Toy v. Viking Pump (In re Toy Asbestos Litigation, 2019)

Our plain-English summary of In re Toy Asbestos Litigation (U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, May 16, 2019).

Thomas Toy, Sr. and his wife Agnes sued 43 companies in federal court in California, alleging he developed malignant mesothelioma from asbestos exposure during his life. The complaint described his work as an Army wheel mechanic working on brakes and clutches, a marine machinist and maintenance machinist at Navy shipyards in California, and a home and vehicle repairer using products with asbestos. One defendant, Viking Pump, Inc., which the complaint called a supplier of asbestos-containing pumps, asked the court to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. Viking relied on a 2003 deposition showing it was incorporated in Delaware and based in Iowa. The court found no general jurisdiction. On specific jurisdiction, it held the Toys' allegations were thin but sufficient for a prima facie case. They alleged that Viking supplied asbestos-containing products into California and did business there, and Viking offered no evidence contradicting this. The court denied the motion without prejudice, so Viking could renew it after discovery.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
• Decided: May 16, 2019
• Docket: Case No. 19-cv-00325-HSG
• Stage: Jurisdiction, venue or removal
• State: California

Outcome. The district court denied, without prejudice to renewal after discovery, Viking Pump's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding the Toys made a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction.

What the court held. When a defendant's submissions do not contradict the complaint, the court accepts the allegations as true. Allegations that the defendant supplied asbestos-containing products into California can make a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction through purposeful availment.

Issues decided: Personal Jurisdiction.

The people and their exposure

• Thomas H. Toy, Sr.: mesothelioma

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Thomas H. Toy, Sr.	wheel mechanic		1953-1962	brakes, clutches and friction materials
Thomas H. Toy, Sr.	marine machinist (shipyards and maritime work)	Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, California	1962-1974
Thomas H. Toy, Sr.	marine machinist (shipyards and maritime work)	Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California	1962-1974
Thomas H. Toy, Sr.	maintenance machinist (shipyards and maritime work)	Treasure Island Naval Shipyard, California	1974-1980
Thomas H. Toy, Sr.	non-occupational home construction and vehicle maintenance		1960s to 1990s	brakes, clutches and friction materials, gaskets and packing

The defendants

• Viking Pump Inc. (supplier)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• Toy v. Honeywell International Inc. (April 29, 2019). The court granted NAPA's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and terminated NAPA from the case, ruling against plaintiffs Thomas and Agnes Toy as to NAPA.
• Toy v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Toy Asbestos Litigation) (May 27, 2020). The court granted in part and denied in part Honeywell's motion to modify the scheduling order: Honeywell could not supplement its expert Dr. Vachani's report, but Plaintiffs could depose him after the deadline.
• Toy v. Armstrong Int'l (In re Asbestos) (March 19, 2021). The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' expert Dr. Staggs: it kept only two pages of his rebuttal report and barred him from testifying in the plaintiffs' case-in-chief, but refused to strike the report as untimely.
• Toy v. Armstrong Int'l (In re Asbestos) (March 23, 2021). The court granted the Toy plaintiffs' motion to strike defense expert Dr. Gail Stockman's testimony on asbestos state of the art and on asbestos exposure and risk from steam traps, a ruling against defendant Armstrong International.
• Toy v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Asbestos) (March 26, 2021). The district court denied Honeywell's motion to exclude plaintiffs' causation expert Dr. Carl Brodkin, so the Toy plaintiffs won the ruling, and it terminated as moot the parallel motions by Ingersoll-Rand, Morse TEC and Metalclad.
• Toy v. Armstrong Int'l (In re Asbestos) (March 30, 2021). The court granted in part and denied in part Armstrong's motion to exclude plaintiffs' expert Dr. Brody (he may give general but not specific causation testimony) and denied Warren Pumps' and Honeywell's motion to exclude "every exposure" testimony, without prejudice to renewed objections at trial.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (March 31, 2021). The federal district court denied the plaintiffs' motions to exclude the testimony of defense experts Dr. Paustenbach and Dr. Roggli, so the defendants won the ruling.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (March 31, 2021). The court granted Warren Pumps' and Armstrong International's motions to exclude plaintiffs' expert Captain Burger from testifying that Mr. Toy worked on or around those companies' products or about land-based steam traps.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (May 13, 2021). The district court denied Warren Pumps, LLC's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine factual disputes on exposure to asbestos from its pumps and gaskets and on substantial-factor causation, so plaintiffs Agnes Toy and Thomas Toy, Jr. prevailed on the motion.
• Toy v. Armstrong Int'l (In re Toy Asbestos) (May 20, 2021). The district court granted Armstrong International's motion for summary judgment on all claims by Agnes Toy and Thomas Toy, Jr., and directed entry of judgment for Armstrong.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

IN RE TOY ASBESTOS LITIGATION.

Case No. 19-cv-00325-HSG.

May 16, 2019.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Thomas H. Toy, Sr. & Agnes Toy, Plaintiffs, represented by Benjamin H. Adams, Dean Omar Branham Shirley & Jessica M. Dean, Dean Omar & Branham LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., sued as successor-in-interest to Bendix Corporation, Defendant, represented by David Raymond Ongaro, Ongaro PC, Glen Elliot Turner, Ongaro PC & Kirsten McNelly Bibbes, Ongaro PC.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, individually and as successor-in-interest to Buffalo Pumps Inc & Velan Valve Corp., Defendants, represented by Glen R. Powell, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, James G. Scadden, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP & Michael J. Pietrykowski, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP.

Alfa Laval Inc., Defendant, represented by Emily M. Cunningham, Foley and Mansfield PLLP, Holly Elizabeth Acevedo, Filice Brown Eassa & McLeod LLP, Janell Maria Alberto, Archer Norris, Keith Michael Ameele, Foley & Mansfield PLLP & Nicole Denine Brown Yuen, Foley & Mansfield, PLLP.

Armstrong International Inc, Defendant, represented by Catherine Ellen Golden, Low, Ball and Lynch, Christine Dianne Calareso, CMBG3 Law LLC & Gilliam Fipp Stewart, CMBG3 Law LLC.

Aurora Pump Company & Dezurik, Inc, individually and successor-in-interest to Copes-Vulcan Inc., Defendants, represented by Christine Dianne Calareso, CMBG3 Law LLC, Gilliam Fipp Stewart, CMBG3 Law LLC, Haley Lanell Hansen, CMBG3 Law LLC & W. Joseph Gunter, CMBG3 Law LLC.

Blackmer Pump Company, Carrier Corporation & Warren Pumps LLC, Defendants, represented by James P. Cunningham, Tucker Ellis LLP & Ronald Q. Tran, Tucker Ellis LLP.

BW/IP Inc., individually and as successor-in-interest to Byron Jackson Pumps, Defendant, represented by Dennis Michael Young, Foley & Mansfield, Keith Michael Ameele, Foley & Mansfield PLLP, Nicole Denine Brown Yuen, Foley & Mansfield, PLLP & Suzanna L. Minasian, Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P.

CBS Corporation, a Delaware corporation, successor-by-merger to CBS Corporation, a Pennsylania corporation, and also as success-in interest B.F. Sturtevant Company, Defendant, represented by Charles T. Sheldon, WFBM, LLP, Kevin Douglas Jamison, Kevin Jamison Law, PC, Erin Nicole Empting, Kevin Jamison Law, PC & Justin Finnell Cronin, Kevin Jamison Law, PC.

CLA-VAL Co., Defendant, represented by Charles H. Kanter, Palmieri, Tylerm Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron LLP & John Russell Lister, Palmieri Tyler Wiener Wilhelm Waldron.

Copes-Vulcan Inc., Defendant, represented by Nicole Elisabet Gage, Tucker Ellis LLP & Lance Douglas Wilson, Tucker Ellis LLP.

Crane Co., Defendant, represented by Geoffrey M. Davis, K&L Gates LLP & Peter Edward Soskin, K&L Gates LLP. Dana Companies LLC, Defendant, represented by Edward R. Hugo, Hugo Parker, LLP, Christina M. Glezakos, Hugo Parker, LLC & Heather Marie Sweeney Kirkpatrick, Hugo Parker, LLP.

Flowserve US Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel James Kelly, Tucker Ellis LLP & Nicole Elisabet Gage, Tucker Ellis LLP.

Fryer-Knowles Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles Stewart Bishop, Sinunu Bruni LLP.

General Electric Company, Defendant, represented by Derek S. Johnson, WFBM, LLP, Charles T. Sheldon, WFBM, LLP, Emily Elizabeth Anselmo, WFBM, LLP & Katherine Paige Gardiner, WFBM, LLP.

Genuine Parts Company, doing business as Napa, Defendant, represented by Bina Ghanaat, Lankford Crawford Moreno & Ostertag LLP, Dana Leigh Burch, Pond North LLP, Francis Dennis Pond, Pond North LLP, Paul Vincent Lankford, Lankford Crawford Moreno & Ostertag, LLP, Michael A. Graham, Pond North LLP & Nilufar Kashani Majd, POND NORTH LLP. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Defendant, represented by Carrie S. Lin, Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP, Jennifer Anne Cormier, Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP, Kristi L.K. Young, Manning, Gross & Massenburg LLP & Thomas J. Tarkoff, Manning Gross Massenburg.

Grinnell LLC, doing business as Grinnell Corporation, Hill Brothers Chemical Company & ITT LLC, formerly known as, Defendants, represented by Amy Jo Talarico, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Joseph Duffy, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Michael Quinn Eagan, Jr., Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP.

IMO Industries Inc., Defendant, represented by Frederick W. Gatt, Leader & Berkon LLP, Olga Guadalupe Pena, Leader and Berkon LLP & Bobbie Rae Bailey, Leader & Berkon LLP.

Ingersoll-Rand Company, Defendant, represented by Arpi Galfayan, Prindle, Goetz, Barnes and Reinholtz LLP, Carla Lynn Crochet, Prindle, Amaro, Goetz, Hillyard, Barnes & Reinholz LLP, Jeremy David Milbrodt, Prindle, Amaro, Goetz, Hillyard, Barnes & Reinholtz LLP & Thomas Alan Steig, Prindle, Goetz, Barnes & Reinholtz LLP.

M. Slayen and Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by Emily Denise Bergstrom, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer, Emily Diane Bergstrom, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer, Patrick Mark Mahoney, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer, Juniper Bacon, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer & Mark S. Kannett, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer.

Metalclad Insulation LLC, individually and as successor-in-interest to Metalclad Insulation Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel B. Hoye, McKenna Long & Aldridge, Lisa Lurline Oberg, Dentons US LLP, Michelle Christian Jackson, Dentons US LLP & Samuel David Jubelirer, Dentons US LLP.

Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Defendant, represented by Marte J. Bassi, Bassi, Edlin, Huie & Blum LLP, Joseph Blaise Adams, Bassi Martini Edlin & Blum, LLP & Reno Cross, Bassi, Edlin, Huie and Blum LLP.

Pneumo Abex LLC, successor-in-interest to Abex Corporation, Defendant, represented by Edward P. Tugade, Demler, Armstrong & Rowland LLP & John R. Brydon, Demler Armstrong Rowland LLP.

SB Decking Inc, Defendant, represented by Florence Anne McClain, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP & Trina Marie Clayton, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP.

Smothers Parts International, Inc., doing business as Smothers Auto Parts & Performance Accessories, Defendant, represented by Marshall E. Bluestone, Bluestone Zunino & Hamilton, LLP.

Standard Motor Products Inc., individually and successor-in-interest to EIS Automotive, Defendant, represented by Leonard Michael Tavera, Semper Law Group, LLP.

Viad Corp., individually and successor-in-interest to Griscom-Russell Company, Defendant, represented by Whitney A. Davis, K.W. Davis, Attorneys at Law.

Viking Pump Inc., Defendant, represented by Peter K. Renstrom, WFBM, LLP & Todd Marshall Thacker, WFBM, LLP. Weir Valves & Controls USA, Inc., individually and as successor-in-interest to Atwood & Morrill Co. Inc., Defendant, represented by Emily Diane Bergstrom, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer, Mark S. Kannett, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer & Juniper Bacon, Becherer Kannett & Schweitzer.

Western Auto Supply Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Advance Auto Parts Inc, Defendant, represented by Dana Leigh Burch, Pond North LLP, Frank D. Pond, Pond North LLP, Francis Dennis Pond, Pond North LLP, Michael A. Graham, Pond North LLP & Nilufar Kashani Majd, POND NORTH LLP.

The William Powell Company, Defendant, represented by Douglas Garth Wah, Foley Mansfield, PLLP, Khaled Taqi-Eddin, Foley & Mansfield PLLP, Andrew Livingston Sharp, Foley & Mansfield PLLP & Lori A. Cataldo, Foley & Mansfield PLLP.

BorgWarner Morse TEC LLC, as successor-b-merger to Borg-Warner Corporation, Defendant, represented by Daniel B. Hoye, McKenna Long & Aldridge, Lisa Lurline Oberg, Dentons US LLP & Samuel David Jubelirer, Dentons US LLP. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 81

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiffs Thomas H. Toy, Sr. and Agnes Toy initially filed this asbestos lawsuit in Alameda County Superior Court on December 14, 2018, naming 45 Defendants. See Dkt. No. 1-1 (state court complaint). Three Defendants removed the case to this Court, where it was later consolidated into one action. See Dkt. No. 153. Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint in this Court on February 11, naming 43 Defendants. See Dkt. No. 76 ("FAC").

On February 13, 2019, Defendant Viking Pump, Inc. ("Viking") moved, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 81 ("Mot."). Plaintiffs responded on February 27, asking the Court to deny the motion or to allow them to conduct jurisdictional discovery. See Dkt. No. 115 ("Opp."). Viking replied on March 6. See Dkt. No. 130 ("Reply"). The Court held a hearing on the motion on May 14. Though Plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations against Viking are spare, they are uncontroverted and sufficient to make out a prima facie case; therefore, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs' Allegations

Thomas H. Toy, Sr. "was exposed to asbestos during the course of his life," which led to him developing malignant mesothelioma. See FAC ¶¶ 5-6. Mr. Toy identified the following sources of asbestos exposure:

• 1953 to 1962: service in the United States Army. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Toy worked as a "wheel mechanic. . . while stationed in Germany where he worked on all types of vehicles performing maintenance and repairs

including brakes and clutches." Id. He also "worked on the wire team" in Korea and the United States, in which his "team would lay telephone wire and cables for telephone communications." Id.

• 1962 to 1990: federal civil service employee in California. Id.

• 1962 to 1974: Mr. Toy "worked as a marine machinist aboard ships, submarines and air craft carriers performing activities in ship building and/or ship repair at several locations including but not limited to Hunters Point Naval Shipyard and Mare Island Naval Shipyard." Id.

• 1974 to 1980: Mr. Toy "worked as a maintenance machinist performing activities in building operation, maintenance and repair to HVAC, pumps, valves, condensate in the mechanical room and other equipment at Treasure Island Naval Shipyard." Id.

• 1980 to 1990: Mr. Toy "worked as a planner/estimator performing activities of buying materials for projects and visiting on-site locations including but not limited to: Hamilton Air Force Base, Alameda Naval Air Station and the Naval Hospital in Oak Knoll while working at the Navy Public Works Center in San Francisco." Id. • 1960s to 1990s: Mr. Toy "worked in non-occupational capacities performing home construction, repairs and remodeling involving asbestos-containing products," including while "building, repairing and remodeling his own homes." Id. During this period, Mr. Toy also "worked in non-occupational capacities performing vehicle maintenance and repairs involving asbestos-containing products, including brakes, clutches, and gaskets" on "his own and on his family's vehicles." Id.

In the FAC, Plaintiffs identified 43 Defendants whose products (or those of their predecessors) allegedly contained asbestos. See id. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants "were and are authorized to do and are doing business in the State

of California" and "have regularly conducted business" in Alameda County, California. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that Viking was "a supplier of asbestos-containing Viking pumps." Id. ¶ 6.

B. Viking's Evidence in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss

In support of its motion, Viking included excerpts from a 2003 deposition taken in another case of "Viking's person most knowledgeable," John Petersen. See Dkt. No. 81-2 at 2. Petersen testified in that deposition that Viking was incorporated in Delaware and was established in Cedar Falls, Iowa. See Mot. Ex. A at 2, 3. Petersen also testified that Viking had manufacturing facilities in Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 4. Viking later filed a statement in accordance with Civil Local Rule 3-15, disclosing that it is wholly-owned by IDEX Corporation, a publicly traded company. See Dkt. No. 179.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Due process limits a court's power to "render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant." See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). Where a state authorizes "jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States," as does California, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, federal courts must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant "comports with the limits imposed by federal due process." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014); see also Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) ("California's long-arm statute. . . is coextensive with federal due process requirements, so the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same."). "For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consistent with due process, that defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the relevant forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014) ("Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.") (internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff may invoke either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015). "[G]eneral jurisdiction requires affiliations so continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in the forum State, i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State." Daimler, 571 U.S. at 133 n.11 (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). Specific jurisdiction exists if: (1) the defendant has performed some act or consummated some transaction with the forum by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in California; (2) the plaintiff's claims arise out of or result from the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985)).

"When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant." Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Although the court "may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit," CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must resolve conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits in plaintiff's favor. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). When the Court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of facts supporting personal jurisdiction to avoid dismissal. See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

Based on the record before it, the Court concludes that it does not have general personal jurisdiction over Viking. At least as of 2003, Viking was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Iowa. See Mot. Ex. A at 2, 3. Plaintiffs do not appear to contest Viking's assertion that the Court does not have general personal jurisdiction over it, see Mot. at 4-5. Because the Court concludes that there is no basis upon which to exercise general jurisdiction, it must proceed to determine whether there is specific personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs contend that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Viking under the "stream of commerce plus" theory. See Opp. at 8 (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)). Plaintiffs explain their theory as follows: Plaintiffs have alleged that Viking supplied a known hazardous product in California and that Mr. Toy was injured by exposure to that product in this State. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of Viking's purposeful efforts to serve directly or indirectly the market for asbestos containing products in this State. Viking's distribution and supply of asbestos-containing products in California provides sufficient basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Viking. Such continuing sales into California certainly satisfy the long-arm statute, as well as due process. Viking's product sales in California are sufficient to establish purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of California law. Viking should have realized that it would have liability for injury caused by exposures to the asbestos products it sold in this State.

Opp. at 8. Plaintiffs' jurisdictional theory thus relies on two sets of allegations in their complaint: that Viking was "a supplier of asbestos-containing Viking pumps," FAC ¶ 6, and that Viking was "authorized to do and [is] doing business" and has "regularly conducted business" in California, id. ¶ 9.

Viking contends that Plaintiffs have not provided any "evidence that Mr. Toy's injuries arose out of Viking's California activities" and hypothesize that "it seems much likelier that Viking supplied its products to the Navy somewhere outside of California." Reply at 5. But Viking has not offered any evidence in support of its alternative theory (evidence that Viking presumably would possess). Rather, Viking attached excerpts from a fifteen-year-old deposition, which seems to show that it did not have any facilities in California—at least in 2003, according to the testimony of a witness whose basis for knowledge is unexplained. Because Viking's submissions do not contradict the allegations in the pleadings, the Court must accept Plaintiffs' pleadings as true for purposes of this motion. See CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1073. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' allegations, though meager, establish a prima facie basis for specific personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has alleged that Viking supplied its asbestos-containing products into the California market, thereby purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting business in California and subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of California's courts. Viking may ultimately be correct that the Court does not have specific jurisdiction over it—but it has not submitted any evidence to repudiate Plaintiffs' allegations. Therefore, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss, but it does so without prejudice to renewal after the parties have had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Varney v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 3:18-CV-05105-RJB, 2018 WL 1517669, at [*2] (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction where defendants had "not controverted any of the factual allegations derived from the Complaint relied upon by Plaintiffs in their showing of personal jurisdiction")

IV. CONCLUSION

Viking's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• California asbestos laws
• California asbestos exposure sites