Government Contractor Defense and Removal in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on government contractor defense: 310 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Louisiana

• Lebeau v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the 30-day removal clock for federal officer removal starts only when a voluntary act by the plaintiff makes removability unequivocally clear and certain, and a defendant's subjective knowledge or its own production of documents does not start it.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association (2023). A federal court that had jurisdiction at the time of federal officer removal does not lose it because the claims that supported removal were later dismissed, and it may also keep the remaining state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.
• Thompson v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2023). Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant satisfies the 'related to' requirement by showing the plaintiff was likely exposed to asbestos being used under a federal officer's direction, with no direct causal nexus required.
• Adams v. Eagle, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a party must show significant exposure to asbestos attributable to the defendant and that the exposure was a substantial factor in the injury; a reasonable jury could find both here, so summary judgment was not proper.
• Adams v. Eagle, Inc. (2022). The Boyle defense to a failure-to-warn claim requires government-approved warnings or a reasonably precise government specification, and a minimum safety standard like the Walsh-Healey Act is not one. Yearsley immunity does not protect a contractor from claims of its own separate negligence in carrying out a government contract.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). An expert's testimony is admissible if relevant to a pending issue, such as a shipyard's knowledge of asbestos hazards for a sophisticated-purchaser defense, but testimony on issues already resolved by summary judgment or outside the expert's field is excluded.
• Crossland v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). Under the Fifth Circuit's modified Boyle test for failure-to-warn claims, a contractor must show the government exercised discretion over the warnings. Yearsley immunity covers only acts authorized and directed by the government, not separate negligence in workplace safety and warnings.
• Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A federal court that properly had federal officer removal jurisdiction at removal keeps that jurisdiction even after the federal contractor defense fails, and may keep exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims where no novel issues exist, the case is advanced and trial is near.
• Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A contractor asserting the Boyle defense to failure-to-warn and failure-to-prevent-spread claims must show the government exercised discretion in approving specific warnings or precise specifications; minimum safety standards are not enough. Yearsley does not shield a contractor's own negligence that is separate from the acts the government authorized.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (2022). A state-law preference for terminally ill litigants does not bind a federal court in a case removed under the federal officer removal statute. Good cause for an expedited trial was not shown where defendants needed time for discovery and would be prejudiced.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2022). Under Rule 56(d), a summary judgment motion filed very early, before discovery beyond the plaintiff's deposition, is premature and may be denied where the opposing party shows specific discovery needed to oppose it.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2022). Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only raise a colorable federal defense, one that is not wholly insubstantial or frivolous, and need not prove the defense on the merits. The 30-day removal period runs from service of the petition on the defendant, not from the date the petition was filed.
• Roussell v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). Federal-officer removal jurisdiction is judged on the record at the time of removal, so a court does not lose jurisdiction when the claims tied to the federal contractor defense are later dismissed. The court may also keep supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
• Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls (2022). A federal court may keep supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal-officer defendants are dismissed, given the case's age, extensive discovery, absence of novel state-law issues, and judicial resources already spent. Diversity is judged when the action is filed, so adding a nondiverse party later does not defeat it.
• Stansbury v. McCARTY Corporation (2022). The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, raised only as a preemption defense, does not create federal removal jurisdiction. A court that has federal officer removal jurisdiction may keep the remaining state claims after the federal officer defendant leaves, but it may decline to under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
• Stansbury v. McCARTY Corporation (2022). Where a third-party defendant properly removes under the federal officer removal statute, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state-law claims when they are sufficiently intertwined with the removed claim that they do not predominate, and judicial economy, fairness and comity do not require remand.
• Tabor v. William B. Reily & Co., Inc. (2022). A defendant must remove within 30 days of service when the initial pleading affirmatively reveals removability, and a federal officer removal defendant must show a causal nexus between its work under federal direction and the plaintiff's claims, supported by evidence.
• Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). The government contractor defense to a failure-to-warn claim requires evidence that the federal government was involved in the decision to give or not give a warning and that the contractor complied with the government's warning provisions. Avondale offered no such evidence.
• Clark v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). Under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only show a broad connection or association between the plaintiff's claims and its acts done under federal direction; evidence that a particular person exposed the plaintiff worked on a federal vessel is not required.
• Danos v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2021). A court of appeals decision in another case involving the same defendant, a similar factual situation and a similar legal issue can be an "order" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), so the Fifth Circuit's en banc Latiolais decision started a new 30-day removal period for Avondale under the federal officer removal statute.
• Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2021). Avondale and Hopeman Brothers can remove an asbestos case under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), following earlier decisions that allowed it.
• Labarre v. Bienville Auto Parts, Inc. (2021). A federal-officer removal clock under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3) starts only when an amended pleading or other paper makes the basis for removal unequivocally clear and certain; a suspicion from experience or vague references to federal vessels is not enough.
• Legendre v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2021). Under the federal officer removal statute, a contractor need only show a colorable federal defense and a connection to acts taken under federal direction. Factual disputes are resolved in favor of federal jurisdiction, and a government contractor defense is colorable when it is plausible.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Association (2021). Under the federal officer removal statute, the connection requirement is read broadly, so asbestos exposure at a shipyard building federal vessels satisfies it even if the plaintiff never boarded one. The 30-day removal clock starts only when the plaintiff's pleading unequivocally reveals why the case is removable, and a defendant may remove before then.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (2021). Federal officer removal's connection prong is met where federal vessels were under construction at the shipyard during the exposure period, even if plaintiff never boarded one; the 30-day removal clock runs only from a plaintiff's pleading that unequivocally shows why the case is removable, so removal before that trigger is timely.
• Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corporation (2021). A defendant may remove under the federal officer statute based on the full state-court record if it raises a colorable government contractor defense. Mesothelioma claims accruing after the 1975 Louisiana workers' compensation amendment are barred by the exclusive remedy provision, and plaintiffs needed evidence of significant asbestos exposure before that date to avoid the bar.
• Williams v. Seidenbach (2021). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product as a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the burden is not relaxed in a long-latency, multiple-defendant case. Federal officer removal was proper because the contractor raised a colorable government contractor defense.
• Bourgeois v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2020). After the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Latiolais, an asbestos negligence claim against a shipyard is removable under the federal officer statute if connected to work done at a federal officer's direction and a colorable federal defense exists. Latiolais also counts as an "order" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) that started a new 30-day removal period.
• Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2020). A Fifth Circuit en banc decision in an unrelated case can be an "order" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) when it involves the same defendant and a similar situation and resolves the legal issue that makes the case removable. The removal clock therefore started only after Latiolais, and the defendants met the requirements for federal officer removal under § 1442(a)(1).
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2020). Receipt of a deposition transcript revealing previously unstated facts can be an "order or other paper" that starts the 30-day removal clock. A defendant meets the federal officer removal test by colorably showing a Boyle government contractor defense, person status, action under a federal officer's direction, and a connection to that act, with the statute construed liberally.
• Hernandez v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2020). Under Latiolais (5th Cir. en banc), a shipbuilder that shows a colorable government contractor defense, status as a person, acting under federal direction, and a connection between the alleged negligence and that work may remove under the federal officer removal statute.
• Holmes v. Bossier (2020). A decision in a separate case can be an "order" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) that restarts the removal period when the cases share the same defendants and similar facts and the decision resolves a legal issue that makes the case removable. Latiolais met this test, so removal within thirty days of it was timely.
• Jackson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2020). A subcontractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it shows a colorable federal defense, that it is a person, that it acted under a federal officer's directions, and that the charged conduct is connected or associated with those directions. At the removal stage the court may consider affidavits and deposition testimony from other cases without applying strict admissibility rules.
• Jackson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2020). Remand was warranted because the plaintiff had settled with the removing defendants and no claimed basis for removal jurisdiction existed as to the remaining defendants, so the court did not reach the validity or merits of the federal officer removal.
• Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2020). After the 2011 amendment adding "relating to," a defendant may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it asserts a colorable federal defense, is a "person," acted pursuant to a federal officer's directions, and the charged conduct is connected or associated with that act. The earlier "causal nexus" test is overruled.
• McAllister v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). Under general maritime law a plaintiff must show a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in the injury, and circumstantial evidence can show exposure, but not when nothing shows the defendant's product was present at the worksite. Louisiana law governed successor liability and does not recognize the product line exception.
• Roussell v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2020). A defendant seeking federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) need only show a colorable (plausible) federal defense, such as Boyle government contractor immunity, and that defense can rest on work on government-contract vessels built under federal specifications requiring asbestos.
• Sampey v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2020). The 30-day federal-officer removal clock under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) runs from receipt of an "other paper" that makes removability unequivocally clear. A bare witness-list name with no stated connection to the claims does not start it.
• Waguespack v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2020). In federal officer removal, the 30-day removal clock starts from the initial pleading only if it affirmatively reveals on its face the allegations supporting removal; otherwise a later 'other paper' such as a deposition transcript can start the clock under § 1446(b)(3).
• Bondurant v. 3M Company (2019). A boilerplate disclaimer of claims arising from federal officers' acts does not defeat federal officer removal where the plaintiff still brings strict liability claims and defendants show a colorable government contractor defense, federal direction and a causal nexus.
• Knight v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2019). On the present record it was premature to sever claims, remand, or abstain in a case removed under the federal officer removal statute, and Colorado River abstention appeared inapplicable because removal of the entire case left no parallel state action.
• Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2019). Under binding circuit precedent (Bartel, Legendre), federal officer removal requires a causal nexus between actions taken under federal direction and the plaintiff's claims, and negligent failure-to-warn claims about asbestos do not meet it where the government did not control the shipyard's safety practices. A panel cannot overrule that precedent despite the 2011 "relating to" amendment.
• Parfait v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2019). A notice of removal under the federal officer removal statute is untimely when the state court petition itself set forth the facts supporting removal, so a later deposition does not restart the 30-day clock. Under binding Fifth Circuit law, no causal nexus exists where the plaintiff limits his claim against the contractor to negligence.
• Brown v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2018). Federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) requires a causal nexus between the federal officer's direction and the challenged conduct, and negligence claims for failure to warn or adopt safety procedures for asbestos do not meet it under Fifth Circuit precedent.
• Burkart v. PPG Industries, Inc. (2018). Following its decision in Guillot, the court held that Avondale did not show a causal nexus between the federal requirement to use asbestos-containing materials and its ability to comply with state-law duties to warn and safeguard, so federal officer removal failed.
• Guillot v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2018). Federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) still requires a causal nexus between the defendant's conduct under federal direction and the plaintiff's claims. The 2011 "relating to" amendment did not change this under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, and federal direction to use asbestos does not reach failure-to-warn or safety claims when the government did not control safety.
• Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2018). Under the federal officer removal statute, a shipyard sued only in negligence for its own safety practices must show the federal government controlled those practices to establish a causal nexus. A government requirement to use asbestos is not enough.
• Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2018). Under the circuit's binding Bartel precedent, federal officer removal of negligence claims requires a causal nexus, and none exists where the government did not restrict the contractor's freedom to adopt the safety measures the plaintiffs say would have prevented the injury.
• Melancon v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2018). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant must show a causal nexus between the government's direction and the charged conduct. Negligent failure to warn, train and adopt safety procedures about asbestos is private conduct that implicates no federal interest, so it does not meet that requirement.
• Melancon v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2018). Federal officer removal requires a causal nexus between the defendant's actions under federal direction and the plaintiff's claims. Negligence and failure-to-warn claims about how asbestos was handled do not meet it without evidence the government controlled safety procedures or warnings, and a boiler maker acts under a federal officer only for boilers made for the military.