Venue, Removal and Transfer in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on venue: 496 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

California

• Slaughter v. Union Carbide Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2007). A suitable alternative forum for forum non conveniens is one where all named defendants can be sued, so an action may be dismissed only if all defendants are shown to be subject to jurisdiction there. Otherwise it may only be stayed, and if the alternative forum's limitations period has run, the stay must be conditioned on defendants waiving that defense.
• Hopkins v. Plant Insulation Company (2006). State courts keep concurrent jurisdiction over bankruptcy trustee fraudulent-transfer claims under 11 U.S.C. section 544(b), and a bankruptcy-related claim removed under section 1441 as well as section 1452 can still be remanded on equitable grounds under section 1452(b).
• Hansen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 1996). A forum non conveniens stay does not require the moving defendant to show that every one of many defendants is subject to jurisdiction in the alternative forum. A stay lets the plaintiffs test that in the alternative forum and return if it fails, and a plaintiff's choice of forum can be overcome when private and public interests strongly favor the other state.

Colorado

• Mestas v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court predicted that Colorado courts would not reject a take-home asbestos exposure claim simply because the plaintiff lacked direct contact with the defendants' products. Foreseeability, public policy and the alleged exposure to fibers from those products supported a duty of reasonable care.
• Wallic v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (1999). Fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) turn on whether the removal was proper, not whether it was merely colorable, and bad faith is not required. A notice of removal filed after six days of trial, falsely claiming abandonment of claims against a non-diverse defendant, violated Rule 11.

Connecticut

• Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2016). A corporation is not subject to general jurisdiction merely because it has substantial but small-share contacts with a state; absent incorporation or principal place of business, it is rarely 'essentially at home' there. Connecticut's registration and agent-appointment statutes, being unclear, were not construed as consent to general jurisdiction.
• Kotecki v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2009). A defendant may remove under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), by showing it acted under a federal officer, that its acts were causally tied to the government's directions, and that it has a colorable federal defense. The defense need not be proven on the merits at the removal stage.
• Murphy v. General Electric Company (2009). A defendant can remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) if it acted under a federal officer, its acts were causally connected to the claims, and it raises a colorable federal defense. A colorable military contractor defense is enough, and the defendants need not prove it on the merits.
• Carroll v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2008). A defendant may remove under the federal officer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), if it is a person acting under a federal officer, acted under color of federal office, and raises a colorable federal defense. Federal officer jurisdiction rests on the defendants' defenses, so plaintiffs cannot disclaim it in their complaint.
• Pantalone v. Aurora Pump Co. (2008). Federal-officer removal under § 1442(a)(1) requires only adequately supported assertions of acting under a federal officer, causation and a colorable federal defense. Removal is still subject to the 30-day limit of § 1446(b), and the defendant bears the burden of showing it could not have ascertained removability earlier.
• Contois v. Able Industries Inc. (2007). A defendant may remove under the federal officer statute when it shows it acted under federal direction, with a causal link to the claim, and has a colorable military contractor defense. The 30-day removal period runs from when the defendant can intelligently ascertain removability from a pleading or other paper.
• Machnik v. Buffalo Pumps Inc. (2007). A government contractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it shows a colorable federal defense, that it acted under a federal officer, and a causal nexus to the claims. It need not fully prove the defense on the merits at that stage.

Delaware

• Salvemini v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and vague testimony that cannot separate that defendant's product from others fails. General maritime law did not reach a spouse's land-based take-home exposure when the plaintiffs did not show the maritime connection test was met.
• In re Bestwall LLC (2021). A motion to quash a subpoena must be decided in the district of compliance, and transfer under Rule 45(f) requires exceptional circumstances that outweigh the nonparty's interest in local resolution. Subpoenas for confidential trust claimant data must be consistent with the protections in the earlier Delaware Bankruptcy Court access decision.
• In re Imerys Talc America, Inc. (2019). A non-debtor seeking wholesale provisional transfer of thousands of personal injury cases under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) must show grounds for immediate, ex parte relief, such as irreparable harm and no fault in creating the emergency. J&J did not make that showing, and the cases it cited did not support routine provisional transfer for a non-debtor.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show asbestos exposure from the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing injury, and about five brake jobs over seventeen years was de minimis exposure that did not meet that standard. A manufacturer generally has no duty to warn of dangers of another manufacturer's product, and Washington does not allow punitive damages unless the legislature authorizes them.
• Denbow v. CBS Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply.
• Evans v. Foster Wheeler Energy, Corporation (2016). Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only identify facts that, viewed in its favor, would establish a colorable government contractor defense, not prove the defense by a preponderance; the statute is broadly construed.
• Genuine Parts Company v. Cepec (2016). Delaware's foreign-corporation registration statutes (8 Del. C. §§ 371 and 376) provide a means of serving process and do not constitute consent to general jurisdiction; after Daimler, jurisdiction over a registered foreign corporation must satisfy due process.
• Wines v. Abb, Inc. (2016). A defendant removing under the federal officer removal statute must show it acted under direct federal orders or detailed regulations and that its challenged conduct is causally linked to that federal direction. Evidence that the Navy did not approve the asbestos-containing products at issue defeats removal.
• Dougherty v. AO Smith Corporation (2014). A complaint's jurisdictional disclaimer does not defeat federal officer removal, but a post-removal express disclaimer of the claims supporting removal can be given effect, and the court then must decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims absent affirmative justification, favoring remand.
• In re Geier (2012). When no other action is pending, Delaware's Cryo-Maid standard applies even if the plaintiff previously filed and dismissed suits elsewhere, so defendants must show overwhelming hardship to obtain dismissal for forum non conveniens.
• Martinez v. EI DuPont De Nemours and Co. (2012). A parent corporation cannot be sued for its subsidiary's workplace conduct without specific pleaded facts of its own tortious acts. An absent foreign subsidiary that employed the worker and owned the plant is an indispensable party under Rule 19. Delaware forum non conveniens dismissal was warranted where the defendant was wrongly named in place of the foreign employer.
• In re Asbestos Litigation v. Adel Wiggins Group (2009). A defendant removing under the federal officer statute must show a causal connection between the federal direction it acted under and the claim; for a failure-to-warn claim, it must show the government directed or restricted warnings, which the affidavits did not do, so no colorable government contractor defense existed.
• Kirks v. General Electric Company (2009). A contractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute, construed broadly, when affidavits show the Navy controlled the warnings on its equipment, so that the failure-to-warn claims arise from acting under a federal office. The contractor must also raise a colorable federal contractor defense.
• Hopkins v. Plant Insulation Co. (2006). A district court sitting in the bankruptcy case may abstain under the discretionary abstention provision rather than transfer a related personal injury and wrongful death action under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). Here the debtor's opposition and the lack of precedent for using § 157(b)(5) against a debtor/plaintiff's chosen forum supported abstention.
• Arnold v. Garlock, Inc. (2001). A non-debtor co-defendant that has no valid contribution claim against a bankrupt co-defendant cannot rely on bankruptcy 'related to' jurisdiction to transfer personal injury and wrongful death cases under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). Nor can it obtain a discretionary stay pending appeal, because it was unlikely to succeed on the merits and a stay would harm the plaintiffs.

Florida

• Gallo v. Carnival Corporation (2023). With the plaintiffs' disclaimer of recovery for exposures during years covered by arbitration agreements, those agreements do not "relate to" the claims for Convention-based removal. The removing party bears the burden of showing jurisdiction, and Carnival did not give enough information to interpret the arbitration agreement's reach under the governing contract law.
• In re Eight Adversary Proceedings (2019). A court receiving a removed case decides remand before any motion to transfer venue to the home bankruptcy court. Even assuming "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, it may remand on any equitable ground under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b), and the relevant factors here favored remand.
• Waite v. Aii Acquisition Corp. (2018). In the Eleventh Circuit, specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant's forum contacts be a but-for cause of the claimed tort, and a corporation is not at home in a state, or deemed to consent to general jurisdiction, merely by substantial business there or by registering and appointing a service agent under Florida law.
• Batchelor v. American Optical Corp. (2016). A defendant has no colorable federal defense supporting federal officer removal when the plaintiff has expressly disclaimed all claims based on asbestos exposure during military service, because the defense would address claims that do not exist.
• Dugas v. 3M Company (2015). Florida's heightened asbestos pleading requirement (Fla. Stat. 774.205) conflicts with Federal Rule 8 and does not apply in federal court. Fraudulent concealment claims must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b), and lumping defendants together fails that standard.
• Taylor v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC (2015). A settlement with non-diverse defendants does not support removal on diversity grounds until those defendants are formally dismissed, and uncertainties about removal jurisdiction are resolved in favor of remand.
• Marley v. Elliot Turbomachinery Co., Inc. (2008). For federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), a defendant need only advance a colorable federal contractor defense and show a causal nexus to its official duties, without proving the defense on the merits. General affidavits from Navy admirals suffice at the removal stage.

Georgia

• Thurmon v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2014). Predicting how the Georgia Supreme Court would rule, the court held that Georgia recognizes the bare metal defense, so a valve manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in replacement gaskets and packing it did not manufacture, supply or design, and plaintiffs must show exposure to the defendant's own product.

Illinois

• Hicks v. Ford Motor Company (2020). A non-diverse defendant dismissed by involuntary summary judgment may be treated as fraudulently joined when procedural rules (waiver, and Illinois limits on reconsideration with late evidence) leave no reasonable possibility of reinstating the claim; the common-defense exception does not apply where the reason is specific to that defendant.
• Longobardi v. Honeywell International Inc. (2020). A removal is invalid unless all properly joined and served defendants join in or consent to it, and a defendant that has settled but not been formally dismissed still remains a defendant for that purpose.
• Johnson v. Edward Orton JR. Ceramic Foundation (2019). A trust's citizenship for diversity purposes is that of its trustees, and a removing defendant may, after the 30-day removal period, cure a technical defect in its jurisdictional allegations (such as mislabeling a trust as a foundation) without asserting a new jurisdictional ground.
• Ayotte v. Boeing Co. (2018). The 30-day clock for federal officer removal starts only when the defendant receives a paper that affirmatively and unambiguously shows the grounds for removal; in asbestos cases that means notice of the specific military products at issue.
• Betzner v. Boeing Co. (2018). A notice of removal under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), need only contain a short and plain statement meeting Rule 8(a) pleading standards and need not include evidentiary submissions; plausible allegations of a colorable federal defense suffice.
• Campbell v. Acme Insulations, Inc. (1st District, 6th Division, 2018). A nonresident corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only where it is "at home," and specific jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum and the plaintiff's specific claims, which the plaintiff must support with competent evidence; registered-agent status and unrelated Illinois business do not amount to consent, and the court declined to adopt "jurisdiction by necessity."
• John Crane, Inc. v. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, Apc (2017). A court in the forum state lacks specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state lawyers when the alleged fraud was centered on litigation in other states and the only Illinois contacts were discovery responses and communications sent to the plaintiff there. Under the general venue statute, a plaintiff's receipt of such papers and its economic harm in the district do not make venue proper.
• Perez v. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. (2016). A defendant does not waive removal by filing a state-court motion to dismiss shortly before removing, and under Ruppel a federal officer removal defendant need only show a colorable government contractor defense, which affidavits from Navy and medical experts can support.
• Speedy v. 3M Company (2015). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the 30-day removal clock starts when the defendant receives a pleading or other paper that affirmatively and unambiguously shows the case is removable; here the plaintiffs' interrogatory answers did so, and a later deposition did not restart the clock.
• Burns v. All Acquisitions, LLC (2014). Where the only basis for federal jurisdiction was federal officer removal and the federal grounds have dropped out, the court normally relinquishes jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, considering limitations, federal resources spent, and whether the outcome is obvious.
• Hasenberg v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2014). A defendant meets the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), by showing it is a person acting under a federal officer, sued for acts under color of office, with a colorable federal defense. A plausible government contractor defense is enough, and its validity need not be resolved to decide removal.
• Horrie v. AW Chesterton Company (2014). A defendant removing on the government contractor defense in a failure-to-warn case must show with specifics, such as contracts or Navy warning requirements, that the government controlled the warnings and that this conflicted with state law. Crane's general affidavits did not do so.
• Mohler v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). A defendant invoking federal officer removal need only show a plausible, colorable federal defense, such as the government contractor defense, and a defense that applies to one claim makes the whole case removable.
• Smith v. AW Chesterton Company (2014). A private defendant may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it acted under a federal officer, raises a colorable federal defense such as the government contractor defense, and shows a causal nexus. Affidavits that Navy specifications required asbestos-containing materials can satisfy this without a contract with the government.
• Totten v. Crane Co. (2014). A defendant sued over asbestos in products made for the Navy may remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) if it is a person, acted at a federal officer's direction, has a causal link to the claims, and raises a plausible government contractor defense; it need not prove that defense at the removal stage. Attaching the wrong complaint to the notice of removal is a minor irregularity that does not defeat jurisdiction.