Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

California

• Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Company (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2010). A plaintiff must show with admissible evidence that he was exposed to the defendant's asbestos with enough frequency and regularity to be a substantial factor in causing his disease; a party cannot create a triable issue with a declaration that contradicts his earlier discovery responses without explanation, and mere possibility of exposure is insufficient.
• Wilson v. Certainteed Corporation (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2010). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos product to establish causation, and circumstantial evidence that amounts only to speculation or the possibility of exposure does not create a triable issue of fact.
• Clemmer v. Thorpe Insulation Company (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2009). A plaintiff may prove exposure to a defendant's asbestos product through circumstantial evidence that the product was sufficiently prevalent at the work site to support a reasonable inference of exposure.
• Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2009). A manufacturer is not strictly liable for failure to warn or design defect from asbestos products it did not make, supply or place in the chain of distribution, even if their use with its product was foreseeable. The component parts doctrine also bars liability absent proof that the defendant's own component caused the injury.
• Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2009). A valve manufacturer that did not make or supply the asbestos-containing packing, gaskets or insulation that caused the plaintiff's exposure is not in the chain of distribution of those products and has no strict liability duty to warn of their hazards. The same reasoning bars the design defect claim, and the component parts doctrine supports it.
• O'neil v. Crane Co. (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2009). Makers of pumps and valves designed to be used with asbestos insulation and packing are not shielded by the component parts defense. They can be strictly liable for failure to warn and design defect when a user is injured by replacement asbestos used with their products during ordinary maintenance.
• Behshid v. Bondex International, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2008). In California asbestos cancer cases, a plaintiff need not show that fibers from the defendant's product began the malignancy. It is enough to show in reasonable medical probability that exposure to the product was a substantial factor contributing to the risk of cancer. A defendant seeking to assign fault to 'others' must offer substantial evidence that the others' products were defective and a cause of the injury.
• Holliday v. Warren Pumps LLC (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2008). An expert declaration built on speculation (that a pump's asbestos packing and gaskets were removed in an overhaul years before the plaintiff's service, and that fibers then resuspended) lacks foundation and cannot create a triable issue of exposure to the defendant's product.
• Norris v. Crane Company (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2008). Under Rutherford's substantial factor test, exposure to asbestos from a defendant's product that adds to the cumulative dose can support causation. The consumer expectations test may be used for a design defect claim based on asbestos-containing valve gaskets and packing.
• Whitlock v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2008). An order granting a new trial for juror misconduct, with a statement of reasons, is reviewed for abuse of discretion, including the prejudice finding. A juror's injection of outside specialized knowledge is misconduct that raises a presumption of prejudice.
• Bakkie v. Union Carbide Corporation (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2007). A raw-asbestos supplier is not relieved of its duty to warn merely because the buyer-employer knew or should have known of asbestos hazards or was subject to OSHA rules. A noneconomic damages award that is grossly disproportionate to the evidence and was influenced by improper argument may be reduced or retried on appeal.
• Cadlo v. Metalclad Insulation Corporation (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2007). When a trial court validly enters a judgment nunc pro tunc to a date before the plaintiff's death, that date decides whether Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 bars pain-and-suffering and future economic damages. A verdict exceeding a plaintiff's section 998 offer is prima facie evidence the offer was reasonable.
• Quarles v. Advocate Mines Limited (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2006). A supplier of raw asbestos fiber that is used in a finished product can be liable for design defect under the consumer-expectations test, and substantial evidence supported the jury's findings on liability, exposure, causation and damages.
• Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2006). A defendant moving for summary judgment cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff merely by showing the plaintiff's deposition testimony that he does not recall the defendant's product; it must show in some way that the plaintiff does not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence of causation.
• Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2004). A former manufacturer that sold its product line before the plaintiff's exposure is not liable in fraud, concert of action or strict liability for the successor's later-made product absent any role in the design, manufacture, distribution or marketing of the product that exposed him.
• Chavers v. Gatke Corp. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2003). In California a civil conspiracy can be formed only by parties who already owe the plaintiff an independent tort duty, and concert of action cannot make a manufacturer liable for an industry's products absent evidence its own product caused the injury.
• Ferris v. Gatke Corporation (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2003). Even assuming Sindell market share liability could apply to asbestos friction products, plaintiffs failed to supply its requisites, including proof of the defendant's share of the national market. A civil conspiracy claim requires that each defendant already owe the plaintiff an independent tort duty.
• McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2002). A defendant can shift the burden on summary judgment by showing through the plaintiff's deposition that he had no knowledge of exposure to its products, and the plaintiff must then produce non-speculative evidence of exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product; mere possibility and a conclusory expert opinion are not enough.
• Gatton v. AP Green Services, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 1998). Deposition testimony from another action cannot be treated as an affidavit to avoid the former-testimony hearsay requirements of Evidence Code section 1292 (witness unavailability and a similar interest and motive); Williams v. Saga Enterprises was rejected on this point.
• Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 1995). A plaintiff must prove exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and a reasonable medical probability that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease; the court declined to shift the burden of proof on causation to defendants under an alternative liability theory.
• Dumin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 1994). Even under the more lenient standard for proving exposure to a defendant's asbestos product, circumstantial evidence must support a reasonable inference of exposure rather than conjecture. The alternative liability theory of Summers v. Tice only shifts the burden of proof among proven wrongdoers and does not excuse proof that the defendant's product was present.
• Smith v. ACandS, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 1994). A plaintiff must prove the defendant's asbestos products or activities were present at his work site, and speculation will not do. A landowner is not vicariously liable under the peculiar risk doctrine for one contractor's negligence that injures employees of other hired contractors.
• Skip Fordyce, Inc. v. Workers'comp. Appeals BD. (4th Appellate District, 2nd Division, 1983). A workers' compensation award must rest on substantial evidence of work-related asbestos exposure, and multiple-level hearsay from a doctor's report, a general pamphlet and an unsupported 'admission' that brake linings contain asbestos does not supply it. Medical opinions based on statistical studies can be substantial evidence of causation.

Connecticut

• Carlson v. CBS Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A loss of consortium claim under Connecticut law fails when the injured spouse's underlying claim fails.
• Bagley v. Adel Wiggins Group (2017). When it is not conceded and not within lay jurors' common knowledge, a plaintiff must prove with competent expert testimony that a product emitted respirable asbestos fibers when used as it was, in order to show the product was dangerous and caused the disease. Without that proof, both strict liability and negligence claims fail, and this requirement existed under law predating the court's recent product liability decisions.
• Bray v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2015). Under either the Connecticut Product Liability Act or general maritime law, a plaintiff must show with direct or circumstantial evidence that he was exposed to the particular defendant's product. Speculative equipment lists and inadmissible hearsay do not meet that burden. A loss of consortium claim under Connecticut law fails when the injured spouse's underlying claim fails.

Delaware

• Salvemini v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and vague testimony that cannot separate that defendant's product from others fails. General maritime law did not reach a spouse's land-based take-home exposure when the plaintiffs did not show the maritime connection test was met.
• Roadarmel v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2023). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Bystander testimony about dust from repairs of the defendant's engines was enough to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Droz v. Hennessy Industries, LLC (2022). Under Rule 56 and Stigliano, once a defendant shows it made both asbestos-containing and asbestos-free products at the time of exposure, the plaintiff need only show by direct or circumstantial evidence a genuine issue whether she was exposed to the asbestos-containing product; exclusive use or direct evidence is not required.
• Thorne v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2022). Under Iowa law, a valve attached to real property remains an improvement after it is detached and refurbished, so the statute of repose bars claims based on exposure during that work. Iowa Code § 686B.7(5) also shields a defendant from liability for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.
• Gilstrap v. CBS Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant exposure to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A failure to respond to a summary judgment motion does not alone justify judgment, but here the undisputed record showed no such evidence.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product, that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and that the defendant made or sold it; and a manufacturer may have a duty to warn about asbestos parts incorporated into its equipment under the DeVries test, which here raised genuine fact issues.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a manufacturer may owe a duty to warn about third-party replacement parts when its product requires them, it knows or has reason to know of the danger, and it has no reason to believe users will realize that danger. Disputed facts on these elements and on the Boyle elements preclude summary judgment.
• Cox v. Nash Engineering Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must first show exposure to the specific defendant's product before substantial factor causation is reached; without product identification evidence, strict liability, wrongful death, consortium and punitive damages claims fail.
• Carnes v. General Dynamics Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under Texas law a plaintiff must prove that, more probably than not, he breathed asbestos fibers from the defendant's product, and an expert's speculation without record support of asbestos in the components cannot create a genuine factual dispute.
• Pruitt v. Gardner Denver (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Circumstantial evidence that a worker repaired a defendant's pumps with asbestos-containing gaskets and packing, with enough frequency and proximity, can create a jury question on whether the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury, even without a witness who identified the product by maker.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under Stigliano, where a manufacturer made both asbestos and non-asbestos versions of a product, the plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence of exposure to the asbestos-containing version. Under Rhode Island's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure to friable asbestos in connection with the defendant's product.
• Pruitt v. Amdura (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; circumstantial evidence can suffice, but not a chain of speculative inferences. Under Georgia law the plaintiff must show the defendant's asbestos product was used at the job site and that he was in proximity to it when it was used.
• Pruitt v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Georgia law requires proof that the product was a contributing factor and that the plaintiff was near its use. An unopposed motion still requires the court to find that the undisputed facts support judgment.
• Vocciante v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or mere presence of the product somewhere at the workplace, does not suffice without evidence of frequency, regularity or proximity.
• Evans v. Imo Industries, Inc. (2019). An expert may be qualified without direct experience in the subject, and lack of experience goes to weight; but expert testimony lacks "fit" and is excluded when the documents relied on do not govern the defendant's products. Late disclosure of reliance documents is harmless where the opposing party had notice and was not prejudiced.
• Mosher v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal exposure or the mere presence of a product aboard a ship is insufficient.
• Mosher v. ABB (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law and Colorado law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos-containing product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal or unidentified exposure is insufficient, and failure to oppose a motion does not alone justify summary judgment.
• Stimson v. J-M Mfg. Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A plaintiff must show more than a possibility of exposure to the defendant's asbestos product, and a motion for reargument cannot rely on deposition testimony that counsel knew of and could have presented before the summary judgment ruling.
• Rogers v. Asbestos Corp. Limited (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under Delaware law a plaintiff must show that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the job site and that he was near it when it was used. Facts recited in earlier cases cannot stand in for evidence, and speculation about the product is not enough.
• Rogers v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing injury; mere presence of a product at the workplace is insufficient. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff must show a product nexus, meaning proximity to the defendant's asbestos product when it was used.
• Rogers v. Nosroc Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under Delaware law a plaintiff must show a product nexus between exposure to the defendant's product and his injury, and under maritime law that the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury; a plaintiff who identifies no exposure to the defendant's product cannot meet either test.
• Rowland v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A plaintiff must offer evidence, beyond speculation, that the product used actually contained the defendant's asbestos. Where the defendant was only one of several suppliers to the product's maker, that inference cannot reasonably be drawn.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under maritime law and Washington law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A general recollection of a manufacturer's name, with no detail on where, when or how often he worked with the product, does not meet that burden.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show asbestos exposure from the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing injury, and about five brake jobs over seventeen years was de minimis exposure that did not meet that standard. A manufacturer generally has no duty to warn of dangers of another manufacturer's product, and Washington does not allow punitive damages unless the legislature authorizes them.