Pleural Plaques and Pleural Thickening: Asbestos Court Decisions

Decisions in our case-law library that involve pleural plaques and thickening: 155 cases, by state. Each line gives the exposure the court described, or else what it decided. For the topic itself, see Pleural Plaques and Pleural Thickening.

Pennsylvania

• Kiser v. AW Chesterton Co. (2011). The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding the estate's wrongful death claim over Mr. Kiser's mesothelioma was time-barred under Virginia law, so Phyllis Kiser, as executor, lost.
• Peter & Elpis Constantinides v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2010). The court overruled Leslie Controls' objections and denied its summary judgment motion on product identification and medical causation, leaving the bare-metal question for the Florida transferor court, so plaintiffs prevailed for now.
• Peter & Elpis Constantinides v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2010). The court overruled Leslie Controls' objections and denied its summary judgment motion on product identification and causation, leaving the bare metal defense to the transferor court, so the plaintiffs prevailed for now.
• Summers v. Certainteed Corp. (2010). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order affirming summary judgment for Union Carbide, Certainteed and Allied Signal, disapproved Quate v. American Standard, and sent the cases back so Summers and Nybeck could proceed.
• Summers v. Certainteed Corp. (2005). The en banc Superior Court was evenly divided, so the trial court's summary judgment for the asbestos defendants (CertainTeed and Union Carbide) against plaintiffs Summers and Nybeck was affirmed.
• Smalls v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp. (2004). The Superior Court rejected John Crane's evidentiary challenges but held the $2,000,000 award to Oscar Smalls and $500,000 consortium award to Lizzie Smalls excessive, vacating the judgment and remanding for a new trial on damages only.
• Andaloro v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (2002). The Superior Court vacated the judgments because the trial court applied a pro rata setoff for the unsettled Manville Trust claims, remanded for a pro tanto setoff, and otherwise affirmed the rulings against John Crane, Inc. on judgment n.o.v., new trial and remittitur.
• In re Patenaude (2000). The Third Circuit denied the asbestos plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to remand their cases from MDL 875, so the defendants prevailed and the cases stayed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
• Lonasco v. A-Best Products Co. (2000). The Superior Court affirmed the denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Owens-Corning and Garlock on Phase I, and affirmed the grant of a new Phase II trial on Garlock's liability, so the Lonascos and the Collinses prevailed.
• McCauley v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998). The Superior Court reversed the trial court's refusal to remove a compulsory nonsuit entered against plaintiff Bradley McCauley on statute of limitations grounds, and remanded for a new trial, ruling against the defendants.
• Sharpless v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas (1997). The trial court granted compulsory nonsuits for defendants Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Uniroyal and Harbison Walker Refractories against plaintiffs Dallas Sharpless and Richard Wilson, and issued this opinion explaining the nonsuits for their appeals.
• McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1996). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order to the extent it allowed a new trial on the lung cancer claim (a win for Owens Corning), and affirmed a new trial limited to the McNeils' non-cancer injury claims (a win for the McNeils).
• Simmons v. Pacor, Inc. (1996). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, which had upheld judgment n.o.v. for the defendants in Giffear and reversed the plaintiffs' verdicts in Simmons and Murray, so Owens-Illinois, Fibreboard and Keene prevailed over the three plaintiff couples.
• Busfield v. AC & S., Inc. (1994). The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order excluding evidence of Alva Busfield's fear of developing cancer, so the plaintiffs lost against the asbestos defendants.
• DiDio v. Philadelphia Asbestos Corp. (1994). The court stayed Keene's appeal because of its bankruptcy, vacated the judgment against Fibreboard because asymptomatic pleural thickening and asbestosis based on fear of cancer were not compensable, and affirmed the $900,000 judgment against Owens-Illinois and the severance of its cross-claims.
• Dempsey v. Pacor, Inc. (1993). The Superior Court vacated the judgments entered for the six plaintiff couples against Owens-Illinois, Keene and Fibreboard and remanded for a new trial on damages only, with no fear or increased-risk-of-cancer elements.
• Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1993). The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's judgment n.o.v. for Keene and Fibreboard, setting aside the jury's $300,000 award to William Giffear, because asymptomatic pleural thickening and fear or risk of cancer are not compensable injuries.
• Higginbotham v. Fibreboard Corp. (1993). The Superior Court vacated the judgment for Nathan and Jean Higginbotham against Fibreboard Corporation and remanded for a new trial limited to Mr. Higginbotham's present injuries, so Fibreboard prevailed on appeal.
• Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (1992). The en banc Superior Court reversed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Marinari's lung cancer action was not time-barred by the earlier discovery of pleural thickening.
• Taliferro v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1992). The Superior Court reversed the trial court's compulsory nonsuit for defendants Pittsburgh Corning and Fibreboard on James Taliferro's lung cancer and pleural thickening claims and remanded for further proceedings.
• Manzi v. HK Porter Co. (1991). The Superior Court affirmed the judgment for defendant H.K. Porter against plaintiff James Manzi, holding the jury instruction that Manzi could sue again if he later developed a compensable asbestos injury was correct (Celotex was severed due to bankruptcy stay); one judge dissented.
• Maher v. Wcab (BP Oil Corp.) (1989). The Commonwealth Court reversed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's affirmance of the referee's denial of benefits to claimant Maher against B.P. Oil Corporation and remanded for a determination of the date of disability and computation of benefits.
• Morgan v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1986). The court reversed summary judgment for the defendant asbestos companies in the Bagian case and remanded it, and affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in the Alice and Morgan cases because their claims were time-barred.
• Lowe v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1985). The district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment on limitations grounds, ruling that a jury must decide when Lowe learned he had an asbestos-related disease, and so allowed the Lowe estate's claims to go forward.
• Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1984). The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining the defendants' preliminary objections to the Does' petition for a declaratory judgment on when the limitations period begins in asbestos disease cases.
• Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1982). Affirmed summary judgment for the asbestos product manufacturer defendants, holding the Staianos' claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
• Grabowski v. Turner & Newall (1980). The court granted summary judgment for the defendant asbestos suppliers in the DaMato, Lindahl, Saylor and Pearson cases as time-barred, and denied it in the Grabowski, Gravatt and Marincola cases because of factual gaps.

Tennessee

• Ingram v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. (1994). The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Ingram's workers' compensation claim, held he was entitled to employer-paid medical benefits for periodic pulmonary exams and related treatment, found his disability claim not yet ripe, and remanded to determine the medical benefits due.

Texas

• Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske (2012). The en banc court affirmed the MDL pretrial court's order denying Union Carbide's motion and renewed motion to dismiss, so the Emmites' asbestosis wrongful-death claims could go forward.
• Ford Motor Company v. Miller (14th District, 2008). The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the $10,000,000 jury verdict and rendered judgment for Ford Motor Company, holding Ford owed no duty to Carolyn Miller and that John Roland had no compensable injury or damages evidence.
• Todd Shipyards Corporation v. Perez (2000). The Texas Supreme Court denied Todd Shipyards' petition for review, leaving in place the court of appeals' reversal of summary judgment for Todd and in favor of Garcia's daughters; Justices Hecht and Owen dissented from the denial.
• North American Refractory Co. v. Easter (13th District, 1999). The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict and judgment for Moss's estate, Easter, Roberts and the two spouses against North American Refractory Co. (NARCO), including the $1.5 million punitive award.
• Perez v. Todd Shipyards Corp. (1999). The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment for Todd Shipyards, which had been based on its bankruptcy discharge, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in favor of the decedent's children.
• Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Carter (1999). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment to the extent it reinstated the plaintiffs' actual damages claims, and rendered judgment that Carter and Wilson take nothing against Temple-Inland, which won.
• In re Ethyl Corp. (1998). The Texas Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus, leaving in place the trial court's order setting twenty-two workers' asbestos premises claims for a single trial, so the defendants (Ethyl, USX, Todd Shipyards and Texas City Refining) lost and the plaintiffs won.
• Srite v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1993). The court of appeals affirmed the jury's zero past-damages awards for the workers and wives against Owens-Illinois, Fibreboard, Pittsburgh-Corning and Keene, but reversed the limitations bar against the Spikes plaintiffs and reversed the Burt and Friley judgments for a wrong prejudgment-interest start date, remanding each.
• Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool (6th District, 1991). The court affirmed the Williams judgment and, in the Pool/Strong/Sledge/Freeman case, affirmed in favor of the plaintiffs except that it set aside the $100,000 future medical award to Pool (new trial unless he remits) and the punitive damages against Garlock.
• Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1990). After a class trial of 2,298 asbestos plaintiffs, the court approved its sampling-based damages plan, set rules for prejudgment interest, the Johns-Manville settlement and punitive multipliers against Pittsburgh-Corning, Fibreboard and Celotex, and held ACL liable to only one plaintiff.

Utah

• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2014). The district court denied Crane Co.'s motion, joined by other defendants, to exclude plaintiff Arva Anderson's expert Dr. Abraham's specific causation testimony, so the plaintiff prevailed on the motion.

Virginia

• Goodrich v. John Crane, Inc. (2018). The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motions to limit defense experts McCloskey and Henshaw, granted the plaintiffs' motion to bar fiber potency ratio testimony, denied the plaintiffs' motion on dose reconstruction, and denied John Crane's motion on regulatory statements without prejudice.
• Kiser v. AW Chesterton Co. (2013). Answering a question certified by the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the executrix's mesothelioma wrongful death claim accrued at the earlier asbestosis diagnosis, not the mesothelioma diagnosis, which favored the defendants (two justices dissented).
• Joyce v. AC & s., Inc. (1984). The court granted summary judgment to Celotex and the joining defendants (Owens-Corning, Armstrong, Eagle-Picher, Keene, Pittsburgh Corning), holding all of plaintiff Joyce's asbestos-related claims barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations.
• Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. (1981). The court granted the power shovel manufacturers Bucyrus-Erie and Northwest Engineering partial summary judgment, holding the plaintiff's respiratory injury claims time-barred; his hearing loss claim was not challenged.

Washington

• Atchinson v. Howmet Aerospace, Inc. (2021). The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Alcoa (Howmet Aerospace) against the estate of Clinton Casey, upheld the denial of certification to the Washington Supreme Court, and denied the renewed certification motion.
• Herring v. Texaco, Inc. (2007). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated summary judgment for Todd Shipyards, holding Todd's bankruptcy discharged Herring's claim because he was entitled only to publication notice.
• Brewer v. Fibreboard Corp. (1995). The Washington Supreme Court affirmed that the $175,000 Manville Trust settlement was reasonable but held the setoff should be only the $21,000 actually received, and remanded for recalculation of the judgment against Fibreboard, Owens-Corning Fiberglas and Pittsburgh Corning at $290,643.56, a result favoring the Brewers.
• Kilpatrick v. Dept. of Labor and Industries (1994). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the summary judgments for the Department of Labor and Industries and held the three widows were entitled to survivor's benefits at the 100 percent rate, remanding for attorney fees and further proceedings.
• Koker v. Armstrong Cork, Inc. (1st Division, 1991). The court rejected most of Celotex's and Raymark's challenges but reversed the jury verdict for Lewis and Roberta Koker and remanded for a new trial because of an erroneous lost-chance-of-survival instruction.

West Virginia

• Murphy v. ST. Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. (2024). The intermediate appeals court affirmed the Workers' Compensation Board of Review's order denying Linda Murphy dependents' benefits, so the employer and the Old Fund prevailed over the widow.

Wisconsin

• Ahnert v. Employers Insurance Company OF Wausau (2017). The court denied Wisconsin Electric Power Company's motion for summary judgment, ruling that factual disputes prevented it from deciding that the Safe Place Statute or the construction statute of repose barred the Ahnerts' claims, so the plaintiffs prevailed on the motion.