MetLife and its corporate allies: dust diseases and the manipulation of science

Our plain-English summary of MetLife and its corporate allies: dust diseases and the manipulation of science, by D.S. Egilman, T. Bird, C. Lee (International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, 2013).

The study

• Authors: D.S. Egilman, T. Bird, C. Lee
• Journal: International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health
• Published: 2013;19(4):287-303
• Cited by: 14 articles, as counted by NIH iCite
• Read it: PubMed · Publisher

Abstract

Background: The dust diseases silicosis and asbestosis were the first occupational diseases to have widespread impact on workers. Knowledge that asbestos and silica were hazardous to health became public long after the industry knew of the health concerns. This delay was largely influenced by the interests of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife).

Objectives: To understand how MetLife influenced the science and politics of asbestos and silica exposure in the first half of the twentieth century.

Methods: We examined previously secret corporate documents produced in litigation, deposition, and trial testimony, as well as published scholarship.

Results: MetLife established itself as an authority in public and industrial health in the early part of the twentieth century, gaining the trust of the public and government. They were able to use this trust and authority to avoid financial loss, including the firing of sick workers, and avoid legal liability by organizing a network of experts to testify on their behalf in silica- and asbestos-related damage suits. They further manipulated the results of scientific findings from major research institutions, delaying important knowledge about the asbestos-cancer relationship. They also influenced law and public policy through writing and implementing worker compensation laws in numerous states and concocting an arbitrary "protective" standard to monitor asbestos exposure. This standard was known by MetLife to not protect against disease.

Conclusions: The actions of MetLife and its allies had real human and scientific consequences and an effect on the industry lasting until now.

In plain English

This article is a historical analysis, not a medical study. The authors examined previously secret corporate documents from litigation, deposition and trial testimony, and published scholarship to describe how Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) influenced the science and politics of silica and asbestos in the early twentieth century. Based on these documents, the authors reported that miners found with dust-related disease at a MetLife-backed clinic were fired without being told their results; that MetLife blocked publication of Canadian data showing asbestosis in 24 of 54 miners; that MetLife's Dr. Anthony Lanza changed a 1935 asbestos paper after Johns-Manville asked for changes and left out dose-response data; and that cancer findings were cut from a Saranac Laboratory animal study in which 8 of 11 mice inhaling long fiber asbestos developed malignant lung tumors. They also described narrow state compensation laws and an asbestos exposure limit that, in their view, was never designed to protect workers. The authors concluded that these strategies had real human costs and contributed to a decades-long delay in open publication of asbestos hazards.

We wrote this plain-English summary from the full article with the help of AI, and a second AI model checked each sentence against the article. It is not the authors' wording; the abstract and the article are their own account.

What the study did and found

• Design: Historical review of previously secret corporate documents, deposition and trial testimony, and published scholarship (not an epidemiological or clinical study)
• Who was studied: MetLife, its corporate clients (silica and asbestos mining and product companies) and allied experts and organizations in the USA and Canada, mainly in the first half of the twentieth century
• Exposure: Silica and asbestos dust, and the related diseases silicosis and asbestosis, as well as the asbestos-cancer relationship
• Main results:
  • In the Tri-State mining region, MetLife insured 10,600 men. By 1928, 2723 of them had silicosis.
  • The authors reported that miners found sick with dust-related diseases at the clinic run with MetLife, the Federal Bureau of Mines and the mine owners were fired without being informed of their results. A doctor's estimates reported by Lanza put the share of underground men with definite lung disease at 28% in July 1928, 12% in July 1929 and 7% on November 1, 1929.
  • According to the authors, MetLife blocked publication of McGill Canadian asbestos miner data in which Dr. Frank Pedley found asbestosis in 24 of 54 miners in 1930.
  • The authors reported that Lanza changed a paper on MetLife's asbestos textile plant study to meet Johns-Manville's needs, and omitted the key dose-response data when it was published in 1935.
  • In the authors' account, the asbestos exposure limit of 5 million particles per cubic foot (the TLV) was never designed to protect worker health.
  • In Gardner's confidential Saranac animal studies, 8 of 11 mice inhaling long fiber asbestos for 15 to 24 months developed malignant lung tumors. Lanza later wrote that all references to cancer or tumors should be omitted, and the 1951 published paper left them out.
  • The authors reported that the Pennsylvania compensation bill Lanza said he ghostwrote set a one-year statute of limitations after leaving a job and limited recovery to workers who were 100% impaired. Lanza noted that, in the 2 years after these laws passed, about 10 or 12 silicosis claims on average resulted in compensation in each of the most industrial states.
  • The authors described a network of defense experts coordinated by MetLife. They argued that radiologist Pancoast's trial testimony denying acute silicosis at Hawk's Nest contradicted his own earlier published paper.
• The authors' conclusion: The authors concluded that MetLife and its corporate allies used four strategies to keep the silica and asbestos industries thriving and to avoid liability and compensation: establishing authority, creating a network of experts, manipulating science, and influencing law and policy. In their view these strategies had a real human cost and contributed to a decades-long delay in open publication of asbestos health hazards.

Topics

The National Library of Medicine indexes this study under subjects our site covers: Asbestosis.

Medical terms in this study, explained in our Lexicon: Silicosis, Occupational Disease, Deposition, Asbestos Exposure.

Related studies

• Dust diseases and the legacy of corporate manipulation of science and law — D. Egilman, T. Bird, et al. (2014)
• Re: Comments on Egilman's response to Hessel regarding the health hazards of brake dust and his reflections on corporate behavior — D. Paustenbach (2019)
• Radiographic readings for asbestosis: misuse of science--validation of the ILO classification — A. Miller (2007)
• Exercise training for asbestos-related and other dust-related respiratory diseases: a randomised controlled trial — M.T. Dale, Z.J. McKeough, et al. (2014)
• Corporate corruption of science-Another asbestos example — D. Egilman, R. Monárrez (2017)
• Asbestos panelists accuse government of misusing science — L. Eggertson (2008)

Browse more research in International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health, or return to medical research.