Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Delaware

• Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1991). There is no 'law of the district' binding one district judge to another's ruling, and a court must independently assess authenticity under Rule 901(b)(8), which asks whether a document is what it purports to be, not whether its content is complete or reliable.

District of Columbia

• Jackson v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2019). An expert's asbestos testing opinion is unreliable and excluded where the method skipped a required confirmatory step and the results cannot be verified, and a specific causation opinion fails where it rests on an unreliable control group and ignores other reported exposure; gaps in chain of custody for talc samples go to weight where adulteration is reasonably eliminated.
• Wannall v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2013). Under Virginia law as stated in Boomer, a plaintiff in a multiple-exposure mesothelioma case needs expert evidence of what level of exposure is sufficient to cause mesothelioma and that the defendant's exposure was sufficient. Substantial-contributing-factor opinions and 'no safe level' risk opinions do not meet that standard, and a late expert declaration filed without leave can be excluded under Rules 26 and 37.
• Alliegro v. ACandS, Inc. (1997). On a directed verdict motion, evidence is viewed in the plaintiff's favor, and proof that the plaintiff and the defendant's asbestos products were in the same place at the same time, with expert testimony that exposure was a substantial factor, is enough for the jury.

Florida

• Edmonds v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). An expert opinion that every asbestos exposure, however small, substantially contributed to cancer is unreliable under Daubert, but a cumulative-exposure opinion limited to exposures found to be regular, frequent and proximate and framed as increasing risk in a dose-related way is admissible.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Font (3rd District, 2020). A defendant may present evidence of alternative causes, such as a decedent's own sworn asbestos claims against non-parties, without proving those non-parties' fault by expert testimony; and a learned intermediary instruction must let the jury understand that reasonable reliance on an intermediary fulfills or discharges the duty to warn.
• Doolin v. Ford Motor Company (2018). Under Daubert and Eleventh Circuit precedent, an expert's "any exposure" or cumulative-exposure opinion on specific causation is unreliable if it does not analyze the plaintiff's dose, does not address the particular form of mesothelioma, and does not weigh a competing cause such as radiation therapy. Without admissible expert proof of specific causation, a Florida product liability plaintiff cannot show proximate cause and loses on summary judgment.
• Bechtel Corporation v. Batchelor (3rd District, 2017). Premises liability requires proof that the defendant possessed or controlled the premises, meaning the ability to control access or exclude others; a contractor's large presence and service contracts silent on possession do not support that inference. A discovery sanction such as an adverse inference instruction is unavailable where the party never violated an order compelling the discovery.
• Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation v. Britt (3rd District, 2017). A suggestion of death must be filed with the court and served to start Florida's 90-day substitution period under Rule 1.260(a)(1). Competent, substantial evidence of causation may support a mesothelioma verdict even without precise dose quantification, particularly where the premises owner did not monitor airborne asbestos.
• Crane Co. v. DeLisle (4th District, 2016). A trial court must act as an active gatekeeper under section 90.702 and Daubert, and an expert's 'every exposure above background' causation opinion unsupported by tested data or explained methodology is inadmissible. Counsel's invitation to measure damages by the defendants' expert fees is an improper basis for an award.
• Dugas v. 3M Company (2016). A dust mask not designed or marketed to protect against asbestos is not defectively designed for failing to do so, but a jury may find the manufacturer's warnings about its limits inadequate. A Florida fraud claim is barred when the last act of concealment fell outside the 12-year repose period.
• Waite v. Aii Acquisition Corp. (2016). Where the medical community accepts that asbestos causes mesothelioma, the court need not conduct an extensive general-causation Daubert analysis, and weight-of-the-evidence expert testimony may go to the jury. The bare metal defense does not bar liability where the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant's own original asbestos-containing parts.
• Aubin v. Union Carbide Corporation (2015). Florida keeps the consumer expectations test from the Second Restatement for strict liability design defect and does not require proof of a reasonable alternative design. Causation is judged by ordinary causation rules rather than by comparing the product with raw asbestos. A manufacturer may argue that it reasonably relied on a learned intermediary to warn end users, but it must request an accurate instruction on the defense.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Aubin (3rd District, 2012). Under the Third Restatement's component parts doctrine, adopted in this district, a component seller is liable for a design defect only if the defective design, not the raw material's natural dangers, caused the harm. Whether a bulk supplier could discharge its duty to warn by reasonably relying on intermediaries is a jury question, and an instruction omitting that was misleading.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Aubin (3rd District, 2012). Under the Third Restatement's component parts rule, which binds the Third District, a component supplier is liable for design defect only if the design, not the raw material's natural dangers, caused the harm. Whether a supplier discharged its duty to warn by reasonably relying on an intermediary is a jury question, and the jury must be told so.
• Wood v. Harry Harmon Insulation (1st District, 1987). An exposure is 'injurious' under the last injurious exposure rule if, independent of other causes, it could over extended time lead to the disease; the claimant need not prove it actually caused the disease. The 350-week limit on death benefits for occupational disease does not unconstitutionally deny access to courts.
• Keene Corp. v. Bahl (1st District, 1985). Under Florida's occupational disease statute, the employer in whose employment the worker was last injuriously exposed is solely liable, and the 350-week limit after last exposure applies only to death claims, not disability claims.
• Copeland v. Celotex Corp. (3rd District, 1984). A complaint alleging long-term cumulative exposure to asbestos products need not plead a specific time and place of exposure. Where the plaintiff cannot identify which manufacturer's product caused the injury, the court adopted market share liability, applied through Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(2) in asbestosis cases.

Georgia

• Bowers v. CSX Transportation, Inc. (2023). The relaxed causation standard in FELA cases does not relax the standard for admitting expert testimony, which is still governed by Rule 702. A trial court acting as gatekeeper does not abuse its discretion by excluding a specific-causation opinion whose use of studies and differential diagnosis it finds unreliable.
• Georgia Power Company v. Campbell (2021). An owner owes no duty to a contractor's employees only if it relinquished possession and did not control the work, and contract terms showing retained control raise fact questions. A trial court must act as gatekeeper and rule on a challenge to an expert's qualifications; an appellate court will not decide an argument the trial court did not address.
• Davis v. John Crane, Inc. (2019). In Georgia a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos-containing products for which the defendant is responsible, and a plaintiff's own testimony from personal knowledge can meet that burden. A pump manufacturer is not liable for design or failure to warn over asbestos-containing replacement parts made by others (bare metal defense).
• McKENNEY'S Inc. v. Sinyard (2019). A superior court must uphold a Workers' Compensation Board finding supported by any competent evidence unless the Board clearly relied on an erroneous legal theory. A claimant's earlier unverified complaint can be used as an evidentiary admission, and the claimant bears the burden of proving the employer of last injurious exposure.
• Hanson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2018). Expert opinion is unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert when the expert did not record data that would let others test his work and skipped a step needed to rule out false positives. Other experts cannot rely on an opinion the court has excluded or repeat findings outside their own expertise.
• Hanson v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2018). Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product, at a level greater than de minimis. Evidence that some samples of a product contained asbestos, with nothing tying them to the plaintiff's own product, does not create a jury issue. Punitive damages fail when the underlying tort claims fail.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight (2016). Expert causation testimony that any exposure above background asbestos contributes to mesothelioma, regardless of extent, does not "fit" Georgia's causation standard, which requires more than a de minimis contribution, and so should be excluded under the gatekeeping standard of former OCGA § 24-9-67.1 (b).
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight (2015). Where a plaintiff has multiple asbestos exposures involving multiple defendants, each defendant's conduct need only be a contributing cause, not a substantial one. Expert testimony that Scapa's exposures were substantial causes was reliable enough to be admitted, and a pretrial reliability hearing is discretionary, not mandatory.
• Thurmon v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2014). Predicting how the Georgia Supreme Court would rule, the court held that Georgia recognizes the bare metal defense, so a valve manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in replacement gaskets and packing it did not manufacture, supply or design, and plaintiffs must show exposure to the defendant's own product.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos product, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply; a parent or successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent facts supporting piercing the corporate veil.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Fields (2012). A defendant cannot have fault allocated to a nonparty under OCGA § 51-12-33 unless it presents competent evidence that the nonparty's product actually contributed to the plaintiff's injury; inference, unverified allegations, or settled status alone are not enough. An employer owes no duty for take-home exposure, so it bears no allocable fault.
• Butler v. Union Carbide Corporation (2011). A trial court does not abuse its discretion under OCGA § 24-9-67.1 and Daubert by excluding an expert's 'any exposure above background' specific causation opinion as unreliable, and without that expert evidence a toxic tort plaintiff cannot show specific causation to survive summary judgment.
• DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Ferrante (2006). A statute that adds a new requirement of prima facie proof that asbestos exposure was a substantial contributing factor affects substantive rights and cannot be applied retroactively to claims that accrued before its effective date. The unconstitutional provisions could not be severed because they were the heart of the Act, so the whole Act fell.
• Putzel Elect. Contractors v. Jones (2006). Under OCGA § 34-9-281(b)(2), the one-year filing period was met whichever way it was measured, because the worker learned of the link to asbestos and was definitively diagnosed in the same year. The Board's findings on injurious exposure stand if any evidence supports them.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Highsmith (2004). The court followed the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in John Crane v. Jones in rejecting the requested "substantial" contributing factor charge. It also held that a jury verdict stands if any evidence supports it, and that the evidence of defect and exposure was sufficient.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Jones (2004). Where several defendants' tortious acts may have combined to cause an injury, Georgia law does not require each defendant's conduct to be a "substantial" contributing factor to be a proximate cause; it is enough that the conduct was a contributing factor.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Jones (2003). A trial court need not charge that exposure to a defendant's product must be a 'substantial' contributing factor; Georgia's joint tortfeasor rule requires only that the defendant's negligence be a contributing cause. A verdict will be upheld if any evidence supports it.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Wommack (1997). A jury verdict approved by the trial judge must be affirmed if any evidence supports it. Here there was evidence that the manufacturer knew or should have known of asbestos hazards, owed a duty to warn, that its packing released respirable fibers in foreseeable use, and that it contributed to the plaintiff's disease.

Hawaii

• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2014). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos product as a substantial factor, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply. A parent corporation or its successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent a showing supporting veil-piercing.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A manufacturer has no duty to warn about, and is not liable for, asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not manufacture or distribute.

Idaho

• Stephens v. Union Pacific R. Co. (2019). Under Idaho's substantial-factor test, applied as in the Ninth Circuit's asbestos cases, a plaintiff must show substantial exposure to the defendant's asbestos over a substantial period. Expert opinions that rest on assumptions the record does not support cannot create a genuine factual dispute.
• Stephens v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (2018). Field preemption under the Locomotive Inspection Act is an affirmative defense that is waived if not pleaded, not a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. A plaintiff must prove exposure as a threshold matter and must produce evidence that the defendant's asbestos was a substantial factor in causing the disease.

Illinois

• Pelton v. John Crane, Inc. (2024). Under maritime law, a plaintiff may show substantial-factor causation through admissible general expert testimony plus circumstantial evidence of substantial exposure over a substantial period, without expert testimony specific to the defendant's product. The Second Restatement's consumer-expectations test still governs maritime strict liability, and punitive damages remain available as a remedy even though willful and wanton conduct is not a separate cause of action.
• McNamara v. Ico Polymers North America, Inc. (1st District, 2nd Division, 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when it arbitrarily requires a witness with documented hardships to testify in person when remote video testimony is permitted under Supreme Court Rule 241. A pre-suit evidence deposition is not admissible against defendants who had no notice and whose motive to cross-examine differed from that of those present.
• Johnson v. Orton (2021). Under Krik v. Exxon Mobil, an expert's 'cumulative exposure' causation opinion that ignores the amount and duration of exposure to each defendant's product is unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert. Experts may rely on facts established by other experts, and chain-of-custody gaps go to weight, not admissibility.
• Krumwiede v. Tremco, Inc. (4th District, 2020). Under Illinois's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show more than de minimis exposure to respirable asbestos fibers released from the defendant's product; proof of frequent contact with a product merely capable of releasing fibers is not enough.
• Daniels v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (1st District, 4th Division, 2019). A trial court may use the standard Illinois pattern proximate-cause instruction in an asbestos case, and need not give a 'substantial factor' instruction. A manufacturer that actually knew of the danger is not entitled to a 'state of the art' instruction, and settled defendants need not appear on the verdict form.
• McKinney v. Hobart Bros. Co. (4th District, 2018). A manufacturer owes no duty to warn of a hazard that was unknown to its industry when the product was made, and knowledge that raw asbestos was dangerous does not show knowledge that a product with encapsulated asbestos was dangerous. A plaintiff must also present evidence that exposure to the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the disease.
• Krik v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2017). A district court may exclude expert testimony that every asbestos exposure, whether framed as "each and every" or "cumulative" exposure, is a substantial contributing factor, because it is not tied to dose and shifts the burden of proof on causation. A new trial for improper juror-related contact requires a showing of prejudice.
• Startley v. Welco Mfg. Co. (1st District, 2nd Division, 2017). Under Illinois's frequency, regularity and proximity test, which is less rigid for mesothelioma, testimony that a worker used a defendant's joint compound on some jobs, backed by expert evidence that low exposures contribute to the disease, can let a jury find a substantial factor. The injury occurred in Illinois, so Illinois law presumptively applies.
• Bell v. Abb Group, Inc. (2015). An occupational medicine physician who is a B Reader was qualified to give diagnosis and causation opinions, and an expert's reliance on an "every exposure" theory does not make testimony inadmissible under Daubert and Rule 702, given Illinois's frequency, regularity and proximity standard and Seventh Circuit precedent.
• Bell v. Abb Group, Inc. (2015). An expert's reliance on an 'every exposure' theory does not make his testimony inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert, where Illinois law and Seventh Circuit precedent allow a jury to find that minor exposures can be a substantial factor, and the expert considered the plaintiff's occupational history.