The Motley 1000

Where the collection comes from

The set is named after Ronald Motley, a South Carolina lawyer who represented insulation workers and their families in asbestos cases. These were the documents he used most often at trial.

On January 23, 1984, Kathy Rogers of Johns-Manville's legal department sent the company an index she had prepared to "the group of approximately 1,000 documents commonly referred to as the 'Motley 1,000.'" Johns-Manville's regional coordinating counsel had collected them and sent a copy to the company's headquarters. According to the memo, about nine in ten of the documents were exhibits in the 1982 trial of James Jackson, a former shipyard worker, in Biloxi, Mississippi. The rest came from other cases.

The documents are varied. They include minutes of the Asbestos Textile Institute and the Asbestos Information Association, autopsy reports, papers from early lawsuits by Johns-Manville's own workers, medical articles, the Sumner Simpson Papers (letters from the 1930s and 1940s among Raybestos-Manhattan, Johns-Manville, Saranac Laboratory and Metropolitan Life), and papers about Kaylo, the Owens-Illinois insulation. The index marked with an "I" the documents about risks to insulators and others outside the asbestos plants, and with "CK" those that showed what insurance carriers knew.

Johns-Manville filed for bankruptcy in 1982. Its records passed to the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust when its reorganization plan took effect in November 1988. In 2018 the custodian of the Trust's records facility in Aurora, Colorado, certified the set as true copies of documents found there, stamped CRMC-Motley1000-Subj-000001 to 005339 ("CRMC" is the Claims Resolution Management Corporation, which runs the facility for the Trust). We bought our copies of the certified set from that archive.

Documents marked ★ are ones the 1984 index listed among "the most significant."

The 1920s

May 10, 1929 (No. 746). Anna Pirskowski, a former Manville plant worker, sues Johns-Manville in federal court, saying asbestos dust disabled her; the case is settled in 1934. Read the document
July 8, 1929 (No. 741). John Perone, a former Manville plant worker in a sanatorium, sues Johns-Manville; J-M questions him there to try to end the suit, which is settled in 1934. Read the document
July 8, 1929 (No. 748). Benjamin Perone sues Johns-Manville over dust disease; J-M's bid to dismiss, based on a statement taken at his home, fails in court. Read the document
July 8, 1929 (No. 749). Michael Perone sues Johns-Manville over asbestos dust at the Manville plant; after his death his mother pursues the case, which is settled in 1934. Read the document
July 23, 1929 (No. 738). Helen Zackwiejz's mother sues Johns-Manville for her asbestos-related illness; J-M obtains the young worker's signed statement, taken at the plant, disowning the suit. Read the document
July 23, 1929 (No. 739). John Zackwiejz's mother sues Johns-Manville over his tuberculosis; J-M's attempt to have the suit thrown out with her disavowal fails, and the case later settles. Read the document
July 23, 1929 (No. 740). Manville worker Frank Bartus sues Johns-Manville over tuberculosis, then signs a statement in the plant manager's office disowning the suit, which is dropped in 1930. Read the document
August 10, 1929 (No. 747). Pauline Lasin sues Johns-Manville over her husband's death; J-M has the suit dismissed using a statement its plant manager helped take from her at home. Read the document
September 26, 1929 (No. 742). The mother of Michael DeMuro, a Manville plant worker who died in January 1929, sues Johns-Manville for his death from asbestos dust; the case is settled in 1934. Read the document
September 26, 1929 (No. 744). Robert Marshall sues Johns-Manville over the death of his daughter Helen, a Manville plant worker; J-M takes a statement from him at the plant saying he blamed no one. Read the document
October 7, 1929 (No. 743). The widow of Mike Strelec, a Manville plant worker who died in a sanatorium, sues Johns-Manville over his death; J-M's investigator takes her statement at home. Read the document
October 22, 1929 (No. 756). Susie Rinaldo sues Johns-Manville over her husband's death; J-M has the suit discontinued with a statement taken from her in the plant manager's office. Read the document

The 1930s

1930 (No. 745A). The executors of Benjamin Perone, a Manville plant worker who died in 1930, carry on his suit against Johns-Manville; it is settled in 1934. Read the document
April 9, 1930 (No. 757). Vincent DeMuro, a Manville plant worker, sues Johns-Manville for $100,000 over asbestos dust; the case is settled in 1934. Read the document
May 22, 1930 (No. 750). Joseph Stepka, a Manville plant worker, sues Johns-Manville for $100,000 over asbestos dust; the case is settled in 1934. Read the document
January 25, 1932 (No. 745). Concetta Perone sues Johns-Manville over the death of her son John, a former Manville plant worker who died in December 1931 of lung disease; the case settles in 1934. Read the document
January 26, 1932 (No. 751). The widows of Joseph and Paul Stepka, Manville plant workers who died in 1931, sue Johns-Manville, each for $50,000. Read the document
May 5, 1932 (No. 754). Matius Grabow, a Manville plant worker, sues Johns-Manville for $100,000 over asbestos dust; the case is settled in 1934. Read the document
April 24, 1933 (No. 14). Johns-Manville's board authorizes settling eleven asbestosis suits by former workers if their lawyer promises to bring no new cases. Read the document
September 12, 1933 (No. 753). Alexander Ososki sues Johns-Manville for $250,000, saying dust at the Manville plant gave him tuberculosis; the case is settled within months. Read the document
October 27, 1933 (No. 802 ★). Bernard Dugan, a laborer who mixed asbestos by hand, sues R. V. Aycock Company, a business J-M bought in 1932, for asbestos lung damage; he dies in 1934. Read the document
November 28, 1933 (No. 198 ★). J-M officials and Metropolitan Life's Dr. Lanza plan to complete the asbestos survey, and E. M. Voorhees suggests outside dust counts could help J-M in litigation. Read the document
1934 (No. 699). Charles Sarounas, who worked near the asbestos mixing operation at Waukegan, sues Johns-Manville over dust disease. Read the document
1934 (No. 881 ★). Waukegan plant laborer Tony Yakobich sues Johns-Manville over asbestos and magnesia dust; J-M removes the case to federal court with Royal Indemnity as surety. Read the document
March 1, 1934 (No. 693). Nick Bojko, a laborer in the Waukegan plant's mixing room, sues Johns-Manville over asbestos and cement dust. Read the document
March 14, 1934 (No. 698). George Ruskell, a Waukegan laborer who mixed silica and other materials, sues two Johns-Manville companies for silicosis. Read the document
June 18, 1934 (No. 694). Frank Brown, who shoveled asbestos, fibre and cement at the Waukegan plant, sues Johns-Manville over lung disease. Read the document
July 16, 1934 (No. 882 ★). Waukegan plant laborer Jack Coleman sues Johns-Manville over asbestos cement dust; J-M removes the case to federal court and moves to dismiss. Read the document
September 18, 1934 (No. 697). Waukegan laborer Luis Perez sues Johns-Manville; the federal court refuses to dismiss his and eight other workers' asbestos dust suits. Read the document
December 10, 1934 (No. 206). Vandiver Brown asks Dr. Lanza to restore passages favorable to the industry in Metropolitan Life's asbestos study before it is published. Read the document
December 15, 1934 (No. 207). J-M's New Jersey counsel George Hobart asks for changes to Metropolitan Life's asbestos study that would help J-M's defense in negligence suits. Read the document
December 18, 1934 (No. 21). Vandiver Brown sends Raybestos-Manhattan the galley proof of Metropolitan Life's asbestos study and expects Dr. Lanza to accept most of their requests. Read the document
December 21, 1934 (No. 208). Vandiver Brown returns Metropolitan Life's galley proof to Dr. Lanza with J-M's requested changes, asking that unfavorable findings not appear in "darker tones." Read the document
December 24, 1934 (No. 15). Vandiver Brown tells Raybestos-Manhattan that he and George Hobart suggested changes to Dr. Lanza's report "beneficial from the Industry viewpoint." Read the document
January 2, 1935 (No. 209). Raybestos-Manhattan leaves approval of Metropolitan Life's asbestos report to Vandiver Brown and praises George Hobart's suggested changes. Read the document
January 18, 1935 (No. 199). Vandiver Brown reports on the Mellon Institute dust symposium, where industries share worries about lawsuits and favor compensation laws that would take dust cases from juries. Read the document
January 22, 1935 (No. 197). Vandiver Brown sends Raybestos-Manhattan his memo to J-M's president on the Mellon Institute's Symposium on Dust Problems. Read the document
January 30, 1935 (No. 196). Raybestos-Manhattan pays its share of Dr. Lanza's survey expenses and tells Vandiver Brown it sees no need to join the Mellon Institute dust group. Read the document
February 11, 1935 (No. 195). M. F. Judd thanks Vandiver Brown for copies of the published Metropolitan Life asbestos study and sends one to each Raybestos-Manhattan division. Read the document
March 23, 1935 (No. 696). William Norwood sues Johns-Manville over dust at the Waukegan roofing and shingle plant. Read the document
April 11, 1935 (No. 692). Waukegan worker Andy Belcher sues Johns-Manville, saying four years of asbestos and silica dust gave him asbestosis and silicosis. Read the document
April 11, 1935 (No. 695). Estella Hacker, an asbestos packer and washer maker at Waukegan since 1922, sues Johns-Manville over dust disease. Read the document
May 9, 1935 (No. 700). Fred Seifert, a Waukegan laborer since 1926, sues Johns-Manville over asbestos dust disease. Read the document
September 25, 1935 (No. 205). Asbestos magazine's editor reminds Sumner Simpson that at his request it has published nothing on asbestosis, and asks whether it may now. Read the document
October 1, 1935 (Nos. 22, 23, 24). Vandiver Brown agrees with Sumner Simpson that the industry's interests are best served by asbestosis getting "the minimum of publicity" in Asbestos magazine. Read the document
October 31, 1936 (No. 212). Sumner Simpson worries that government X-rays of his workers could reach "shyster lawyers and doctors" and bring "an endless number of suits." Read the document
November 5, 1936 (No. 211). Sumner Simpson lets the Public Health Service X-ray Raybestos-Manhattan's North Charleston workers, provided the films are kept from "shyster lawyers and doctors." Read the document
November 10, 1936 (No. 213). Sumner Simpson invites Thermoid Rubber to share the cost of Dr. Gardner's asbestos experiments, with the sponsors to decide whether anything is published. Read the document
November 20, 1936 (No. 214). Eleven asbestos companies sign an agreement to share the $15,000 cost of Dr. Leroy Gardner's three-year asbestos dust experiments at Saranac. Read the document
November 20, 1936 (No. 215). Vandiver Brown authorizes Dr. Leroy Gardner's asbestos experiments and states that the sponsors will own the results and approve any manuscript before publication. Read the document
November 23, 1936 (No. 228). Dr. Leroy Gardner accepts the sponsors' terms, agreeing that they will own the results and approve any report before publication. Read the document
December 4, 1936 (No. 201). Vandiver Brown reports on the Air Hygiene Foundation's meeting and urges the asbestos industry to join a body he calls "the creature of industry." Read the document
December 8, 1936 (No. 200). C. J. Stover of Asbestos magazine urges asbestos companies to join the Air Hygiene Foundation, enclosing Vandiver Brown's report on its meeting. Read the document
January 8, 1937 (No. 210). E. H. Jeffords tells Sumner Simpson he will review Dr. Shull's asbestosis article with the company's attorney and Dr. Kenneth Lynch. Read the document
February 27, 1937 (Nos. 16, 18, 20, 19, 17). Vandiver Brown reminds Sumner Simpson that the asbestos companies paying for Dr. Gardner's experiments decide whether and how the results are made public. Read the document
May 5, 1937 (No. 1020). Leroy Gardner reports that the industry-funded asbestosis experiments at Saranac have begun, with animals breathing chrysotile dust from Manville. Read the document
May 11, 1937 (No. 1018). Vandiver Brown sends Union Asbestos & Rubber a copy of Leroy Gardner's first progress report on the Saranac asbestosis experiments. Read the document
May 13, 1937 (No. 809). Union Asbestos & Rubber passes around Vandiver Brown's copy of Gardner's first Saranac progress report, which finds no significant early results. Read the document
September 27, 1937 (No. 217). Sumner Simpson reports that Dr. Gardner finds his early results "somewhat promising" but that a Harvard asbestos sample killed his animals on injection. Read the document
September 29, 1937 (No. 216). Vandiver Brown tells Sumner Simpson he has heard nothing from Dr. Gardner about the Harvard asbestos sample that killed laboratory animals. Read the document
May 6, 1938 (No. 218). Dr. Kenneth Lynch writes that sufficient exposure to asbestos dust will cause asbestosis and doubts that Gardner's work disproves that the disease progresses. Read the document
December 9, 1938 (No. 1024). Leroy Gardner reports that very finely ground asbestos has caused little lung scarring in animals and starts a new experiment with long-fibered chrysotile. Read the document
December 19, 1938 (No. 810). A Union Asbestos & Rubber manager reports that Gardner's Saranac experiments point to particle size, not chemistry, as the cause of asbestos fibrosis. Read the document
March 21, 1939 (No. 204). A. S. Rossiter of Asbestos magazine sends Sumner Simpson a clipped article on asbestosis. Read the document
March 22, 1939 (No. 203). Sumner Simpson tells Asbestos magazine's editor, in confidence, about the Saranac findings and says he will not make them public for now. Read the document
March 23, 1939 (No. 202). Asbestos magazine's editor agrees to keep asbestosis out of the magazine and keep Sumner Simpson's Saranac news confidential until he is ready to publish. Read the document
May 4, 1939 (No. 219). Sumner Simpson objects that Dr. Gardner used asbestosis results without the sponsors' consent, which "could be very embarrassing." Read the document
August 1939 (No. 752). Julia Lacho sues Johns-Manville over the death of her husband, a Manville plant weaver, saying the plant was full of asbestos dust; the case is settled. Read the document

The 1940s

1940 (No. 893). A list of ships built and repaired at Ingalls Shipbuilding records each hull's dates and insulation subcontractor. Read the document
June 17, 1940 (No. 755). Frank Smutko sues Johns-Manville, saying asbestos dust at the Manville plant made him ill; the case is settled in 1941. Read the document
1942 (No. 151 ★). Two Queens pathologists report lung cancer with asbestosis in two long-time asbestos pipe coverers, the ninth and tenth such cases in the literature. Read the document
February 12, 1943 (No. 234). Owens-Illinois research director U. E. Bowes asks Saranac's Leroy Gardner whether its new calcium silicate insulation is a hazard to plant workers and installers. Read the document
February 23, 1943 (No. 235). Leroy Gardner tells Owens-Illinois its calcium silicate samples may cause respiratory trouble and advises respirators for exposed pilot plant workers. Read the document
March 8, 1943 (Nos. 1148, 1204). Keasbey & Mattison sends Turner & Newall Gardner's monograph outline, saying the reference to cancer susceptibility should be left out of the report as inconclusive. Read the document
March 12, 1943 (No. 236). Leroy Gardner learns the Owens-Illinois insulation contains chrysotile and warns that quartz and asbestos are "all the ingredients for a first class hazard." Read the document
June 14, 1943 (No. 194 ★). The Northwest Magnesia Association asks Washington State to drop its proposed asbestosis safety rule, calling asbestosis a "foreign disease" that "should be left in Europe." Read the document
June 17, 1943 (No. 1205). Keasbey & Mattison forwards Gardner's letter to Vandiver Brown saying asbestos and cancer is unsettled and that he will "say nothing" about his mouse findings for now. Read the document
June 18, 1943 (No. 193 ★). A. S. Rossiter of Asbestos magazine sends Sumner Simpson the Northwest Magnesia Association's letter against Washington State's asbestosis rule. Read the document
June 24, 1943 (No. 192 ★). Vandiver Brown tells Sumner Simpson he will leave the Northwest Magnesia Association to learn about asbestosis from Washington State and simply file its letter. Read the document
May 2, 1944 (No. 222). O. H. Cilley reports Industrial Hygiene Foundation dust counts at Raybestos-Manhattan's Manheim mill, with the Picker House above 5 million particles per cubic foot. Read the document
May 31, 1944 (No. 237). Leroy Gardner reports that finely ground Owens-Illinois calcium silicate caused an asbestosis-like reaction in guinea pigs and could be dangerous. Read the document
November 21, 1944 (No. 238). Owens-Illinois asks Saranac to study whether its Berlin, New Jersey, insulation is a hazard to the workers who make it and to those who install it. Read the document
November 27, 1944 (No. 239). Leroy Gardner proposes a $5,000-a-year animal study of Kaylo dust for Owens-Illinois, noting that nothing will be published without the company's authorization. Read the document
1945 (No. 485). A Navy shipboard electrical handbook gives specifications for asbestos-insulated cable with no safety information. Read the document
August 1945 (No. 334 ★). Britain's Chief Inspector of Factories warns of asbestosis among shipyard insulation workers and asks the industry to adopt respirators and dust controls aboard ship. Read the document
September 14, 1945 (No. 335 ★). The Thermal Insulation Contractors Association asks Britain's Chief Inspector of Factories for seventy more copies of his asbestos warning for its members. Read the document
April 9, 1946 (No. 736). Benjamin Szymanski, a Manville plant worker with asbestosis, sues Johns-Manville for failing to ventilate, protect and warn him; J-M removes the case to federal court. Read the document
May 13, 1946 (No. 1206). Keasbey & Mattison passes on Vandiver Brown's letters about Gardner's cancer views and urges pressure on Gardner to finish his final report. Read the document
August 12, 1946 (No. 220). Thomas Gatke urges Raybestos-Manhattan to press for Gardner's report, wanting its findings "without injections of possibilities of cancer" to answer doctors' claims in court. Read the document
August 19, 1946 (No. 221). Vandiver Brown sends Raybestos-Manhattan Dr. Gardner's reply on the delayed dust report and hopes Gardner will finish it that winter. Read the document
1947 (No. 299 ★). The Sixth Saranac Symposium meets on pneumoconiosis and compensation, with asbestos makers and insurers among those attending. Read the document
June 18, 1947 (Nos. 10, 510 ★). W. C. L. Hemeon reports to the Asbestos Textile Institute that the five-million-particle dust limit does not ensure workers will not get asbestosis. Read the document
November 19, 1947 (No. 64). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee recommends a $5,000 Industrial Hygiene Foundation program on dust control and diagnosis. Read the document
December 5, 1947 (No. 27). The Asbestos Textile Institute's members hear the Air Hygiene Committee's recommended $5,000 program and agree to decide on it at their next meeting. Read the document
December 5, 1947 (No. 28). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Board of Governors elects its officers for 1948, with G. W. Marshall, Jr., of Raybestos-Manhattan as president. Read the document
December 29, 1947 (Nos. 74, 89, 78, 86, 76, 75, 79, 85, 81, 77, 82, 80, 87, 83, 90, 84, 88). Johns-Manville learns that a Waukegan superintendent's autopsy showed asbestosis; Saranac's Arthur Vorwald confirms it and warns that others with similar exposure may be affected. Read the document
1948 (No. 716). Raybestos-Manhattan price cards record sales of asbestos cloth, tape and other products to shipyards, the Navy and industrial customers. Read the document
June 17, 1948 (No. 65). Asbestos Textile Institute members learn that the Air Hygiene Committee's recommended program failed to win member approval, and the Institute gives up its paid manager. Read the document
September 21, 1948 (No. 184). W. G. Hazard tells Saranac that the Kaylo dust under test is 15 to 20 percent amosite and chrysotile asbestos. Read the document
September 30, 1948 (No. 98). The Saranac Laboratory sends Johns-Manville a confidential report on twenty years of animal experiments with asbestos dust. Read the document
October 30, 1948 (No. 232). Saranac's interim report tells Owens-Illinois that Kaylo can produce asbestosis in guinea pigs and should be handled as a hazardous industrial dust. Read the document
November 16, 1948 (Nos. 231, 240). Arthur Vorwald tells Owens-Illinois that Kaylo dust has produced asbestosis in every animal exposed more than 30 months, reversing Saranac's earlier tentative finding. Read the document
December 14, 1948 (No. 505 ★). Owens-Illinois's W. G. Hazard tells the Industrial Hygiene Foundation that Kaylo dust appears to cause asbestosis in animals and asks it to study the hazard. Read the document
February 3, 1949 (No. 8). A. R. Fisher sends Vandiver Brown Dr. Kenneth Smith's X-ray survey of 708 Canadian mill workers, which finds asbestosis cases the men have not been told about. Read the document
March 21, 1949 (No. 508 ★). Theodore F. Hatch of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation returns the Saranac Kaylo report, saying there is no point in checking its findings but suggesting a dust comparison. Read the document
April 7, 1949 (No. 336). Asbestos Textile Institute members decide a Scientific American article unjustly links asbestos to cancer and ask Raybestos-Manhattan's G. W. Marshall to consult Dr. Lanza. Read the document
August 13, 1949 (No. 4). The Journal of the American Medical Association links lung cancer to asbestosis and calls it a probable occupational hazard for asbestos workers. Read the document
November 10, 1949 (No. 509 ★). Owens-Illinois's W. G. Hazard sends Kaylo boxcar dust to the Industrial Hygiene Foundation, reporting counts of 25 to 50 million particles during loading. Read the document

The 1950s

January 3, 1950 (No. 506 ★). Chemist James F. Morgan reports that X-ray tests found no quartz in Kaylo boxcar dust but could not measure its asbestos, and proposes electron microscope studies. Read the document
February 8, 1950 (No. 3). Dr. Kenneth Smith of Canadian Johns-Manville asks Dr. Vorwald to comment on a Merewether article whose conclusions do not match J-M's "operating experience." Read the document
May 2, 1950 (No. 507 ★). Owens-Illinois's W. G. Hazard asks the Industrial Hygiene Foundation for more copies of its monthly Abstracts to send to the company's plants. Read the document
June 1, 1950 (No. 241). Arthur Vorwald tells Owens-Illinois that Kaylo dust produces an asbestotic reaction in the lungs and every precaution should be taken to limit workers' exposure. Read the document
June 1, 1950 (No. 66). The Saranac Laboratory completes its industry-funded report on Leroy Gardner's animal experiments, finding that long asbestos fibers cause asbestosis in several species. Read the document
July 25, 1950 (No. 68). Arthur Vorwald passes on an Owens-Illinois doctor's warning that burlap asbestos bags release undue dust and suggests paper containers. Read the document
July 28, 1950 (No. 69). J. P. Woodard replies that J-M has studied alternatives but still ships fiber in burlap bags, as he believes all producers do. Read the document
August 31, 1950 (No. 9). Dr. Kenneth Smith notes the Lanza contract leaves J-M little choice if unfavorable lung cancer results are submitted for publication. Read the document
September 1, 1950 (No. 6). J. P. Woodard tells A. R. Fisher that company and outside doctors have met to plan a program to learn whether asbestos causes lung cancer. Read the document
October 6, 1950 (No. 143). J. P. Woodard sends Dr. Anthony Lanza the Saranac Laboratory's proposal to study asbestosis and lung cancer and asks for his views. Read the document
October 9, 1950 (No. 144). J. P. Woodard forwards to Dr. Anthony Lanza a September letter from Dr. Kenneth Smith on the pulmonary malignancy study. Read the document
November 10, 1950 (Nos. 5, 145). J. P. Woodard asks Vandiver Brown to draft an agreement keeping Saranac Laboratory's test data confidential, as the Quebec mining association prepares to fund research there. Read the document
November 28, 1950 (Nos. 791, 878 ★). An insurance engineer reports heavy asbestos dust and six asbestosis claims at the Carolina Asbestos mill in Davidson, North Carolina, and calls it "not a desirable risk." Read the document
December 1, 1950 (No. 1035). A Johns-Manville memorandum summarizes the defense doctors' testimony on diagnosing asbestosis at the Haines compensation hearing. Read the document
December 4, 1950 (No. 146). J. P. Woodard asks Ivan Sabourin to tighten the Quebec mining association's agreement with Saranac so the industry gets advance notice of any published results. Read the document
December 12, 1950 (No. 230). W. G. Hazard of Owens-Illinois tells Saranac's Arthur Vorwald the Kaylo Division wants a brochure on Kaylo dust's health aspects and asks for the final animal report. Read the document
December 18, 1950 (No. 242). Arthur Vorwald advises Owens-Illinois to hold its Kaylo health brochure until Saranac's final report is written. Read the document
1951 (No. 150 ★). Doctors at Queens General Hospital report lung cancer with asbestosis in a shipyard pipe coverer and say the cancer should be compensable. Read the document
January 1951 (No. 139). Saranac Laboratory publishes the industry-funded asbestos dust experiments begun by Dr. Leroy Gardner, concluding that long fibers cause asbestosis. Read the document
April 13, 1951 (No. 73). Waukegan plant doctor Samuel Keller thanks Arthur Vorwald for reviewing the plant's chest X-rays at Saranac. Read the document
April 17, 1951 (No. 67). Arthur Vorwald tells J. P. Woodard that X-rays of about 64 Waukegan workers show many cases of asbestosis and urges J-M to improve plant conditions. Read the document
May 29, 1951 (No. 229). A Saranac Laboratory survey of Owens-Illinois's Kaylo plant finds hazardous asbestos dust in boxcar loading and recommends respirators and yearly chest X-rays. Read the document
January 30, 1952 (No. 233). Saranac's final report tells Owens-Illinois that prolonged inhalation of Kaylo dust produces the lung fibrosis typical of asbestosis in guinea pigs. Read the document
February 7, 1952 (No. 185). Arthur Vorwald sends Owens-Illinois the final Kaylo report: the dust causes asbestos-type fibrosis, and published work will not name Kaylo. Read the document
April 1952 (No. 320). An Owens-Illinois research director describes Kaylo insulation, which contains asbestos fiber, as "non-toxic" in a petroleum trade journal. Read the document
June 13, 1952 (No. 142). J. P. Woodard asks Ivan Sabourin for copies of Saranac's first interim report on asbestosis and lung cancer for himself and Dr. Anthony Lanza. Read the document
June 20, 1952 (No. 29). The Asbestos Textile Institute hears that "several new hygienic problems" confront the industry and plans a questionnaire to member companies. Read the document
August 1, 1952 (No. 2). J. P. Woodard sends Dr. Lanza Saranac's interim mouse study on asbestos and lung cancer, saying the findings so far are not unfavorable. Read the document
September 1952 (No. 70). Asbestos company, insurance and government representatives sign in at the Seventh Saranac Symposium on pneumoconiosis. Read the document
September 22, 1952 (No. 1013). The Saranac Laboratory's Seventh Symposium program lists insurance men among the speakers and sets a session on pneumoconiosis and lung cancer, with papers on asbestos miners and weavers. Read the document
September 24, 1952 (No. 71). At the Saranac Symposium, Paul Cartier presents lung cancer figures for Quebec asbestos miners and E. R. A. Merewether reports lung cancer in 16.2 percent of British asbestosis deaths. Read the document
October 13, 1952 (No. 243). An Owens-Illinois research report says Saranac found Kaylo's asbestos had "the usual effect" but calls the hazard to those handling Kaylo small. Read the document
December 9, 1952 (No. 186). Owens-Illinois drafts a pamphlet telling users that research has proven normal handling of Kaylo safe, citing the Saranac animal studies. Read the document
December 29, 1952 (No. 880 ★). An American Mutual hygienist finds excessive asbestos dust at Badham Insulation Company's pipe-covering saws despite a new ventilation system. Read the document
March 9, 1953 (No. 32). The Asbestos Textile Institute's auditor reports to its treasurer on the Institute's accounts through March 6, 1953. Read the document
March 11, 1953 (No. 30). J-M medical director Dr. K. W. Smith briefs the Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee on asbestosis, and the committee proposes inviting company doctors. Read the document
March 12, 1953 (No. 31). The Asbestos Textile Institute votes to invite member companies' doctors to its Air Hygiene Committee's next meeting. Read the document
June 8, 1953 (No. 35). The Asbestos Textile Institute's auditor reports to its treasurer on the Institute's accounts through June 4, 1953. Read the document
June 10, 1953 (No. 33). Company doctors meet the Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee and agree that pre-employment and annual medical examinations of asbestos workers are essential. Read the document
June 11, 1953 (No. 34). The Asbestos Textile Institute hears of its committee's first meeting with company doctors and invites the doctors back for September. Read the document
August 3, 1953 (No. 95). The Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes research projects for Johns-Manville, including an epidemiologic study of whether asbestosis is linked to lung cancer. Read the document
September 9, 1953 (No. 36). Company doctors and the Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee set criteria for diagnosing compensable asbestosis and plan an industry-wide X-ray survey. Read the document
September 10, 1953 (No. 37). The Asbestos Textile Institute approves its Air Hygiene Committee's work with company doctors and distributes its new Handbook of Asbestos Textiles. Read the document
November 1953 (No. 94 ★). Boston doctors publish a case of lung cancer with asbestosis and a review of 20 autopsied cases, including pipe insulators, linking asbestos to bronchogenic carcinoma. Read the document
December 9, 1953 (No. 1009). The Asbestos Textile Institute's air hygiene committee reviews a member survey finding asbestosis in 5 to 11 percent of exposed textile workers and weighs eliminating dry weaving. Read the document
March 10, 1954 (No. 38). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee reviews a seven-plant fiber survey and French reports finding no link between asbestosis and lung cancer. Read the document
March 11, 1954 (No. 40). Asbestos Textile Institute members show "reluctance" to add air hygiene and dust control information to their handbook, asking first for an outline. Read the document
May 19, 1954 (No. 191). M. S. Maier reviews dust counting instruments after O. H. Cilley of Raybestos-Manhattan asks for a study of dust counts in the mill. Read the document
May 28, 1954 (No. 330). O. H. Cilley of Raybestos-Manhattan asks the Industrial Hygiene Foundation for help with dust control and backs lowering the dust limit to 1 million particles. Read the document
June 8, 1954 (No. 1140). An Owens-Illinois chemist compares the amount and kind of asbestos in Kaylo with competing calcium silicate pipe insulations, including Johns-Manville's. Read the document
June 9, 1954 (No. 39). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee urges member companies to obtain autopsies of workers wherever possible, for study at Saranac Laboratory. Read the document
June 10, 1954 (No. 41). The Asbestos Textile Institute reviews federal specifications and wartime fiber supply, and again invites company doctors to its Air Hygiene Committee. Read the document
June 17, 1954 (No. 331). W. C. L. Hemeon of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes ways to measure and cut the remaining dust at Raybestos-Manhattan's Manheim plant. Read the document
July 13, 1954 (No. 72). A J-M works manager sends Hugh Jackson confidential testimony from a compensation case on asbestosis and lung cancer and plans to answer the claimant's doctor. Read the document
October 6, 1954 (No. 337). Company doctors at the Asbestos Textile Institute hear how asbestosis cases were reported as pulmonary fibrosis, and plan autopsy and lung cancer studies. Read the document
December 1, 1954 (No. 42). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Board of Governors, chaired by J-M's F. J. Wakem, approves its 1955 budget and admits Cape Asbestos as an associate member. Read the document
December 1, 1954 (No. 43). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee urges autopsy and heart studies that would help limit compensation liability, noting international attention to asbestos and cancer. Read the document
1955 (No. 298B). Richard Doll reports that men with 20 or more years at a British asbestos works died of lung cancer at about ten times the expected rate. Read the document
February 15, 1955 (No. 877). The Saranac Laboratory asks the Asbestos Textile Institute to fund a three-year animal study of whether asbestos fibers cause lung cancer. Read the document
March 1955 (No. 45). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee reviews a Saranac Laboratory proposal to study lung cancer and asbestosis, and asks members to join clinical and autopsy studies. Read the document
March 10, 1955 (No. 44). The Asbestos Textile Institute hears that its Air Hygiene Committee is weighing outside studies of asbestos and heart and lung disease. Read the document
June 9, 1955 (No. 338). Asbestos Textile Institute members call an autopsy study "ill-advised" because it implies a link between asbestosis and cancer. Read the document
September 7, 1955 (No. 47). Quebec mining association officials tell the Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee about asbestosis, cancer and dust control in the Quebec mines. Read the document
September 8, 1955 (No. 46). The Asbestos Textile Institute holds its annual meeting in New York, hears the Air Hygiene Committee's report, and elects its officers for 1956. Read the document
November 28, 1955 (No. 100). Kenneth W. Smith and H. M. Jackson brief Johns-Manville's industrial relations managers on medical examinations, dust hazards and workmen's compensation costs. Read the document
December 7, 1955 (No. 48). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee adopts a 1956 program of medical exams and dust control, and plans a dust count survey of members' plants. Read the document
1956 (No. 792). The Manufacturing Chemists' Association publishes model warning labels, including statements for products whose dust is "Harmful if Inhaled." Read the document
February 13, 1956 (No. 1141). North American Asbestos confirms an Owens-Illinois order for 25 tons of amosite, raises its price, and warns that the grade is getting hard to obtain. Read the document
March 5, 1956 (No. 52). Auditor S. C. Gehman reports to the Asbestos Textile Institute's treasurer on the Institute's books for the past three months. Read the document
March 7, 1956 (No. 50). Dr. Kenneth Smith, J-M's medical director, tells the textile makers he has no evidence against a link between asbestosis and cancer, and urges an industry study. Read the document
March 8, 1956 (Nos. 49, 51). The Asbestos Textile Institute reports that its Board of Governors has funded a preliminary survey toward action "designed to refute the work of Dr. Hueper." Read the document
March 14, 1956 (No. 874 ★). An American Mutual engineer asks that his notes on an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting about asbestosis and cancer be kept confidential within the insurer. Read the document
May 21, 1956 (No. 96). C. Richard Walmer of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation sends the Asbestos Textile Institute a proposal for a study of lung cancer in asbestos textile workers. Read the document
May 21, 1956 (No. 97). The Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes a $17,500 study for the Asbestos Textile Institute to determine whether lung cancer is related to asbestos exposure in textile plants. Read the document
June 4, 1956 (No. 339). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee discusses a compensation ruling linking asbestosis and cancer, and declines to support Dr. Kenneth Lynch's research. Read the document
June 12, 1956 (No. 147). A J-M researcher reports on the Asbestos Textile Institute's Quebec mine tour, where Dr. Paul Cartier says he has found asbestosis only among mill workers. Read the document
June 12, 1956 (No. 187). W. G. Hazard sends Ira Brought the Saranac Kaylo article, stressing that it found no silicosis hazard and only a mild asbestosis reaction in animals. Read the document
June 12, 1956 (No. 1880). W. G. Hazard notes that Ira Brought asked for a Kaylo health brochure and was told the only published material is Saranac's technical article. Read the document
June 13, 1956 (No. 329). Raybestos-Manhattan's Martin Maier asks Dr. Paul Cartier at Thetford Mines to measure the dust and fiber content of a sample from the company's mill. Read the document
September 5, 1956 (No. 53). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee debates a proposed lung cancer study of asbestos workers and makes no recommendation. Read the document
October 11, 1956 (No. 176 ★). Owens-Corning's Boston office reports that the Boston insulators' local is x-raying members, finding lung shadows, and seeking to have the trade declared hazardous. Read the document
October 16, 1956 (No. 177 ★). Owens-Corning's legal department forwards the Boston union report and says the matter will be taken up with the union's international officers. Read the document
October 16, 1956 (No. 178 ★). John D. Black tells W. L. Bowes that Owens-Corning will take the union's lung investigation up directly with its international officers. Read the document
November 20, 1956 (No. 179 ★). Ira Brought reports that the insulators' union officers have cut health references from their journal's minutes, and urges Owens-Corning to head off complaints through sales offices. Read the document
November 26, 1956 (No. 180 ★). D. W. Ladd urges Owens-Corning to examine insulators nationwide to show glass fibers are harmless, after the union journal reports deaths in the trade. Read the document
December 6, 1956 (No. 91 ★). Daniel C. Braun of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation sends Hugh M. Jackson published reports linking asbestos to lung cancer, including cases in pipe insulators, for an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting. Read the document
1957 (No. 308). Kenneth Lynch and colleagues report more lung tumors in mice that breathed asbestos dust than in controls, but call the result short of proof that asbestos causes cancer. Read the document
1957 (No. 600 ★). Johns-Manville answers an insulation worker's interrogatories, saying it knew of no asbestosis among applicators and so had no reason to warn anyone outside its plants. Read the document
February 19, 1957 (No. 834 ★). Armstrong Cork's insurance department, handling an insulator's asbestosis claim, writes that "these asbestosis claims are on the increase." Read the document
March 7, 1957 (No. 25). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee votes down a proposed lung cancer study of asbestos workers, partly for fear it would "stir up a hornet's nest." Read the document
April 30, 1957 (No. 1142). An Owens-Illinois buyer sends the Technical Center amosite samples from North American Asbestos and asks whether another grade could replace scarce ones. Read the document
May 9, 1957 (No. 181 ★). Ira Brought warns Owens-Corning's president that the union's published report of members' deaths will spread alarm, and urges salesmen to watch union business agents. Read the document
May 23, 1957 (No. 182 ★). An Owens-Corning manager in California reports the union's asbestosis motion and a rumor that insulators will again seek extra pay for handling Fiberglas. Read the document
June 1957 (No. 99 ★). The Industrial Hygiene Digest abstracts a Danish study finding asbestosis and pleural calcification among long-time insulation workers. Read the document
June 3, 1957 (No. 183 ★). M. D. Burch thanks K. S. Johnson and says Owens-Corning will follow the union's asbestosis inquiry closely. Read the document
June 10, 1957 (No. 794 ★). J-M's Manville plant doctors review workers' abnormal chest X-rays and decide case by case whom to move, tell or report. Read the document
July 17, 1957 (No. 598 ★). Frederick Le Grande, a construction worker with asbestos disease, sues Johns-Manville Products for failing to warn of the dangers of its asbestos products. Read the document
July 23, 1957 (No. 795 ★). Manville plant doctors review more workers' abnormal chest X-rays, and the safety supervisor asks whether J-M is "facing a liability." Read the document
August 23, 1957 (No. 92 ★). Daniel C. Braun tells Hugh M. Jackson that most reported lung cancers with asbestosis occurred in factory workers, not miners, and that the Quebec mining study is nearly finished. Read the document
September 5, 1957 (No. 55). The Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee hears that the Quebec-sponsored lung cancer study is nearly finished, and compares dust sampling methods. Read the document
September 6, 1957 (Nos. 56, 54). The Asbestos Textile Institute holds its annual meeting; its president warns of shrinking markets for asbestos textiles. Read the document
December 1957 (No. 13). H. M. Jackson of Johns-Manville tells the asbestos textile makers that respirators are the last line of defense against asbestos dust. Read the document
December 5, 1957 (Nos. 12, 57). The Asbestos Textile Institute's air hygiene committee discusses dust control and respirators and hears that the Quebec miners' dust study is finished but not available. Read the document
December 30, 1957 (No. 93). Kenneth W. Smith tells Ivan Sabourin that he and Hugh Jackson accept a condensed miners' survey with all references to asbestosis and lung cancer deleted. Read the document
1958 (No. 480). An earlier Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on pneumonoconiosis treats silicosis as the main dust disease and gives asbestosis brief mention. Read the document
1958 (No. 602 ★). Dr. Samuel Einhorn swears that Frederick Le Grand's asbestosis was not diagnosed until February 1956. Read the document
1958 (No. 827). Johns-Manville publishes "Asbestos: The Magic Mineral" for its 100th anniversary, praising asbestos with no word on its health effects. Read the document
January 2, 1958 (No. 599 ★). Judge Reynier Wortendyke rules on J-M's objections to an insulation worker's interrogatories, holding that J-M's warnings to its own employees are irrelevant to his case. Read the document
March 5, 1958 (No. 796 ★). At Manville plant health conferences, J-M doctors debate whether to tell workers of abnormal X-rays; one says "We take the X-rays for our own protection." Read the document
April 28, 1958 (No. 369). Aetna's engineers survey dust at Owens-Illinois's Kaylo plant in Berlin, New Jersey, find a "dangerously high" count at a saw, and recommend respirators and exhaust systems. Read the document
September 1958 (No. 59). The Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee discusses the Quebec-sponsored study finding no excess lung cancer among asbestos miners, and plans to share it with plant doctors. Read the document
October 22, 1958 (No. 604 ★). Frederick Le Grand swears he did not learn until February 1956 that his illness was asbestosis from his work. Read the document
October 30, 1958 (No. 601 ★). Frederick Le Grand answers J-M's interrogatories, saying J-M should have warned users and that many men in his union local have asbestosis. Read the document
November 1958 (No. 140). The Trudeau Foundation compiles the publications of the Saranac Laboratory from 1885 to 1958, with a history of the laboratory. Read the document
November 5, 1958 (No. 603 ★). Dr. Harold Goldberg swears he suspected pneumoconiosis in Frederick Le Grand as early as 1955 but gave no diagnosis then. Read the document
1959 (No. 58). H. M. Jackson of J-M tells the Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee that the 5 million particle limit is "a carry over from the quartz industry." Read the document
1959 (No. 605 ★). Johns-Manville settles Frederick Le Grande's suit for $35,000, with his employer's insurer, Travelers, waiving its lien. Read the document
March 5, 1959 (No. 60). The Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee compares members' X-ray and medical exam policies and reviews the Asbestosis Research Council's first report. Read the document
June 10, 1959 (No. 61). Members of the Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee report no progression in chest X-rays of recently hired workers. Read the document
June 22, 1959 (No. 148 ★). H. M. Jackson tells a Navy shipyard hygienist he knows of only two asbestosis cases among insulation installers, and describes J-M's dust and fiber limits. Read the document
December 1, 1959 (No. 896). Southern Asbestos Company transfers its business to H. K. Porter, which assumes all of its debts and liabilities. Read the document
December 3, 1959 (No. 62). The Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee discusses dust collectors, dust samplers and plant safety, and plans an environmental health survey. Read the document

The 1960s

1960 (No. 26). A list records the Asbestos Textile Institute General and Air Hygiene Committee meetings that J-M's H. M. Jackson attended between 1947 and 1960. Read the document
1960 (No. 298C). J. C. Wagner and colleagues report 33 cases of pleural mesothelioma linked to crocidolite in South Africa's Cape asbestos region, many of them not miners. Read the document
January 13, 1960 (No. 306). J. B. Jobe of Johns-Manville tells the insulation makers' trade association that the industry "could benefit" from a health program; a recommendation is promised for the next meeting. Read the document
March 3, 1960 (No. 63). A member company tells the Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee its asbestosis cases have fallen from eighty-five in 1936 to seven. Read the document
May 6, 1960 (No. 307). The insulation makers' trade association decides, without recorded discussion, that a NIMA safety program "with respect to health should be dropped." Read the document
December 3, 1960 (No. 298D). E. E. Keal reports lung, ovarian and peritoneal cancers among London Hospital patients with asbestosis, mostly asbestos factory workers. Read the document
1961 (No. 479). The Encyclopaedia Britannica's entry on pneumonoconiosis, by Dr. G. W. H. Schepers, links asbestos with lung cancer. Read the document
1961 (No. 481). The Encyclopaedia Britannica's list of contributors names Dr. G. W. H. Schepers, then a du Pont pathologist. Read the document
1961 (No. 793). The Manufacturing Chemists' Association issues the sixth edition of its guide to warning labels, keeping its model label for dust-producing products. Read the document
February 23, 1961 (Nos. 737, 606, 608, 607 ★). The estate of Fred Wenham, an insulation worker who died in 1960, sues Johns-Manville Products for failing to warn of its asbestos products' dangers; the case later settles. Read the document
March 20, 1961 (No. 897 ★). The widow of insulator Clarence Faciane sues Travelers, Eagle-Picher, insulation makers and tobacco companies over his death from lung damage. Read the document
September 26, 1961 (No. 875 ★). American Mutual's engineers advise Keasbey & Mattison to avoid a Public Health Service cancer survey of the asbestos industry, fearing higher claim costs, and to handle cancer internally. Read the document
November 30, 1961 (No. 845). Owens-Corning decides to stop using Johns-Manville chrysotile at its Berlin plant because of its high chloride content. Read the document
December 4, 1961 (Nos. 846, 1144). Owens-Corning drops Johns-Manville chrysotile from Kaylo insulation to meet DuPont's and Union Carbide's demands for low chloride. Read the document
1962 (No. 384). Dr. G. W. H. Schepers' textbook chapter warns that asbestosis can follow brief exposure and is appearing in wartime Liberty ship pipe insulators. Read the document
1962 (No. 835 ★). Johns-Manville contests an insulator's asbestosis claim for work at an Ohio Bakelite plant, and its insurance manager welcomes the denial. Read the document
January 30, 1962 (No. 876 ★). J. B. Skinner of American Mutual gathers what his files show on asbestos and lung cancer, including 1950s reports of a causal link, for insured Keasbey & Mattison. Read the document
March 21, 1962 (No. 611 ★). A Union Carbide survey finds that band-sawing Johns-Manville's Thermobestos blocks is a health hazard, and the plant stops cutting them. Read the document
July 20, 1962 (No. 612 ★). Union Carbide tests three new Thermobestos blocks from Johns-Manville and finds the dust still more than twice the safe limit. Read the document
July 26, 1962 (No. 836 ★). Johns-Manville's agents report a former two-week insulator's dust disease claim disallowed after a doctor finds pneumoconiosis but blames heart disease. Read the document
December 4, 1962 (No. 613 ★). After Union Carbide stops buying Thermobestos, Johns-Manville disputes its dust tests and invites its hygienist to Manville; the plant doctor opposes the visit. Read the document
February 8, 1963 (No. 616). Union Carbide hygienist Robert Peele's diary records his dust survey work and contacts during the Thermobestos dispute. Read the document
June 6, 1963 (No. 340). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee hears that Dr. Selikoff will report high lung cancer rates among insulation workers, "damaging to the industry." Read the document
October 3, 1963 (No. 341). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee briefly discusses Dr. Selikoff's paper on cancer among insulation workers, already mailed to its members. Read the document
October 23, 1963 (No. 614 ★). Union Carbide's third dust survey finds Thermobestos and Carey-Temp blocks unsafe to cut with existing equipment, but Kaylo safe. Read the document
1964 (No. 1182). Johns-Manville's labels for its Marinite boards carry a caution that breathing asbestos dust "may cause serious bodily harm." Read the document
May 1964 (No. 149). William T. Marr reports asbestosis disability and a death among Long Beach Naval Shipyard insulators, and heavy dust when old insulation is removed. Read the document
June 4, 1964 (No. 343). Dr. Lewis Cralley shows the Asbestos Textile Institute charts of falling dust levels, and the committee decides not to take part in the coming asbestos conference. Read the document
September 2, 1964 (No. 1184). Johns-Manville's insulation division decides to put a precautionary label on every asbestos product in its high temperature line and tells the plants how to apply it. Read the document
September 14, 1964 (No. 493). J-M medical director Kenneth W. Smith objects that a gummed caution label was put on Thermobestos cartons and urges a meeting on labels for other asbestos products. Read the document
October 8, 1964 (No. 342). The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee asks how the coming Biological Effects of Asbestos conference, linking asbestos with cancer, can be "investigated and rebutted." Read the document
October 15, 1964 (No. 829). Johns-Manville's insulation division orders a caution label on its asbestos high-temperature insulation, phased in as old cartons and bags are used up. Read the document
October 19, 1964 (No. 532). Abstracts for the New York Academy of Sciences asbestos conference include Selikoff's insulator death figures and papers by Wagner and J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith. Read the document
October 19, 1964 (No. 533). The New York Academy of Sciences program for its 1964 asbestos conference calls asbestos-related cancers perhaps the most important industrial cancers. Read the document
February 11, 1965 (No. 344). The Asbestos Textile Institute's board seeks standard answers for customers about asbestos hazards after the 1964 conference, with Dr. Cralley's help. Read the document
June 4, 1965 (No. 345). At Thetford Mines, J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith urges the asbestos industry to tell the truth about worker health, while Ivan Sabourin doubts any asbestos and cancer link. Read the document
August 3, 1966 (No. 609). F. H. Edwards urges Owens-Corning to track lung disease among its insulation contracting workers so it knows as much as Dr. Selikoff. Read the document
August 19, 1966 (No. 610). F. H. Edwards proposes an industry X-ray program for insulation workers, partly to check Dr. Selikoff's findings and contest compensation claims. Read the document
December 23, 1966 (No. 899). Insulator Claude Tomplait sues J-M and other insulation makers in Texas; Eagle-Picher's examining doctor later confirms asbestosis. Read the document
1968 (No. 661). The Quebec mining industry's research institute lists outside asbestos studies its scientific committee declined to support, including work on non-occupational exposure and brake dust. Read the document
1968 (No. 662). Dr. Enrico Vigliani proposes studying cancer and mesothelioma among Balangero chrysotile miners and Genoa and La Spezia shipyard insulation workers. Read the document
January 29, 1968 (No. 929). R. S. Coleman sends H. A. Berg Johns-Manville's position paper on asbestos and health, which says finished asbestos products pose no shown risk to the public. Read the document
February 23, 1968 (No. 574). Owens-Corning notes record Johns-Manville saying it uses no amosite in Thermobestos because of cost and health problems, calling amosite a health "bad actor." Read the document
March 28, 1968 (No. 7). Quebec asbestos miners propose caution labels on fiber bags to limit legal responsibility, and hear that all three asbestos types "are in the same boat." Read the document
April 4, 1968 (No. 915). National Gypsum's safety director reports that J-M is pressing an industry health safety booklet for asbestos-cement products and will publish it with or without agreement. Read the document
April 17, 1968 (Nos. 842, 911). National Gypsum tells Johns-Manville it strongly opposes an industry safety booklet on asbestos-cement products because it would create fear among buyers and workers. Read the document
May 8, 1968 (No. 841). J-M's C. L. Sheckler answers National Gypsum's objections to the asbestos-cement safety booklet and seeks unanimous industry agreement. Read the document
May 16, 1968 (No. 908). J-M's C. L. Sheckler calls a joint industry meeting on asbestos-cement health problems and circulates a draft health safety booklet. Read the document
May 29, 1968 (No. 912). J-M's Edward Cerny confirms a June 17 industry seminar on asbestos environmental control and sends J-M's position paper and insulation safety pamphlets. Read the document
June 3, 1968 (No. 901). At a Quebec Asbestos Mining Association meeting, a member proposes putting the caution label on shipping papers instead of bags; J-M's offer of $100,000 to Selikoff's group is reported. Read the document
January 29, 1969 (No. 897 ★). H. K. Porter acquires Tallman-McCluskey Fabrics Company of St. Louis, takes over its property and liabilities, and liquidates it. Read the document
April 22, 1969 (No. 1166). C. L. Sheckler tells F. W. Matthews that J-M's paper slitting makes little dust but that he does not know how customers cut asbestos paper, and asks for dust counts. Read the document
April 23, 1969 (No. 328). Dr. Lewis J. Cralley of the U.S. Public Health Service explains to an international conference why the American asbestos dust standard is moving to a fiber count. Read the document
April 30, 1969 (No. 881 ★). The Navy tells Ingalls Shipbuilding its shipyards have long known of asbestos hazards and asks how the yard protects insulation workers; Ingalls answers in the fall. Read the document
May 19, 1969 (No. 326). Johns-Manville's environmental control director, Edmund Fenner, tells New Jersey doctors how J-M has controlled asbestos dust since the Saranac research of the 1930s. Read the document
September 10, 1969 (No. 637). The Industrial Hygiene Foundation sends J-M and other sponsors a confidential draft Public Health Service document, offering to have corrections made through committee member Dr. Paul Gross. Read the document
September 24, 1969 (No. 597). Owens-Corning's Dr. Jon Konzen advises that a worker's case be accepted as asbestosis, though plant asbestos levels had not been excessively high. Read the document

The 1970s

February 27, 1970 (No. 924). R. S. Coleman notes that National Asbestos Mines' deal to make asbestos-cement sheets for J-M requires buying J-M fiber, and reviews fiber sales to other companies. Read the document
May 11, 1970 (No. 631). The Industrial Health Foundation's president promises Raybestos-Manhattan advance notice of publications and a share in research planning in return for its funding. Read the document
June 11, 1970 (No. 346). An Asbestos Textile Institute committee drafts a customer health brochure that a union could not use against management, and urges caution on a federal health form. Read the document
July 21, 1970 (No. 848). Owens-Corning's payment records show it buying asbestos fiber from Johns-Manville in Ontario for its Berlin plant. Read the document
September 9, 1970 (No. 333). Berkeley researchers report that cutting asbestos insulation in a closed room can raise fiber levels far above the proposed limit. Read the document
1971 (No. 305). Finnish researchers report that dust levels in insulation work far exceed recommended limits and that insulators seldom wear masks. Read the document
January 25, 1971 (No. 499). Notes from a visit to Johns-Manville's Manville plant record its dust limit of 5, a likely new code of 2, and a mandatory respirator program. Read the document
February 3, 1971 (No. 347). The Asbestos Textile Institute's board elects new members for Johns-Manville and American Asbestos Textile. Read the document
February 4, 1971 (No. 348). An industry doctor calls Dr. Selikoff "dangerous" at an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting, and J-M's C. L. Sheckler says warning labels will likely become mandatory. Read the document
March 24, 1971 (No. 630). The Industrial Health Foundation sends its asbestos company sponsors the fibrous dust study report for its annual report, inviting objections to the text. Read the document
April 26, 1971 (No. 922). National Gypsum sets terms for supplying corrugated asbestos-cement sheets to Johns-Manville Sales Corporation for resale. Read the document
1972 (No. 321). A photograph of insulation work produced by Raybestos-Manhattan in Philadelphia (exhibit 321). Read the document
1972 (No. 322). A photograph of insulation work produced by Raybestos-Manhattan in Philadelphia (exhibit 322). Read the document
1972 (No. 323). A photograph of insulation work produced by Raybestos-Manhattan in Philadelphia (exhibit 323). Read the document
1972 (No. 663). Index cards summarize Italian studies of asbestosis and cancer among Balangero chrysotile miners, compensated asbestosis cases and shipyard workers. Read the document
1972 (No. 828). Johns-Manville's Fred Pundsack tells the Labor Department that a cancer warning on asbestos products is needlessly frightening and offers a milder caution label. Read the document
February 14, 1972 (No. 879). An industrial hygienist writing to the American Mutual Insurance Alliance opposes a 2-fiber asbestos limit and warning signs naming asbestosis, citing their impact on claims. Read the document
February 25, 1972 (No. 189). Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director argues against a 2-fiber asbestos limit, urging 5 to 7 fibers, and says insulators have the most asbestos disease. Read the document
March 1972 (No. 11). Reitze, Selikoff and colleagues report heavy asbestos exposure from sprayed fireproofing, reaching other trades working nearby on building sites. Read the document
March 16, 1972 (No. 310). Dr. George Wright, presented by Johns-Manville, tells the Labor Department hearing that the five-fiber limit is safe and a two-fiber standard is not justified. Read the document
March 16, 1972 (No. 311). Johns-Manville vice president Henry Moreno testifies on the cost and engineering of meeting a lower asbestos limit, saying twenty percent of J-M's sampled stations still exceed five fibers. Read the document
March 16, 1972 (No. 312). Insulation manufacturers' and contractors' spokesmen tell the Labor Department hearing that a two-fiber asbestos standard is impractical and would put small contractors out of business. Read the document
March 16, 1972 (No. 313). Asbestos Information Association president Albert Fay tells the Labor Department hearing that strict standards could "spell the demise" of much of the asbestos industry. Read the document
March 16, 1972 (No. 314). Matthew Swetonic, for the asbestos industry's association and Johns-Manville, tells the Labor Department hearing that a two-fiber limit is unsupported and opposes cancer warning labels on most asbestos products. Read the document
March 16, 1972 (No. 315). Raybestos-Manhattan's Isaac Weaver tells the Labor Department hearing that a two-fiber asbestos limit is not feasible and urges keeping five fibers. Read the document
March 16, 1972 (No. 316). Johns-Manville's Walter Hesse tells the Labor Department that insulation workers' asbestos exposure fell substantially between 1945 and 1970. Read the document
July 31, 1972 (No. 645). A Raybestos-Manhattan executive learns that textile products are shipping without the warning labels OSHA requires and orders every textile plant checked. Read the document
November 10, 1972 (No. 673). Dr. Joseph Goodman tells Raybestos-Manhattan's president that asbestos undoubtedly causes lung cancer and mesothelioma, and that public relations is not the answer. Read the document
March 7, 1973 (No. 625). Raybestos-Manhattan's I. H. Weaver tells John Marsh he doubts the company wants NIOSH testing its pipe covering, as the asbestos textile industry turns to McGill University. Read the document
May 10, 1973 (No. 664). Paul-A. Filteau reports to Quebec mining association members on Selikoff's Toronto lectures and wishes for an industry doctor able to debate him. Read the document
June 22, 1973 (Nos. 617, 620). J-M's Dr. G. W. Wright attacks Dr. Selikoff's case for a lower asbestos standard and gathers questions for British experts. Read the document
October 2, 1973 (No. 646). John H. Marsh writes that the industry had hoped NIOSH would study a dustier plant than J-M's Manville textile plant, fearing a stricter standard. Read the document
1974 (No. 309). A British asbestos company's medical officer, Hilton Lewinsohn, publishes a review of research on asbestos disease since 1964. Read the document
1974 (No. 682). The Asbestos Information Association/North America publishes a booklet saying asbestos disease is confined to the workplace and reflects past conditions. Read the document
1974 (No. 863). A translated news item in Raybestos-Manhattan's files reports that the Soviet Union is expanding asbestos mining in the Urals as world supply tightens and prices rise. Read the document
January 29, 1974 (No. 643). McGill's Dr. G. W. Gibbs tells Raybestos-Manhattan that safety garment fiber levels raise a serious problem, and recalls the contract's one-year delay on publication. Read the document
March 1, 1974 (No. 659). John H. Marsh sends managers the McGill report showing safety garment fiber levels above federal limits and calls for immediate engineering improvements. Read the document
March 4, 1974 (No. 660). John Magenheimer of Raybestos-Manhattan tells John Marsh that asbestos safety garments give unsatisfactory dust counts and recommends improving the fabric. Read the document
March 6, 1974 (No. 655). John Hawkins tells John H. Marsh the McGill safety garment research was poorly done and not worthy of publication in its present form. Read the document
March 12, 1974 (No. 640). John H. Marsh agrees with Cape Asbestos that the U.S. industry association should be more careful about calling some asbestos fibers more hazardous than others. Read the document
March 12, 1974 (No. 658). John J. Magenheimer rebuts John Hawkins and says the McGill report shows asbestos safety garments expose their wearers to excessive dust. Read the document
March 15, 1974 (No. 629). Raybestos-Manhattan's John Marsh defends a McGill study finding problems with asbestos safety garments and urges using it to avoid "undesirable publicity." Read the document
May 24, 1974 (No. 670). John Marsh thanks Cape Asbestos's Alec Cross for a dust control film and says many American manufacturers take dust control less seriously than British ones. Read the document
June 14, 1974 (No. 726). An unsigned review of the asbestos-health literature says asbestosis was a recognized occupational hazard by 1930 and lists unanswered research questions, including whether any exposure is safe. Read the document
June 17, 1974 (No. 651). John J. Magenheimer urges that customers be told of the McGill safety garment results and that a lower-dust Novatex fabric be marketed quickly. Read the document
June 28, 1974 (No. 653). M. Q. Scowcroft warns that publishing the McGill safety garment study would be extremely damaging to asbestos textile makers and the whole protective clothing industry. Read the document
July 15, 1974 (No. 654). John J. Magenheimer writes that the McGill report will likely be published and that Raybestos-Manhattan can affect only its timing and possibly its tone. Read the document
July 19, 1974 (Nos. 618, 621). Nicolet's Guy Gabrielson urges Raybestos-Manhattan's president to join other asbestos companies in intervening in the Tyler, Texas worker suits against Pittsburgh Corning. Read the document
July 24, 1974 (No. 652). John H. Marsh writes that the McGill study confirms asbestos safety garments can release fibers above permissible limits, and urges the company to lead on safer garments. Read the document
August 21, 1974 (No. 648). A Philadelphia meeting reviews mortality and illness data on Raybestos-Manhattan workers and the size of the company's Novatex fibers. Read the document
August 22, 1974 (No. 864). W. J. Kissel sends John Marsh minutes and round-robin X-ray readings exchanged among Raybestos-Manhattan plants, still awaiting North Charleston's readings of Manheim films. Read the document
September 19, 1974 (No. 639). Dr. Joseph L. Goodman tells Raybestos-Manhattan that dust counts in its plants are still above 2 fibers per cc and lists six steps needing immediate attention. Read the document
October 24, 1974 (Nos. 690, 862). A company writer tells Dr. A. D. McDonald that Bridgeport-area pleural mesothelioma cases have risen to 27 as Connecticut proposes strict asbestos emission rules. Read the document
October 28, 1974 (No. 642). John H. Marsh offers Dr. J. C. Gilson Raybestos-Manhattan's dust data and notes cases of mesothelioma among Manheim plant workers. Read the document
November 4, 1974 (No. 225). Isaac Weaver sends John Marsh Dr. Schepers' 1965 conference remarks and sees "several possibilities why J-M might wish to denigrate Dr. Schepers." Read the document
November 6, 1974 (No. 1189). Johns-Manville's new Labeling Review Committee is called to discuss labels on fiber bags and whether to label asbestos products sold abroad. Read the document
December 18, 1974 (No. 713). J. H. Marsh reports that a British industry doctor answered every question on the asbestos standard with "ask me in 20 years," and regrets U.S. industry's absence from earlier meetings. Read the document
1975 (No. 840). An Asbestos Information Association card tells the public that asbestos disease follows only heavy, long exposure and poses no community hazard. Read the document
1975 (Nos. 671, 638). Handwritten notes for a meeting with medical directors list reasons for Raybestos-Manhattan to share its health data, including the legal risk of withholding it. Read the document
February 18, 1975 (No. 626). Raybestos-Manhattan's divisions report to John Marsh which asbestos products carry the OSHA caution label, most of them labeled only since 1974. Read the document
March 6, 1975 (No. 649). Dr. G. W. Gibbs sends Raybestos-Manhattan his final manuscript on fiber release from asbestos safety garments, submitted to a British journal. Read the document
April 23, 1975 (Nos. 667, 687). John Marsh asks Dr. Philip Enterline to review a Cassiar Asbestos chairman's address on asbestos and health that Marsh thinks inaccurate and misleading. Read the document
April 27, 1975 (No. 872). An Associated Press story reports a study finding occupational disease, including lung disease from asbestos and fibrous dusts, in one of four small-business workers. Read the document
May 5, 1975 (No. 873). John H. Marsh warns Raybestos-Manhattan managers that small-shop workers' ignorance of asbestos hazards leaves the industry open to third-party suits after Borel. Read the document
May 29, 1975 (No. 666). Dr. Philip Enterline proposes a $65,811 study of deaths among about 4,000 workers at Raybestos-Manhattan's Stratford plant and sends a draft agreement. Read the document
June 27, 1975 (No. 665). Joseph Glennon asks that Dr. Enterline's study agreement require Raybestos-Manhattan's prior approval before any data from the study are published. Read the document
July 7, 1975 (No. 650). Dr. Graham Gibbs reports to Raybestos-Manhattan on laboratory tests of fiber released from 14 asbestos fabrics used for safety garments. Read the document
July 14, 1975 (No. 712). Raybestos-Manhattan's J. H. Marsh asks Cape Asbestos's A. A. Cross what a news release for Asbestos magazine should say, having asked Doris Fagan to print nothing meanwhile. Read the document
August 8, 1975 (Nos. 636, 686). Raybestos-Manhattan's J. H. Marsh lists the four recognized asbestos diseases and the first published reports of each, from Merewether in 1930 to Wagner in 1960. Read the document
August 8, 1975 (Nos. 641, 669). John H. Marsh asks Cape's Alex Cross for a press release and says Asbestos magazine will print nothing about the international organization without checking with him. Read the document
September 29, 1975 (No. 672). Union Carbide's H. B. Rhodes reports that mesothelioma findings look discouraging and that the British two-fiber limit does not consider mesothelioma. Read the document
September 29, 1975 (No. 861). H. B. Rhodes of Union Carbide reports that a paper on mesothelioma deaths in Israel, many without work exposure, was the asbestos "bombshell" of an international health congress. Read the document
1976 (No. 327). A British respiratory newsletter reports that people exposed to asbestos show a high rate of small airways obstruction, and reviews asbestos disease. Read the document
January 22, 1976 (No. 380). Johns-Manville's Dr. Paul Kotin tells a Labor Department advisory committee that the proposed 0.5 fiber asbestos limit is unsupported and that J-M is committed to 2 fibers. Read the document
January 22, 1976 (No. 624). J-M's Dr. Paul Kotin argues to an OSHA advisory committee that the evidence does not support cutting the asbestos limit to 0.5 fibers, while calling take-home exposure a tragedy. Read the document
May 1976 (No. 859). A British magazine explains the new asbestos warning label and warns that even short or low exposure has been linked to mesothelioma. Read the document
June 24, 1976 (No. 635). Raybestos-Manhattan offers Asbestos Corporation a limited health clause for fiber purchases, refusing the indemnity the miner wants against third-party injury claims. Read the document
October 25, 1976 (No. 644). John H. Marsh reports that a trade editor agreed to kill a critical article, and offers a positive story on asbestos friction materials instead. Read the document
November 24, 1976 (No. 647). John H. Marsh asks that sales staff stop telling customers that asbestos sealed in resin poses no hazard, since machining it releases fibers. Read the document
November 24, 1976 (No. 869). John H. Marsh warns that a few weeks of heavy asbestos exposure can cause disease and that fiber carried home puts young children at risk around the clock. Read the document
December 8, 1976 (No. 628). The Asbestos Information Association widens its literature review to asbestosis because a chronology "would be useful in litigation," and its counsel begins interviewing possible expert witnesses. Read the document
December 9, 1976 (No. 733). Asbestos Information Association directors fund a study of a captive insurer as product liability coverage is cancelled, and hear their research program exists to improve lawsuit defenses. Read the document
December 23, 1976 (No. 860). The International Agency for Research on Cancer announces that all commercial forms of asbestos cause lung cancer and mesothelioma in exposed workers. Read the document
1977 (No. 714). Britain's Asbestos Information Committee issues a point-by-point rebuttal of Nancy Tait's pamphlet "Asbestos Kills," which had accused the industry of misleading the public. Read the document
1977 (No. 803). A trade magazine sends Raybestos-Manhattan a draft article on brake-dust hazards for approval; a reader there marks parts of it "Not true." Read the document
January 1977 (No. 627). The Asbestos Information Association corrects its minutes to record that its counsel is interviewing physicians as possible expert witnesses in third-party suits. Read the document
January 3, 1977 (No. 719). Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director calls a NIOSH asbestos review naive, while conceding that the link to asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma is not in dispute. Read the document
February 10, 1977 (No. 633). The Asbestos Information Association hears that its counsel is building litigation files for defense lawyers and that J-M is backing legislation to bar third-party suits. Read the document
February 16, 1977 (No. 868). John H. Marsh tells a Raybestos-Manhattan manager the company cannot call its products safe because no safe level of asbestos exposure is known. Read the document
February 28, 1977 (No. 632). Philip Enterline tells Nicolet's Guy Gabrielson he will give Barry Castleman the industry-funded literature review, calling the project "a gamble on the part of AIA." Read the document
March 4, 1977 (No. 866). John H. Marsh strikes "safe" and "safely" from a Raybestos-Manhattan letter to asbestos textile customers, writing that no safe level of exposure has been established. Read the document
March 24, 1977 (No. 668). Dr. Philip Enterline tells Nicolet's Guy Gabrielson that his literature review for the industry asks when it was known that various trades were at risk. Read the document
April 11, 1977 (No. 325). Raybestos-Manhattan's John Marsh sends Nicolet's chairman a history of exposure limits and the 1943 asbestosis letters, saying industry could not be expected to know more than the Public Health Service. Read the document
April 13, 1977 (No. 324). The Industrial Health Foundation tells Raybestos-Manhattan's Isaac Weaver that the company joined it in 1937 and dropped out from 1957 to 1968. Read the document
April 26, 1977 (No. 711). Lake Asbestos tells its customers that its fiber bags will carry a new warning naming asbestosis, lung cancer "and other fatal diseases." Read the document
May 4, 1977 (Nos. 619, 622). J-M's Dr. Paul Kotin sends Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director his Toronto seminar statement accepting that asbestos causes disease and that management must compensate injured workers. Read the document
May 20, 1977 (No. 226). Dr. Joseph Goodman asks Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director whether a worker diagnosed with asbestosis should keep working around asbestos fiber. Read the document
May 27, 1977 (No. 227). Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director advises that workers diagnosed with asbestosis should not keep working around respirable asbestos fibers. Read the document
May 27, 1977 (No. 870). Dr. Paul Kotin of J-M tells Turner & Newall he believes all forms of asbestos can cause mesothelioma, not crocidolite alone. Read the document
June 9, 1977 (No. 623). J-M's Dr. Paul Kotin tells the Consumer Product Safety Commission that family members of asbestos workers suffer "maximal exposures" but that asbestos can stay in commerce safely. Read the document
June 22, 1977 (No. 190). Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director tells the friction materials industry that mesothelioma rates are extremely high among insulators and that controlled exposure can make the risk "virtually nil." Read the document
September 1977 (No. 708). A Swedish government booklet describes rules requiring asbestos to be replaced by safer materials where possible, and bans on crocidolite and asbestos spraying. Read the document
October 1977 (No. 684). The Asbestos Information Association sends Dr. Enterline's completed literature review to special counsel for use in the state of the art legal defense. Read the document
October 27, 1977 (No. 701). The Asbestos Information Association and Johns-Manville protest to Crown Zellerbach over an "Adios Asbestos" ad calling asbestos a killer. Read the document
November 29, 1977 (No. 720). NIOSH sends Raybestos-Manhattan a draft study of its plant's workers concluding that chrysotile exposure "poses a severe carcinogenic risk of malignancies of multiple sites." Read the document
December 2, 1977 (No. 709). Raybestos-Manhattan's I. H. Weaver disputes a NIOSH study linking chrysotile to mesothelioma at the company's plant, suggesting the 17 victims had crocidolite or amosite exposure. Read the document
December 14, 1977 (No. 723). The industry's trade group hears its counsel's seven-point "State of the Art Defense," dating knowledge of insulators' disease to Selikoff's 1964 work and warning labels to 1965-66. Read the document
1978 (No. 224). Lake Asbestos's health booklet for workers handling asbestos fiber, sent to customers with its June 1978 letter (cover pages only). Read the document
1978 (No. 368). North American Asbestos Company, a raw asbestos supplier, answers interrogatories in Austin v. Johns-Manville, denying that prolonged exposure to its asbestos causes disease. Read the document
1978 (No. 718). An OSHA poster for workers warns that "there is no safe kind of asbestos" and that fibers carried home on clothing endanger families. Read the document
1978 (No. 844). Charts tally Canadian Johns-Manville's asbestos fiber sales to Owens-Corning's Sayreville and Berlin plants from the 1950s to 1972. Read the document
January 25, 1978 (No. 731). The Asbestos Information Association's counsel drafts a letter offering non-members Enterline's lung cancer review for $2,000, as privileged work product, for use in a pending lawsuit. Read the document
February 2, 1978 (No. 703). The Asbestos International Association's European council answers the European Parliament's proposed asbestos resolution point by point. Read the document
February 2, 1978 (No. 837). Dr. George Wright tells an Asbestos International Association adviser that all common asbestos types are linked to fibrosis and lung cancer. Read the document
February 27, 1978 (No. 681). Johns-Manville sends the Asbestos Information Association Dr. Paul Kotin's letter to a European customer stating the company's position on asbestos and health. Read the document
March 1, 1978 (No. 867). Dr. Hilton Lewinsohn tells Raybestos-Manhattan that McGill data on lung cancer in non-smoking asbestos miners undercut J-M's smoking ban, and that asbestos exposure itself must be eliminated. Read the document
April 26, 1978 (No. 676). The Asbestos Information Association answers the HEW asbestos warning by saying wartime exposures cannot be compared with present working conditions. Read the document
April 28, 1978 (No. 675). Raybestos-Manhattan prepares a statement for employees and the press answering the HEW warning about wartime shipyard workers. Read the document
May 1978 (No. 725). A literature review tabulates published reports of asbestosis by occupation, finding the first report in an insulation worker in 1938 (Merewether). Read the document
May 8, 1978 (No. 734). Raybestos-Manhattan's John Marsh reports the international asbestos industry is preparing a paper to support its position that asbestos can be handled safely, and planning labels to head off skull-and-crossbones warnings. Read the document
June 1978 (No. 634). Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director drafts a paper on medical surveillance of asbestos-exposed groups, with tables showing insulators' high cancer and asbestosis death rates. Read the document
June 1978 (No. 710). Industry physicist Klaus Robock tells a New York Academy of Sciences panel that asbestos has a safe threshold and the 2-fiber limit should stay. Read the document
June 2, 1978 (No. 683). John H. Marsh circulates a revised U.S. draft of the Asbestos International Association's common position on asbestos and health. Read the document
June 19, 1978 (Nos. 223, 865). Lake Asbestos tells Raybestos-Manhattan it is adding a larger cancer warning to its fiber bags and urges the company to warn its own workers and customers. Read the document
June 24, 1978 (No. 679). The Asbestos Information Association's president declares there is a safe level of asbestos exposure and calls the federal two-fiber standard safe. Read the document
July 6, 1978 (No. 680). R. H. Mereness sends members the HEW asbestos warning campaign plan, with Johns-Manville's and the Association's statements answering Secretary Califano. Read the document
July 7, 1978 (No. 721). The Asbestos International Association's executive committee is given the ILO's hazard symbols, including the skull and crossbones, beside the British industry's milder "Take care with asbestos" label. Read the document
July 13, 1978 (No. 304). A Raybestos-Manhattan division tells its employees that shipyard asbestos exposure, the subject of HEW's warning, was "totally unlike" exposure in its plants. Read the document
July 31, 1978 (No. 702). Union Carbide's Harrison Rhodes and Raybestos-Manhattan's Dr. Lewinsohn disagree over whether the industry should call for medical checks of all exposed workers. Read the document
September 20, 1978 (No. 732). The Asbestos Information Association hears that its state of the medical art defense memo is nearly ready and that a plant physicians' conference will prepare doctors to testify. Read the document
October 11, 1978 (No. 722). Sir Neville Stack tells J. H. Marsh the industry hopes Europe will accept its own asbestos label, since "anything is better than the death's head label." Read the document
October 27, 1978 (No. 704). The Asbestos International Association agrees that industry doctors should write a statement refuting the asbestos death figures in the U.S. government's Califano statement. Read the document
November 17, 1978 (No. 678). John Marsh circulates a proposal to hire a retired Cleveland Plain Dealer editor to place articles casting asbestos in a more favorable light. Read the document
November 29, 1978 (No. 724). Philip Enterline's industry-funded history finds the asbestos and lung cancer link accepted in Germany by the early 1940s, and settled in the United States by 1964. Read the document
December 12, 1978 (No. 728). The Asbestos Information Association hears that eleven more West Coast physicians have been interviewed as possible expert witnesses and plans an open letter to HEW Secretary Califano. Read the document
December 15, 1978 (No. 677). The Asbestos Information Association files objections to the government's occupational cancer estimates and surveys members to build an asbestos constituency in Congress. Read the document
December 19, 1978 (No. 706). The Asbestos International Association tells a European distributor to avoid other labels on asbestos bags while it promotes an industry label to head off the skull and crossbones. Read the document
December 20, 1978 (No. 707). Sir Neville Stack asks Raybestos-Manhattan's J. H. Marsh to get Calidria to use the industry's asbestos label in Europe rather than the OSHA label, to avoid the skull and crossbones. Read the document
1979 (No. 727). Raybestos-Manhattan's medical director, Dr. Hilton Lewinsohn, publishes a review of cancer deaths among asbestos workers and calls for medical and workplace surveillance of exposed groups. Read the document
January 8, 1979 (No. 729). Guy Gabrielson sends the Asbestos Information Association's legal committee counsel's report on interviews of West Coast doctors as possible expert witnesses, with an expanded list of experts. Read the document
January 9, 1979 (No. 730). The Asbestos Information Association discusses Secretary Califano's call for standards that account for smoking, and its counsel's expanded list of medical expert witnesses. Read the document
May 1979 (No. 674). Automotive Industries reports that Raybestos-Manhattan's friction materials unit will stop using asbestos in brake linings after some 1,300 lawsuits. Read the document

The 1980s

1980 (No. 839). Johns-Manville's 1980 annual report counts 5,087 asbestos suits and warns that the cost to the company "could be substantial." Read the document
March 6, 1980 (No. 820). Raybestos-Manhattan's counsel asks Dr. David Ozonoff to testify as a medical historian on occupational medicine from the 1930s through World War II. Read the document
January 30, 1981 (No. 883). Plaintiffs in consolidated Mississippi shipyard cases serve interrogatories on J-M and other makers about asbestos insulation products, warnings and sales to Ingalls. Read the document
March 17, 1982 (No. 892). Shipyard worker James L. Jackson files tables tying the Ingalls ships he worked on to J-M and other asbestos insulation products. Read the document

This page is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Every asbestos case turns on its own facts, exposure history, diagnosis, deadlines, available evidence, and applicable law. Reviewing this page does not create an attorney-client relationship. For advice about your specific situation, call 833-4-ASBESTOS for a free case review.

Asbestos

Exposure

Look it up

By location

Cell types

Treatment & help

Cancers

Lung disease

Not sure

Trust claims

Lawsuits

Benefits

Guides & deadlines

Look up

History

Read & watch

The firm

Reach us