Personal Jurisdiction in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on personal jurisdiction over a defendant: 271 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Minnesota

• Palmer v. Walker Jamar Company (2019). A Minnesota asbestos wrongful-death claim accrues when the disease manifests in a way causally linked to asbestos, or at death if earlier, without the plaintiff needing to identify the specific defendant. Podvin bars claims against a dissolved corporation brought more than two years after dissolution, and the 2007 amendment to section 302A.781 does not apply retroactively.
• McGill v. Conwed Corporation (2017). A corporation's principal place of business is where its officers direct and coordinate its activities, not where its outside litigation counsel sits. A foreign corporation whose Minnesota authority to do business was revoked is not deemed to consent to jurisdiction by having a registered agent, and the court lacked general or specific jurisdiction over it.
• James v. 3M Corporation (2008). Specific personal jurisdiction requires the defendant's forum contacts to be sufficiently connected to the plaintiff's claim; incidental airport travel, speculative use of Minnesota subcontractors and possible product purchases did not meet that standard, and a plaintiff's later move to the forum cannot create jurisdiction.

Missouri

• Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson (Eastern District, 2nd Division, 2020). Specific personal jurisdiction must be shown separately for each non-resident plaintiff's claim, and a parent corporation's jurisdictional contacts can be attributed to it from a subsidiary only through proven agency or alter ego. Expert testimony was admissible under section 490.065, and the evidence supported submitting causation and punitive damages to the jury.
• New Hampshire Insurance Company v. Pennington (2018). A federal court with diversity jurisdiction may decline, under its discretion in declaratory judgment actions, to hear an insurer's coverage action when a parallel state workers' compensation proceeding between the same parties can resolve the same coverage issue, and should stay rather than dismiss it.
• Accident Fund Insurance Company v. Casey (Western District, 2017). A preserved, real and substantial claim that applying a state statute violates the constitutional ban on retrospective laws is a challenge to the statute's validity, and the whole case must go to the Missouri Supreme Court, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
• MacCormack v. the Adel Wiggins Group (2017). Missouri's foreign corporation registration statute does not constitute consent to general personal jurisdiction, per State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, which is an intervening change in law justifying reconsideration; a global corporation with business in Missouri is not 'at home' there under Daimler.
• Hovsepian v. the Adel Wiggins Group (2016). Interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) requires a controlling question of law, substantial ground for difference of opinion, and a materially advanced termination of the litigation. Two in-circuit district court cases and a few out-of-circuit cases do not establish substantial ground for difference of opinion.
• Hagen v. Rapid American Corp. (Eastern District, 4th Division, 1990). A party is aggrieved and may appeal only if a judgment prejudices its rights directly and immediately. Plaintiffs who stipulated to severing a defendant, and who feared only a remote contingent future loss, were not aggrieved by a without-prejudice dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Montana

• Morey v. BNSF Railway Company (2023). After the federal officer defendant is dismissed, a district court has discretion to remand the remaining state claims, weighing the stage of the case, comity, federalism, judicial economy and fairness. Here remand was appropriate, and the complaint as pleaded did not show the amount in controversy needed for diversity jurisdiction.
• McDowell v. Burlington Northern Santa FE Railway Company (2017). A state is not a citizen for diversity purposes, so a properly joined, non-nominal state defendant defeats complete diversity. The court declined to adopt the 'fraudulent misjoinder' doctrine to sever the state and keep the remaining claims in federal court.

New Jersey

• Ltl Management LLC v. Emory (2024). A plaintiff alleging intentional torts must show that each defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum and expressly aimed its conduct there. Sending an article to a forum-based journal, prior expert work in the forum's courts, and knowing the plaintiff's home state did not meet that standard.
• In re Ltl Management, LLC (2022). A bankruptcy court may extend the automatic stay under § 362(a), or enjoin under § 105(a), state consumer-protection actions against nondebtors even where they fall within the § 362(b)(4) police-power exception, when unusual circumstances exist and the injunction factors are met.
• Klick v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2021). Jurisdictional discovery may be allowed when the existing record is inadequate to support personal jurisdiction and the factual allegations suggest the possible existence of the needed contacts with the forum state with reasonable particularity.
• Klick v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2021). A defendant's purchase of asbestos-containing parts from vendors in the forum state does not, without more, establish specific personal jurisdiction over tort claims arising from a plaintiff's exposure elsewhere, because but-for causation alone does not satisfy the relatedness requirement.
• Kirkwood v. Brenntag North America, Inc. (2020). A court may allow jurisdictional discovery where a plaintiff's allegations suggest with reasonable particularity that the defendant has contacts with the forum, including through successor theories. A § 1404(a) transfer requires that the transferee court could command jurisdiction over all defendants, and the movant bears the burden of showing this.
• Huff v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Company (2019). A court will not decide the constitutionality of product-line successor jurisdiction when the record on the defendant's corporate succession is too undeveloped to show that the question is actually presented.
• McClung v. 3M Company (2019). A plaintiff must show with sworn affidavits or other competent evidence, not conclusory pleadings or briefs, that the claims arise out of or relate to the defendant's own forum contacts. A defendant's purchases from a forum vendor, or the vendor's unilateral activity, do not establish specific jurisdiction. Arguments not raised before the magistrate judge are waived.
• Thomas-Fish v. Aetna Steel Products Corp. (2019). To impute a predecessor's jurisdictional contacts to an alleged successor, a plaintiff must plead facts supporting a plausible conclusion that the successor is a mere continuation of or the same as the predecessor, such as an asset acquisition or merger; unsupported assertions of successorship do not make a prima facie showing.
• Grimes v. AT&T Corp. (2018). When the federal defendant that supported removal under the federal officer removal statute drops out, the district court keeps discretion to decide whether to retain or remand the remaining state-law claims, and may decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) in favor of remand.
• Grimes v. AT&T Corp. (2017). A plaintiff facing a personal jurisdiction challenge should be allowed jurisdictional discovery unless the claim is clearly frivolous. Prior rulings against the defendants did not by themselves supply the facts needed to establish jurisdiction.
• McClung v. 3M Company (2017). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Rule 21, a court may sever claims against one defendant and transfer them when the balance of private and public interest factors favors transfer and the events giving rise to the claim did not occur in the forum.
• Lewis v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2012). Under the federal officer removal statute, one defendant that satisfies the Feidt factors can remove the entire case without the other defendants joining, and the court may keep the related state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.
• Fusco v. Asbestos Corporation (2011). A U.S. citizen domiciled abroad is stateless for diversity purposes and, even if also a foreign citizen, only her American citizenship counts, so neither diversity nor alienage jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
• Buttitta v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2010). In a mesothelioma case, the frequency, regularity and proximity test is applied in light of expert evidence that the disease can follow minimal and infrequent exposure, so brief but regular work near a defendant's asbestos product can support a jury finding of medical causation.
• Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. US Gypsum Co. (2001). A civil RICO claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of its injury, and a building owner who should have known of the potential asbestos hazard in its buildings more than four years before suing is time-barred. A prior state class settlement is given the preclusive effect it would have in the state that rendered it.

New York

• Beagan v. Akebono Brake Corp. (1st Dept., 2025). New York's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3) over defendants in this toxic tort case was consistent with due process, and interstate federalism concerns did not outweigh the other relevant considerations. Material issues of fact remained, so no preliminary trial on jurisdiction was required.
• McFarland v. Abb, Inc. (Erie, 2024). Successor liability rules do not confer personal jurisdiction over a successor, so jurisdiction cannot rest on a predecessor's New York acts. Where a prima facie showing of jurisdiction is not yet made but facts may exist, a plaintiff who makes a sufficient start is entitled to jurisdictional discovery under CPLR 3211(d).
• English v. Avon Prods., Inc. (1st Dept., 2022). A New York court has specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) over a nondomiciliary that maintained a New York office from which it marketed the product at issue, where the plaintiff used the product in New York, and exercising jurisdiction satisfies due process.
• Theophil v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2022). A summary judgment movant cannot meet its prima facie burden merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and may not cure that failure with new evidence in reply. Personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) was shown by O'Connor's New York business and use of New York real property connected to the alleged exposure.
• Fitzwater v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2021). A New York court lacks general jurisdiction over a corporation that is neither incorporated nor has its principal place of business in New York, and lacks specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) where the claims have no connection to the defendant's New York conduct.
• Nelson v. 3M Co. (2021). A New York court lacks general jurisdiction over a corporation not incorporated or headquartered in New York, and specific jurisdiction under the long-arm statute requires a substantial relationship between the defendant's New York activities and the plaintiff's claims, which plaintiffs did not show.
• Paroni EX rel. Estate OF Paroni v. General Electric UK Holdings Ltd. (2021). A New York federal court lacks specific jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) or due process where asbestos injuries from 1960s-80s California exposure do not arise from a 2015 corporate acquisition, and a parent's contacts are not imputed to a subsidiary absent alter-ego control. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a court may transfer rather than dismiss to cure lack of personal jurisdiction.
• Paroni v. General Electric UK Holdings Ltd. (2021). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a court may transfer a case in the interest of justice to cure a lack of personal jurisdiction, considering whether transfer alleviates a procedural obstacle, enables personal jurisdiction, would severely prejudice the defendant, and whether the case is clearly doomed.
• Unger v. AW Chesterton Co. (2021). On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the pleading is read liberally and the alleged facts taken as true. A connection between the alleged asbestos exposure from valves bearing the Watts name and Watts' New York business was enough to defeat dismissal, even though there was no general jurisdiction.
• Witte v. Algoma Hardwoods, Inc. (2021). A plaintiff who has made a sufficient start by identifying the defendant's product is entitled to jurisdictional discovery on how the product reached New York, where the defendant's affidavit denying New York contacts is conclusory.
• Castro v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2020). A district court need not review a magistrate judge's recommendation de novo when no party objects, and may adopt it.
• Castro v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2020). The magistrate judge recommended denying as moot all three pending motions (CVS Pharmacy's two motions to dismiss or transfer and the Castros' cross-motion for leave to amend) because the Castros had dismissed CVS without prejudice, leaving the scheduling order in place.
• English v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2020). A New York court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) over a foreign talc maker whose New York offices and marketing and product development work have a clear connection to the claims, even though the plaintiff bought and used the product outside New York.
• Luca v. The Neslemur Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A dissolved foreign corporation previously authorized to do business in New York may be served through the Secretary of State under BCL 306(b) for liabilities incurred in New York before dissolution, and a mistaken reliance on BCL 307 is disregarded. New York may exercise specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) where the claim arises from the defendant's New York business and product sales.
• Graul v. Tecumseh Prods. Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). New York courts lacked general jurisdiction over a corporation incorporated and headquartered in Michigan, and lacked specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) where the plaintiff's alleged exposure to its products occurred only in New Jersey, so there was no articulable nexus to the corporation's New York contacts.
• Montell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A New York court lacks general jurisdiction over a corporation not incorporated or headquartered in New York, and lacks specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) where the exposure occurred outside New York and there is no articulable nexus to the defendant's New York contacts; a supplier's New York headquarters and contracting with it are not a sufficient start for jurisdictional discovery.
• Conaway v. ABB (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A defendant that waits many months after the note of issue and long after discovery to seek forum non conveniens dismissal waives that relief, and the motion is untimely under the NYCAL 45-day rule for dispositive motions.
• English v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A motion to reargue must be made within 30 days of service of the order with notice of entry, and renewal requires a change in the law or new evidence with a reasonable justification for not presenting it earlier; a concurrent trial-court decision is not a change in law.
• Germain v. The Neslemur Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A dissolved foreign corporation that was previously authorized to do business in New York may be served through the Secretary of State under BCL § 306(b) for liabilities incurred in New York before dissolution, and service mistakenly made under the stricter BCL § 307 is not fatal. New York courts may exercise specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) where the claim arises from the defendant's New York business and in-state tortious conduct.
• Koenig v. Pneumo Abex (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). New York courts lacked general or specific personal jurisdiction over a non-New York defendant where the plaintiff's exposure and injury occurred in Massachusetts, and a New York office and contract negotiations alone did not make a sufficient start for jurisdictional discovery.
• Montell v. Viking Pump (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). New York courts lacked general jurisdiction over a corporation not incorporated or headquartered there, and lacked specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) where the plaintiff's alleged exposure occurred outside New York and had no articulable nexus to the defendant's New York contacts; a plaintiff who made no sufficient start was not entitled to jurisdictional discovery.
• Paroni EX rel. Estate OF Paroni v. Alstom SA (2020). A court may order jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff has identified a genuine issue of jurisdictional fact, and a defendant's unsworn statements in a legal brief are not enough to defeat that request or win dismissal.
• Nelson v. Holley Performance Prods. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). After Daimler, a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business, and specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) requires that the claims arise from the defendant's New York conduct or injury in New York.
• Rosen v. Genuine Parts Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A corporation is subject to general jurisdiction where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business, and specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) requires that the claim arise from the defendant's New York transactions, which cannot rest on unsupported assumptions.