Personal Jurisdiction in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on personal jurisdiction over a defendant: 271 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

North Carolina

• In re Aldrich Pump LLC (2023). Financial distress is not a constitutional or jurisdictional prerequisite to filing Chapter 11. Under the Fourth Circuit's Carolin test, a bad faith dismissal requires both objective futility and subjective bad faith, and objective futility was not shown. Section 1112(b) cause also was not shown.
• In re Bestwall LLC (2023). A bankruptcy court has "related to" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) to enjoin thousands of identical asbestos claims against a non-debtor affiliate when they could conceivably affect the debtor's estate. A § 105(a) preliminary injunction in chapter 11 requires only a realistic possibility of successful reorganization, not a showing that a permanent § 524(g) injunction will issue.
• Bell v. American International Industries (2020). A non-resident seller that sold a product in the forum for years and then contracted to indemnify the buyer for liabilities from those sales has purposefully availed itself of the forum. A parallel Delaware declaratory action did not justify abstention or a stay under Colorado River or Landis.
• Brock v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). On a pretrial motion decided without a hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction. Alleged direct sales of asbestos-containing products into the forum that injured a forum resident satisfy that showing, even where the defendant's affidavit disputes the sales.
• Finch v. Covil Corporation (2020). A non-party insurer that knew of its insured's receivership for decades but did not examine public court records cannot timely intervene or obtain Rule 60(b)(2) relief after judgment. A Rule 60(b)(4) motion based on a claimed statute-of-repose jurisdictional bar fails where there was at least an arguable basis for diversity jurisdiction.
• Zurich American Insurance Company v. Covil Corporation (2020). Under South Carolina law (Crossmann), a loss from progressive injury spanning several policy periods is allocated pro rata by each insurer's time on the risk, with the insured bearing uninsured years. A federal court should not decide hypothetical coverage questions and declines declaratory jurisdiction where they are not tied to a concrete claim.
• Lineberger v. CBS Corporation (2017). When a court decides a Rule 12(b)(2) motion on the pleadings without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, with the complaint's allegations read in the plaintiff's favor. The defendant's affidavit is not considered at that stage.
• Young v. American Talc Company (2017). A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the defendant itself purposefully directed activities at the forum state; minimal, isolated contacts, a passive website, foreseeability that products might reach the state, and a parent company's contacts do not suffice.
• Branson v. American International Industries (2016). A court may defer a belated personal jurisdiction challenge until trial under Rule 12(i) when the defendants answered late and participated in discovery planning, and the jurisdictional facts need further development and overlap with the merits. Under Rule 12(c), the complaint's allegations were enough to prevent dismissal.
• Richardson v. Pcs Phosphate Company, Inc. (2016). A Medicare beneficiary may bring a private action under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act in federal court, and the beneficiary may sue as a third-party beneficiary under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-98 for a workers' compensation payer's failure to promptly pay. Unjust enrichment is unavailable where the claim rests on an express contract.
• Young v. 3M Company (2016). Where personal jurisdiction is disputed and the plaintiff's claim is not clearly frivolous or merely attenuated and based on bare allegations against specific denials, a court should ordinarily permit limited jurisdictional discovery.
• Young v. Agco Corporation (2014). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, with allegations and factual disputes construed in the plaintiff's favor. Allegations that the defendant placed asbestos products into the stream of commerce so they were used at the decedent's North Carolina job sites met that showing.
• Kingston v. Lyon Construction, Inc. (2010). A superior court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-10.2(j) to determine a workers' compensation lien once a final, enforceable settlement with some third parties exists, even if claims against other third parties remain. The court has discretion to reduce the lien after considering the statutory factors.

Ohio

• Parker Hannifin Corp. v. Standard Motor Products, Inc. (2019). A 1986 asset-purchase agreement's broad assumption-of-liabilities and indemnity clauses unambiguously cover punitive damages in qualifying asbestos claims, and are not void as against Ohio public policy because they allocate responsibility for past conduct only. The duty to indemnify is not ripe until the underlying appeal ends.
• Case v. Clark Indus. Insulation (8th Appellate District, 2018). Under Ohio Civ.R. 12(H)(1) and Gliozzo, a personal jurisdiction defense is waived only by omitting it from a responsive pleading or certain pre-pleading motions, not by active participation in the case. A notice of appearance under the Cuyahoga asbestos docket rules preserved all affirmative defenses.
• Bartel EX rel. Estate, Rich v. AC Prod. Liab. Tr. (2006). Asbestos exposure on navigable waters falls under admiralty jurisdiction and federal maritime law, but land-based exposure at a refinery fails the locality and maritime-connection tests and is governed by state law. A joined admiralty claim and non-admiralty claim may be tried to one jury.

Oklahoma

• Galier v. Murco Wall Products, Inc. (2022). A nonresident manufacturer that deliberately sold a product into the forum may be sued there on a claim that arises out of or relates to those sales, and the plaintiff need not trace the specific product that injured him to a documented sale into the forum.
• Bootenhoff v. Hormel Foods Corporation (2012). General personal jurisdiction cannot rest on a defendant's placing products in the national stream of commerce, and national advertising and a passive website without more do not show continuous and systematic contacts with the forum.

Oregon

• Levin v. Johnson & Johnson (2019). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b), a court may remand removed claims on any equitable ground, and it can do so without deciding whether the claims are "related to" a bankruptcy case. Here the factors (state-law predominance, non-core claims, jury demand, comity, avoiding split proceedings) favored remand.

Other federal courts

• Susino EX rel. Estate OF Decedent Susino v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2023). A remand motion is not a prohibited continuation of an action under the bankruptcy automatic stay. Maritime claims brought under the saving to suitors clause are removable only with an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, and a new ground for removal raised after the 30-day removal period is untimely.
• Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. US (2015). The Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to a general liability insurer suing as equitable subrogee of a prime contractor, because the insurer never stepped into the contractor's shoes in contract performance.
• Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co. (1994). Personal jurisdiction requires that the defendant have created a substantial connection to the forum state through action purposefully directed toward it, and merely placing a product in the stream of commerce with knowledge it will be sold in the forum is not enough. The exercise of jurisdiction must also comport with fair play and substantial justice.
• In re Joint E. & SO. Dist. Asbestos Lit. (1993). A complaint that asks only for a court-assisted class settlement and states no substantive claim of right against the defendants presents no Article III case or controversy, and a request for a declaratory judgment does not supply one. A debtor may not use a mandatory limited-fund class action to evade the Bankruptcy Code.
• In re Joint E. & So. Dist. Asbestos Litigation (1992). A mandatory non-opt-out Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class settlement that readjusts creditors' rights against an insolvent entity requires proper subclasses, and co-defendant manufacturers cannot be in the same class as health claimants. Bankruptcy jurisdiction cannot be used to modify a confirmed and substantially consummated plan in violation of section 1127(b).
• Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. US (1988). The LHWCA's express exclusion of federal employees (§ 903(b)) means § 905(b) gives no right of action against the United States for its own employees, so a third-party contribution claim under the FTCA fails. Asbestos injuries to shipyard workers also lack the significant relationship to traditional maritime activity needed for admiralty jurisdiction.
• Johns-Manville Corp. v. US (1988). Because a related claim was pending in another court, 28 U.S.C. § 1500 deprived the Claims Court of jurisdiction, so its merits decision was void and had to be vacated.
• Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, A Div. of Litton (1984). A declaratory judgment suit needs an independent basis of federal jurisdiction; realigning parties by their true interests defeated diversity, a federal defense under the LHWCA cannot support federal question jurisdiction, and admiralty jurisdiction requires a maritime situs and a relationship to traditional maritime activity, which the pleadings did not show.

Pennsylvania

• Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2), a pleading asserting a new claim against a party in default for failing to appear must be served under Rule 4, so a default judgment entered without such service is void.
• Gorton v. Gardner Denver, Inc. (2022). A plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal filed under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) before the defendant serves an answer or summary judgment motion automatically dismisses the claims without prejudice. No court order or signed stipulation is needed, and the court then lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.
• Data v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a worker whose occupational disease first appears more than 300 weeks after his last exposure may bring common law claims against his employer, and a foreign corporation registered in Pennsylvania when the asbestos cause of action accrued (at injury) consents to general jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5301.
• Traser v. Sea Land Services (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2020). A dismissal order ends all proceedings and the district court relinquishes jurisdiction, so later orders in that case are void even if the court and parties mistakenly kept litigating; counsel's failure to notice the dismissal and timely appeal or seek relief does not make the order a nullity.
• Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). A foreign corporation registered to do business in Pennsylvania consented to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts under 42 Pa. C.S. § 5301, and Daimler does not change that. A complaint with only conclusory allegations, or that does not say which corporate entity owned or made the product, fails the Rule 8 and 12(b)(6) pleading standard.
• Youse & Youse v. Johnson & Johnson (2019). Complete diversity exists where the party challenging it offers no evidence that a corporate defendant is a citizen of the forum state. Under Bane, registration to do business in Pennsylvania is sufficient for general personal jurisdiction, absent Third Circuit or Supreme Court direction to the contrary after Daimler.
• Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2018). A foreign corporation registered in Pennsylvania consents to general personal jurisdiction under 42 Pa. C.S. § 5301 for acts or omissions occurring while it was registered after that statute took effect, and Bane remained good law after Daimler. A federal court applies Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards to a removed case, and conclusory asbestos allegations fail them.
• George v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). Even assuming consent-by-registration survives Daimler, Pennsylvania's registration statute limits general jurisdiction to acts occurring during the period of registration, so a registration that began after the alleged injury does not support jurisdiction.
• Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. (1994). A federal court that has approved a class settlement may, under the All-Writs Act and the Anti-Injunction Act, enjoin non-opted-out class members from pursuing the settled claims in other courts where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, after weighing the four preliminary injunction factors.

Rhode Island

• Freitas v. AO Smith Water Products Corporation (2024). A plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant purposefully directed conduct at the forum state; knowing that a product is sold nationwide through the stream of commerce, without more, does not make out a prima facie case of specific personal jurisdiction.
• Belac v. 3M Company (2018). A court need not allow a renewed summary judgment motion that repeats arguments already decided twice without an expanded record (law-of-the-case). Under Rule 41(a)(2), a court weighs the circumstances, and voluntary dismissal without prejudice may be granted where the plaintiff was diligent and had a sufficient explanation.
• Murray v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2016). A foreign corporation incorporated and headquartered elsewhere is not subject to general jurisdiction in Rhode Island absent being 'at home' there, and a defendant that took part in limited early discovery and then timely moved to dismiss has not forfeited its personal jurisdiction defense.
• Cary v. American Optical Corporation (2013). Selling products to distributors who resell them in the forum does not alone show purposeful contacts; the defendant must have sought to serve the forum's market. Jurisdictional discovery is proper when the relevant facts are in the defendant's exclusive control and denial would prejudice the plaintiff.
• Santos v. AC McLOON Oil Co. (2013). A Rhode Island court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state buyers who voluntarily bought boats from a Rhode Island builder, and allegations that they specified asbestos products in those boats are enough at the pleading stage for negligence, failure to warn, strict liability, implied merchantability and wrongful death claims, though not for express or fitness warranty claims lacking reliance or particular-purpose allegations.
• Cera v. AW Chesterton Company (2012). An employee who has not preserved his common-law rights under the waiver-of-rights provision is barred by the exclusivity provision from suing his employer in tort where workers' compensation benefits are appropriate. The 'casual employee' exception applies only if the employment is both casual and outside the employer's trade or business.

South Carolina

• Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2007). Under the Door Closing Statute, a nonresident plaintiff must show the foreign corporation's asbestos exposure of the victim occurred in South Carolina, and exposure is actionable only if it meets the "frequency, regularity, and proximity" test; mere presence near static asbestos is not exposure.
• Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (2003). For a latent disease tort claim by a nonresident against a foreign corporation, the Door Closing Statute is satisfied if the corporation's activities that allegedly exposed the victim to the harmful substance, and the exposure itself, occurred in South Carolina, even if injury appeared after the plaintiff left the state.
• Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (2001). Under South Carolina's Door Closing Statute, a cause of action 'arises' where the act or omission giving rise to the claim originated (here, the asbestos exposure), even though it does not 'accrue' until diagnosis elsewhere. An order dismissing some but not all defendants under Rule 12 is directly appealable.

Tennessee

• Cashio v. 3M Company (2015). A transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) does not require the transferring court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendants or to decide whether they are subject to jurisdiction in the transferee district. The court may transfer to a district where the action could have been brought to avoid an obstacle to adjudication on the merits.
• Cashio v. 3M Company (2015). A district court has broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer a case in the interest of justice, and may do so whether or not venue is proper in the transferring court.

Texas

• Wisener v. Revlon Consumer Products Corp. (2022). A removing defendant must affirmatively establish the citizenship of every defendant, including each member of an LLC, and can show improper joinder of in-state defendants only if the plaintiff has no reasonable basis for a claim against them; alleging actual knowledge of the defect with supporting facts suffices under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 82.003(a)(6).
• Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company v. Adkins (1st District, 2020). A defendant waives its special appearance by filing an answer in a Texas court before challenging personal jurisdiction, and a transfer to the MDL court does not create a new proceeding for that rule. Claimants whose pre-2003 asbestos case was transferred under section 90.010(b) for failing to serve a section 90.003 medical report must serve a compliant report to obtain remand.
• Bradshaw v. Johnson & Johnson (2019). Federal 'related-to' bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) requires that the outcome could conceivably affect the bankruptcy estate; the removing party did not show this through contractual indemnity, shared insurance, or unity of identity.