Asbestos Timeline: The 1970s

Every dated document we have published from the 1970s, year by year: 175 from the J-M chronology, 138 from the Motley 1000, 13 from the J-M litigation chronology, 1 from the Simpson Papers. Each line links to the document itself. For the story these documents tell, read the 1970s on our history page.

Key documents

• February 27, 1970. A survey of J-M plants finds many workers with pneumoconiosis never told; Billerica says the philosophy had been "to withhold this info." Read it
• May 27, 1970. Billerica's Paul Chapman reports he tried to keep a worker with signs of asbestosis from learning he might have an industrial disease claim. Read it
• June 11, 1970. An Asbestos Textile Institute committee drafts a customer health brochure that a union could not use against management, and urges caution on a federal health form. Read it
• September 28, 1970. A J-M management report concedes asbestos causes disease, counts a sharp rise in compensation claims, and orders uncontrollable dust operations closed by April 1971. Read it
• December 11, 1970. J-M's company-wide X-ray review finds severe lung disease problems at seven plants, with 30% of Billerica X-rays read as pneumoconiosis. Read it
• February 4, 1971. An industry doctor calls Dr. Selikoff "dangerous" at an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting, and J-M's C. L. Sheckler says warning labels will likely become mandatory. Read it
• February 17, 1971. A J-M-funded study of the company's retirees finds lung cancer deaths at two and a half times the normal rate, and four times among maintenance men. Read it
• May 21, 1971. J-M managers agree to resign from Selikoff's insulation research board over an article finding the 5-fiber limit too high, and refuse him workers' health records. Read it
• September 20, 1971. J-M's Pittsburg plant is told not to inform former employees of hazards they were exposed to before the OSHA rules of August 1971. Read it
• November 16, 1971. J-M's lawyers agree not to revise the warning label on its asbestos products until the Borel appeal is decided, so as not to suggest it was inadequate. Read it
• February 14, 1972. An industrial hygienist writing to the American Mutual Insurance Alliance opposes a 2-fiber asbestos limit and warning signs naming asbestosis, citing their impact on claims. Read it
• March 16, 1972. Matthew Swetonic, for the asbestos industry's association and Johns-Manville, tells the Labor Department hearing that a two-fiber limit is unsupported and opposes cancer warning labels on most asbestos products. Read it
• November 10, 1972. Dr. Joseph Goodman tells Raybestos-Manhattan's president that asbestos undoubtedly causes lung cancer and mesothelioma, and that public relations is not the answer. Read it
• 1973. Dr. George Wright writes that J-M left World War II without an adequate health program and "Pace was not kept with what was known." Read it
• April 12, 1973. J-M lawyer J. A. McKinney urges ending crocidolite and amosite use and dust over 5 fibers, warning of "excessive future liabilities." Read it
• September 20, 1973. Defense counsel in Borel write that their "principal practical ambition" is to delay publication of the Fifth Circuit opinion "before the deluge starts." Read it
• October 2, 1973. John H. Marsh writes that the industry had hoped NIOSH would study a dustier plant than J-M's Manville textile plant, fearing a stricter standard. Read it
• March 1974. J-M first tells investors of asbestos lawsuits: 29 suits, with "adequate legal defenses and insurance coverage" and no material effect expected. Read it
• June 11, 1974. Reitze writes that in 1947 J-M's health research "was handled by our Legal Department on a hush-hush basis." Read it
• June 28, 1974. M. Q. Scowcroft warns that publishing the McGill safety garment study would be extremely damaging to asbestos textile makers and the whole protective clothing industry. Read it
• July 15, 1974. John J. Magenheimer writes that the McGill report will likely be published and that Raybestos-Manhattan can affect only its timing and possibly its tone. Read it
• August 22, 1974. Reitze agrees that J-M has "a definite liability" for leaving labels off products sold abroad: "We know of the hazards." Read it
• December 18, 1974. J. H. Marsh reports that a British industry doctor answered every question on the asbestos standard with "ask me in 20 years," and regrets U.S. industry's absence from earlier meetings. Read it
• January 17, 1975. Seeking help for J-M's defense in insulators' lawsuits, Dr. George Wright tells Cape Asbestos that in hindsight warnings "probably should have" come earlier. Read it
• June 27, 1975. Joseph Glennon asks that Dr. Enterline's study agreement require Raybestos-Manhattan's prior approval before any data from the study are published. Read it
• September 12, 1975. J-M's former medical director, Dr. Kenneth Smith, records that non-medical officials in New York decided whether workers were told their X-ray results. Read it
• September 29, 1975. Union Carbide's H. B. Rhodes reports that mesothelioma findings look discouraging and that the British two-fiber limit does not consider mesothelioma. Read it
• November 11, 1975. W. B. Reitze warns that equipment planned for J-M's Mexican venture with Peñoles, which produced 50–100 f/cc at Reeves, will endanger the workers' lives. Read it
• December 15, 1975. W. B. Reitze writes that after J-M's U.S. experience it cannot morally keep making asbestos Thermobestos in Brazil, and backs switching to Thermo-12. Read it
• December 8, 1976. The Asbestos Information Association widens its literature review to asbestosis because a chronology "would be useful in litigation," and its counsel begins interviewing possible expert witnesses. Read it
• December 9, 1976. Asbestos Information Association directors fund a study of a captive insurer as product liability coverage is cancelled, and hear their research program exists to improve lawsuit defenses. Read it
• April 11, 1977. Raybestos-Manhattan's John Marsh sends Nicolet's chairman a history of exposure limits and the 1943 asbestosis letters, saying industry could not be expected to know more than the Public Health Service. Read it
• June 10, 1977. W. B. Reitze reports that staying in Asbestos de Mexico without a cleanup would be "immoral, if not criminal," with 900 to 1,200 workers at risk. Read it
• June 22, 1977. Dr. Kotin rewrites J-M's president's letter to Nicolet to drop his view that crocidolite causes mesothelioma and to tone down the Manville plant's record. Read it
• August 12, 1977. J-M staff conclude it is in the company's interest to delay OSHA's asbestos hearings for years, and weigh whether a smoking-ban petition would speed them up. Read it
• October 1977. The Asbestos Information Association sends Dr. Enterline's completed literature review to special counsel for use in the state of the art legal defense. Read it
• November 29, 1977. NIOSH sends Raybestos-Manhattan a draft study of its plant's workers concluding that chrysotile exposure "poses a severe carcinogenic risk of malignancies of multiple sites." Read it
• December 8, 1977. At a Waukegan meeting on compensation claims, J-M staff ask whether to tell flagged workers now or "wait until is disabled." Read it
• December 14, 1977. The industry's trade group hears its counsel's seven-point "State of the Art Defense," dating knowledge of insulators' disease to Selikoff's 1964 work and warning labels to 1965-66. Read it
• December 22, 1977. With Pittsburg plant medical files showing undiagnosed disease, W. B. Reitze argues J-M must tell former employees, though it could bring "an onslaught" of compensation cases. Read it
• January 25, 1978. The Asbestos Information Association's counsel drafts a letter offering non-members Enterline's lung cancer review for $2,000, as privileged work product, for use in a pending lawsuit. Read it
• July 31, 1978. Union Carbide's Harrison Rhodes and Raybestos-Manhattan's Dr. Lewinsohn disagree over whether the industry should call for medical checks of all exposed workers. Read it
• November 29, 1978. Philip Enterline's industry-funded history finds the asbestos and lung cancer link accepted in Germany by the early 1940s, and settled in the United States by 1964. Read it
• January 12, 1979. A J-M public relations executive tells the chairman the company's public positions on asbestos do not match the facts and it must stop "playing semantic games." Read it
• April 17, 1979. Dr. Paul Kotin warns that Waukegan's failure to log occupational disease cases since 1972 appears willful and urges reporting them to OSHA at once. Read it
• April 19, 1979. J-M's associate general counsel recommends adding 23 unrecorded Waukegan disease cases to the OSHA logs without telling OSHA. Read it
• September 24, 1979. J-M managers conclude the company is "better off not labeling" Transite pipe, since a label would bring California notice and inspection rules. Read it

1970

• 1970. The ACGIH keeps its asbestos limit at 5 million particles per cubic foot and proposes a new limit of 5 fibers per milliliter. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 2, 1970. J-M's Environmental Control Subcommittee recommends cutting the company's respirator level for asbestos dust from 12 to 5 fibers per cubic centimeter. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 18, 1970. H. M. Jackson asks Dr. Davison to find out whether J-M plants tell employees with occupational lung disease about their condition. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 25, 1970. A J-M representative reports W. R. Grace is seeking an asbestos substitute for medical reasons and suggests J-M is "over doing it" on dust control. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 27, 1970. A survey of J-M plants finds many workers with pneumoconiosis never told; Billerica says the philosophy had been "to withhold this info." Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 27, 1970. R. S. Coleman notes that National Asbestos Mines' deal to make asbestos-cement sheets for J-M requires buying J-M fiber, and reviews fiber sales to other companies. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 11, 1970. Manville plant managers voice "tremendous concern" over workmen's compensation and occupational disease costs rising "at an astronomical rate." Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 27, 1970. Unable to improve dust in the old section of the Asbestos, Quebec, plant, Hutcheson avoids enforcing respirators for fear of public "discussion of the entire health question." Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 1970. J-M researchers publish tests of dust respirators against a chrysotile test dust; all but one let through less than 1% of the fiber. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 7, 1970. An incentive-pay audit of Min-K panel pressing finds a station rated an out-of-line dust condition, where respirators were not being worn. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 11, 1970. The Industrial Health Foundation's president promises Raybestos-Manhattan advance notice of publications and a share in research planning in return for its funding. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 11, 1970. J-M's Celite Division, whose asbestos-containing products carried no asbestos warning, proposes caution notices after being told one is required. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 27, 1970. Billerica's Paul Chapman reports he tried to keep a worker with signs of asbestosis from learning he might have an industrial disease claim. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 9, 1970. Pundsack recommends a caution label for J-M's Micro-Fibers after animal studies found mesothelioma tumors and granulomas from injected fibers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 11, 1970. An Asbestos Textile Institute committee drafts a customer health brochure that a union could not use against management, and urges caution on a federal health form. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 1, 1970. J-M's Industrial Insulations Division orders caution labels on its asbestos products, warning that breathing the dust over long periods "may be harmful." Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 7, 1970. J-M International asks whether export shipments must carry the asbestos warning labels just ordered for domestic shipments. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 13, 1970. Breese advises that export shipments "legally" should carry caution labels, but notes possible "policy and/or business considerations." Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 21, 1970. Owens-Corning's payment records show it buying asbestos fiber from Johns-Manville in Ontario for its Berlin plant. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 23, 1970. Burleson orders that customer questions about the health hazards of asbestos products go to C. L. Sheckler, to "protect the company." Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 1970. J-M compiles a history of its health research, from the 1928 Saranac animal studies to twelve current asbestos projects, for use with the press. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 9, 1970. Berkeley researchers report that cutting asbestos insulation in a closed room can raise fiber levels far above the proposed limit. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 28, 1970. A J-M management report concedes asbestos causes disease, counts a sharp rise in compensation claims, and orders uncontrollable dust operations closed by April 1971. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 8, 1970. Travelers warns J-M's counsel that news of settling an asbestos claim may stir up "many dormant claims that we know are in the bushes." Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 13, 1970. Massachusetts occupational hygiene officials ask Billerica for employees' X-ray dates and a list of asbestosis-related claims; J-M agrees to provide them. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 5, 1970. Eight companies led by J-M form the Asbestos Information Association/North America to inform the public about "the asbestos/health problem." Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 20, 1970. J-M's Toronto plant asks Dr. Davison what a "no dust" restriction means for workers with pneumoconiosis, given the company's and ACGIH's differing limits. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 24, 1970. Dr. Bristol's X-ray readings for J-M are tabulated: 30% of Billerica workers' sets show pneumoconiosis, with Nashua and Pittsburg above 10%. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 8, 1970. A marine customer threatens to cancel orders unless J-M stops putting asbestos caution labels on Marinite sheets, which take ten minutes each to sand off. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 10, 1970. After a customer complaint, J-M switches its Marinite marine sheets from stick-on caution labels to a red rubber stamp with the same asbestos warning. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 11, 1970. J-M's company-wide X-ray review finds severe lung disease problems at seven plants, with 30% of Billerica X-rays read as pneumoconiosis. Read it (J-M chronology)

1971

• 1971. Finnish researchers report that dust levels in insulation work far exceed recommended limits and that insulators seldom wear masks. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 4, 1971. Dr. Davison defends a procedure under which J-M arranges a worker's job transfer before telling him he has pneumoconiosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 25, 1971. Notes from a visit to Johns-Manville's Manville plant record its dust limit of 5, a likely new code of 2, and a mandatory respirator program. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 3, 1971. The Asbestos Textile Institute's board elects new members for Johns-Manville and American Asbestos Textile. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 4, 1971. An industry doctor calls Dr. Selikoff "dangerous" at an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting, and J-M's C. L. Sheckler says warning labels will likely become mandatory. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 17, 1971. A J-M-funded study of the company's retirees finds lung cancer deaths at two and a half times the normal rate, and four times among maintenance men. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 18, 1971. Manville plant staff tell J-M headquarters of difficulties in carrying out the new procedure for restricting and counseling workers with pneumoconiosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 25, 1971. J-M arranges a meeting at its Marrero plant with Tulane's Dr. Hans Weill on how to estimate workers' past exposures for his study. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 17, 1971. Dr. Enterline tells J-M that lung cancer is also higher among Quebec plant workers and among maintenance men at its "non-exposure" plants. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 24, 1971. The Industrial Health Foundation sends its asbestos company sponsors the fibrous dust study report for its annual report, inviting objections to the text. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 12, 1971. Tulane's Dr. Hans Weill sends J-M revised charts grading past dust exposures by job at the Marrero plant, worked out with company staff. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 14, 1971. Waukegan's union learns that workers found to be "dusted" are being moved to other jobs, and seeks to protect their pay. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 26, 1971. National Gypsum sets terms for supplying corrugated asbestos-cement sheets to Johns-Manville Sales Corporation for resale. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 27, 1971. Dr. Davison presses to set up a way of counseling Marrero plant workers found to have pneumoconiosis "as expeditiously as possible." Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 7, 1971. J-M hires Boston University's Dr. Gaensler to examine Billerica workers, with lawyers' requests for results to be referred to the company. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 11, 1971. A J-M regional manager finds the industry's asbestos insulation safety brochure was never sent to J-M's own branch and job site staff. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 12, 1971. J-M headquarters tells the Manville plant to report every possible cancer case, including mesothelioma, and to hold off on exams and lawyers pending review. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 21, 1971. J-M managers agree to resign from Selikoff's insulation research board over an article finding the 5-fiber limit too high, and refuse him workers' health records. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 28, 1971. Dr. Selikoff, at the request of the Manville plant union, asks J-M for employment data and past X-rays to study whether its dust controls protect workers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 28, 1971. Finding Waukegan workers with pleural calcification on file but unrestricted, J-M's doctors put them on a "blue slip" no-dust restriction. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 1, 1971. A J-M research report notes Public Health Service findings of possible asbestos disease among older textile workers, and the industry's opposition to asbestos product bans. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 16, 1971. J-M agrees to give Dr. Selikoff data on Manville plant workers, and asks how he would handle employees who come to him for advice. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 23, 1971. The Manville plant doctor counts 505 pneumoconiosis diagnoses among its workers since 1932, and says many unexplained pleural changes would likely prove to be asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 20, 1971. J-M's Pittsburg plant is told not to inform former employees of hazards they were exposed to before the OSHA rules of August 1971. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 1, 1971. J-M's environmental control department tells plants that dust stations exactly at the limit will now count as under it, following OSHA's wording. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 16, 1971. J-M's lawyers agree not to revise the warning label on its asbestos products until the Borel appeal is decided, so as not to suggest it was inadequate. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 7, 1971. OSHA issues an emergency standard cutting the asbestos limit from 12 to 5 fibers per milliliter, finding the old level a "grave danger." Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 27, 1971. J-M's environmental control department notes that full dust survey record books stopped being kept at the plants two years earlier, at the legal department's request. Read it (J-M chronology)

1972

• 1972. Index cards summarize Italian studies of asbestosis and cancer among Balangero chrysotile miners, compensated asbestosis cases and shipyard workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1972. A photograph of insulation work produced by Raybestos-Manhattan in Philadelphia (exhibit 321). Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1972. A photograph of insulation work produced by Raybestos-Manhattan in Philadelphia (exhibit 322). Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1972. A photograph of insulation work produced by Raybestos-Manhattan in Philadelphia (exhibit 323). Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 4, 1972. J-M agrees to estimate past dust levels at its Manville plant for Dr. Selikoff's study, before seeing the union's own estimates. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 5, 1972. J-M's legal department advises that asbestos fiber exported to Britain and Europe should carry caution labels, despite a fiber division policy against them. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 13, 1972. A J-M lawyer writes that without the 1964 caution labels the company's position in pending asbestos suits "would be all but indefensible." Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 25, 1972. J-M's fiber sales side recommends postponing warning labels on exported asbestos fiber "indefinitely," citing customers' resistance and competition. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 14, 1972. A former J-M plant manager testifies that until about 1970 to 1972, company doctors did not tell workers their examination findings. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 14, 1972. An industrial hygienist writing to the American Mutual Insurance Alliance opposes a 2-fiber asbestos limit and warning signs naming asbestosis, citing their impact on claims. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 25, 1972. Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director argues against a 2-fiber asbestos limit, urging 5 to 7 fibers, and says insulators have the most asbestos disease. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 1972. Reitze, Selikoff and colleagues report heavy asbestos exposure from sprayed fireproofing, reaching other trades working nearby on building sites. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 3, 1972. A J-M fiber division manager urges new dust-tight packaging and shipping, saying safe handling could raise J-M's share of the asbestos market. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 16, 1972. Asbestos Information Association president Albert Fay tells the Labor Department hearing that strict standards could "spell the demise" of much of the asbestos industry. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 16, 1972. Dr. George Wright, presented by Johns-Manville, tells the Labor Department hearing that the five-fiber limit is safe and a two-fiber standard is not justified. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 16, 1972. At the federal asbestos hearings, Fred Pundsack of J-M argues that a label warning of asbestosis and cancer is "unnecessarily frightening" and would destroy the industry. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 16, 1972. Johns-Manville vice president Henry Moreno testifies on the cost and engineering of meeting a lower asbestos limit, saying twenty percent of J-M's sampled stations still exceed five fibers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 16, 1972. Insulation manufacturers' and contractors' spokesmen tell the Labor Department hearing that a two-fiber asbestos standard is impractical and would put small contractors out of business. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 16, 1972. Raybestos-Manhattan's Isaac Weaver tells the Labor Department hearing that a two-fiber asbestos limit is not feasible and urges keeping five fibers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 16, 1972. Matthew Swetonic, for the asbestos industry's association and Johns-Manville, tells the Labor Department hearing that a two-fiber limit is unsupported and opposes cancer warning labels on most asbestos products. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 16, 1972. J-M's executives and consultant testify against OSHA's proposed 2-fiber asbestos limit, one urging a return to 12 fibers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 16, 1972. Johns-Manville's Walter Hesse tells the Labor Department that insulation workers' asbestos exposure fell substantially between 1945 and 1970. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 24, 1972. A survey finds every dust station at J-M's Reeves fiber plant over the limit, some above 100 fibers, and plans no further surveys before the plant closes. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 1972. Waukegan's medical department lists 174 red slip dust-disease cases since 1945, with the date each was diagnosed and the date he was told. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 21, 1972. J-M asks its Waukegan and Manville plants to measure what the new OSHA standard's respirator rules will cost in job rates and incentive pay. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 26, 1972. A J-M division asks which packing and friction products need OSHA caution labels, having labeled none so far, to meet a July 7 deadline. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 27, 1972. J-M's Manville plant begins a survey of how respirator and protective clothing rules under the OSHA standard will affect job rates and incentive pay. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 7, 1972. A Boston University physician reports eight cases of moderately advanced asbestosis among 65 workers examined at J-M's Billerica plant. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 12, 1972. The asbestos industry's trade association advises members not to ask OSHA about labeling borderline products, since OSHA would likely require labels. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 31, 1972. A Raybestos-Manhattan executive learns that textile products are shipping without the warning labels OSHA requires and orders every textile plant checked. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 10, 1972. Dr. Joseph Goodman tells Raybestos-Manhattan's president that asbestos undoubtedly causes lung cancer and mesothelioma, and that public relations is not the answer. Read it (Motley 1000)

1973

• 1973. Dr. George Wright writes that J-M left World War II without an adequate health program and "Pace was not kept with what was known." Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 26, 1973. Men unloading a boxcar of crocidolite at J-M's Waukegan plant are measured at 107 to 170 fibers per cubic centimeter, against a 5-fiber limit. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 7, 1973. Raybestos-Manhattan's I. H. Weaver tells John Marsh he doubts the company wants NIOSH testing its pipe covering, as the asbestos textile industry turns to McGill University. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 12, 1973. J-M lawyer J. A. McKinney urges ending crocidolite and amosite use and dust over 5 fibers, warning of "excessive future liabilities." Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 17, 1973. A J-M-funded researcher reports that chrysotile slows the clearing of a cigarette-smoke carcinogen from hamster lungs, and offers J-M his manuscript first. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 10, 1973. The Quebec mining association reports on Selikoff's Toronto lectures, where industry speakers argue Canadian miners' experience differs from that of U.S. insulators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 22, 1973. J-M's Dr. G. W. Wright attacks Dr. Selikoff's case for a lower asbestos standard and gathers questions for British experts. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 24, 1973. A J-M salesman reports a "horribly dusty mess" at customer Proko's Dallas plant, which drops dust control after its insurer's air samples pass. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 26, 1973. Planning a silica-asbestos study of the Stockton and Manville plants, Reitze writes that J-M has "a very strong moral obligation to our people to find some answers." Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 31, 1973. Hendry replies that J-M's "problems should be minimal" if its fiber reaches Proko undamaged and is handled within OSHA limits. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 20, 1973. Dr. Wright finds Billerica has one of J-M's poorest asbestosis and cancer records and that masks are being substituted for proper dust control. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 20, 1973. Defense counsel in Borel write that their "principal practical ambition" is to delay publication of the Fifth Circuit opinion "before the deluge starts." Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 2, 1973. John H. Marsh writes that the industry had hoped NIOSH would study a dustier plant than J-M's Manville textile plant, fearing a stricter standard. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 6, 1973. Pittsburg plant sends headquarters a confidential list of 96 workers with pneumoconiosis findings on X-ray, including a mesothelioma case. Read it (J-M chronology)

1974

• 1974. The Asbestos Information Association/North America publishes a booklet saying asbestos disease is confined to the workplace and reflects past conditions. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1974. A British asbestos company's medical officer, Hilton Lewinsohn, publishes a review of research on asbestos disease since 1964. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1974. A translated news item in Raybestos-Manhattan's files reports that the Soviet Union is expanding asbestos mining in the Urals as world supply tightens and prices rise. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 21, 1974. J-M's industrial hygienists report that plants neglect stations already under the TLV and that some plants are "playing games" with dust surveys. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 29, 1974. McGill's Dr. G. W. Gibbs tells Raybestos-Manhattan that safety garment fiber levels raise a serious problem, and recalls the contract's one-year delay on publication. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 5, 1974. J. A. McKinney proposes telling overseas customers about asbestos with a label that is not a "warning label," expecting a future legal duty to inform users. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1974. J-M first tells investors of asbestos lawsuits: 29 suits, with "adequate legal defenses and insurance coverage" and no material effect expected. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• March 1974. At customer seminars, J-M says it is responsible for telling customers and their employees about asbestos hazards and how to control them. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1, 1974. John H. Marsh sends managers the McGill report showing safety garment fiber levels above federal limits and calls for immediate engineering improvements. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 1, 1974. J-M's president tells the board that, at the two-fiber OSHA standard, "future asbestos-related disease is not being generated." Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• March 4, 1974. John Magenheimer of Raybestos-Manhattan tells John Marsh that asbestos safety garments give unsatisfactory dust counts and recommends improving the fabric. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 6, 1974. John Hawkins tells John H. Marsh the McGill safety garment research was poorly done and not worthy of publication in its present form. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 12, 1974. John H. Marsh agrees with Cape Asbestos that the U.S. industry association should be more careful about calling some asbestos fibers more hazardous than others. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 12, 1974. John J. Magenheimer rebuts John Hawkins and says the McGill report shows asbestos safety garments expose their wearers to excessive dust. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 14, 1974. Citing Pittsburg's medical history and "the possible litigation that can result," Reitze approves costlier outside medical care for the plant. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 15, 1974. Raybestos-Manhattan's John Marsh defends a McGill study finding problems with asbestos safety garments and urges using it to avoid "undesirable publicity." Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 20, 1974. The Fifth Circuit denies rehearing in Borel; Fibreboard's lawyer expects new suits once the decision is publicized. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 24, 1974. John Marsh thanks Cape Asbestos's Alec Cross for a dust control film and says many American manufacturers take dust control less seriously than British ones. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 11, 1974. Reitze writes that in 1947 J-M's health research "was handled by our Legal Department on a hush-hush basis." Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 14, 1974. J-M attorney R. B. Von Wald calls it "indefensible" to label asbestos products in the United States but not abroad. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 14, 1974. An unsigned review of the asbestos-health literature says asbestosis was a recognized occupational hazard by 1930 and lists unanswered research questions, including whether any exposure is safe. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 14, 1974. W. C. Streib proposes a talc label saying only that it "may contain fibrous tremolite," without the amount. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 17, 1974. John J. Magenheimer urges that customers be told of the McGill safety garment results and that a lower-dust Novatex fabric be marketed quickly. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 17, 1974. At J-M's Nashua plant, three sanding-line workers again refuse to wear dust samplers during the industrial hygiene survey. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 18, 1974. J-M counsel G. E. Parker tells managers their delays in labeling talc containing free tremolite are "not defensible" and must end. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 28, 1974. M. Q. Scowcroft warns that publishing the McGill safety garment study would be extremely damaging to asbestos textile makers and the whole protective clothing industry. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 15, 1974. John J. Magenheimer writes that the McGill report will likely be published and that Raybestos-Manhattan can affect only its timing and possibly its tone. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 19, 1974. Nicolet's Guy Gabrielson urges Raybestos-Manhattan's president to join other asbestos companies in intervening in the Tyler, Texas worker suits against Pittsburgh Corning. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 24, 1974. John H. Marsh writes that the McGill study confirms asbestos safety garments can release fibers above permissible limits, and urges the company to lead on safer garments. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 21, 1974. A Philadelphia meeting reviews mortality and illness data on Raybestos-Manhattan workers and the size of the company's Novatex fibers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 22, 1974. Reitze agrees that J-M has "a definite liability" for leaving labels off products sold abroad: "We know of the hazards." Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 22, 1974. W. J. Kissel sends John Marsh minutes and round-robin X-ray readings exchanged among Raybestos-Manhattan plants, still awaiting North Charleston's readings of Manheim films. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 5, 1974. Touring Waukegan, W. B. Reitze finds broken dust controls, primitive bag opening and broom sweeping, calling the pipe operation among the worst in J-M. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 16, 1974. Although OSHA's final standard drops the ban, W. B. Reitze orders J-M plants to stop sweeping asbestos waste with brooms. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 19, 1974. Dr. Joseph L. Goodman tells Raybestos-Manhattan that dust counts in its plants are still above 2 fibers per cc and lists six steps needing immediate attention. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 27, 1974. Reitze reports Advocate Mine stations "almost out of control" at 23 and 53 f/cc and urges mandatory respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 24, 1974. A company writer tells Dr. A. D. McDonald that Bridgeport-area pleural mesothelioma cases have risen to 27 as Connecticut proposes strict asbestos emission rules. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 28, 1974. John H. Marsh offers Dr. J. C. Gilson Raybestos-Manhattan's dust data and notes cases of mesothelioma among Manheim plant workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 4, 1974. Isaac Weaver sends John Marsh Dr. Schepers' 1965 conference remarks and sees "several possibilities why J-M might wish to denigrate Dr. Schepers." Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 6, 1974. Johns-Manville's new Labeling Review Committee is called to discuss labels on fiber bags and whether to label asbestos products sold abroad. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 7, 1974. Dr. Paul Kotin warns J-M executives that R. T. Vanderbilt objects to J-M's asbestos caution labels on talc, which J-M believes contains fibrous asbestos. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 12, 1974. Former J-M sales official Ward Burleson tells J-M's lawyer he was told in the late 1940s that asbestos lung fibrosis was "really not harmful." Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 18, 1974. J. H. Marsh reports that a British industry doctor answered every question on the asbestos standard with "ask me in 20 years," and regrets U.S. industry's absence from earlier meetings. Read it (Motley 1000)

1975

• 1975. An Asbestos Information Association card tells the public that asbestos disease follows only heavy, long exposure and poses no community hazard. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1975. Handwritten notes for a meeting with medical directors list reasons for Raybestos-Manhattan to share its health data, including the legal risk of withholding it. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 17, 1975. Seeking help for J-M's defense in insulators' lawsuits, Dr. George Wright tells Cape Asbestos that in hindsight warnings "probably should have" come earlier. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 12, 1975. In the Toronto Sun, Dr. Paul Kotin says J-M must handle asbestos safely or get out of the business; Toronto plant workers say they were never told. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 18, 1975. Raybestos-Manhattan's divisions report to John Marsh which asbestos products carry the OSHA caution label, most of them labeled only since 1974. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 19, 1975. Answering a rumor that the Manville plant hid 200 disease cases, Dr. R. M. Liss reports about 20 new cases a year in the 1960s and 7 since. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 28, 1975. Dr. George Wright tells Dr. Kotin the evidence that crocidolite is more dangerous is not conclusive but "provocative," possibly justifying a stricter standard. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1975. J-M tells investors it faces 57 failure-to-warn suits and maintains that no warning was called for before 1964. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• March 3, 1975. At a Canadian government meeting on asbestos rules, J-M says it uses crocidolite in pipe and gives it no special in-plant handling. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 6, 1975. Dr. G. W. Gibbs sends Raybestos-Manhattan his final manuscript on fiber release from asbestos safety garments, submitted to a British journal. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 19, 1975. J-M's London office recommends no physical warning labels on products for Britain until rules are settled; warnings on invoices and literature should "suffice." Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 23, 1975. John Marsh asks Dr. Philip Enterline to review a Cassiar Asbestos chairman's address on asbestos and health that Marsh thinks inaccurate and misleading. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 27, 1975. An Associated Press story reports a study finding occupational disease, including lung disease from asbestos and fibrous dusts, in one of four small-business workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 5, 1975. John H. Marsh warns Raybestos-Manhattan managers that small-shop workers' ignorance of asbestos hazards leaves the industry open to third-party suits after Borel. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 12, 1975. W. B. Reitze reports that asbestos bags reaching J-M's Toronto plant from its Canadian mines carry no OSHA caution label. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 29, 1975. Dr. Philip Enterline proposes a $65,811 study of deaths among about 4,000 workers at Raybestos-Manhattan's Stratford plant and sends a draft agreement. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 29, 1975. J-M's Toronto plant tells employees of the "direct link" between asbestos disease and smoking and bans smoking in its asbestos pipe buildings. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 2, 1975. J-M's Toronto plant manager urges Ontario not to cut the crocidolite limit to 0.2 f/cc, offering 0.5 and citing cost and lack of evidence. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 6, 1975. CBC reports on dust at J-M's Advocate Mine in Newfoundland; the mine manager sends transcripts of each broadcast to J-M's Quebec headquarters. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 27, 1975. Joseph Glennon asks that Dr. Enterline's study agreement require Raybestos-Manhattan's prior approval before any data from the study are published. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 7, 1975. Dr. Graham Gibbs reports to Raybestos-Manhattan on laboratory tests of fiber released from 14 asbestos fabrics used for safety garments. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 14, 1975. Raybestos-Manhattan's J. H. Marsh asks Cape Asbestos's A. A. Cross what a news release for Asbestos magazine should say, having asked Doris Fagan to print nothing meanwhile. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 29, 1975. Filming a J-M health film at the Jeffrey mill, W. A. Cooper finds the bagging floor "shocking," with fiber everywhere and workers without respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 31, 1975. A J-M survey of the Toronto plant finds weak dust suction on one line and notes workers "are being told more regarding their health than in the past." Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 1, 1975. J-M's outside lawyers write that they obtained a plaintiff's X-rays without a court order, though they had "no right to these films." Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 8, 1975. Raybestos-Manhattan's J. H. Marsh lists the four recognized asbestos diseases and the first published reports of each, from Merewether in 1930 to Wagner in 1960. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 8, 1975. John H. Marsh asks Cape's Alex Cross for a press release and says Asbestos magazine will print nothing about the international organization without checking with him. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 11, 1975. J-M makes respirators mandatory above 2 f/cc in plants and 5 f/cc in Canadian mines, admitting enforcement had been "rather lax." Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 21, 1975. Asked by the Wall Street Journal whether its plant doctor was to inform only J-M, not the patient, J-M's researchers note "Apparently J-M would concur." Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 10, 1975. After visiting the Advocate Mine, W. B. Reitze reports counts over the limit, deep dust, and evergreens for two miles white with asbestos from the tailings. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 12, 1975. J-M's former medical director, Dr. Kenneth Smith, records that non-medical officials in New York decided whether workers were told their X-ray results. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 29, 1975. H. B. Rhodes of Union Carbide reports that a paper on mesothelioma deaths in Israel, many without work exposure, was the asbestos "bombshell" of an international health congress. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 29, 1975. Union Carbide's H. B. Rhodes reports that mesothelioma findings look discouraging and that the British two-fiber limit does not consider mesothelioma. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 11, 1975. W. B. Reitze warns that equipment planned for J-M's Mexican venture with Peñoles, which produced 50–100 f/cc at Reeves, will endanger the workers' lives. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 26, 1975. W. B. Reitze sends J-M's legal staff Manville plant records showing pneumoconiosis diagnosed since 1932, some after only a few years' exposure. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 27, 1975. J. R. M. Hutcheson forms a task force on dust from handling asbestos fiber, writing that "lack of it could mean our demise." Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 15, 1975. A University of Toronto doctor reports that J-M's Advocate Mines misled workers and doctors about asbestos hazards and contaminated the town of Baie Verte. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 15, 1975. W. B. Reitze writes that after J-M's U.S. experience it cannot morally keep making asbestos Thermobestos in Brazil, and backs switching to Thermo-12. Read it (J-M chronology)

1976

• 1976. A British respiratory newsletter reports that people exposed to asbestos show a high rate of small airways obstruction, and reviews asbestos disease. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 7, 1976. A Toronto plant manager warns that hygiene surveys listing many busy machines as "did not operate" invite suspicion that dusty stations were shut down. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 22, 1976. Dr. Paul Kotin of J-M argues before a Labor Department committee against OSHA's proposal to cut the asbestos limit to 0.5 fibers per cc. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 3, 1976. W. B. Reitze tells J-M's Toronto plant that maintenance men in a trench with 30 to 50 fibers per cc are not wearing respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1976. J-M reports 124 asbestos suits, its first settlements and trial losses, and a class action by 309 Raybestos-Manhattan workers. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• April 1976. A J-M employee writes that a worker's disability papers could start "a new comp suit" and that it is "better to let sleeping dogs lie." Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 1, 1976. Dr. Paul Kotin protests that J-M holds back health and safety controls until an operation proves profitable. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 21, 1976. Preparing lawsuit answers, J-M staff worry about "another 'Kenneth Smith' situation" at plants where company physicians were fired. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 22, 1976. A J-M talc manager tells Johnson & Johnson that a new study clears pure talc but makes asbestos-bearing talcs harder to defend. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 1976. A British magazine explains the new asbestos warning label and warns that even short or low exposure has been linked to mesothelioma. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 3, 1976. Selling new stock, J-M tells investors it faces 136 asbestos suits whose costs, net of insurance, will not materially affect it. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• June 24, 1976. Raybestos-Manhattan offers Asbestos Corporation a limited health clause for fiber purchases, refusing the indemnity the miner wants against third-party injury claims. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 2, 1976. W. B. Reitze orders that a dying 40-year employee's asbestos claim not be contested, and asks for discretion about who learns of his condition. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 27, 1976. As OSHA's 2-fiber limit takes effect, W. B. Reitze asks J-M plants to list stations over or near it and their plans to comply. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 2, 1976. J-M tests show that sawing Thermobestos as in the 1960s produced 18 to 28 times the 1965 dust limit. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 25, 1976. John H. Marsh reports that a trade editor agreed to kill a critical article, and offers a positive story on asbestos friction materials instead. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 5, 1976. W. B. Reitze tells J-M's Markusson that real job-site cement mixing ran 30 to 80 fibers per cc, far above J-M's simulated tests. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 19, 1976. J-M makes it policy that hygiene surveys reflect maximum normal exposures and that hygienists report imminent dangers to plant managers at once. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 24, 1976. John H. Marsh asks that sales staff stop telling customers that asbestos sealed in resin poses no hazard, since machining it releases fibers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 24, 1976. John H. Marsh warns that a few weeks of heavy asbestos exposure can cause disease and that fiber carried home puts young children at risk around the clock. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 1976. NIOSH tells OSHA there is no safe level of asbestos exposure and recommends a limit of 0.1 fibers per cc. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 8, 1976. The Asbestos Information Association widens its literature review to asbestosis because a chronology "would be useful in litigation," and its counsel begins interviewing possible expert witnesses. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 9, 1976. Asbestos Information Association directors fund a study of a captive insurer as product liability coverage is cancelled, and hear their research program exists to improve lawsuit defenses. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 23, 1976. The International Agency for Research on Cancer announces that all commercial forms of asbestos cause lung cancer and mesothelioma in exposed workers. Read it (Motley 1000)

1977

• 1977. A trade magazine sends Raybestos-Manhattan a draft article on brake-dust hazards for approval; a reader there marks parts of it "Not true." Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1977. Britain's Asbestos Information Committee issues a point-by-point rebuttal of Nancy Tait's pamphlet "Asbestos Kills," which had accused the industry of misleading the public. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1977. An illegible plant drawing and a photograph of a factory building are marked as a 1977 exhibit. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• January 1977. The Asbestos Information Association corrects its minutes to record that its counsel is interviewing physicians as possible expert witnesses in third-party suits. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 3, 1977. Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director calls a NIOSH asbestos review naive, while conceding that the link to asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma is not in dispute. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 14, 1977. Dr. Paul Kotin reports to J-M's president that X-rays at Denison and Stockton show pleural changes but no definite asbestosis attributable solely to those plants. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 10, 1977. The Asbestos Information Association hears that its counsel is building litigation files for defense lawyers and that J-M is backing legislation to bar third-party suits. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 11, 1977. W. A. Cooper tells Dr. Kotin that before 1973 J-M's education of employees about asbestos and health was "erratic." Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 16, 1977. John H. Marsh tells a Raybestos-Manhattan manager the company cannot call its products safe because no safe level of asbestos exposure is known. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 24, 1977. An Aetna review finds about 90% of union workers at J-M's Manville plant have filed or will file asbestosis or hearing-loss claims. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 28, 1977. Philip Enterline tells Nicolet's Guy Gabrielson he will give Barry Castleman the industry-funded literature review, calling the project "a gamble on the part of AIA." Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 1977. J-M reports 271 asbestos suits, four trial losses in five, and an average payment under $50,000, along with its own workers' suits against company doctors. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• March 4, 1977. John H. Marsh strikes "safe" and "safely" from a Raybestos-Manhattan letter to asbestos textile customers, writing that no safe level of exposure has been established. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 24, 1977. Dr. Philip Enterline tells Nicolet's Guy Gabrielson that his literature review for the industry asks when it was known that various trades were at risk. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 11, 1977. Raybestos-Manhattan's John Marsh sends Nicolet's chairman a history of exposure limits and the 1943 asbestosis letters, saying industry could not be expected to know more than the Public Health Service. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 13, 1977. The Industrial Health Foundation tells Raybestos-Manhattan's Isaac Weaver that the company joined it in 1937 and dropped out from 1957 to 1968. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 26, 1977. Lake Asbestos tells its customers that its fiber bags will carry a new warning naming asbestosis, lung cancer "and other fatal diseases." Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 2, 1977. W. B. Reitze reports asbestos hanging "in garlands" at a Brazilian affiliate and urges J-M to end Thermobestos there. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 4, 1977. J-M's Dr. Paul Kotin sends Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director his Toronto seminar statement accepting that asbestos causes disease and that management must compensate injured workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 11, 1977. A Manville plant manager protests that protective clothing ordered by Dr. Kotin seven months earlier still has not been issued. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 20, 1977. Dr. Joseph Goodman asks Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director whether a worker diagnosed with asbestosis should keep working around asbestos fiber. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 27, 1977. Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director advises that workers diagnosed with asbestosis should not keep working around respirable asbestos fibers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 27, 1977. Dr. Paul Kotin of J-M tells Turner & Newall he believes all forms of asbestos can cause mesothelioma, not crocidolite alone. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 9, 1977. J-M's Dr. Paul Kotin tells the Consumer Product Safety Commission that family members of asbestos workers suffer "maximal exposures" but that asbestos can stay in commerce safely. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 10, 1977. W. B. Reitze reports that staying in Asbestos de Mexico without a cleanup would be "immoral, if not criminal," with 900 to 1,200 workers at risk. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 22, 1977. Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director tells the friction materials industry that mesothelioma rates are extremely high among insulators and that controlled exposure can make the risk "virtually nil." Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 22, 1977. Dr. Kotin rewrites J-M's president's letter to Nicolet to drop his view that crocidolite causes mesothelioma and to tone down the Manville plant's record. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 1, 1977. At the Zelienople plant, Dr. William Paul counsels workers after four learn from outside X-rays of lung abnormalities the company doctors had not told them about. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 1, 1977. J-M's president orders an end to company tobacco promotions and plans a smoking ban for employees exposed to asbestos. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 12, 1977. J-M staff conclude it is in the company's interest to delay OSHA's asbestos hearings for years, and weigh whether a smoking-ban petition would speed them up. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 1977. A Swedish government booklet describes rules requiring asbestos to be replaced by safer materials where possible, and bans on crocidolite and asbestos spraying. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 13, 1977. J-M's outside counsel objects to every interrogatory in Fearn v. Johns-Manville and promises to make it "difficult for plaintiff to obtain any further information." Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 20, 1977. Dr. Paul Kotin calls J-M's Jeffrey textile plant "an embarrassment" that has missed company dust standards for years and proposes shutting it if not cleaned up. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 20, 1977. Launching a survey of fiber customers, J-M's J. F. Reis writes, "we know that there are health problems" from excessive asbestos exposure. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 26, 1977. Visiting a retired Texas couple who complained about J-M fiber glass ducts, A. E. Bentz dismisses them as worriers but suggests J-M pay to replace the ducts. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 28, 1977. J-M's Manville paper mill makes respirators mandatory for dusty asbestos and Celite work, with discharge for a third offense. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 1977. The Asbestos Information Association sends Dr. Enterline's completed literature review to special counsel for use in the state of the art legal defense. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 6, 1977. Deposed in Burows v. Johns-Manville, Dr. Paul Kotin agrees asbestosis can appear long after exposure and says he has known the 1930 Merewether report for 20 years. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 27, 1977. The Asbestos Information Association and Johns-Manville protest to Crown Zellerbach over an "Adios Asbestos" ad calling asbestos a killer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 1977. A J-M legal review finds the Long Beach plant still leaving asbestos waste uncovered while appealing its second OSHA citation for the same violation. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 15, 1977. J-M requires protective clothing and respirators where fiber levels exceed 1.2 f/cc, saying counts near OSHA's 2.0 limit can be off by 70 percent. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 29, 1977. NIOSH sends Raybestos-Manhattan a draft study of its plant's workers concluding that chrysotile exposure "poses a severe carcinogenic risk of malignancies of multiple sites." Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 2, 1977. Dr. William Paul finds Marrero's medical program deficient, with poor sputum samples, an old X-ray machine and a workforce many of whom show occupational disease. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 2, 1977. Raybestos-Manhattan's I. H. Weaver disputes a NIOSH study linking chrysotile to mesothelioma at the company's plant, suggesting the 17 victims had crocidolite or amosite exposure. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 8, 1977. At a Waukegan meeting on compensation claims, J-M staff ask whether to tell flagged workers now or "wait until is disabled." Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 14, 1977. The industry's trade group hears its counsel's seven-point "State of the Art Defense," dating knowledge of insulators' disease to Selikoff's 1964 work and warning labels to 1965-66. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 22, 1977. With Pittsburg plant medical files showing undiagnosed disease, W. B. Reitze argues J-M must tell former employees, though it could bring "an onslaught" of compensation cases. Read it (J-M chronology)

1978

• 1978. North American Asbestos Company, a raw asbestos supplier, answers interrogatories in Austin v. Johns-Manville, denying that prolonged exposure to its asbestos causes disease. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1978. Charts tally Canadian Johns-Manville's asbestos fiber sales to Owens-Corning's Sayreville and Berlin plants from the 1950s to 1972. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1978. Lake Asbestos's health booklet for workers handling asbestos fiber, sent to customers with its June 1978 letter (cover pages only). Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1978. An OSHA poster for workers warns that "there is no safe kind of asbestos" and that fibers carried home on clothing endanger families. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 13, 1978. J-M's Toronto plant asks for funds for an automatic bag opener, saying manual opening keeps exposure above the TLV and leaves the company open to claims. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 16, 1978. J-M's top management and lawyers agree that Pittsburg workers found to have disease in old medical files must be told, despite the liability. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 25, 1978. The Asbestos Information Association's counsel drafts a letter offering non-members Enterline's lung cancer review for $2,000, as privileged work product, for use in a pending lawsuit. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 2, 1978. The Asbestos International Association's European council answers the European Parliament's proposed asbestos resolution point by point. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 2, 1978. Dr. George Wright tells an Asbestos International Association adviser that all common asbestos types are linked to fibrosis and lung cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 23, 1978. J-M's W. R. Curtner suggests that in some states workers be encouraged to file disease claims early, locking in lower benefit schedules. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 27, 1978. Johns-Manville sends the Asbestos Information Association Dr. Paul Kotin's letter to a European customer stating the company's position on asbestos and health. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 1978. J-M reports 623 asbestos suits and tells investors that before 1964 the company and the authorities believed insulation dust levels posed no appreciable hazard. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• March 1, 1978. Dr. Hilton Lewinsohn tells Raybestos-Manhattan that McGill data on lung cancer in non-smoking asbestos miners undercut J-M's smoking ban, and that asbestos exposure itself must be eliminated. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 14, 1978. J-M managers plan a smoking ban at the company's Belgian asbestos-cement plants and ask headquarters for material to persuade the unions. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 7, 1978. J-M's board is shown that open asbestos health suits have grown from 106 at the end of 1975 to 562 at the end of 1977. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• April 26, 1978. The Asbestos Information Association answers the HEW asbestos warning by saying wartime exposures cannot be compared with present working conditions. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 28, 1978. Raybestos-Manhattan prepares a statement for employees and the press answering the HEW warning about wartime shipyard workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 1978. A literature review tabulates published reports of asbestosis by occupation, finding the first report in an insulation worker in 1938 (Merewether). Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 8, 1978. Raybestos-Manhattan's John Marsh reports the international asbestos industry is preparing a paper to support its position that asbestos can be handled safely, and planning labels to head off skull-and-crossbones warnings. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 1978. Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director drafts a paper on medical surveillance of asbestos-exposed groups, with tables showing insulators' high cancer and asbestosis death rates. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 1978. Industry physicist Klaus Robock tells a New York Academy of Sciences panel that asbestos has a safe threshold and the 2-fiber limit should stay. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 2, 1978. John H. Marsh circulates a revised U.S. draft of the Asbestos International Association's common position on asbestos and health. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 12, 1978. An internal review finds J-M's export fiber bags and woven poly bags went without caution labels for years after domestic paper bags were labeled. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 19, 1978. Lake Asbestos tells Raybestos-Manhattan it is adding a larger cancer warning to its fiber bags and urges the company to warn its own workers and customers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 24, 1978. The Asbestos Information Association's president declares there is a safe level of asbestos exposure and calls the federal two-fiber standard safe. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 6, 1978. R. H. Mereness sends members the HEW asbestos warning campaign plan, with Johns-Manville's and the Association's statements answering Secretary Califano. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 7, 1978. The Asbestos International Association's executive committee is given the ILO's hazard symbols, including the skull and crossbones, beside the British industry's milder "Take care with asbestos" label. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 10, 1978. J-M's C. G. Linke warns managers that ABC's special "Asbestos: The Way to Dusty Death" will air July 14 and bring "more unfavorable publicity." Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 11, 1978. W. B. Reitze tells Dr. Kotin that children write their names in asbestos dust near the Advocate mine, and tailings dust has blown around three J-M mining towns for decades. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 13, 1978. A Raybestos-Manhattan division tells its employees that shipyard asbestos exposure, the subject of HEW's warning, was "totally unlike" exposure in its plants. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 31, 1978. Union Carbide's Harrison Rhodes and Raybestos-Manhattan's Dr. Lewinsohn disagree over whether the industry should call for medical checks of all exposed workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 11, 1978. J-M attorney James K. Green learns Dr. Kenneth Smith told insulation contractors in 1964 they were not at risk, and asks that the papers not be circulated among counsel. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 12, 1978. Dr. Paul Kotin defends telling employees that 2 f/cc is safe alone but hazardous with smoking, despite concern over customers and legal position. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 20, 1978. The Asbestos Information Association hears that its state of the medical art defense memo is nearly ready and that a plant physicians' conference will prepare doctors to testify. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 10, 1978. Citing legal reasons among others, H. M. Jackson asks J-M's employee relations managers for any minutes of their meetings back to 1937. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 11, 1978. Sir Neville Stack tells J. H. Marsh the industry hopes Europe will accept its own asbestos label, since "anything is better than the death's head label." Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 27, 1978. The Asbestos International Association agrees that industry doctors should write a statement refuting the asbestos death figures in the U.S. government's Califano statement. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 2, 1978. Interviewed by J-M's lawyers, Hugh Jackson recalls a plant doctor saying management did not want him to discuss problems fully with employees. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 17, 1978. John Marsh circulates a proposal to hire a retired Cleveland Plain Dealer editor to place articles casting asbestos in a more favorable light. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 29, 1978. Philip Enterline's industry-funded history finds the asbestos and lung cancer link accepted in Germany by the early 1940s, and settled in the United States by 1964. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 12, 1978. The Asbestos Information Association hears that eleven more West Coast physicians have been interviewed as possible expert witnesses and plans an open letter to HEW Secretary Califano. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 15, 1978. The Asbestos Information Association files objections to the government's occupational cancer estimates and surveys members to build an asbestos constituency in Congress. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 19, 1978. The Asbestos International Association tells a European distributor to avoid other labels on asbestos bags while it promotes an industry label to head off the skull and crossbones. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 20, 1978. Sir Neville Stack asks Raybestos-Manhattan's J. H. Marsh to get Calidria to use the industry's asbestos label in Europe rather than the OSHA label, to avoid the skull and crossbones. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 29, 1978. Defense counsel in the Beaumont, Texas asbestosis cases tells J-M and Travelers the judge went duck hunting with plaintiffs' counsel before a pretrial conference. Read it (J-M chronology)

1979

• 1979. Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director, Dr. Hilton Lewinsohn, publishes a review of cancer deaths among asbestos workers and calls for medical and workplace surveillance of exposed groups. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 8, 1979. Guy Gabrielson sends the Asbestos Information Association's legal committee counsel's report on interviews of West Coast doctors as possible expert witnesses, with an expanded list of experts. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 9, 1979. The Asbestos Information Association discusses Secretary Califano's call for standards that account for smoking, and its counsel's expanded list of medical expert witnesses. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 12, 1979. A J-M public relations executive tells the chairman the company's public positions on asbestos do not match the facts and it must stop "playing semantic games." Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1979. J-M's annual SEC filing reports 1,370 asbestos suits and first says insurance may not cover punitive damages, while expecting no material adverse effect. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• March 2, 1979. J-M's chairman tells the board the company will oppose any effort to make industry pay for government's and medical science's part in asbestos disease. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• March 12, 1979. J-M's senior attorney suggests that a letter from Dr. William E. Smith not be mentioned to other counsel before Smith's further deposition. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 19, 1979. At a Toronto plant meeting, workers ask why new hires are not told of health hazards and say they were not told for months that they had asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 22, 1979. A defense lawyer notes it is established that in 1965 J-M did not let its doctors tell a worker about his condition; the report went to the company. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 11, 1979. Waukegan's J. W. Szcygielski reports 35 pneumoconiosis cases never entered on the OSHA log and asks headquarters how to resolve it. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 16, 1979. W. B. Reitze tells J-M plant managers, "once again," that posting industrial hygiene survey reports in the plants is mandatory. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 17, 1979. Dr. Paul Kotin warns that Waukegan's failure to log occupational disease cases since 1972 appears willful and urges reporting them to OSHA at once. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 19, 1979. J-M's associate general counsel recommends adding 23 unrecorded Waukegan disease cases to the OSHA logs without telling OSHA. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 20, 1979. Registering $100 million of notes, J-M tells investors that of the last eight asbestos cases tried, six ended in defense verdicts. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• April 20, 1979. An outside lawyer assures J-M's associate general counsel that no one will inspect the articles his firm holds until J-M's medical library bibliography arrives. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 1979. Automotive Industries reports that Raybestos-Manhattan's friction materials unit will stop using asbestos in brake linings after some 1,300 lawsuits. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 1979. J-M discloses to investors a shareholder class action charging that its filings misstated its asbestos liabilities. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• June 12, 1979. Dr. Paul Kotin warns that a J-M executive's 1972 testimony, denying knowledge of hazards in 1949, conflicts with company testimony that the industry knew. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 25, 1979. J-M's chairman sets a smoking policy at World Headquarters and extends a quit-smoking subsidy to staff who had worked at asbestos processing plants. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 26, 1979. J-M Canada warns pipe contractors not to cut asbestos-cement pipe dry with abrasive saws, while calling the pipe otherwise "perfectly safe." Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 2, 1979. J-M's lawyers show the board 3,636 asbestos plaintiffs, a list of cover-up allegations, and a federal law's appeal: ending punitive damages and third-party suits. Read it (J-M litigation chronology)
• August 6, 1979. Dr. Paul Kotin announces a study of illness among workers at all J-M asbestos-using locations, with medical records to be abstracted from September. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 24, 1979. J-M managers conclude the company is "better off not labeling" Transite pipe, since a label would bring California notice and inspection rules. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 27, 1979. A J-M chart of hourly workers' diagnoses shows most were told within months, but some diagnosed between 1958 and 1962 waited more than a year. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 11, 1979. Retired and disabled workers and their wives picket the Manville plant over compensation; one sign reads "Give me back my husband." Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 16, 1979. Reviewing Lompoc records for a lawsuit, a J-M defense memo notes "two potential smoking guns" that fall outside the plaintiff's document request. Read it (J-M chronology)