck loader, and warehouse worker from 1963 to 1999, Louis Genusa, Jr. ("Genusa"), was exposed to asbestos. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 4). See Genusa v. Asbestos Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 773, 776 (M.D. La. 2014). Genusa allegedly was exposed to asbestos throughout his career while working for various shipment and transportation companies at the Port of Baton Rouge in Port Allen, Louisiana. (Id.). Genusa's last injurious exposure to asbestos allegedly occurred while he was working for Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. ("BRMC"). (Id. at ¶ 15).

Genusa contracted malignant mesothelioma and passed away on September 18, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 12). On November 11, 2014, Genusa's wife filed a claim for death benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., against BRMC. (Id. at ¶ 5). As a result, BRMC and its insurer, Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Ltd. ("Signal") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), paid benefits under the LHWCA to Genusa's wife. (Id.). Plaintiffs filed this action on September 18, 2015, against thirteen defendants that allegedly "designed, tested, evaluated, manufactured, packaged, furnished, stored, handled, transported, installed, supplied and/or sold [the] asbestos-containing products" that were the proximate cause of Genusa's injuries. (Id. at ¶ 7). Plaintiffs instituted this action to recover the benefits they paid to Genusa's wife under the LHWCA. (Id. at ¶ 35). Plaintiffs state causes of action for negligence, strict

SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LTD. v. ASBESTOS CORPORATION, LTD., Dist. Court, MD Louisiana 2017 - Goo… liability, breach of express or implied warranty, and unjust enrichment. Through the course of these proceedings, Plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss twelve of the thirteen defendants. (See Docs. 6, 23). The only remaining defendant is Port of Greater Baton Rouge Port Association, also known as Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a claim is "`properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate' the claim." In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). In order to "prevent[] a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice," a court should consider a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction before addressing any motions that concern the merits of a case. Id. at 286-87 (citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). That standard seeks to determine whether "a complaint. . . contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "[F]acial plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. DISCUSSION

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over any "civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). For admiralty jurisdiction to attach, a plaintiff "must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity." Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). The "locality" test "assesses `whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water.'" Venable v. La. Workers' Comp. Corp., 740 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534). The "connection" test requires the Court (1) to "assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce" and (2) to "determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A review of the Complaint reveals that Plaintiffs filed this action in federal court with the intent of invoking the Court's admiralty jurisdiction.[1] Paragraph four of the Complaint states that "jurisdiction is within the jurisdiction of the Court" and that Genusa was "exposed to asbestos aboard vessels on navigable waters while engaged in the traditional maritime activity of loading and unloading vessels." (Doc. 1 at ¶ 4). Nevertheless, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter.

In Genusa v. Asbestos Corp., this Court addressed whether the same underlying facts of Genusa's claims for asbestos exposure satisfied the locality and connection tests. See 18 F. Supp. 3d 773. This Court found that Genusa's claims met the locality test, in part, because "he did his stevedoring work both on floating vessels on the Mississippi River, a navigable waterway, and on land." Id. at 784. When this Court applied the connection test, however, it found that Genusa was a primarily land-based worker and that "the prospect of injuries to a predominantly land-based worker is less likely to disrupt maritime commerce because such workers are not necessary for ships to operate on the navigable waters." Id. at 785-86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 455, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2011)). As a result, this Court found that it did not have original admiralty jurisdiction over Genusa's claims.

Plaintiffs urge the Court to not follow its prior decision, arguing that the decision was in error due to its reliance on Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 455. (See Doc. 20 at p. 13).[2] The district court in Conner addressed the issue of admiralty jurisdiction in a consolidated action involving four plaintiffs who alleged that they had suffered asbestos-related injuries as a result of their exposure to asbestos-containing products during their service in the United States Navy. See 799 F. Supp. 2d at 458. Three of the plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos while they were assigned to work aboard various vessels, but the fourth plaintiff was exposed to asbestos while employed as a shipyard worker, performing land-based repairs, overhauls,

SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LTD. v. ASBESTOS CORPORATION, LTD., Dist. Court, MD Louisiana 2017 - Goo… and reinstallations on Navy ships. Id. at 459-60. The court concluded that the injuries of the fourth plaintiff — the predominantly land-based worker — did not have a sufficient connection to traditional maritime activity to warrant admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 468.

Similar to the fourth plaintiff in Conner, Genusa's work as a stevedore employee was predominantly land-based. Genusa testified that he worked with asbestos cargo in the holds of the vessels, on the dock, in the warehouse, and while loading asbestos onto trucks. (Doc. 14-2 at p. 25, ll. 9-20). On average, vessels transporting asbestos docked once every two months. (Doc. 20-1 at p. 101, ll. 17-21). When a vessel was docked, Genusa would either work on the vessel — unloading asbestos from the holds of the vessel — or on the dock — hauling the asbestos to the warehouse. (Doc. 14-2 at p. 17, ll. 19-25; id. at p. 18, 1. 1; id. at p. 25, ll. 9-20). On average, a vessel was unloaded in two-and-a-half days. (Id. at p. 20, ll. 9-15). Once a vessel was unloaded, Genusa's duties were entirely confined to land-based operations until another vessel docked.

Although Genusa occasionally went aboard vessels to unload asbestos cargo, his duties were predominantly land-based. As this Court previously ruled, Genusa's injuries — as a predominantly land-based worker — were less likely to disrupt maritime commerce because the duties he performed are not necessary for ships to operate on the navigable waters. See Genusa, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 785-86. Accordingly, the Court adopts its prior reasoning in Genusa v. Asbestos Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 773, finding that the Court does not have original admiralty jurisdiction over this matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant the Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(1) and Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims against Port of Greater Baton Rouge Port Association, also known as Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. [1] Plaintiffs apparently concede that the Court does not have federal-question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction and only argue that admiralty jurisdiction is proper. (See Doc. 20).

[2] Plaintiffs contend that the facts of this case more closely resemble the facts in Cabasug v. Crane Co., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Haw. 2013). In Cabasug, the plaintiff worked as a pipefitter and nuclear engineer at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, where he spent seventy-five percent of his time on vessels in dry-dock. Id. at 1180. The district court concluded that the plaintiff was not a predominantly land-based worker because he spent seventy-five percent of his time aboard vessels. The district court further found that the asbestos exposure in that case stemmed from products that were manufactured for use on vessels, thereby bearing a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id. at 1190 (citing Conner, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 469). Here, there is no evidence that Genusa spent a majority of his time aboard vessels, and there is no evidence that the asbestos to which he was exposed was manufactured for use on vessels. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the facts here do not closely resemble the facts in Cabasug.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Louisiana asbestos laws
• Louisiana asbestos exposure sites