Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

California

• Hall v. Warren Pumps LLC (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2010). A manufacturer of pumps and valves is not strictly liable or negligent for failing to warn of asbestos hazards from third-party asbestos insulation, gaskets and packing used with its equipment, where it did not make or supply those products and its own equipment did not cause or create the risk.
• Russell v. Ford Motor Company (2nd Appellate District, 8th Division, 2010). Substantial evidence can support a finding that a failure to warn caused a plaintiff's disease. A non-settling defendant must be allowed to review the evidence supporting a contested post-trial settlement offset, and the trial court may not review it only in camera.
• Smith v. Pneumo Abex LLC (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2010). A trial court cannot, after the verdict, reduce a lump-sum medical-expense award that includes future expenses without speculating about the future portion, so the Hanif-Nishihama reduction could not be applied here. Settlement credits against economic damages are calculated by a three-step method, and the court need not accept the settling parties' allocations to wrongful death claims.
• Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Company (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2010). A plaintiff must show with admissible evidence that he was exposed to the defendant's asbestos with enough frequency and regularity to be a substantial factor in causing his disease; a party cannot create a triable issue with a declaration that contradicts his earlier discovery responses without explanation, and mere possibility of exposure is insufficient.
• Wilson v. Certainteed Corporation (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2010). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos product to establish causation, and circumstantial evidence that amounts only to speculation or the possibility of exposure does not create a triable issue of fact.
• Clemmer v. Thorpe Insulation Company (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2009). A plaintiff may prove exposure to a defendant's asbestos product through circumstantial evidence that the product was sufficiently prevalent at the work site to support a reasonable inference of exposure.
• Mahoney v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2009). Under Rutherford, an asbestos plaintiff need not quantify dose; evidence of repeated, close exposure to a dusty product, plus expert testimony of substantial contribution to risk, supports causation. A trial court may grant a new trial limited to medical expenses when noneconomic damages are separable from them.
• Ransom v. Calaveras Asbestos, Ltd. (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2009). A jury's apportionment of fault is reviewed for substantial evidence and is not subject to exact mathematical computation. Sophisticated user and bulk supplier arguments not raised at trial are forfeited on appeal.
• Silvestro v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 8th Division, 2009). Under Rutherford, expert testimony that cumulative asbestos exposures, including low-level chrysotile exposure, contribute to mesothelioma, together with the plaintiff's own account of regular exposure, is substantial evidence of causation. A fault allocation that cannot be reconciled with the plaintiff's own evidence about the relative potency of the fibers is not supported by substantial evidence.
• Walmach v. Wheeler (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2009). A judgment stands if an independent ground, here the unchallenged design defect verdict, supports it, so the sophisticated intermediary defense to the failure to warn claims did not need to be reached. Substantial evidence supported the apportionment of fault, and due process did not bar punitive damages for conduct that was directed at the decedent and occurred partly outside California.
• Behshid v. Bondex International, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2008). In California asbestos cancer cases, a plaintiff need not show that fibers from the defendant's product began the malignancy. It is enough to show in reasonable medical probability that exposure to the product was a substantial factor contributing to the risk of cancer. A defendant seeking to assign fault to 'others' must offer substantial evidence that the others' products were defective and a cause of the injury.
• Cadlo v. Metalclad Insulation (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2008). A final judgment in the earlier personal injury action establishing that the defendant's products legally caused the plaintiff's mesothelioma bars the defendant from relitigating causation in the later wrongful death action, even with new evidence, absent unusual circumstances denying a full and fair opportunity to defend.
• Clemmer v. John Crane, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2008). A remittitur may be used only when a new trial is warranted solely because damages are excessive, not to correct an improper apportionment of fault. Counsel's closing argument urging that two separate companies were the same entity, after counsel conceded they were separate, was misconduct that could justify a new trial.
• Cunningham v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2008). The consumer expectations test for design defect can apply to asbestos gaskets and packing in pumps and valves, and failure to warn is a distinct strict liability theory that cannot be made to depend on first finding a risk/benefit design defect. A maker of a finished product cannot escape liability by pointing to a component made by another.
• Holliday v. Warren Pumps LLC (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2008). An expert declaration built on speculation (that a pump's asbestos packing and gaskets were removed in an overhaul years before the plaintiff's service, and that fibers then resuspended) lacks foundation and cannot create a triable issue of exposure to the defendant's product.
• Norris v. Crane Company (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2008). Under Rutherford's substantial factor test, exposure to asbestos from a defendant's product that adds to the cumulative dose can support causation. The consumer expectations test may be used for a design defect claim based on asbestos-containing valve gaskets and packing.
• Bakkie v. Union Carbide Corporation (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2007). A raw-asbestos supplier is not relieved of its duty to warn merely because the buyer-employer knew or should have known of asbestos hazards or was subject to OSHA rules. A noneconomic damages award that is grossly disproportionate to the evidence and was influenced by improper argument may be reduced or retried on appeal.
• Cadlo v. Metalclad Insulation Corporation (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2007). When a trial court validly enters a judgment nunc pro tunc to a date before the plaintiff's death, that date decides whether Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 bars pain-and-suffering and future economic damages. A verdict exceeding a plaintiff's section 998 offer is prima facie evidence the offer was reasonable.
• Kinsman v. Unocal Corporation (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2007). A premises owner that relies on an industry exposure limit (TLV) as a defense to negligence bears the burden of showing it knew of and complied with that standard. The plaintiff need not prove exposure above the limit, and substantial evidence that the owner knew or should have known of asbestos hazards supports a negligence verdict.
• Rosen v. Regents of University of California (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2007). A negligent failure-to-warn claim requires that the risk was known or reasonably should have been known when the product was supplied. Without evidence of foreseeability there is no duty to warn, and nonsuit on negligence is proper.
• Quarles v. Advocate Mines Limited (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2006). A supplier of raw asbestos fiber that is used in a finished product can be liable for design defect under the consumer-expectations test, and substantial evidence supported the jury's findings on liability, exposure, causation and damages.
• Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2006). A defendant moving for summary judgment cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff merely by showing the plaintiff's deposition testimony that he does not recall the defendant's product; it must show in some way that the plaintiff does not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence of causation.
• McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2002). A defendant can shift the burden on summary judgment by showing through the plaintiff's deposition that he had no knowledge of exposure to its products, and the plaintiff must then produce non-speculative evidence of exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product; mere possibility and a conclusory expert opinion are not enough.
• Howard v. Owens Corning (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 1999). A jury may reject expert testimony, even uncontradicted testimony and even where the defendant calls no expert, so long as it does not act arbitrarily. The rule that uncontradicted expert testimony is conclusive applies only in professional negligence cases where expert testimony sets the standard of care.
• Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997). In asbestos-related cancer cases, no instruction shifting the burden of proof on causation to defendants is warranted. A plaintiff proves causation by showing that exposure to the defendant's product was, in reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor contributing to the risk of developing cancer, without showing that the defendant's fibers began the malignancy.
• Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 1995). A plaintiff must prove exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and a reasonable medical probability that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease; the court declined to shift the burden of proof on causation to defendants under an alternative liability theory.
• Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 1995). A product such as asbestos insulation that releases toxic dust in its ordinary use can be judged under the consumer expectation test without proof of a safer alternative design. A defendant claiming that other manufacturers or the plaintiff's employer share fault must prove it, and a defendant that did not try to prove it at trial waives the point.
• Smith v. ACandS, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 1994). A plaintiff must prove the defendant's asbestos products or activities were present at his work site, and speculation will not do. A landowner is not vicariously liable under the peculiar risk doctrine for one contractor's negligence that injures employees of other hired contractors.
• Uram v. Abex Corp. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 1990). Under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2, the limitations period runs from disability or from when the plaintiff knew or should have known asbestos exposure caused it, under the Jolly inquiry-notice standard. A loss of consortium claim based on asbestos exposure is governed by the one-year period of section 340(3), subject to the discovery rule.
• Indus. Indemnity Co. v. Worker's Comp. App. BD. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 1983). Absent substantial medical evidence that an earlier period of employment was the exclusively hazardous exposure, Labor Code section 5500.5 requires the board to determine liability by the applicant's last date of exposure to asbestos, and it may not postpone that finding indefinitely.
• Scott Co. v. Workers'comp. Appeals BD. (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 1983). Labor Code section 5500.5 does not impose liability on a last-exposure employer unless the exposure was a contributing (injurious) cause of the disease; the causation requirement of the workers' compensation statutes remains. The board's finding of the last injurious exposure date was supported by substantial evidence.
• Skip Fordyce, Inc. v. Workers'comp. Appeals BD. (4th Appellate District, 2nd Division, 1983). A workers' compensation award must rest on substantial evidence of work-related asbestos exposure, and multiple-level hearsay from a doctor's report, a general pamphlet and an unsupported 'admission' that brake linings contain asbestos does not supply it. Medical opinions based on statistical studies can be substantial evidence of causation.
• Baptist v. Workers'comp. Appeals BD. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 1982). An expert medical opinion that rests on speculation or on a study with fundamental unresolved caveats is not substantial evidence supporting a Board decision. The record as a whole, read with the rule of liberal construction in favor of the employee, supported a finding that the death was industrially related.

Connecticut

• Erhardt v. Bmw OF North America, LLC (2021). Expert opinions based on a cumulative-exposure theory of asbestos causation, grounded in scientific literature and case-specific records, can meet Rule 702 reliability standards. The defendant's criticisms of the methods go to weight rather than admissibility, and admissible expert causation testimony creates a genuine factual dispute that defeats summary judgment.
• Carlson v. CBS Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A loss of consortium claim under Connecticut law fails when the injured spouse's underlying claim fails.
• Bagley v. Adel Wiggins Group (2017). When it is not conceded and not within lay jurors' common knowledge, a plaintiff must prove with competent expert testimony that a product emitted respirable asbestos fibers when used as it was, in order to show the product was dangerous and caused the disease. Without that proof, both strict liability and negligence claims fail, and this requirement existed under law predating the court's recent product liability decisions.
• Bray v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2015). Under either the Connecticut Product Liability Act or general maritime law, a plaintiff must show with direct or circumstantial evidence that he was exposed to the particular defendant's product. Speculative equipment lists and inadmissible hearsay do not meet that burden. A loss of consortium claim under Connecticut law fails when the injured spouse's underlying claim fails.
• Deschenes v. Transco, Inc. (2008). Permanent partial disability benefits may be apportioned or proportionally reduced when the employer proves that a disability results from two concurrently developing disease processes, one occupational and one not, and that the claimant's occupation had no influence on the development of the nonoccupational disease.

Delaware

• Salvemini v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and vague testimony that cannot separate that defendant's product from others fails. General maritime law did not reach a spouse's land-based take-home exposure when the plaintiffs did not show the maritime connection test was met.
• Roadarmel v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2023). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Bystander testimony about dust from repairs of the defendant's engines was enough to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Estate of Anderson v. American Seaboard Exteriors (2022). Under the last injurious exposure rule, the claimant bears the burden of proving the employer injuriously exposed the employee to a disease-causing substance, and the Board may choose between conflicting expert opinions. Prior deposition testimony from asbestos cases can be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1), but excluding it is harmless where it does not show the claimant's own exposure.
• Thorne v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2022). Under Iowa law, a valve attached to real property remains an improvement after it is detached and refurbished, so the statute of repose bars claims based on exposure during that work. Iowa Code § 686B.7(5) also shields a defendant from liability for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.
• Gilstrap v. CBS Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant exposure to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A failure to respond to a summary judgment motion does not alone justify judgment, but here the undisputed record showed no such evidence.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product, that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and that the defendant made or sold it; and a manufacturer may have a duty to warn about asbestos parts incorporated into its equipment under the DeVries test, which here raised genuine fact issues.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a manufacturer may owe a duty to warn about third-party replacement parts when its product requires them, it knows or has reason to know of the danger, and it has no reason to believe users will realize that danger. Disputed facts on these elements and on the Boyle elements preclude summary judgment.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under Vermont law, a plaintiff shows substantial factor causation with evidence of more than de minimis exposure, and a right to recover that vested through exposure before the 1967 enactment of the asbestos-related statute of repose is not barred by it.
• Pruitt v. Gardner Denver (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Circumstantial evidence that a worker repaired a defendant's pumps with asbestos-containing gaskets and packing, with enough frequency and proximity, can create a jury question on whether the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury, even without a witness who identified the product by maker.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under Stigliano, where a manufacturer made both asbestos and non-asbestos versions of a product, the plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence of exposure to the asbestos-containing version. Under Rhode Island's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure to friable asbestos in connection with the defendant's product.
• Pruitt v. Amdura (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; circumstantial evidence can suffice, but not a chain of speculative inferences. Under Georgia law the plaintiff must show the defendant's asbestos product was used at the job site and that he was in proximity to it when it was used.
• Pruitt v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Georgia law requires proof that the product was a contributing factor and that the plaintiff was near its use. An unopposed motion still requires the court to find that the undisputed facts support judgment.