Personal Jurisdiction in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on personal jurisdiction over a defendant: 271 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New York

• English v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). New York courts lacked general jurisdiction over New Jersey-incorporated, New Jersey-headquartered defendants, and lacked specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), (2) or (3) because the talcum products were not bought in New York and the illness arose outside the state.
• Peralta v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). The original tortfeasor doctrine did not make Cyprus Amax Minerals Company answerable for the talc torts of its subsidiary Cyprus Mines, because a parent is not liable for a subsidiary's torts unless its control disregards the subsidiary's corporate independence, and plaintiffs showed no such control.
• Babcock v. Watts Water Technologies (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Plaintiffs need only make a non-frivolous showing of specific jurisdiction to defeat a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion, and a defendant's lack of documentation of pre-merger assets and liabilities left successor-liability jurisdiction a non-frivolous theory. Leave to amend to add a defendant is freely given absent surprise or prejudice.
• DeRozieres v. Munaco Sealing Solutions (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Collateral estoppel applied because personal jurisdiction over Munaco and its status as successor to the New York company had already been decided against it in a prior case, and the newly offered contract did not change that analysis.
• Dembski v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). General jurisdiction over a corporation requires that it be at home in New York (place of incorporation or principal place of business), and specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus between the defendant's New York conduct and the claims asserted.
• Godfrey v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant that preserved its personal jurisdiction defense in its answer is not subject to general jurisdiction in New York unless it is incorporated or has its principal place of business there, and specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) requires a nexus between the defendant's New York conduct and the claims, which plaintiffs did not show.
• Shea v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Doing business in a federal enclave within New York's boundaries, here the Brooklyn Navy Yard, counts as doing business in New York, and New York keeps jurisdiction over injuries sustained there. That supplied the nexus for specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) even though general jurisdiction was lacking.
• Gayoso v. Nissan North America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A personal jurisdiction defense is waived if the defendant does not assert it with specificity in its answer, and general denials do not preserve it. Where the parties' experts rely on conflicting studies, issues of fact on general and specific causation preclude summary judgment.
• Leavitt v. Rogers Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show facts from which exposure to the defendant's product may reasonably be inferred, and a defendant's conclusory sales-record affidavit does not meet its prima facie burden. Specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) exists where the defendant's sales of its product into New York have an articulable nexus to the plaintiff's claim.
• Czulada v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A New York court has general jurisdiction over a company that was, at the time of the exposure, a division of a corporation doing business in New York. Specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) requires an articulable nexus or substantial relationship between the defendant's New York business conduct and the claims asserted. A plaintiff opposing a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion need only make a sufficient start showing that jurisdiction is not frivolous.
• Olson v. Imerys Talc America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). New York courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) over out-of-state talc suppliers that sold talc shipped into New York for use in consumer talcum powder, because the claim has an articulable nexus to that business. General jurisdiction was lacking because the defendants are not incorporated or headquartered in New York.
• Leavitt v. AO Smith Water Prods., Co. (2019). Specific long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) exists where the defendant supplied asbestos-containing product to a New York facility where the plaintiff was allegedly exposed. A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and conflicting testimony raises credibility issues for trial.
• Rothlein v. Imerys Talc America (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). General jurisdiction over a corporation exists only where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. A corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless an exception applies (assumption, merger, mere continuation, or fraud).
• Miller v. AO Smith Water Prods. (2019). A corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business, absent exceptional circumstances, and specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) requires a connection between the claims and the defendant's New York contacts. A defendant preserves a personal jurisdiction objection by pleading it in its answer so as to fairly apprise the plaintiff.
• Aston v. Algoma Hardwoods, Inc. (2018). After Daimler, a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is at home (place of incorporation or principal place of business), and registration to do business in New York does not confer it. Specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) requires a connection between the defendant's New York conduct and the claims, which was absent where all exposure and injury occurred in New Jersey.
• Brewer v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2018). New York courts may exercise specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) over a non-domiciliary that continuously shipped asbestos-contaminated talc into New York for use in the product alleged to have caused the injury, since there is an articulable nexus between that business and the claim. A forum non conveniens movant bears a heavy burden, even against a non-resident plaintiff, and a substantial nexus to New York weighs against dismissal.
• Shulman v. Imerys Talc America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). New York courts may exercise specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) over a talc supplier whose predecessors sold talc to a New York company, where the plaintiff's claim of injury from the finished product has an articulable nexus to those sales.
• Hooper-Lynch v. Imerys Talc America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A non-domiciliary defendant that sold and shipped talc into New York on a continuous basis, which was used in a product sold to the plaintiff in New York, transacts business here with an articulable nexus to the claim, supporting specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) even though there is no general jurisdiction.
• Holleman v. Cosmetics Specialties (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(1), reaches a non-domiciliary that sold and shipped asbestos-contaminated talc into New York for a product used by the plaintiff, because there is an articulable nexus between that business and the claim. General jurisdiction was lacking because the defendant was not at home in New York.
• Johnson v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) or (a)(2) requires evidence that the defendant actually transacted business in New York or committed a tortious act there, and a plaintiff's inference that a sales employee visited the Brooklyn Navy Yard does not meet that requirement.
• Black v. Imerys Talc America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). New York courts may exercise specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) over a non-domiciliary talc supplier that sold and shipped asbestos-contaminated talc into New York for use in a product that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury. Dismissal for forum non conveniens is not warranted where there is a substantial nexus to New York and the movant does not meet its heavy burden.
• Crozier v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). New York courts lacked general jurisdiction over corporations not incorporated or headquartered in New York, and lacked specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) where the plaintiff's exposure and injury occurred entirely outside New York.
• Grabowski v. The Scotts Miracle-Gro Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). After Daimler, a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business absent exceptional circumstances, and a subsidiary's registration to do business in New York does not confer jurisdiction over the parent. Specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) was lacking because the exposure and injury occurred in New Jersey.
• Gibson v. Mack Trucks (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A personal jurisdiction defense not asserted in the first responsive pleading (answer or pre-answer motion) is waived under CPLR 3211(a)(8). Registering to do business in New York does not by itself confer general jurisdiction after Daimler.
• Chen v. Nissan North America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Under the NYCAL Case Management Order, a party objecting to a Special Master's recommendation must follow the CMO's notice and objection procedure. A plaintiff who identifies a defendant's product at deposition has made a sufficient start to obtain jurisdictional discovery.
• Chen v. Volkswagen Group of America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A New York court may exercise long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3) over out-of-state car makers where the plaintiff raises a fact issue that their asbestos-containing parts injured him in New York and due process is met. Defendants did not carry the heavy burden of showing the balance of factors strongly favored dismissal for forum non conveniens.
• Matter of Crozier v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2018). New York may exercise specific long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) over out-of-state talc suppliers that shipped allegedly asbestos-contaminated talc into New York for a powder maker, because the claim has an articulable nexus to that business. Dismissal for forum non conveniens requires the movant to meet a heavy burden, which was not met here.
• Theodore v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2018). Registering to do business in New York does not, after Daimler, amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction requires a substantial relationship between the defendant's New York activities and the plaintiff's claim.
• Cerutti v. Baruffaldi S.P.A. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Where a plaintiff specifically identifies a foreign defendant's products and the defendant's jurisdictional affidavit is conclusory, the plaintiff has made a sufficient start to obtain discovery on how the products reached New York, whether directly or through a distributor or agent, to support specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3).
• Trumbull v. American Biltrite (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2017). New York's long-arm statute (CPLR 302(a)(1)-(3)) did not reach an out-of-state manufacturer whose product exposure occurred wholly in Missouri and which had no current presence or substantial revenue in New York. A California mass-tort jurisdiction decision (Bristol-Myers) and Licci did not change that result.
• Barbarino v. BASF Catalysts, LLC (2016). Where a served defendant never responded or appeared and the plaintiff submitted the CPLR 3215 proof, a default judgment on liability is granted and damages are referred to a special referee. The court noted that Daimler did not affect long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302, the plaintiff's stated basis for jurisdiction.
• Finerty v. Abex Corp. (1st Dept., 2015). A parent company is not liable on a veil-piercing theory, but fact issues exist whether it may be directly liable for its role in standardizing and distributing a subsidiary's asbestos-containing parts. Personal jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) requires that it reasonably expected the out-of-state exposure to have consequences in New York.
• Hernandez-Vega v. Fisher Controls Int'l (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A defendant moving for summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and personal jurisdiction defenses not raised in a pre-answer motion or the answer are waived under CPLR 3211(e). A valve maker with a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos parts used with its valves may be liable even if the valve was "bare metal."
• Quinlan v. Marine Transport Lines (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2015). Equitable tolling applies only where the plaintiff timely filed in the wrong forum, the defendant actively misled the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was extraordinarily prevented from filing; the diligence standard applies to counsel as well, and plaintiffs showed neither active misleading nor extraordinary prevention.
• North v. Adam Opel AG. (Albany, 2015). Plaintiffs asserting long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302 must make a sufficient start showing that facts may exist supporting jurisdiction to obtain further discovery; speculative submissions that do not tie the defendant to New York do not meet that standard.
• Viera v. BASF Catalysts LLC (2015). A case may be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) if it could have been brought in the transferee district, meaning that court would have had personal jurisdiction and venue at filing, and the convenience and interest-of-justice factors favor transfer. Here, Florida jurisdiction over a distributor of the product was supported by its Florida sales, and the factors favored Florida.
• Langhorne v. Aerofin Corp. (2014). A personal jurisdiction defense not raised in the first responsive pleading or a pre-answer motion is waived. Prior sworn testimony from related federal litigation is admissible if the party had the same motive and opportunity to cross-examine, and circumstantial evidence can support an inference of exposure to a defendant's product.
• Finerty v. Abex Corp. (2013). A court may allow jurisdictional discovery under CPLR 3211(d) when the plaintiff makes a "sufficient start" and shows its position is not frivolous, including on a theory that a foreign subsidiary is a mere department of a New York-present parent.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (1st Dept., 2013). Compliance with the 60-day pre-suit notice of claim requirement in the Port Authority's suability statute is a mandatory jurisdictional condition that is strictly construed, with no substantial compliance exception, so a prematurely served complaint cannot confer jurisdiction.
• Walker v. Abb, Inc. (2013). Under CPLR 306-b, a court may extend the time to serve a defendant for good cause or in the interest of justice, weighing factors such as diligence, the limitations period, delay, promptness and prejudice. The NYCAL case management order's amendment provision does not cure defective service on a party already named.
• Tycz v. Asbeka Industries OF New York, Inc. (2012). A removing defendant claiming fraudulent joinder must show by clear and convincing evidence that there is no possibility of stating a claim against the non-diverse defendant. That burden is heavier than the summary judgment standard, and a plaintiff's failure to identify a defendant's product in discovery does not meet it.
• Andrucki v. Alcoa, Inc. (2011). A claim against the Port Authority requires a notice of claim served at least sixty days before suit and commencement within one year of accrual. Plaintiffs who served a valid notice and then added the Port Authority by supplemental summons and amended complaint within the year met these conditions, and the relation-back doctrine did not apply.
• Bernard v. Brookfield Props. Corp. (2011). A person whose asbestos disease had not appeared when a debtor's reorganization plan was confirmed did not lose her claims, because due process outweighs the plan's discharge language. A corporation that acquires another's assets can be liable as successor-in-interest only on certain grounds, and the defendants did not show these were absent.
• Vasura v. Acands (2000). Removal jurisdiction is judged as of the time of removal, so later dismissal of a non-diverse defendant does not validate an improper diversity removal. A defendant's foreign-state status under the FSIA did not apply where its government ownership (1980-1989) did not overlap with the 1969 exposure or the 1999 filing.
• Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc. (1999). A defendant that preserves a personal jurisdiction defense in its answer can still forfeit it by participating in extensive pretrial proceedings and forgoing clear opportunities to move to dismiss; forfeiture is governed by federal procedural law.
• Hamilton v. Garlock, Inc. (1998). After trial, a plaintiff must prove personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Under New York law, the situs of injury for CPLR 302(a)(3) is where the asbestos exposure occurred, not where the plaintiff lives or suffers later damages.
• Penny v. United Fruit Co. (1994). New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), requires that the defendant expect or reasonably expect its act to have consequences in New York. British shipowners could not foresee a British crewman later moving to New York and developing mesothelioma there. A parent is liable as employer under the Jones Act only if the subsidiary is its mere instrumentality, which requires actual domination.
• Barnett v. City of Yonkers (1990). Under New York law a school board is liable like a private landowner only if it had actual or constructive notice of the hazard, an owner out of possession without control is not liable, and an architect is liable only for professional negligence judged by the standards of the time his services ended.
• In re Johns-Manville Corp. (1989). A bankruptcy court retains post-confirmation jurisdiction to enforce a confirmed plan's channeling injunction and claims resolution procedures, and may enjoin asbestos suits filed in other courts against the debtors or the trust without meeting the strict Rule 65 standard.
• Kaufman v. City of New York (1989). A city asbestos abatement law that applies only when owners choose to alter or demolish buildings is a rational exercise of police power and does not violate substantive or procedural due process or effect a taking, even though the City earlier approved asbestos fireproofing.