Venue, Removal and Transfer in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on venue: 496 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Illinois

• Adams v. Armstrong International, Inc (2012). A defendant removing under the federal officer statute must show the federal government prevented it from complying with its state-law duty to warn; without that showing, the government contractor defense does not support federal jurisdiction and the case is remanded.
• Fennell v. Illinois Central Railroad Company (5th District, 2012). A defendant seeking forum non conveniens dismissal must show the plaintiff's chosen forum is inconvenient to the defendant and that another forum is more convenient to all parties; where the private and public interest factors do not strongly favor the alternative forum, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.
• Ruppel v. AO Smith Corporation (2012). A removing defendant under the federal officer statute must show that a federal officer directed the acts at issue and that it has a colorable federal defense; extensive government supervision alone is not enough, and doubts are resolved in favor of remand.
• Glein v. Boeing Company (2011). A defendant removing under the federal officer statute must show it acted under a federal officer's direction and has a colorable federal defense, which includes evidence that the Navy prevented it from complying with state-law duties to warn. Doubts are resolved in favor of remand.
• Sublett v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2011). A removing defendant must show the Navy prevented it from complying with state-law warning duties to establish federal officer jurisdiction and the government contractor defense. Federal officer removal is read narrowly where only a private company's liability is at issue, and doubts are resolved in favor of remand.
• Vickroy v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2011). A removing defendant under the federal officer statute must show it acted under a federal officer's direction and has a colorable federal defense. For a failure-to-warn claim, it must show the Navy prevented it from complying with state-law warning duties, and doubts are resolved in favor of remand.
• Glein v. Boeing Company (2010). A defendant removing under the federal officer statute on a failure-to-warn claim must show a causal nexus and a colorable government contractor defense, which requires that the government dictated or prevented warnings; mere Navy approval of warnings is not enough.
• Laverty v. CSX Transportation, Inc. (5th District, 2010). A nonresident plaintiff's choice of forum gets less deference. Where the plaintiff and decedent never lived in Illinois, the exposure and witnesses are all outside Illinois, and the public-interest factors weigh against Illinois, denying a forum non conveniens dismissal is an abuse of discretion.
• Fuller v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2009). A state-law personal injury claim removed on the ground that a co-defendant's bankruptcy may trigger an indemnity right is a non-core, at most related matter, and a federal court may remand it sua sponte under permissive abstention and equitable remand (28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c)(1), 1452(b)).
• Funk v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2009). A removed state-law claim only remotely related to a co-defendant's bankruptcy (through a potential indemnification claim) is a non-core matter, and a federal court may sua sponte remand it on permissive abstention and equitable grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c)(1) and 1452(b).
• Stephens v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2009). A defendant removing under the federal officer statute must show it acted under a federal officer's direction and has a colorable federal defense; affidavits without contracts or regulations showing the Navy prevented compliance with state-law warning duties are insufficient.
• Burns v. AP Green Industries, Inc. (5th District, 2001). A trial court abuses its discretion in a forum non conveniens ruling when it focuses on one factor, here the plaintiff's short life expectancy, and ignores the other private-interest and public-interest factors.
• Dykstra v. AP Green Industries, Inc. (5th District, 2001). A plaintiff's choice of forum is given deference, and a defendant seeking transfer or dismissal for forum non conveniens must show that the chosen forum is inconvenient and another is more convenient; lack of ties to the county does not relieve that burden, and asbestos litigation is not truly tied to any one county.
• Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (5th District, 1995). A trial court's denial of an intrastate forum non conveniens transfer is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the defendant must show the factors weigh so strongly for transfer that the plaintiff's choice of forum should be disturbed; doubts from an inadequate record are resolved against the defendant.

Kansas

• Harding v. Proko Industries, Inc. (1991). Applying the Texas choice-of-law rules (Restatement (Second) most significant relationship test), the law of the state where the exposure and the defendants' conduct occurred governs, not the state where the disease was later discovered or where the plaintiff later lived.

Kentucky

• Clouse v. Associated Drywall Suppliers, Inc. (2019). The potential effect of a talc injury suit against Johnson & Johnson on its supplier's pending bankruptcy is too remote to give 'related-to' bankruptcy jurisdiction, and remand would in any event be warranted on equitable grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b).
• Hayes v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2019). A federal court may remand a removed bankruptcy-related claim on any equitable ground under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b), and the court may do so without deciding related-to jurisdiction where, for example, trial is imminent, only state-law claims are asserted, and the state court has long handled the case.
• Brown v. Kentucky Utilities Company (2015). After severing a federal-officer defendant's third-party claims, a federal court may decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) and (4) where state-law claims predominate and a late-removed case was nearly ready for state trial.
• Stallings v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation (2013). A government contractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it was acting under a federal agency, there is a causal nexus between its work and the plaintiff's claims, and it raises a plausible (colorable) government contractor defense. A defendant may support removal with declarations and affidavits at an early stage.
• Bush v. Eaton Corporation (2010). Fraudulent joinder is not shown where there is a colorable claim against the non-diverse defendant, with disputed facts and ambiguities in state law resolved for the non-removing party. Under Kentucky law, an employee can be personally liable for breach of his own duty or where he can control the employer's negligent acts.

Louisiana

• LeBOEUF v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2025). A federal contractor is immune from failure-to-warn claims under the modified Boyle test only if the government exercised discretion and approved the warnings, and minimum government safety standards are not reasonably precise specifications. Yearsley immunity does not cover a failure to warn or protect that the government did not authorize or direct.
• Constanza v. Sparta Insurance Company (2024). Under the Fifth Circuit's en banc Latiolais test, a shipbuilder removing under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) must show a colorable federal defense, that it is a person under the statute, that it acted under a federal officer's directions, and that the charged conduct is connected or associated with that act. The Eleventh Circuit's Meadows decision on former federal officers does not displace that test for a private contractor.
• Ditcharo v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (2024). A defendant that raises a colorable federal contractor defense and acted under a federal officer may remove the whole case under § 1442(a)(1). The court may then exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state claims and over FELA claims that § 1445(a) would otherwise make non-removable.
• Jacob v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (2024). A defendant's ability to remove under the federal officer removal statute does not depend on its acting under a federal officer at the time of removal. The 30-day removal clock starts only when a plaintiff's voluntary act makes removability unequivocally clear, so documents produced by co-defendants or merely showing Navy service did not start it.
• Lagrange v. Eagle, Inc. (2024). A federal court that had federal officer removal jurisdiction at the time of removal does not lose it when the federal defense later fails, and it may keep supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims where they raise no novel or complex state-law issues.
• Lyles v. K&b Louisiana Corporation (2024). When a plaintiff seeks after removal to join a non-diverse defendant, the court weighs the Hensgens factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), and may deny joinder where the amendment's purpose is to defeat diversity and the plaintiff was dilatory. An amendment is also futile when it does not plead a valid Louisiana direct action against the insurer.
• Marcella v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2024). A defendant removing under the federal-officer removal statute need only assert a colorable federal defense, such as Boyle government contractor immunity, and that defense is not defeated because other courts rejected it on the merits at summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit's Meadows decision on former federal officers does not displace the Fifth Circuit's Latiolais ruling allowing Avondale to remove.
• Fiffie v. Taylor-Seidenbach (2023). When all federal claims have been dismissed before trial, the general rule is that a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Here the statutory and common-law factors favored remand.
• Hernandez v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2023). After all claims supporting federal-officer removal were dismissed, a federal court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the common-law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity, and remand to state court.
• Lebeau v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the 30-day removal clock for federal officer removal starts only when a voluntary act by the plaintiff makes removability unequivocally clear and certain, and a defendant's subjective knowledge or its own production of documents does not start it.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association (2023). A federal court that had jurisdiction at the time of federal officer removal does not lose it because the claims that supported removal were later dismissed, and it may also keep the remaining state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Under Barrosse, the LHWCA does not preempt state tort claims by maritime workers injured in the twilight zone in Louisiana who neither sought nor obtained LHWCA compensation and whose injuries were not covered by the relevant version of the state workers' compensation act.
• Thompson v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2023). Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant satisfies the 'related to' requirement by showing the plaintiff was likely exposed to asbestos being used under a federal officer's direction, with no direct causal nexus required.
• Adams v. Eagle, Inc. (2022). The Boyle defense to a failure-to-warn claim requires government-approved warnings or a reasonably precise government specification, and a minimum safety standard like the Walsh-Healey Act is not one. Yearsley immunity does not protect a contractor from claims of its own separate negligence in carrying out a government contract.
• Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A federal court that properly had federal officer removal jurisdiction at removal keeps that jurisdiction even after the federal contractor defense fails, and may keep exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims where no novel issues exist, the case is advanced and trial is near.
• Manchester v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A removing defendant claiming improper joinder must show no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant; pointing to the plaintiff's lack of evidence early in the case does not meet that burden.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2022). Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only raise a colorable federal defense, one that is not wholly insubstantial or frivolous, and need not prove the defense on the merits. The 30-day removal period runs from service of the petition on the defendant, not from the date the petition was filed.
• Roussell v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). Federal-officer removal jurisdiction is judged on the record at the time of removal, so a court does not lose jurisdiction when the claims tied to the federal contractor defense are later dismissed. The court may also keep supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
• Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls (2022). A federal court may keep supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal-officer defendants are dismissed, given the case's age, extensive discovery, absence of novel state-law issues, and judicial resources already spent. Diversity is judged when the action is filed, so adding a nondiverse party later does not defeat it.
• Stansbury v. McCARTY Corporation (2022). The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, raised only as a preemption defense, does not create federal removal jurisdiction. A court that has federal officer removal jurisdiction may keep the remaining state claims after the federal officer defendant leaves, but it may decline to under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
• Stansbury v. McCARTY Corporation (2022). Where a third-party defendant properly removes under the federal officer removal statute, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state-law claims when they are sufficiently intertwined with the removed claim that they do not predominate, and judicial economy, fairness and comity do not require remand.
• Tabor v. William B. Reily & Co., Inc. (2022). A defendant must remove within 30 days of service when the initial pleading affirmatively reveals removability, and a federal officer removal defendant must show a causal nexus between its work under federal direction and the plaintiff's claims, supported by evidence.
• Williams v. Boeing Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, and a court may not draw inferences against the non-movant on summary judgment. Wrongful death and survival actions are separate causes of action, so a late wrongful death claim by new plaintiffs does not relate back to the decedent's original suit.
• Aaron v. Bancroft Bag, Inc. (2021). A case with a non-diverse defendant becomes removable only when that defendant is clearly out of the case, and a settlement with it counts only if it is binding and enforceable under state law; the removing defendant bears the burden of proving this.
• Arrowood Indemnity Company v. ST Joseph's Roman Catholic Church (2021). Under the Fifth Circuit's seven-factor test, a federal court should keep a declaratory judgment action when the insurer was not a party to the pending state suit and could not have had its coverage issues litigated there.
• Brindell v. Carlisle Industrial Brake and Friction Inc. (2021). A case removed more than one year after filing may be removed only if the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. A non-diverse defendant is improperly joined only if there is no reasonable possibility of recovery against it.
• Clark v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only show a broad connection or association between the plaintiff's claims and its acts done under federal direction; evidence that a particular person exposed the plaintiff worked on a federal vessel is not required.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2021). A federal court has inherent discretionary power under Landis to stay an entire case, weighing hardship, prejudice and judicial economy, and an insurer's state-court liquidation stay must be honored. Louisiana's expedited-trial article is procedural and does not apply in a case removed under the federal officer removal statute.
• Danos v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2021). A court of appeals decision in another case involving the same defendant, a similar factual situation and a similar legal issue can be an "order" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), so the Fifth Circuit's en banc Latiolais decision started a new 30-day removal period for Avondale under the federal officer removal statute.
• Deaville v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2021). A removing party claiming improper joinder bears a heavy burden, and a court's summary inquiry may not weigh evidence or resolve factual disputes; those are resolved in favor of the plaintiff. A conflict between the plaintiff's testimony and a Social Security statement about employment dates before September 1, 1975 therefore defeated the improper joinder claim.