Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Delaware

• Stimson v. AO Smith Corporation (2020). A new trial is warranted only where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict or the verdict clearly results from confusion; a jury may accept or reject expert testimony, and a jury-confusion objection not raised at trial is reviewed only for plain error.
• Vocciante v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or mere presence of the product somewhere at the workplace, does not suffice without evidence of frequency, regularity or proximity.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). When deciding whether a jury's compensatory damages verdict is excessive, a court must look at the total damages the jury found, not the defendant's smaller share based on its percentage of fault.
• Mosher v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal exposure or the mere presence of a product aboard a ship is insufficient.
• Mosher v. ABB (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law and Colorado law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos-containing product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal or unidentified exposure is insufficient, and failure to oppose a motion does not alone justify summary judgment.
• Rogers v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing injury; mere presence of a product at the workplace is insufficient. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff must show a product nexus, meaning proximity to the defendant's asbestos product when it was used.
• Rogers v. Nosroc Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under Delaware law a plaintiff must show a product nexus between exposure to the defendant's product and his injury, and under maritime law that the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury; a plaintiff who identifies no exposure to the defendant's product cannot meet either test.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A court will not overturn a jury verdict as inconsistent if the differently worded interrogatory answers can be logically reconciled, and will not set aside or reduce a damages award unless it was the product of passion, prejudice or disregard of the evidence or law.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under maritime law and Washington law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A general recollection of a manufacturer's name, with no detail on where, when or how often he worked with the product, does not meet that burden.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show asbestos exposure from the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing injury, and about five brake jobs over seventeen years was de minimis exposure that did not meet that standard. A manufacturer generally has no duty to warn of dangers of another manufacturer's product, and Washington does not allow punitive damages unless the legislature authorizes them.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan, Inc. (2019). Under Ohio law, Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.96 and its manner-proximity-frequency factors address only whether exposure to each defendant's asbestos was more than minimal. A plaintiff must still offer expert medical evidence of specific causation to survive summary judgment.
• Call v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Indiana's general negligence "but for" causation standard applies to asbestos cases, so a substantial contributing factor opinion that concedes it does not meet that standard cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A party seeking to supplement an expert report after summary judgment must show good cause or excusable neglect, and plaintiffs who never sought leave before judgment was entered did not do so.
• Pieno v. Crosby Valve (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Vague recollection of a brand name, with no link to a particular ship or product, does not meet that burden, even when the motion is unopposed.
• Kister v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no product identification, summary judgment follows even when the motion is unopposed.
• Charlevoix v. Caterpillar, Inc. (2017). Under both maritime law and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; mere presence of a product, or minimal exposure, is not enough.
• Evans v. CBS Corp. (2017). Under maritime law (and Colorado law for land-based claims), a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or distribute (the bare metal defense). Even an unopposed summary judgment motion requires the court to find the undisputed facts warrant judgment.
• Evans v. Flowserve US Inc. (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Even when a motion is unopposed, the court must find that the undisputed facts support judgment.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A plaintiff who bears the burden of proof at trial and cannot show this loses on summary judgment.
• Leathers v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Applying Rhode Island law, the court used the frequency, regularity, proximity test for asbestos causation. It held that disputed facts about product identification and exposure, including whether the testimony was contradictory, are for the factfinder.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; general testimony about replacement parts, without evidence they were made by the defendant, does not meet that burden.
• Charlevoix v. Caterpillar (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or supply.
• Evans v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and under the bare metal defense a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply.
• Tallman v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare metal defense bars liability for asbestos materials the defendant did not make or supply. Speculation does not create a genuine factual dispute on these points.
• Shaw v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under Connecticut law, a plaintiff must show the defendant's product was a substantial contributing factor to the injury, and even an unopposed summary judgment motion requires the court to find that the undisputed facts warrant judgment.
• Denbow v. CBS Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply.
• Charlevoix v. John Crane (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Evidence that does not show regular exposure over an extended period does not meet this test. A failure to respond to a summary judgment motion does not alone justify judgment.
• In re Asbestos Litigation Evans v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Without evidence of exposure to a defendant's product, summary judgment is proper even when the motion is unopposed.
• Hillyer v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2016). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply, and speculation cannot create a fact issue on product identification.
• In re Asbestos Litigation Charlevoix v. CBS Corporation (2016). Under maritime and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no evidence identifying such a product, summary judgment is proper even when unopposed.
• Hillyer v. ABB (In re Asbestos Litigation Hillyer) (2016). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or a manufacturer's product merely being present, is not enough, and a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or distribute.
• Malone v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under Mississippi law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity, even in a mesothelioma case. A manufacturer of bare-metal equipment has no duty to warn about asbestos insulation made and supplied by others, and foreseeability of such use alone does not create that duty.
• Winhauer v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under Mississippi's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity to support causation. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos products made by others that were used with its product.
• In re Specialty Products Holding Corp. (2013). In estimating asbestos liability under §502(c)(1), the court relies on the debtors' own tort-system claiming and settlement history, which places a value on claims. It will not discount that history for claimed implicit defense costs, nuisance settlements, market share, or apportionment among corporate eras.
• Pease v. Ford Motor Company (2012). A transferee MDL court's earlier summary judgment ruling rejecting the bare metal defense stood, and a defendant that did not seek reargument there could not relitigate the same arguments on remand. The MDL ruling would have been the same under Delaware or maritime law.
• Gordon v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under Kansas's asbestos statute, which the court read as codifying the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show that exposure to the defendant's product was a substantial factor. The court held that Kansas law does not apply this test less strictly in mesothelioma cases, and that specific dates or counts of exposure are not required.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show substantial exposure to asbestos from the defendant's own product; a valve maker is not liable for third-party asbestos packing, gaskets or insulation absent evidence it specified or required them.
• Foucha v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under Louisiana substantive law, a plaintiff must show that a defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing disease, and Delaware courts do not allow a plaintiff to proceed on speculative exposure to a defendant's product; conflicting, speculative product identification testimony does not create a genuine factual dispute.
• Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under North Carolina law, a product's mere presence at a worksite does not show exposure, but a worker's testimony that he regularly used a brand's brakes, together with supporting context, can raise a triable issue of frequent, regular exposure over an extended period, without proof of specific instances.
• Foucha v. CertainTeed Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the specific defendant's product; a belief based on general "common knowledge" that shingles contained asbestos, against unrebutted evidence that the particular product was asbestos-free, is speculation that cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show a defendant's asbestos-containing product was a contributing factor to the injury, which requires proof of proximity to its use; he need not recall a specific time, job, or incident if he offers product identification, proximity, and supporting expert testimony. A movant that ignores the controlling jurisdiction's authority cannot show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Ashworth v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under Delaware's borrowing statute the shorter Delaware limitations period applied to the survival claim. A wrongful death claim accrues no earlier than the decedent's death. In a multi-defendant asbestos case, but-for causation does not apply, and the Utah Supreme Court was not expected to apply it.
• Cruz v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under Texas law (Borg-Warner v. Flores), a plaintiff must offer defendant-specific evidence of at least an approximate dose of exposure to prove substantial-factor causation; evidence of some exposure, or of its frequency and regularity, is not enough.
• Rhodes v. Diamond State Port Corporation (2010). The Board may credit one expert over another, and its finding that the claimant did not prove asbestos exposure or asbestos causation was supported by substantial evidence. The last injurious exposure rule does not apply where injurious exposure during the employment was not proved.
• General Motors Corporation v. Grenier (2009). A trial court's decision to admit expert testimony under Daubert and D.R.E. 702 is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and experts may reliably conclude that chrysotile from friction products is carcinogenic without epidemiological studies showing that association. Isolated errors in evidence and in closing argument did not require a new trial.
• General Motors Corporation v. Grenier (2009). An expert's methodology must be reliably applied to the facts of the case, and a trial court's Daubert findings must be supported by the record and be the product of a logical and orderly reasoning process. Findings that mischaracterize the expert testimony require remand for reconsideration.
• Grenier v. General Motors Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2009). A plaintiff's expert need not disprove a defendant's unproven hypothesis to satisfy Daubert; an expert who reviews all available evidence and finds no reliable support for the hypothesis uses a reliable methodology. Occupation-specific epidemiology is not required as a matter of law to show that chrysotile in friction products can cause asbestos disease.
• In re Asbestos Litigation (2006). Under Daubert, plaintiffs' experts may testify that friction products increase the risk of asbestos disease, because their methods were reliable. Occupation-specific epidemiology is not required as a matter of law, and the court does not choose between competing reliable scientific views.
• In re WR Grace & Co. (2006). A property damage claimant must show that an asbestos-containing product creates an unreasonable risk of harm at the exposure levels actually encountered; contamination and fiber release on disturbance, without reliable evidence of risk, are not enough. Expert evidence must meet Daubert reliability and fit requirements to defeat summary judgment.
• Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Comp. Fund (1991). To make a prima facie case that a defendant's asbestos product caused an asbestos-related disease, a plaintiff must offer direct expert medical testimony, stated in terms of reasonable medical probability, that the defendant's product was a proximate (but-for) cause of the injury; causation cannot be left to lay inference.