Asbestos Timeline: The 1950s

Every dated document we have published from the 1950s, year by year: 227 from the J-M chronology, 101 from the Motley 1000, 21 from the Simpson Papers. Each line links to the document itself. For the story these documents tell, read the 1950s on our history page.

Key documents

• January 28, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor recommends doing nothing, for now, about the province's new rule requiring doctors to report asbestosis cases, citing the risk of compensation claims. Read it
• February 7, 1950. J-M's Quebec medical director tells headquarters that asbestos and silica are two hazards in J-M's operations that "may lead to pulmonary malignancy." Read it
• June 16, 1950. After an industry meeting in New York, J-M's Quebec doctor suggests no animal experiments "for publication" for now, and a cancer researcher writes that "serious problems in insurance and compensation are involved." Read it
• August 31, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor notes that Dr. Lanza's proposed contract "appears to leave little choice to the Donor if the results of the study are unfavorable to Company interests." Read it
• September 21, 1950. Saranac proposes a study of asbestos and lung cancer for the Quebec mining association, with any manuscript submitted to the sponsor "for its review and approval" before publication. Read it
• November 7, 1950. Planning the Quebec producers' lung cancer study at Saranac, J-M and its advisers agree the report will go only to the sponsoring companies until they review it. Read it
• November 15, 1950. Vandiver Brown writes that J-M sought approval of Saranac publications so it could delay release until it made "defensive moves." Read it
• November 28, 1950. An insurance engineer reports heavy asbestos dust and six asbestosis claims at the Carolina Asbestos mill in Davidson, North Carolina, and calls it "not a desirable risk." Read it
• December 4, 1950. J. P. Woodard asks Ivan Sabourin to tighten the Quebec mining association's agreement with Saranac so the industry gets advance notice of any published results. Read it
• January 19, 1951. Canadian J-M decides that, given its "seriousness to the Company," asbestosis and lung cancer will be left out of future industrial hygiene minutes. Read it
• April 17, 1951. Dr. Vorwald tells J-M he was "astounded" by the asbestosis on Waukegan X-rays and urges cleanup before outsiders act against the industry. Read it
• June 11, 1951. Dr. Smith advises holding off publicity on the Saranac report in case cancer research on asbestos proves "not entirely favorable." Read it
• 1952. Testifying in 1976, Dr. Kenneth Smith recalls that J-M executives, asked in the early 1950s to put caution labels on asbestos insulation, weighed the cost and the liability. Read it
• January 30, 1952. J-M's lawyers draft a caution label for asbestos fiber bags under Illinois rules; the Canadian fiber division asks whether there is "no other way out." Read it
• February 7, 1952. Arthur Vorwald sends Owens-Illinois the final Kaylo report: the dust causes asbestos-type fibrosis, and published work will not name Kaylo. Read it
• September 24, 1952. At the Saranac Symposium, Paul Cartier presents lung cancer figures for Quebec asbestos miners and E. R. A. Merewether reports lung cancer in 16.2 percent of British asbestosis deaths. Read it
• September 24, 1952. At the Saranac Symposium, Merewether reports that 16.2 percent of British asbestosis deaths involved lung cancer, with J-M's medical director attending. Read it
• December 9, 1952. Owens-Illinois drafts a pamphlet telling users that research has proven normal handling of Kaylo safe, citing the Saranac animal studies. Read it
• January 8, 1953. J-M's medical director sorts several hundred Manville workers on the no-dust list and decides those with slight disease "will not be told of their condition." Read it
• June 10, 1953. Asbestos textile makers agree their past particle-count dust surveys are "practically without value" and that they will follow both the state limit and their own fiber standard. Read it
• March 11, 1954. Asbestos Textile Institute members show "reluctance" to add air hygiene and dust control information to their handbook, asking first for an outline. Read it
• May 13, 1954. Raybestos-Manhattan's B. W. Luttenberger proposes that asbestosis information be released only through a medical group that would not make the industry look hazardous. Read it
• May 14, 1954. B. W. Luttenberger tells Raybestos-Manhattan's president that the company stayed out of an Asbestos Textile Institute survey publishing asbestosis rates among members. Read it
• September 24, 1954. J-M's lawyer warns a fibre salesman that calling asbestos non-toxic is a warranty, since Grade 7R fibre "would be a bad offender" in causing asbestosis. Read it
• October 6, 1954. Company doctors at the Asbestos Textile Institute hear how asbestosis cases were reported as pulmonary fibrosis, and plan autopsy and lung cancer studies. Read it
• October 6, 1954. At an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting, doctors hear that asbestosis was entered as "pulmonary fibrosis" on insurance forms, and Schepers reports on asbestos and lung cancer. Read it
• December 1, 1954. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee urges autopsy and heart studies that would help limit compensation liability, noting international attention to asbestos and cancer. Read it
• 1955. Richard Doll reports that men with 20 or more years at a British asbestos works died of lung cancer at about ten times the expected rate. Read it
• June 9, 1955. The Asbestos Textile Institute rejects an autopsy study as ill-advised because it implies a link between asbestosis and cancer. Read it
• June 9, 1955. Asbestos Textile Institute members call an autopsy study "ill-advised" because it implies a link between asbestosis and cancer. Read it
• July 8, 1955. J-M's medical director tells the Nashua plant that men with signs of lung disease are unaware of their X-ray results and should not be told yet. Read it
• August 1955. J-M's medical director publishes his survey of 708 mill workers, reporting 91 percent with normal X-rays and few cases of asbestosis. Read it
• February 21, 1956. Waukegan managers agree the plant doctor will tell men with possible lung disease of their condition only if they ask. Read it
• March 7, 1956. Dr. Kenneth Smith, J-M's medical director, tells the textile makers he has no evidence against a link between asbestosis and cancer, and urges an industry study. Read it
• March 8, 1956. The Asbestos Textile Institute reports that its Board of Governors has funded a preliminary survey toward action "designed to refute the work of Dr. Hueper." Read it
• May 21, 1956. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes a $17,500 study for the asbestos textile industry to prove or disprove a link between asbestos and lung cancer. Read it
• November 20, 1956. Ira Brought reports that the insulators' union officers have cut health references from their journal's minutes, and urges Owens-Corning to head off complaints through sales offices. Read it
• December 6, 1956. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation's medical director sends H. M. Jackson published evidence linking asbestos to lung cancer, as "ammunition" for persuading the textile industry. Read it
• 1957. Johns-Manville answers an insulation worker's interrogatories, saying it knew of no asbestosis among applicators and so had no reason to warn anyone outside its plants. Read it
• January 25, 1957. B. W. Luttenberger tells U.S. Rubber's hygienist that Manheim has had numerous asbestosis cases, now fewer since modern dust removal equipment was installed. Read it
• March 7, 1957. Asbestos textile makers vote down a lung cancer study of their workers, some fearing it would "stir up a hornet's nest" and put the industry under suspicion. Read it
• April 1957. Speaking to life insurance underwriters, J-M's medical director says asbestos workers' lives are not shortened by their work. Read it
• May 1, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith proposes that J-M doctors record no diagnosis of suspected occupational disease, and not tell the worker, until a conference weighs the legal and compensation implications. Read it
• June 10, 1957. J-M's Manville plant doctors review workers' abnormal chest X-rays and decide case by case whom to move, tell or report. Read it
• December 30, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith accepts the Quebec miners' association's deletion of every reference linking asbestosis and lung cancer from the study to be published. Read it
• 1958. Under oath, J-M says it knows of no asbestosis in insulation applicators, dates its first worker's case to 1946, and sees no reason to warn others. Read it
• March 5, 1958. At Manville plant health conferences, J-M doctors debate whether to tell workers of abnormal X-rays; one says "We take the X-rays for our own protection." Read it
• March 18, 1958. J-M drafts a caution label for Marinite board dust but decides against it, partly over competition, relying instead on a line about dust control in its instruction book. Read it
• April 15, 1958. Harry Burris's wife says he was never told his X-rays showed fibrosis; J-M's doctors agree he has asbestosis first diagnosed in 1947. Read it
• September 5, 1958. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks that results of Lompoc workers' lung tests not be reported until J-M discusses them, and that test subjects not disturb contract talks. Read it
• January 9, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith outlines for Lompoc workers' briefing that J-M knew from the early 1940s its diatomaceous earth dust caused disabling lung disease. Read it
• July 14, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith finds lung disease on 21 of 30 Pittsburg plant X-rays and warns of "very serious financial exposure" if the cases progress. Read it
• November 5, 1959. Asked to tell a customer that asbestos is no more hazardous than limestone, Dr. Kenneth Smith refuses, calling it "a very definite health hazard when improperly handled." Read it

1950

• January 3, 1950. Asked by Saranac's director about lung cancer among the Asbestos, Quebec, workers, J-M's doctor reports at least 11 asbestosis cases in 6,500 X-ray files and no known cancers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 3, 1950. Chemist James F. Morgan reports that X-ray tests found no quartz in Kaylo boxcar dust but could not measure its asbestos, and proposes electron microscope studies. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 28, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor urges a study of asbestos and lung cancer, writing that "if we are to defend ourselves in the compensation courts we must have proof." Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 28, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor recommends doing nothing, for now, about the province's new rule requiring doctors to report asbestosis cases, citing the risk of compensation claims. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 30, 1950. A J-M plant doctor proposes further tests on a disabled Manville spinner "rather than merely accept liability" for his asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 30, 1950. Thetford's mining doctor questions Saranac's analysis of eight mill dust samples and notes that asbestosis cases come from the dustiest, most fibrous stages of milling. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 31, 1950. A Canadian J-M manager circulates comments on the Saranac asbestosis report noting that a long-fiber finding could make respirators easier to wear. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 3, 1950. A J-M headquarters manager calls for screening job applicants to avoid hiring men with silicosis and asks Dr. Smith whether lung cancer could be a hazard at J-M. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 7, 1950. J-M's Quebec medical director tells headquarters that asbestos and silica are two hazards in J-M's operations that "may lead to pulmonary malignancy." Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 8, 1950. Dr. Kenneth Smith of Canadian Johns-Manville asks Dr. Vorwald to comment on a Merewether article whose conclusions do not match J-M's "operating experience." Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 8, 1950. J-M headquarters presses its Lompoc plant for a "highly confidential" list of workers whose examinations show changes serious enough to be watched. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 8, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor sends Saranac the new Merewether article, writing that its "very definite conclusions do not agree with our operating experience." Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 10, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor writes to the Toronto office that "the chief causes of lung cancer are dust and certain coal tar products." Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1950. The industry's trade magazine reports surgeons using an asbestos paste as an "irritant" to join a patient's lung to the heart. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 3, 1950. Woodard tells J-M's Quebec doctor that Dr. Lanza says Merewether's opinions "don't hold water" and would like to run an industry study of asbestos and lung cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 1950. California's Industrial Accident Commission finds that a Redwood City plant worker's dust disease arose from his J-M job and awards him $30 a week. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 10, 1950. Thetford's mining doctor urges an industry study of cancer, reporting eight lung cancer cases among Thetford asbestos workers since 1946. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 18, 1950. Saranac's director calls Merewether's paper on asbestosis and lung cancer "a dilly" and warns of "another storm" brewing in Quebec over a case of asbestosis with cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 2, 1950. Owens-Illinois's W. G. Hazard asks the Industrial Hygiene Foundation for more copies of its monthly Abstracts to send to the company's plants. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 17, 1950. Vandiver Brown writes that J-M is "very much concerned" about reports linking asbestos to lung cancer and is considering animal experiments to test the theory. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 1, 1950. Arthur Vorwald tells Owens-Illinois that Kaylo dust produces an asbestotic reaction in the lungs and every precaution should be taken to limit workers' exposure. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 1, 1950. The Saranac Laboratory completes its industry-funded report on Leroy Gardner's animal experiments, finding that long asbestos fibers cause asbestosis in several species. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 16, 1950. After an industry meeting in New York, J-M's Quebec doctor suggests no animal experiments "for publication" for now, and a cancer researcher writes that "serious problems in insurance and compensation are involved." Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 25, 1950. Saranac passes on an Owens-Illinois doctor's warning that burlap asbestos bags release undue dust; J-M replies that no producer has yet replaced them. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 28, 1950. Planning the Quebec industry's lung cancer study, a Canadian J-M manager favors Saranac though "they have no cancer experts," and notes J-M will pay half the cost. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 28, 1950. J. P. Woodard replies that J-M has studied alternatives but still ships fiber in burlap bags, as he believes all producers do. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 31, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor notes that Dr. Lanza's proposed contract "appears to leave little choice to the Donor if the results of the study are unfavorable to Company interests." Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 1, 1950. J. P. Woodard tells A. R. Fisher that company and outside doctors have met to plan a program to learn whether asbestos causes lung cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 1, 1950. Woodard presses for Lompoc's list of workers whose examinations show "very marked changes," estimating there may be 30 or 40 such cases. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 21, 1950. Saranac proposes a study of asbestos and lung cancer for the Quebec mining association, with any manuscript submitted to the sponsor "for its review and approval" before publication. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 27, 1950. Saranac reports that a Waukegan plant worker who died in April had both asbestosis and lung cancer, leaving the link between them to further study. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 6, 1950. J. P. Woodard sends Dr. Anthony Lanza the Saranac Laboratory's proposal to study asbestosis and lung cancer and asks for his views. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 9, 1950. J. P. Woodard forwards to Dr. Anthony Lanza a September letter from Dr. Kenneth Smith on the pulmonary malignancy study. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 10, 1950. A Manville plant memo reports that the doctor will X-ray the 84 men on J-M's special list only every two years, not annually. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 6, 1950. A British Ministry of National Insurance doctor tells Lanza that Britain does not compensate asbestosis without X-ray findings. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 6, 1950. Quebec mine doctor Paul Cartier reports British findings that asbestosis may raise lung cancer rates and urges a study in the Quebec asbestos district. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 7, 1950. Planning the Quebec producers' lung cancer study at Saranac, J-M and its advisers agree the report will go only to the sponsoring companies until they review it. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 7, 1950. Vandiver Brown complains that a new Saranac proposal lets J-M only "review" results before publication, unlike Gardner's promise of no publication without consent. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 10, 1950. J. P. Woodard asks Vandiver Brown to draft publication terms for the coming Quebec-funded Saranac study, quoting a 30-day review clause. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 15, 1950. Vandiver Brown writes that J-M sought approval of Saranac publications so it could delay release until it made "defensive moves." Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 28, 1950. An insurance engineer reports heavy asbestos dust and six asbestosis claims at the Carolina Asbestos mill in Davidson, North Carolina, and calls it "not a desirable risk." Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 1, 1950. Testifying for J-M in a Manville worker's asbestosis claim, Drs. Vorwald and Lanza decline to say men with dust disease should be removed from exposure. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 4, 1950. J. P. Woodard asks Ivan Sabourin to tighten the Quebec mining association's agreement with Saranac so the industry gets advance notice of any published results. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 12, 1950. W. G. Hazard of Owens-Illinois tells Saranac's Arthur Vorwald the Kaylo Division wants a brochure on Kaylo dust's health aspects and asks for the final animal report. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 18, 1950. Arthur Vorwald advises Owens-Illinois to hold its Kaylo health brochure until Saranac's final report is written. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 19, 1950. Turner Brothers' factory doctor tells the Quebec asbestos producers he found lung cancer with asbestosis in 10 of 100 worker autopsies. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 19, 1950. Dr. Kenneth Smith warns that findings of asbestosis without X-ray signs "might change our whole examination program and seriously affect the field of compensation." Read it (J-M chronology)

1951

• 1951. In a 1978 deposition, pathologist Alfred Angrist says his 1940s cases had convinced him asbestosis and lung cancer were associated. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 1951. Saranac Laboratory publishes the industry-funded asbestos dust experiments begun by Dr. Leroy Gardner, concluding that long fibers cause asbestosis. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 1951. Saranac's long-delayed account of Gardner's asbestos experiments is published in the AMA's industrial hygiene journal, without discussion of cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 16, 1951. J-M decides that moving Lompoc men out of the dust, the one step Lanza recommended, would "in most cases" be "a detrimental proposition." Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 19, 1951. Canadian J-M decides that, given its "seriousness to the Company," asbestosis and lung cancer will be left out of future industrial hygiene minutes. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 1, 1951. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks the Quebec Ministry of Health whether lung cancer is accepted as a cause of death on death certificates. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 1, 1951. J. P. Woodard writes that J-M's main problem with aluminum therapy at Lompoc is how to explain it to the workers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1, 1951. American Rock Wool's president thanks Vandiver Brown for J-M's help defending a lawsuit against Sears, Roebuck over rock wool products. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 7, 1951. Johns-Manville's president Lewis H. Brown dies in late February 1951; the board issues a memorial tribute to stockholders. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 10, 1951. After a West Coast trip on aluminum therapy for Lompoc, J. P. Woodard tells Lanza that eliminating dust is "the sure way" of preventing dust disease. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 13, 1951. A Waukegan doctor writing on J-M letterhead invites Vorwald to see the J-M plant, "the manufacturer of asbestosis and silicosis" in Waukegan. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 16, 1951. J. P. Woodard proposes giving aluminum therapy to the whole Lompoc plant so the mill would not "appear more hazardous" than other departments. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 17, 1951. Dr. Vorwald tells J-M he was "astounded" by the asbestosis on Waukegan X-rays and urges cleanup before outsiders act against the industry. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 29, 1951. A Saranac survey of Owens-Illinois's Kaylo plant at Sayreville, New Jersey, finds hazardous quartz and asbestos dust in some areas and urges respirators and yearly chest X-rays. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 11, 1951. Dr. Smith advises holding off publicity on the Saranac report in case cancer research on asbestos proves "not entirely favorable." Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 27, 1951. Vandiver Brown drafts a reply telling Pratt & Whitney it is "inconceivable" that asbestos in J-M's adhesive and Insulkote could create a dust hazard. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 30, 1951. A Redwood City plant official writes that he will keep ailing worker Jack Leahy "on his feet as long as possible and say nothing." Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 3, 1951. T. H. Boyd reports that state inspectors saw no need to order coveralls for all Mill Room workers after a union grievance. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• July 9, 1951. Dr. Lanza reads X-rays of sixteen Manville workers for the plant doctor and finds asbestosis or signs of it in ten. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 17, 1951. J-M's A. S. Elsenbast writes to J. P. Woodard about a Lompoc compensation award and the case for aluminum therapy. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 27, 1951. J-M's safety engineer asks Dr. Vorwald whether one million fibers per cubic foot would be a safe standard, since 0.8 million had affected Saranac's animals. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 1951. A British abstract of Hueper's survey of environmental lung cancer lists asbestos among the dusts condemned as causes of cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 5, 1951. Dr. Lanza reports X-ray changes in 426 of 617 Lompoc workers and doubts the dust standard, proposing aluminum therapy to prevent diatomaceous earth disease. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 25, 1951. Vandiver Brown assures General Electric that dust from J-M's Spintex mineral wool insulation is "definitely NOT" a hazard because it has no free silica. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 11, 1951. Dr. Smith reports to C. M. McGaw on Dr. Wright's examinations of J-M men and on Saranac's cancer research after a Quebec miners' meeting. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 19, 1951. A Canadian J-M memo reports that annual examinations at Asbestos, Quebec, are three to four years behind and that Dr. Kenneth Smith has left. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 1951. A New York hospital reports another case of lung cancer with asbestosis and reviews the growing literature linking the two. Read it (J-M chronology)

1952

• 1952. Testifying in 1976, Dr. Kenneth Smith recalls that J-M executives, asked in the early 1950s to put caution labels on asbestos insulation, weighed the cost and the liability. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 7, 1952. Citing state laws, J-M begins putting caution labels on bags of diatomaceous earth and presses Saranac for its overdue inhalation study results. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 30, 1952. J-M's lawyers draft a caution label for asbestos fiber bags under Illinois rules; the Canadian fiber division asks whether there is "no other way out." Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 30, 1952. Saranac's final report tells Owens-Illinois that long inhalation of Kaylo insulation dust produces asbestosis-type lung scarring in guinea pigs. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 7, 1952. Arthur Vorwald sends Owens-Illinois the final Kaylo report: the dust causes asbestos-type fibrosis, and published work will not name Kaylo. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 8, 1952. A surgeon asks J-M for asbestos powder to place in the heart sac; J-M quotes prices, declines to vouch for it, and refers him to Saranac. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 13, 1952. J-M's legal department answers a homeowner's injury claim by saying its rock wool insulation is not toxic and the man may be allergic to it. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 1952. An Owens-Illinois research director describes Kaylo insulation, which contains asbestos fiber, as "non-toxic" in a petroleum trade journal. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 1, 1952. J-M tells a railroad that rashes from Stonefelt rock wool are mechanical, pass within weeks, and that the material is not toxic. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 29, 1952. A California health official sends J-M's consultant a state bulletin calling diatomaceous earth dust disabling and often fatal, saying his office would have postponed it. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 29, 1952. J-M's lawyers report that former Lompoc worker Howard Winn says respirators did not keep out the dust and J-M never told him his work caused his illness. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 7, 1952. Saranac's first interim report to the Quebec miners finds more lung tumors in asbestos-dusted mice than controls, a trend not yet statistically significant. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 12, 1952. J-M, Dicalite and health officials agree the U.S. Public Health Service will lead a study of whether diatomaceous earth causes lung disease. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 14, 1952. J-M tells its plant managers that Celite bags now carry a caution label and that workers handling them should wear respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 19, 1952. Answering a customer about a worker's rash, J-M's legal department says Quinterra asbestos paper's ingredients have never caused dermatitis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 13, 1952. J. P. Woodard asks Ivan Sabourin for copies of Saranac's first interim report on asbestosis and lung cancer for himself and Dr. Anthony Lanza. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 17, 1952. A J-M headquarters memo recommends respirators wherever shop cutting of high temperature insulation throws off fine dust, with any instructions cleared by the legal staff. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 20, 1952. J-M sends a California woman's doctor its notes on four kinds of skin rash seen among the few workers "allergic to rock wool." Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 20, 1952. The Asbestos Textile Institute hears that "several new hygienic problems" confront the industry and plans a questionnaire to member companies. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 23, 1952. Answering an Idaho lung fibrosis claim, J-M's Arthur Fisk says the company has never heard of a worker getting silicosis from its rock wool. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 2, 1952. J-M tells Union Oil that its calcined Celite filter aid may be 20 to 50 percent cristobalite and that workers handling the bags should wear respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 15, 1952. The U.S. Public Health Service sends J-M its plan and draft agreement for a study of lung disease in the California diatomaceous earth industry. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 1, 1952. J. P. Woodard sends Dr. Lanza Saranac's interim mouse study on asbestos and lung cancer, saying the findings so far are not unfavorable. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 5, 1952. Under an understanding with a claimants' firm, Herbert Miller's asbestosis petition is held back while J-M's doctors review his records and find no asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 20, 1952. K. J. Soule warns that men in a hot, dusty corner of Department 14 will keep opening windows the state wants closed and suggests ventilation instead. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• September 1952. Asbestos company, insurance and government representatives sign in at the Seventh Saranac Symposium on pneumoconiosis. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 2, 1952. A claims firm urges Union Asbestos & Rubber to trace its former occupational disease claimants and learn how they fared after leaving the dust. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 5, 1952. J-M's safety engineer rules that New Jersey workers moved out of dust because of X-ray changes alone are not to be reported to the state. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 22, 1952. J-M's president creates a company-wide Medical Director to oversee examinations of all employees; Dr. Kenneth W. Smith takes the post. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 22, 1952. The Saranac Laboratory's Seventh Symposium program lists insurance men among the speakers and sets a session on pneumoconiosis and lung cancer, with papers on asbestos miners and weavers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 24, 1952. At the Saranac Symposium, Paul Cartier presents lung cancer figures for Quebec asbestos miners and E. R. A. Merewether reports lung cancer in 16.2 percent of British asbestosis deaths. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 24, 1952. At the Saranac Symposium, Merewether reports that 16.2 percent of British asbestosis deaths involved lung cancer, with J-M's medical director attending. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 1, 1952. J-M tells its salesmen never to say diatomaceous earth is harmless and to advise customers to keep dust down or use respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 1, 1952. Reviewing a dust training talk for Lompoc, a J-M researcher warns workers will ask whether the doctor will discuss their X-ray results with them. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 13, 1952. An Owens-Illinois research report says Saranac found Kaylo's asbestos had "the usual effect" but calls the hazard to those handling Kaylo small. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 31, 1952. Notes from a J-M industrial relations conference give, as an example, dropping a 10% respirator allowance once asbestos fiber is shipped in paper bags. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 11, 1952. Sending a Travelers dust survey to the Marrero plant, Jackson gives J-M's tentative limit for asbestos as 800,000 fibers per cubic foot, based on Saranac research. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 3, 1952. J-M's safety engineer studies dust from its Hy-Sorb floor absorbent at customer plants and plans tests for crystalline silica. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 9, 1952. Owens-Illinois drafts a pamphlet telling users that research has proven normal handling of Kaylo safe, citing the Saranac animal studies. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 11, 1952. In a California widow's compensation claim, her doctor testifies that lung fibrosis and lung cancer together caused her husband's death, citing a study of asbestosis deaths. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 29, 1952. An American Mutual hygienist finds excessive asbestos dust at Badham Insulation Company's pipe-covering saws despite a new ventilation system. Read it (Motley 1000)

1953

• 1953. A Canadian Johns-Manville account describes its Quebec hospital and regular X-ray examinations of all employees. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 8, 1953. J-M's medical director sorts several hundred Manville workers on the no-dust list and decides those with slight disease "will not be told of their condition." Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 12, 1953. Finding that a 1939 study on J-M's own materials went unnoticed, Elsenbast urges a company library of medical literature on occupational hazards. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 27, 1953. A company doctor lists the dusty departments, including shingles, textile and pipe covering, where "B - No Dust" workers are not to be placed. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 4, 1953. At a planning meeting for an insulation job, a J-M representative tells Electric Boat that J-M insulation dust "is not toxic." Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 9, 1953. The Asbestos Textile Institute's auditor reports to its treasurer on the Institute's accounts through March 6, 1953. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 11, 1953. With J-M's medical director present, asbestos textile makers note that their dust surveys counted particles, while Saranac research shows fibers are what matter. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 12, 1953. The Asbestos Textile Institute votes to invite member companies' doctors to its Air Hygiene Committee's next meeting. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 29, 1953. J-M's board hears that Lompoc's diatomaceous earth dust is "a very real hazard" and gives top priority to a $2 million dust abatement program. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 8, 1953. The Asbestos Textile Institute's auditor reports to its treasurer on the Institute's accounts through June 4, 1953. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 10, 1953. Company doctors meet the Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee and agree that pre-employment and annual medical examinations of asbestos workers are essential. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 10, 1953. Asbestos textile makers agree their past particle-count dust surveys are "practically without value" and that they will follow both the state limit and their own fiber standard. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 11, 1953. The Asbestos Textile Institute hears of its committee's first meeting with company doctors and invites the doctors back for September. Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 3, 1953. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes research projects for Johns-Manville, including an epidemiologic study of whether asbestosis is linked to lung cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 9, 1953. Asbestos textile doctors agree there is no cure for asbestosis and recommend moving workers with X-ray changes to less dusty jobs. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 10, 1953. The Asbestos Textile Institute approves its Air Hygiene Committee's work with company doctors and distributes its new Handbook of Asbestos Textiles. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 14, 1953. J-M headquarters approves giving the union and the Public Health Service copies of Lompoc's housekeeping manual. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 13, 1953. Citing poor results in Boston compensation courts, Dr. Kenneth Smith arranges a medical symposium he calls "actually" a Johns-Manville meeting. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 28, 1953. At a Boston symposium J-M helped organize, the state labor commissioner reports insulator deaths from asbestosis and Dr. Kenneth Lynch reports lung cancer with asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 1953. Boston doctors publish a case of lung cancer with asbestosis and a review of 20 autopsied cases, including pipe insulators, linking asbestos to bronchogenic carcinoma. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 18, 1953. Lompoc's manager reports that he asked government surveyors to note unfinished dust projects in their report; counts show much work is needed. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 20, 1953. Manville engineers ask to replace dust collectors at the shingle and Transite machines, citing dust over Travelers' limit and the cost of disability claims. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 24, 1953. New Jersey orders Raybestos-Manhattan's Passaic plant to move a press's safety stop so the operator can stop it with either foot. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• November 30, 1953. T. H. Boyd proposes safety trip cables on a press instead of the foot-operated stop the state ordered after an employee's injury. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• December 9, 1953. The Asbestos Textile Institute's air hygiene committee reviews a member survey finding asbestosis in 5 to 11 percent of exposed textile workers and weighs eliminating dry weaving. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 15, 1953. Asked about Thermobestos skin rashes, Dr. Kenneth Smith declines to recommend barrier cream as standard practice because it "might associate dermatitis with our product." Read it (J-M chronology)

1954

• 1954. Testifying in 1980, Gerrit Schepers recalls urging J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith from 1954 on to warn the public of the hazards of asbestos. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 25, 1954. Dr. Kenneth Smith writes that when one of J-M's products has an established toxic hazard, everyone working with it should be warned and told how to prevent it. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 3, 1954. T. H. Boyd asks the state safety inspector to approve guards and an "inching" button for the Bowling Ball Department mixers; Strong approves by phone. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• February 4, 1954. New Jersey issues Raybestos-Manhattan's Passaic plant an order, apparently on a mixer's "inching" button, to be completed within 30 days. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• February 11, 1954. J-M decides to add caution labels to Transite gas vent cement cans ("Avoid breathing dust") and to Ring-Tite lubricant. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 10, 1954. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee reviews a seven-plant fiber survey and French reports finding no link between asbestosis and lung cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 11, 1954. Asbestos Textile Institute members show "reluctance" to add air hygiene and dust control information to their handbook, asking first for an outline. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 1, 1954. H. M. Jackson orders respirators at Waukegan feeding operations where fiber counts exceed J-M's limit, noting amosite seems to cause fibrosis faster than chrysotile. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 6, 1954. J-M adopts the 1953 ACGIH limits except for asbestos, setting its own tentative limit of 1 million fibers per cubic foot based on Saranac research. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 15, 1954. T. H. Boyd reports that a New Jersey labor inspector has cited the Passaic plant for exits blocked by piles of belts and too much rubber cement on hand. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• April 29, 1954. I. H. Sloane outlines a respirator cleaning and issue program for the Asbestos, Quebec, mine and mill, with personal respirators for each man. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 13, 1954. Raybestos-Manhattan's B. W. Luttenberger proposes that asbestosis information be released only through a medical group that would not make the industry look hazardous. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 14, 1954. B. W. Luttenberger tells Raybestos-Manhattan's president that the company stayed out of an Asbestos Textile Institute survey publishing asbestosis rates among members. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• May 17, 1954. Answering Bethlehem Steel, Harvey Elkins quotes a 1943 finding that "a definite hazard exists" in ripping out old asbestos aboard ships at Quincy. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 19, 1954. M. S. Maier reviews dust counting instruments after O. H. Cilley of Raybestos-Manhattan asks for a study of dust counts in the mill. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 21, 1954. A Passaic plant supervisor reports progress on corrections the New Jersey labor inspector wants done by June 7. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• May 28, 1954. O. H. Cilley of Raybestos-Manhattan asks the Industrial Hygiene Foundation for help with dust control and backs lowering the dust limit to 1 million particles. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 3, 1954. C. F. Barton advises asking New Jersey's labor department for 30 more days to finish the ordered corrections at Passaic. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• June 3, 1954. W. E. Perkins asks New Jersey's labor department for more time on two safety orders, some work having to wait for the summer shutdown. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• June 8, 1954. An Owens-Illinois chemist compares the amount and kind of asbestos in Kaylo with competing calcium silicate pipe insulations, including Johns-Manville's. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 9, 1954. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee urges member companies to obtain autopsies of workers wherever possible, for study at Saranac Laboratory. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 10, 1954. The Asbestos Textile Institute reviews federal specifications and wartime fiber supply, and again invites company doctors to its Air Hygiene Committee. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 15, 1954. New Jersey's labor department tells Raybestos-Manhattan it will consider the extension once its inspector reports. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• June 17, 1954. W. C. L. Hemeon of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes ways to measure and cut the remaining dust at Raybestos-Manhattan's Manheim plant. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 9, 1954. C. F. Barton lists four fire-door, crane and elevator jobs still owed under New Jersey's labor order. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• July 13, 1954. Raybestos-Manhattan sends J-M confidential testimony from a compensation case over asbestosis and lung cancer and plans to "offset" the claimant's doctor. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 28, 1954. Warned confidentially that expanded perlite dust promotes tuberculosis, Dr. Kenneth Smith orders X-rays and work restrictions for J-M's exposed employees. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 3, 1954. Asked whether to warn Fibrocel installers about perlite, Dr. Kenneth Smith says J-M will consider caution labels only if the finished product proves toxic. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 24, 1954. A New Jersey labor inspector checks the Passaic plant's elevator work, cancels two items and asks for further guards. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• August 25, 1954. After weaver Mary Lukasiewicz dies of asbestosis and probable lung cancer, J-M's counsel advises disclaiming liability for her family's claim. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 10, 1954. A union doctor tells J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith that Waukegan workers complain of dust and are not told their chest X-ray results. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 24, 1954. J-M's lawyer warns a fibre salesman that calling asbestos non-toxic is a warranty, since Grade 7R fibre "would be a bad offender" in causing asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 29, 1954. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells the Waukegan plant that doctors have a "moral and legal responsibility" to give employees their examination results, starting immediately. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 6, 1954. Company doctors at the Asbestos Textile Institute hear how asbestosis cases were reported as pulmonary fibrosis, and plan autopsy and lung cancer studies. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 6, 1954. At an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting, doctors hear that asbestosis was entered as "pulmonary fibrosis" on insurance forms, and Schepers reports on asbestos and lung cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 15, 1954. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells J-M's Quebec physician that blood oxygen falls in asbestosis before X-rays show it, and seeks a simple early test. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 1, 1954. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee urges autopsy and heart studies that would help limit compensation liability, noting international attention to asbestos and cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 1, 1954. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Board of Governors, chaired by J-M's F. J. Wakem, approves its 1955 budget and admits Cape Asbestos as an associate member. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 3, 1954. Jackson explains J-M's tentative asbestos limit of one million fibers per cubic foot and writes that amosite seems to cause asbestosis faster than chrysotile. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 14, 1954. New Jersey orders the Passaic plant to hold monthly fire drills and add a second exit and handrail in Building 7. Read it (Simpson Papers)

1955

• 1955. A Manville plant doctor later testifies that Dr. Smith had abnormal chest X-rays held back for a review meeting with the safety department before any formal report. Read it (J-M chronology)
• 1955. Saranac publishes its animal studies of an asbestos-containing calcium silicate insulation, finding lesions like those of asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• 1955. J-M's medical director writes that asbestos may be a carcinogen but that the chrysotile workers he followed had no excess lung cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• 1955. Richard Doll reports that men with 20 or more years at a British asbestos works died of lung cancer at about ten times the expected rate. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 1955. J-M's Manville plant tells headquarters it is denying a worker's compensation claim on the advice of its lawyers, citing his short exposure. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 24, 1955. J-M's plant engineers issue a manual on running and maintaining the dust collectors used in the company's plants. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 15, 1955. The Saranac Laboratory asks the Asbestos Textile Institute to fund a three-year animal study of whether asbestos fibers cause lung cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 21, 1955. J-M's medical director sends fiber for animal tests after new data suggest shorter asbestos fibers may also scar the lungs. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1955. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee reviews a Saranac Laboratory proposal to study lung cancer and asbestosis, and asks members to join clinical and autopsy studies. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 10, 1955. The Asbestos Textile Institute hears that its Air Hygiene Committee is weighing outside studies of asbestos and heart and lung disease. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 24, 1955. J-M's medical director backs paying for more Lompoc men to be tested in the Public Health Service survey, partly for use in compensation cases. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 30, 1955. A Canadian J-M memo reports that Travelers found ten times more fibers than the company's own clinic in duplicate mill samples. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 15, 1955. A J-M draft bulletin offers district units a standard shop for cutting insulation fittings, with a dust collector and respirators for the workers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 2, 1955. An engineer reports asbestos dust above J-M's own limit in the Manville textile building and proposes changes to reach it. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 4, 1955. Lompoc's industrial hygienist reports on a battery-powered dust sampler the plant built, modeled on a U.S. Public Health Service instrument. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 9, 1955. The Asbestos Textile Institute rejects an autopsy study as ill-advised because it implies a link between asbestosis and cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 9, 1955. Asbestos Textile Institute members call an autopsy study "ill-advised" because it implies a link between asbestosis and cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 10, 1955. Company doctors meeting with the Asbestos Textile Institute's hygiene committee agree that asbestos workers need yearly examinations and chest X-rays. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 13, 1955. J-M orders "task teams" to evaluate every dust and fume control project and sets its own asbestos limit of one million fibers per cubic foot. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 8, 1955. J-M's medical director tells the Nashua plant that men with signs of lung disease are unaware of their X-ray results and should not be told yet. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 8, 1955. J-M's medical director finds 43 Nashua workers with occupational lung disease and estimates how many will become compensation claims. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 1955. J-M's medical director publishes his survey of 708 mill workers, reporting 91 percent with normal X-rays and few cases of asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 4, 1955. J-M's medical director tells the Toronto plant to move men with X-ray changes out of the dust carefully, without alarming workers or losing production. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 13, 1955. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation tells J-M it chose not to answer in writing an insulators' union official who reported members dying of lung disorders. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 7, 1955. Quebec mining association guests tell the textile makers' hygiene committee that cancer and heart disease are now the industry's major health questions. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 8, 1955. The Asbestos Textile Institute holds its annual meeting in New York, hears the Air Hygiene Committee's report, and elects its officers for 1956. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 4, 1955. Lompoc's industrial relations office asks J-M's lawyers how to defend a worker's dust claim and reports a trend of departing workers filing claims. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 21, 1955. S. R. Zimmerman sends a Lancaster doctor the Asbestos Textile Institute's minutes on the Quebec miners' report about asbestosis and cancer. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• November 28, 1955. Kenneth W. Smith and H. M. Jackson brief Johns-Manville's industrial relations managers on medical examinations, dust hazards and workmen's compensation costs. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 7, 1955. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee adopts a 1956 program of medical exams and dust control, and plans a dust count survey of members' plants. Read it (Motley 1000)

1956

• 1956. The Manufacturing Chemists' Association publishes model warning labels, including statements for products whose dust is "Harmful if Inhaled." Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 1, 1956. The Manville plant doctor reports 333 employees on the "No Dust" list and five deaths in two years attributed to occupational dust. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 3, 1956. J-M's Manville medical department lists 175 workers barred from dusty jobs for conditions "occupational in origin" and 145 more as a precaution. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 13, 1956. North American Asbestos confirms an Owens-Illinois order for 25 tons of amosite, raises its price, and warns that the grade is getting hard to obtain. Read it (Motley 1000)
• February 14, 1956. B. F. Stanton warns that dust at the Manville No. 4 roofing machine is "a serious health hazard" and that workers' threats to walk off are justified. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 21, 1956. Waukegan managers agree the plant doctor will tell men with possible lung disease of their condition only if they ask. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 1956. A doctor examining a J-M Redwood City worker for the company's lawyers finds lung fibrosis consistent with asbestosis caused by his asbestos exposure. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 5, 1956. B. F. Stanton reports that someone choked a dust sampler at the Manville stamping press, where workers had complained of dust, and urges severe discipline. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 5, 1956. Auditor S. C. Gehman reports to the Asbestos Textile Institute's treasurer on the Institute's books for the past three months. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 7, 1956. Dr. Kenneth Smith, J-M's medical director, tells the textile makers he has no evidence against a link between asbestosis and cancer, and urges an industry study. Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 8, 1956. The Asbestos Textile Institute reports that its Board of Governors has funded a preliminary survey toward action "designed to refute the work of Dr. Hueper." Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 14, 1956. An American Mutual engineer asks that his notes on an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting about asbestosis and cancer be kept confidential within the insurer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• April 10, 1956. J. A. Bettes asks that Raybestos-Manhattan take one company-wide position on Dr. Braun's survey of textile plants for the Asbestos Textile Institute's cancer study. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• May 1956. Governor Meyner refuses the resignation of C. George Krueger, the New Jersey labor official accused of taking a fee from Thomas A. Edison, Inc. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• May 16, 1956. New Jersey suspends C. George Krueger, the labor official who handled the Passaic plant's safety orders, over a $1,500 noise survey sold to Edison. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• May 21, 1956. C. Richard Walmer of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation sends the Asbestos Textile Institute a proposal for a study of lung cancer in asbestos textile workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 21, 1956. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes a $17,500 study for the Asbestos Textile Institute to determine whether lung cancer is related to asbestos exposure in textile plants. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 21, 1956. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes a $17,500 study for the asbestos textile industry to prove or disprove a link between asbestos and lung cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 4, 1956. Asbestos textile makers discuss a ruling linking asbestosis and lung cancer, but cannot agree whether to fund the Industrial Hygiene Foundation's lung cancer study. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 6, 1956. A J-M executive bulletin notes courts holding manufacturers liable for missing warnings and orders caution labels for combustible and flammable products. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 12, 1956. A J-M researcher reports on the Asbestos Textile Institute's Quebec mine tour, where Dr. Paul Cartier says he has found asbestosis only among mill workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 12, 1956. Owens-Illinois tells a consultant Saranac found no silicosis hazard in Kaylo and only a mild asbestosis reaction in animals. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 12, 1956. W. G. Hazard sends Ira Brought the Saranac Kaylo article, stressing that it found no silicosis hazard and only a mild asbestosis reaction in animals. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 12, 1956. W. G. Hazard notes that Ira Brought asked for a Kaylo health brochure and was told the only published material is Saranac's technical article. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 13, 1956. Raybestos-Manhattan's Martin Maier asks Dr. Paul Cartier at Thetford Mines to measure the dust and fiber content of a sample from the company's mill. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 14, 1956. An insurer's notes on three pipe covering contractors record a death claim and a handful of asbestosis claims among insulation workers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 18, 1956. Noting Manville plant sickness benefits running at 111 percent of premiums, Dr. Kenneth Smith asks for the insurer's help finding the diseases behind the losses. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 22, 1956. An insulation worker's widow wins a California asbestosis death award; Johns-Manville Sales Corporation is among the companies joined as defendants. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 25, 1956. A customer asks J-M about the health hazards of Colorlith dust; the Research Center explains the product is "really steam cured Transite" containing asbestos and silica. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 22, 1956. Asked by a customer's doctor about Thermobestos and Superex insulation, H. M. Jackson discusses silica and perlite dust but does not mention their asbestos. Read it (J-M chronology)
• August 31, 1956. B. W. Luttenberger thanks Dr. Spillman for discussing the Manheim plant's "medical problem" and promises him the company's file on the subject. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• September 5, 1956. The Asbestos Textile Institute's Air Hygiene Committee debates a proposed lung cancer study of asbestos workers and makes no recommendation. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 18, 1956. Answering a customer, H. M. Jackson says Colorlith contains silica and asbestos that can cause silicosis and asbestosis, and recommends dust sampling and respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 11, 1956. Owens-Corning's Boston office reports that the Boston insulators' local is x-raying members, finding lung shadows, and seeking to have the trade declared hazardous. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 16, 1956. Owens-Corning's legal department forwards the Boston union report and says the matter will be taken up with the union's international officers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 16, 1956. John D. Black tells W. L. Bowes that Owens-Corning will take the union's lung investigation up directly with its international officers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 18, 1956. Dr. Kenneth Smith recommends an X-ray machine for J-M's Stockton plant because workers there will handle "two potentially toxic dusts, silica and asbestos." Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 20, 1956. Ira Brought reports that the insulators' union officers have cut health references from their journal's minutes, and urges Owens-Corning to head off complaints through sales offices. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 26, 1956. D. W. Ladd urges Owens-Corning to examine insulators nationwide to show glass fibers are harmless, after the union journal reports deaths in the trade. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 26, 1956. J-M arranges to borrow New York State X-ray films of talcosis for a doctor to review before testifying in a case. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 30, 1956. Armstrong Cork tells its broker that insulators' asbestosis claims "are on the increase" and wonders whether insulation makers will help defend them. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 6, 1956. Daniel C. Braun of the Industrial Hygiene Foundation sends Hugh M. Jackson published reports linking asbestos to lung cancer, including cases in pipe insulators, for an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 6, 1956. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation's medical director sends H. M. Jackson published evidence linking asbestos to lung cancer, as "ammunition" for persuading the textile industry. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 18, 1956. A Travelers survey finds excessive dust and asbestos fiber at the Manville pipe department's swing saw and other jobs; H. M. Jackson recommends required respirators. Read it (J-M chronology)

1957

• 1957. Johns-Manville answers an insulation worker's interrogatories, saying it knew of no asbestosis among applicators and so had no reason to warn anyone outside its plants. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1957. Kenneth Lynch and colleagues report more lung tumors in mice that breathed asbestos dust than in controls, but call the result short of proof that asbestos causes cancer. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 7, 1957. Manville engineers ask for more dust control at the shingle forming machine, noting a disability claim from the "serious exposure" would cost about $18,000. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 15, 1957. The Manville union complains that textile workers are "eating more dust"; J-M agrees to a dust survey but advises giving the union no copy of the results. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 25, 1957. B. W. Luttenberger tells U.S. Rubber's hygienist that Manheim has had numerous asbestosis cases, now fewer since modern dust removal equipment was installed. Read it (Simpson Papers)
• February 6, 1957. Manville plant managers urge J-M to fund a New Jersey lung function laboratory to judge a growing number of claims; headquarters gives $2,500. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 19, 1957. Armstrong Cork's insurance department, handling an insulator's asbestosis claim, writes that "these asbestosis claims are on the increase." Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 7, 1957. Asbestos textile makers vote down a lung cancer study of their workers, some fearing it would "stir up a hornet's nest" and put the industry under suspicion. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 15, 1957. H. M. Jackson tells a customer that cutting and fitting J-M's 85% magnesia insulation may pose a health hazard from its asbestos content. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 18, 1957. J-M's Manville plant doctor asks for dust studies of the work areas of employees placed on the "No Dust" list after X-ray findings. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 1957. Speaking to life insurance underwriters, J-M's medical director says asbestos workers' lives are not shortened by their work. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 5, 1957. J-M's president orders the company's dust-control program widened to all industrial wastes, citing pollution cases and their legal and public relations costs. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 18, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith drafts a reply telling a customer there is no silicosis hazard in asbestos cement work, and says the General Attorney must approve all health statements to customers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 26, 1957. The Asbestos Textile Institute tells the Industrial Hygiene Foundation it has rejected its proposed lung cancer study, without giving reasons. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 30, 1957. An Owens-Illinois buyer sends the Technical Center amosite samples from North American Asbestos and asks whether another grade could replace scarce ones. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 1, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith proposes that J-M doctors record no diagnosis of suspected occupational disease, and not tell the worker, until a conference weighs the legal and compensation implications. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 9, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells a Canadian insulation firm that J-M's mines and mills are "developing no cases of asbestosis today." Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 9, 1957. Owens-Corning's consultant warns that the insulators' union is telling its members about asbestosis deaths and urges sales offices to watch for unrest in the locals. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 19, 1957. James Whitcomb Riley, a California insulator, is disabled by dust disease of the lungs; his 1961 death benefit award names J-M among his employers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 23, 1957. An Owens-Corning manager in California reports the union's asbestosis motion and a rumor that insulators will again seek extra pay for handling Fiberglas. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 1957. The Industrial Hygiene Digest abstracts a Danish study finding asbestosis and pleural calcification among long-time insulation workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 3, 1957. M. D. Burch thanks K. S. Johnson and says Owens-Corning will follow the union's asbestosis inquiry closely. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 10, 1957. A research pathologist reports to J-M's medical director that tissue from an unnamed case shows asbestosis and metastatic cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 10, 1957. J-M's Manville plant doctors review workers' abnormal chest X-rays and decide case by case whom to move, tell or report. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 21, 1957. Dr. Paul Gross plans to call asbestosis non-progressive in a manuscript and to send it to J-M's medical director for approval before submitting it. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 17, 1957. Frederick Le Grande, a construction worker with asbestos disease, sues Johns-Manville Products for failing to warn of the dangers of its asbestos products. Read it (Motley 1000)
• July 23, 1957. Manville plant doctors review more workers' abnormal chest X-rays, and the safety supervisor asks whether J-M is "facing a liability." Read it (Motley 1000)
• August 23, 1957. Dr. Daniel Braun tells J-M's Hugh Jackson that the medical literature points to a lung cancer link mainly among asbestos factory workers, not miners. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 1957. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation's report for the Quebec mines finds no excess lung cancer overall, but more lung cancer among miners with asbestosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 5, 1957. The Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee hears that the Quebec-sponsored lung cancer study is nearly finished, and compares dust sampling methods. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 6, 1957. The Asbestos Textile Institute holds its annual meeting; its president warns of shrinking markets for asbestos textiles. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 6, 1957. The first three months of J-M's X-ray conferences find eight cases of mixed pneumoconiosis among 109 Transite pipe workers at Manville. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 30, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells a fireproofing company that J-M's mines and mills have had no new asbestosis cases for many years. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 1, 1957. J-M cancels a planned dust survey at its Zelienople, Pennsylvania, plant to hold down expenses and conserve cash. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 11, 1957. An insurer's engineer predicts that two-thirds of spooling workers at UNARCO's Marshville textile plant would develop asbestosis after more than 15 years. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 22, 1957. J-M answers a sanitation testing laboratory's question whether Marinite 36 is toxic by pointing to Dr. Smith's reply and a sales brochure. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 1957. H. M. Jackson of Johns-Manville tells the asbestos textile makers that respirators are the last line of defense against asbestos dust. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 2, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Whirlpool that J-M's mineral wool insulation causes no lung fibrosis and is "innocuous." Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 5, 1957. Asbestos Textile Institute dust committee discusses respirators; H. M. Jackson's paper calls them the last line of defense and urges telling workers the hazard. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 30, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith accepts the Quebec miners' association's deletion of every reference linking asbestosis and lung cancer from the study to be published. Read it (J-M chronology)

1958

• 1958. An earlier Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on pneumonoconiosis treats silicosis as the main dust disease and gives asbestosis brief mention. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1958. Under oath, J-M says it knows of no asbestosis in insulation applicators, dates its first worker's case to 1946, and sees no reason to warn others. Read it (J-M chronology)
• 1958. Johns-Manville publishes "Asbestos: The Magic Mineral" for its 100th anniversary, praising asbestos with no word on its health effects. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1958. J-M sets out a dust abatement program for its Manville plants, applying a company limit of 1 million asbestos fibers per cubic foot, to cut compensation costs. Read it (J-M chronology)
• 1958. Dr. Samuel Einhorn swears that Frederick Le Grand's asbestosis was not diagnosed until February 1956. Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1958. The U.S. Public Health Service reports pneumoconiosis in diatomite workers, worst where the dust holds cristobalite, and urges caution labels on such products. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 2, 1958. Judge Reynier Wortendyke rules on J-M's objections to an insulation worker's interrogatories, holding that J-M's warnings to its own employees are irrelevant to his case. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 6, 1958. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Hamilton Manufacturing that Colorlith board contains silica and asbestos, both hazardous with long exposure. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 24, 1958. Manville plant doctors agree to route workers who need dust-restricted jobs through the Safety Department before they return to work. Read it (J-M chronology)
• January 24, 1958. Finding lung disease where none was expected, Dr. Kenneth Smith has J-M test finished products; the Research Center finds quartz in Transite pipe and cristobalite in fire brick. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 5, 1958. At Manville plant health conferences, J-M doctors debate whether to tell workers of abnormal X-rays; one says "We take the X-rays for our own protection." Read it (Motley 1000)
• March 13, 1958. H. M. Jackson tells Brush Beryllium Company that J-M's Cerafelt is not toxic and may only irritate the skin. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 18, 1958. H. M. Jackson tells lawyers handling a worker's asbestosis claim that J-M's experience shows asbestosis stops progressing once exposure ends. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 18, 1958. J-M drafts a caution label for Marinite board dust but decides against it, partly over competition, relying instead on a line about dust control in its instruction book. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 15, 1958. Harry Burris's wife says he was never told his X-rays showed fibrosis; J-M's doctors agree he has asbestosis first diagnosed in 1947. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 28, 1958. Aetna's engineers survey dust at Owens-Illinois's Kaylo plant in Berlin, New Jersey, find a "dangerously high" count at a saw, and recommend respirators and exhaust systems. Read it (Motley 1000)
• May 6, 1958. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells A. O. Smith Corporation that J-M's rock wool contains no free silica and causes no lung disease, only occasional skin irritation. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 1958. The industry-funded Quebec miners study is published, concluding asbestos miners have no excess lung cancer, without the draft's finding on asbestosis and lung cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 17, 1958. J-M's medical director sends Raybestos-Manhattan's insurer the industry-funded Quebec study to defend a claim linking asbestosis and lung cancer. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 1958. The Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee discusses the Quebec-sponsored study finding no excess lung cancer among asbestos miners, and plans to share it with plant doctors. Read it (Motley 1000)
• September 5, 1958. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks that results of Lompoc workers' lung tests not be reported until J-M discusses them, and that test subjects not disturb contract talks. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 5, 1958. J-M's standard practices manual lists the 5 million particle limit for asbestos and a company standard of 1 million asbestos fibers per cubic foot. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 15, 1958. A J-M plant doctor examines retired Manville worker Walter Burek, finds extensive lung disease, and asks whether the company will accept responsibility for his care. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 21, 1958. In answers for LeGrande v. Johns-Manville, J-M says about twelve of its employees have contracted asbestosis since 1946 and it never ventilated applicators' work. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 22, 1958. Frederick Le Grand swears he did not learn until February 1956 that his illness was asbestosis from his work. Read it (Motley 1000)
• October 30, 1958. Frederick Le Grand answers J-M's interrogatories, saying J-M should have warned users and that many men in his union local have asbestosis. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 1958. The Trudeau Foundation compiles the publications of the Saranac Laboratory from 1885 to 1958, with a history of the laboratory. Read it (Motley 1000)
• November 5, 1958. Dr. Harold Goldberg swears he suspected pneumoconiosis in Frederick Le Grand as early as 1955 but gave no diagnosis then. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 15, 1958. Planning J-M's defense in LeGrande, its lawyer notes a 1954 manual warning applicators not to breathe dust and an X-ray study of applicators never carried out. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 30, 1958. Hugh Jackson tells J-M plant managers how to apply exposure limits to dusts that mix asbestos or silica with other materials. Read it (J-M chronology)

1959

• 1959. H. M. Jackson of J-M tells the Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee that the 5 million particle limit is "a carry over from the quartz industry." Read it (Motley 1000)
• 1959. Manville plant dust surveys count particles and asbestos fibers at hundreds of stations and flag those above the allowable limit as needing control. Read it (J-M chronology)
• 1959. Johns-Manville settles Frederick Le Grande's suit for $35,000, with his employer's insurer, Travelers, waiving its lien. Read it (Motley 1000)
• January 9, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith outlines for Lompoc workers' briefing that J-M knew from the early 1940s its diatomaceous earth dust caused disabling lung disease. Read it (J-M chronology)
• February 19, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Detroit Edison that Thermobestos dust up to about 50 million particles per cubic foot would hold no excess asbestos. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 5, 1959. The Asbestos Textile Institute's hygiene committee hears that one member's insurer wants a far stricter dust program, and compares members' X-ray and examination practices. Read it (J-M chronology)
• March 26, 1959. After asking six other companies, J-M's Dr. David DuBow recommends continuing to release employees' X-rays to their own doctors with their consent. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 2, 1959. J-M's insurance brokers confirm that Travelers has added no asbestosis surcharge to J-M's workmen's compensation rates. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 8, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks the Marrero plant for the maker's health information on barium metaborate, a new compound for fungus-resistant asbestos shingles. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 8, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells a mother her son's rash from J-M rock wool batts was a mechanical skin irritation, not an allergy. Read it (J-M chronology)
• April 27, 1959. J-M's assistant general attorney tells a lawyer that J-M rock wool contains no asbestos or free silica and causes no lung fibrosis. Read it (J-M chronology)
• May 26, 1959. At J-M's Manville friction materials department, dust counts at a bandsaw run to more than double the limit, and respirators are recommended for three machines. Read it (J-M chronology)
• June 10, 1959. Members of the Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee report no progression in chest X-rays of recently hired workers. Read it (Motley 1000)
• June 22, 1959. H. M. Jackson tells a Navy shipyard hygienist he knows of only two asbestosis cases among insulation installers, and that brief heavy exposures on ships are poorly understood. Read it (J-M chronology)
• July 14, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith finds lung disease on 21 of 30 Pittsburg plant X-rays and warns of "very serious financial exposure" if the cases progress. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 25, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells an Army arsenal that 85% magnesia's hazard is minimal and that he knows of no lung hazard among insulation installers. Read it (J-M chronology)
• September 29, 1959. H. M. Jackson approves setting Waukegan's dust limits for asbestos-cement products from the share of each substance in the raw material mix. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 16, 1959. Weighing dust collectors for its mill dryers, a Canadian J-M manager writes that dust in the town of Asbestos is a public relations problem as well as a possible health hazard. Read it (J-M chronology)
• October 26, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Michigan's occupational health division that long inhalation of the asbestos in Marinite may damage the lungs, and advises dust control. Read it (J-M chronology)
• November 5, 1959. Asked to tell a customer that asbestos is no more hazardous than limestone, Dr. Kenneth Smith refuses, calling it "a very definite health hazard when improperly handled." Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 1, 1959. Southern Asbestos Company transfers its business to H. K. Porter, which assumes all of its debts and liabilities. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 3, 1959. The Asbestos Textile Institute's dust committee discusses dust collectors, dust samplers and plant safety, and plans an environmental health survey. Read it (Motley 1000)
• December 15, 1959. J-M drops its plan to sell asbestos for coal mine rock dusting after Bureau of Mines tests find it cakes more than limestone. Read it (J-M chronology)
• December 21, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells General Motors and Firestone that long inhalation of asbestos may cause lung changes but J-M mines and mills have had no new asbestosis cases for years. Read it (J-M chronology)