Personal Jurisdiction in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on personal jurisdiction over a defendant: 271 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Kentucky

• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2022). A foreign manufacturer that sold products to an intermediary distributor, which resold them to another company that independently sold some into Kentucky, lacked minimum contacts and did not fall under Kentucky's long-arm statute, because the Kentucky sales rested on others' unilateral actions.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company (2020). Where the parties' evidence conflicts on whether a domestic subsidiary is the alter ego and agent of a foreign parent, the court may defer ruling on service of process and personal jurisdiction and allow limited jurisdictional discovery.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2020). Discovery is limited to claims and defenses actually pleaded, so a party may not take alter ego jurisdictional discovery on a theory it did not plead. Discovery on specific jurisdiction must be tied to the defendant's asbestos friction product sales and the relevant time period.

Louisiana

• Ehlers v. Ports America Gulfport, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2024). An insurer (here LIGA) claiming a policy exclusion bears the burden of proving the exclusion was in the policies at issue, and a standard form and circumstantial evidence did not meet that burden where no actual policy containing the exclusion was produced.
• Jacob v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (2024). A defendant's ability to remove under the federal officer removal statute does not depend on its acting under a federal officer at the time of removal. The 30-day removal clock starts only when a plaintiff's voluntary act makes removability unequivocally clear, so documents produced by co-defendants or merely showing Navy service did not start it.
• Lagrange v. Eagle, Inc. (2024). A federal court that had federal officer removal jurisdiction at the time of removal does not lose it when the federal defense later fails, and it may keep supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims where they raise no novel or complex state-law issues.
• Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls (2022). A federal court may keep supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal-officer defendants are dismissed, given the case's age, extensive discovery, absence of novel state-law issues, and judicial resources already spent. Diversity is judged when the action is filed, so adding a nondiverse party later does not defeat it.
• Hayes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2nd Circuit, 2021). A predecessor's minimum contacts with Louisiana can be imputed to a successor corporation for personal jurisdiction where the record shows only name changes between them and counsel conceded the two were the same entity apart from the name change. Plaintiffs need not prove transfer of liabilities through records that are unavailable.
• Legendre v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2021). A party seeking jurisdictional discovery must make a preliminary showing of factual allegations suggesting with reasonable particularity the possible existence of the requisite contacts; allegations of corporate successor status can meet that showing, since a predecessor's forum contacts may be imputed to its successor.
• Gomez v. Aardvark Contractors, Inc. (2020). Nicholls State is an arm of the State of Louisiana entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which Louisiana has not waived for suits in federal court, so claims against it must be dismissed.
• Hsieh v. Apache Deepwater, LLC (2020). A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to raise arguments that could have been made earlier. OCSLA jurisdiction was properly found based on the plaintiff's own sworn discovery responses and complaint, without a separate affidavit from the defendant on the work location.
• Jackson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2020). A subcontractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it shows a colorable federal defense, that it is a person, that it acted under a federal officer's directions, and that the charged conduct is connected or associated with those directions. At the removal stage the court may consider affidavits and deposition testimony from other cases without applying strict admissibility rules.
• Marsh v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2020). Accepting the petition's allegations as true, a plaintiff exposed to asbestos aboard ships in Louisiana waters and ports who alleges the defendant supplied asbestos products to those sites has shown prima facie personal jurisdiction and stated a plausible products liability claim under general maritime law (Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A).
• Bannister v. Sfb Companies, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2019). A nonresident successor corporation cannot be sued in Louisiana by imputing a predecessor's forum contacts unless the record shows the predecessor's liabilities were actually transferred to it; without that evidence, plaintiffs fail their initial burden of proving minimum contacts. A judgment denying an exception is not a final judgment that can be certified under La. C.C.P. art. 1915.
• Bondurant v. 3M Company (2019). Specific personal jurisdiction requires that the plaintiff's claim arise out of the defendant's forum contacts; a plaintiff whose own testimony points to exposure to the defendant's products only outside the forum fails to make a prima facie showing, and jurisdictional discovery is not required absent a preliminary showing.
• Bondurant v. 3M Company (2019). A corporation incorporated and headquartered elsewhere is not subject to general jurisdiction in Louisiana merely because it does business there. Registering to do business and appointing an agent for service does not amount to consent to jurisdiction, and specific jurisdiction requires a connection between the claim, the defendant and the forum.
• Gomez v. Aardvark Contractors, Inc. (2019). Nicholls State is an arm of the State of Louisiana, which has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, so cross-claims against it cannot proceed in federal court.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2019). A court need not accept as true conclusory jurisdictional assertions made on information and belief, but where plaintiffs make a preliminary showing that suggests the possible existence of forum contacts, the court may allow jurisdictional discovery before ruling.
• McMaster v. Union Carbide Corp. (4th Circuit, 2019). A nonresident corporate party in Louisiana litigation may be subpoenaed to appear at trial after a fundamental-fairness review under the Hayden factors. A generic corporate trial subpoena must identify the specific topics for testimony, but the deposition-only Johnson rule on repeat corporate depositions is not extended to trial.
• Brazan v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2018). A case not removable on its initial pleadings becomes removable only through a voluntary act of the plaintiff, and a nondiverse defendant whose claims are stayed by its bankruptcy has not been voluntarily dismissed, so its citizenship still counts for diversity.
• Leech v. 3M Company (2018). When a Rule 12(b)(2) motion raises factual questions about jurisdiction and the requested discovery could add significant facts, the court may allow jurisdictional discovery instead of dismissing at once.
• Schindler v. Dravo Basic Materials Company, Inc. (2018). Temporal limits used in general jurisdiction analysis do not apply to specific jurisdiction; a plaintiff's claim arising from the defendant's Louisiana activities at the time of exposure supports specific jurisdiction, and the defendant must then show that exercising jurisdiction is unreasonable.
• Bordelon v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2017). A court weighing post-removal joinder of a non-diverse defendant applies the Hensgens factors, and a removing party must show federal jurisdiction. Here, a declaration that did not establish where the husband worked was disregarded, and the state-law petitions raised no federal question.
• Coleman v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2017). In a diversity case, a complaint must allege citizenship as domicile for individuals and as state of incorporation and principal place of business for corporations; alleging that defendants are 'foreign corporations' is not enough.
• Leech v. 3M Co. (2017). The forum defendant rule and the rule of unanimity apply only to defendants "properly joined and served," so a non-forum defendant may remove on diversity grounds before any defendant, including a forum defendant, has been served.
• Leech v. 3M Company (2017). Under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b)(2) and 1446(b)(2), the forum defendant rule and rule of unanimity apply only to defendants "properly joined and served," so a non-forum defendant may remove before any defendant is served.
• Murphy v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. (2017). Where plaintiffs have not yet had access to information held by defendants, a court may deny motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, allow jurisdictional discovery, and order a more definite statement of the factual basis for the claims.
• Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Ltd. v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2017). Admiralty jurisdiction requires both a maritime location and a connection to maritime activity; a predominantly land-based stevedore's asbestos injuries are less likely to disrupt maritime commerce, so the connection test was not met.
• Williams v. Rust Engineering & Construction Co. (2016). A plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction; conclusory allegations need not be credited, and an uncontroverted affidavit showing no contacts with the forum defeats jurisdiction. The court will not grant a dispositive motion merely because it is unopposed.
• Genusa v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2014). A third-party claim against unions that depends on interpreting collective bargaining agreements is completely preempted by LMRA Section 301 and supports removal. Claims that are not within original or supplemental jurisdiction must be severed and remanded, and a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law tort claims.
• Landry v. Columbia Casualty Company (2014). A non-diverse defendant is fraudulently joined when the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action against it, and fraudulently joined defendants need not consent to removal. Letters from defense counsel can be an "other paper" that starts a new removal period, because the voluntary-act rule does not apply to fraudulent joinder.
• Whatley v. Eagle, Inc. (2014). Under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine, a federal court on removal under § 1442 acquires only the jurisdiction the state court had, and a tort claim against the United States or its agencies may be brought only in federal court, so the court lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the VAMC. When removal jurisdiction is doubtful, remand is appropriate.
• Phillips v. Abb Combustion Engineering, Inc. (2013). A Louisiana federal court lacks general jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants whose contacts with Louisiana are only occasional trips and one disaster-relief crew, and lacks specific jurisdiction where the plaintiffs' recruitment theory is contradicted by the record and no defendant directed activity toward Louisiana.
• Landry v. Eagle, Inc. (2012). A case with a nondiverse defendant becomes removable only when that defendant is effectively out of the case, such as through a settlement that is binding and enforceable under state law. The removing defendant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence, and any doubt is resolved in favor of remand.
• Bourque v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (3rd Circuit, 2009). When a longshoreman's alleged asbestos exposure occurred only aboard a vessel over navigable waters, the LHWCA is the exclusive remedy and state remedies are precluded, because the case falls outside the concurrent state-federal 'twilight zone'.
• Delancey v. Chicago Insurance Co. (2004). In a direct action against an insurer, the insurer is deemed a citizen of the insured's state under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), even if the insured's corporate charter was later revoked. Supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 cannot by itself support removal.
• Hebert v. Anco Insulation, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2002). A defense that a settlement extinguished the debt must be specifically pleaded, and Dow's post-verdict assertion of it was untimely. The majority held, however, that pre-1985 law (former art. 2203, requiring a reservation of rights) governs the effect of the settlements, so the trial court had to rule on whether plaintiffs reserved their rights. A later general appearance does not waive a pending declinatory exception, and the individual defendants' Louisiana contacts were too thin for personal jurisdiction.
• Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1999). A nonresident maker of a component part (cigarette filter material) that supplied all of its product to one end-product manufacturer, knowing and intending nationwide sale of the end product, purposefully availed itself of the forum, so jurisdiction there comports with due process; the court did not choose between the stream of commerce and stream of commerce plus theories.
• Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1st Circuit, 1998). Under the Asahi "stream of commerce plus" approach, a component-part manufacturer that only placed filter material into the stream of commerce, without conduct aimed at Louisiana, lacks the minimum contacts needed for personal jurisdiction there.

Maryland

• Curtin v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. (2020). A court lacking personal jurisdiction dismisses without prejudice, and under Rule 41(a)(2) a voluntary dismissal without prejudice should not be denied absent substantial prejudice to the defendant; loss of a statute of limitations defense does not by itself bar it.
• Pinner v. Pinner (2020). A North Carolina resident's filing and prosecution of one Maryland lawsuit through her lawyers was not purposeful availment and not a "persistent course of conduct" under Maryland's long arm statute. Maryland courts therefore could not exercise specific jurisdiction over her in a later suit that was only tenuously related to it and arose under North Carolina law.
• Pinner v. Pinner (2019). Filing and prosecuting one Maryland tort suit did not make it constitutionally reasonable to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a North Carolina resident on collateral claims. Under Maryland's strict privity rule, a non-client who is not an intended third-party beneficiary cannot sue a lawyer for malpractice, and lawyers acting within the scope of representation cannot be liable to non-clients for aiding and abetting a client's tort.
• Rhodes v. McIC, Inc. (2016). A defendant seeking federal officer removal need only make a plausible, colorable showing of the government contractor defense, which can apply to failure-to-warn claims, and that showing ordinarily satisfies the causal nexus requirement. The court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims, given the cross-claims and the need for economy and fairness.
• Barlow v. John Crane Houdaille, Inc. (2012). A removing defendant claiming fraudulent joinder must show no possibility of a claim against the in-state defendants; a plaintiff's stated belief about her main exposure source does not eliminate the possibility of other exposures, so joinder was not fraudulent.
• Csr, Limited v. Taylor (2009). Under the Due Process Clause, a foreign defendant must purposefully avail itself of the forum through significant activities there or continuing obligations to residents. Foreseeability that its products will arrive and cause injury, a customer's choice of port, and general trade advertising do not satisfy this.
• Taylor v. Csr Limited (2008). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a foreign company that packaged and shipped asbestos to the Port of Baltimore, expecting it to be unloaded by stevedores there, had purposeful minimum contacts with Maryland. Exercising jurisdiction over it was constitutionally reasonable and within the long-arm statute.
• Hollingsworth v. Connor (2000). A nonresident component maker that sold its product to another company outside the forum, and did not direct activity at the forum, lacks minimum contacts even if it knew the product would be sold there. For Maryland's noneconomic damages cap, a mesothelioma cause of action arises when the disease is contracted, not at the first cellular change.

Massachusetts

• Gillis v. Pbv Inc. (2023). Under a stream-of-commerce-plus theory, a component maker that sold finished gaskets to another manufacturer in its home state, with no role in directing them to Massachusetts, lacks the relatedness and purposeful availment needed for specific jurisdiction there.

Michigan

• King v. Ridenour (2010). A non-resident law firm that is referred a forum resident's case by other counsel and litigates it outside the forum has not purposefully availed itself of the forum. Its limited forum contacts do not support general or specific personal jurisdiction.

Minnesota

• Backe v. AW Kuettel & Sons, Inc. (2020). The court declined to adopt a temporal-relevance threshold test for personal jurisdiction and, applying the five-factor Hardrives minimum-contacts test, held that Minnesota may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a company that operated the Minnesota mill where the plaintiff was exposed, even though it left the state in 1985.