Asbestos Cases A–Z: D

137 decisions whose name begins with D.

• Defazio v. AW Chesterton (New York Supreme Court, 2011). The court denied defendant Crane Co.'s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, finding the motion barred by laches and inexcusable delay, so the estate's case stayed in New York.
• Defazio v. Chesterton (New York Supreme Court, 2011). The court denied Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment, so the plaintiff executrix's failure-to-warn claims against Crane Co. over asbestos components used with its valves went forward.
• Dekens v. Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (California Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2003). Affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Underwriters Laboratories, rejecting the Dekens heirs' wrongful death claim because U.L. never undertook to test or certify small appliances for asbestos health risks.
• Del Vescovo v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (Louisiana Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, 2023). The appeals court affirmed the trial court's judgment granting the defendants' exception of prescription and dismissing, with prejudice, the claims of Sergio Nasini's widow and children, so the defendants won and the family lost.
• Delancey v. Chicago Insurance Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2004). The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand and sent the case back to Orleans Parish Civil District Court, holding that Chicago Insurance's removal failed for lack of diversity or other federal jurisdiction.
• DeLisle v. Crane Co. (Florida Supreme Court, 2018). The Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, which had ordered a new trial for R.J. Reynolds (as Lorillard's successor) and a directed verdict for Crane, and remanded for reinstatement of DeLisle's $8 million final judgment.
• DeLOOF v. Ace Hardware Corp. (California Court of Appeal, 2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2017). The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for W.W. Henry Company and against the plaintiffs, the decedent's husband and son, because they had no evidence the decedent was exposed to an asbestos-containing product made by W.W. Henry.
• Delsart v. Albany Felt Company, Inc. (Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 3rd District, 2012). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's order granting Honeywell's second motion to reconsider, which reversed leave for Delsart to amend his complaint and left the case dismissed.
• Dempsey v. Pacor, Inc. (Pennsylvania Superior Court, 1993). The Superior Court vacated the judgments entered for the six plaintiff couples against Owens-Illinois, Keene and Fibreboard and remanded for a new trial on damages only, with no fear or increased-risk-of-cancer elements.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2020). The court granted the motion in limine by Avondale, Bossier and Lamorak (joined by Foster Wheeler and General Electric), excluding evidence of Avondale accidents and regulatory citations unrelated to asbestos exposure; the plaintiffs lost this ruling.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2020). The court granted in part and denied in part the Avondale Interests' motion in limine, barring plaintiffs' expert Dr. Kraus from comparing the decedent's death to Jesus Christ's crucifixion or making religious references about corporate sinning, but allowing him to compare the death to death by crucifixion.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2020). The court granted Amchem's (joined by Foster Wheeler and General Electric) motion in limine and excluded Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1.157, the Welch Paper, and any reference to it at trial.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2021). The court denied General Electric's motion for summary judgment and reconsideration, finding disputed fact issues about whether the 1991 release covered future lung cancer and wrongful death claims, so the plaintiffs' claims against General Electric continue.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2020). The court granted in part and denied in part the Avondale defendants' motion in limine: it excluded evidence of non-asbestos injuries such as hearing loss suffered by family members and other non-parties, but it refused to bar evidence of asbestos-related illness in non-parties.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2020). The district court denied the plaintiffs' Daubert motion, so defendant Amchem (Bayer CropScience) could present Dr. Paustenbach's testimony on removal and scraping of Benjamin Foster 81-27 adhesive.
• Dempster v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2020). The federal district court denied the motion by Avondale (Huntington Ingalls), its executive officers' insurer Lamorak and other defendants for partial summary judgment declaring that Mr. Dempster's earlier settlements with 37 non-parties released his lung cancer claims, so the plaintiffs prevailed on the motion.
• Dennis v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Ohio Court of Appeals, 3rd Appellate District, 2016). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of General Motors' motion for summary judgment, so the widow Fayrene Dennis kept her jury verdict allowing her to participate in the workers' compensation fund.
• Dent v. Westinghouse (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2010). The magistrate judge denied defendant Warren Pumps' motion to compel plaintiff Reginald Dent to disclose settlement information and dismissed the rest of the motion as moot.
• Denton v. Southern Ry. Co. (Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, 1993). The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissing Norfolk Southern Corporation, but reversed the $25,000 jury verdict for Denton against Southern Railway and remanded for a new trial because of an erroneous causation/damages instruction and the exclusion of fear-of-cancer and cancer-monitoring evidence.
• DePREE v. BASF Catalysts LLC (California Court of Appeal, 1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2016). The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for BASF Catalysts, Eastern Magnesia Talc and Pita Realty, and the DePrees lost, because they showed only a possibility that Mr. DePree was exposed to asbestos-contaminated Emtal talc in Bondo.
• Deschenes v. Transco, Inc. (Connecticut Supreme Court, 2008). The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the compensation review board's decision, which had upheld full permanent partial disability benefits for the plaintiff against employers Reed and AC & S, and remanded for further fact-finding on apportionment.
• Deschenes v. Transco, Inc. (Connecticut Supreme Court, 2007). The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the compensation review board's decision affirming full benefits to George Deschenes, a ruling that favored the employers Reed and AC & S on the legal standard, and remanded for further fact-finding on whether his benefits should be reduced.
• DeStories v. City of Phoenix (Arizona Court of Appeals, 1st Division, Dept. A, 1987). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the City of Phoenix and Liberty Builders, rejecting the exposed workers' claims for increased risk of disease, emotional distress and future medical surveillance costs.
• Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp. (New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, 1985). On a defense motion in seven asbestosis cases, the trial court held that plaintiffs could not recover for the enhanced risk of cancer standing alone, but could seek damages for fear of cancer and for future medical surveillance, with evidence of the increased risk going to the jury on those items.
• DiBenedetto v. Noble Drilling Company (Louisiana Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, 2009). The court affirmed the dismissal of two South African companies and the bar on third party demands against dismissed defendants, but reversed summary judgments and exceptions of no cause of action that had dismissed plaintiff's claims against his stevedoring employers and their executive officers, remanding for further proceedings in plaintiff's favor.
• DiCenzo v. A-Best Prods. Co. (Ohio Supreme Court, 2008). The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment for George V. Hamilton, Inc. on the strict-liability claim, holding Temple v. Wean applies only prospectively, so the DiCenzo plaintiffs lost that claim.
• DiCENZO v. A-Best Prods. Co., Inc. (Ohio Court of Appeals, 8th Appellate District, 2007). The appeals court reversed summary judgment for Borg-Warner and remanded, reversed summary judgment for George V. Hamilton, Inc. on the strict liability claim and remanded, and affirmed summary judgment for Hamilton on negligent failure to warn, so the plaintiff won in part and lost in part.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, 2019). The court granted Edelbrock's unopposed motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Dickens plaintiffs' claims against Edelbrock with prejudice.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair Inc. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, 2021). The court denied the Dickens plaintiffs' motion to reconsider its earlier grant of summary judgment to Ford Motor Co. on causation and punitive damages, so Ford won and the plaintiffs lost.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair Inc. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, 2021). The court granted Ford Motor Co.'s motions for summary judgment on causation and punitive damages, dismissing the Dickens plaintiffs' claims against Ford with prejudice.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair Inc. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, 2020). The court granted Trinity Marine Products' motion for summary judgment, ruling that Delaware or Tennessee law governs successor liability and neither recognizes the product line theory, so plaintiffs William and Karla Dickens lost their claim against Trinity.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair Inc. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, 2019). The court granted A-1 Auto Parts & Repair's Rule 12(b)(6) motion on its innocent seller defense and dismissed the Dickenses' claims against A-1 without prejudice, with 14 days to seek leave to amend.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair, Inc. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, 2019). The court granted Detroit Diesel's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' market-share-type causation theories, fraud/concealment/conspiracy claims and aiding-and-abetting claim, with leave for the Dickenses to seek to amend.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair, Inc. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi, 2018). The court granted Ford Motor Company's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' alternative-causation claims with prejudice and their fraud, concealment and aiding-and-abetting conspiracy claims without prejudice, and allowed the Dickenses to seek leave to amend.
• Dickenson v. Brenntag North America, Inc. (U.S. District Court, District of Kansas, 2023). The magistrate judge granted Henkel's motion to compel production of Dickenson's settlement agreements with Pfizer, Barretts Minerals and any others, denied without prejudice the request for settlement communications, and declined to award expenses.
• Dickenson v. Brenntag North America, Inc. (U.S. District Court, District of Kansas, 2022). The court granted plaintiff Dickenson's motion for limited jurisdictional discovery against defendant BSI, allowing written discovery and a short deposition for 60 days before he must respond to BSI's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
• DiDio v. Philadelphia Asbestos Corp. (Pennsylvania Superior Court, 1994). The court stayed Keene's appeal because of its bankruptcy, vacated the judgment against Fibreboard because asymptomatic pleural thickening and asbestosis based on fear of cancer were not compensable, and affirmed the $900,000 judgment against Owens-Illinois and the severance of its cross-claims.
• Didner v. Keene Corp. (New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1st Dept., 1993). The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment requiring Keene Corporation to pay its 15% share of the reduced verdict to plaintiff Marlene Didner, rejecting Keene's argument that it owed nothing after setoffs for the Manville settlement.
• Dietrich v. Boeing Company (U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2021). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order remanding the case to state court, finding Boeing's federal officer removal timely, vacated the $3,500 fee award to plaintiff Dietrich, and remanded.
• Dilks v. 4520 Corp., Inc. (U.S. District Court, District of Maryland, 2012). The court granted Dilks's motion to remand to state court because Ingersoll-Rand's federal officer removal was untimely, but denied her request for attorney's fees and costs.
• Director, Office OF Workers'comp. v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1982). The Fourth Circuit reversed the Benefits Review Board's ruling that the special fund must pay part of Langley's compensation, upholding the ALJ's findings for the Director against Newport News Shipbuilding, and remanded the question of asbestosis as a pre-existing condition to the ALJ.
• District of Columbia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1989). The court reversed the trial court's partial summary judgment for the asbestos manufacturers and sellers, holding the District of Columbia's property-damage claims were not time-barred, and remanded for further proceedings.
• Ditcharo v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 2024). The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that Avondale properly removed under the federal officer removal statute and that the court had supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, including the FELA claims against Union Pacific.
• Dixon v. Ford Motor Company (Maryland Court of Appeals, 2013). The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the intermediate appellate court, reinstated the jury verdicts for the Dixon plaintiffs against Ford Motor Company, and reversed the trial court's judgment for Ford on its cross-claim against Georgia-Pacific, which won back the jury's verdict.
• Dixon v. Ford Motor Company (Maryland Court of Special Appeals, 2012). The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgments for the Dixon plaintiffs against Ford Motor Company and remanded for a new trial, because the trial court should not have admitted the plaintiffs' expert's causation opinion.
• Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp. (Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 1984). The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining the defendants' preliminary objections to the Does' petition for a declaratory judgment on when the limitations period begins in asbestos disease cases.
• Dollas v. WR Grace & Co. (New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1st Dept., 1996). The Appellate Division reversed the grants of summary judgment to W.R. Grace against plaintiffs Dollas and Gargano, finding a fact question on whether the decedents were exposed to Grace's Monokote.
• Donn v. AW Chesterton Co., Inc. (U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2012). The district court denied the motion of CBS Corporation and General Electric to dismiss plaintiff Alan Donn's asbestos failure-to-warn claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rejecting their preemption and political question arguments.
• Donohue v. CBS Corporation (U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, 2017). The district court denied the Donohues' motion to remand the case to New York state court, allowing removal by CBS Corporation (Westinghouse) and Crane Co. under the federal officer removal statute to stand.
• Donoughe v. Lincoln Elec. Co. (Pennsylvania Superior Court, 2007). The Superior Court affirmed the denial of Lincoln Electric's and Hobart Brothers' motions for JNOV and a new trial, so the Donoughes kept the verdict against them, but it vacated the judgment and remanded because the trial court wrongly treated the Manville Trust settlement as a pro rata set-off instead of pro tanto.